Rel: August 7, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0638 and CL-2025-0639
M.J.
v.
Macon County Department of Human Resources
CL-2025-0751 and CL-2025-0760
M.L.
v.
Macon County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Macon Juvenile Court
(JU-22-22.02 and JU-22-14.03)
BOWDEN, Judge.
CL-2025-0638, CL-2025-0639, CL-2025-0751, and CL-2025-0760
M.J. ("the mother") and M.L. ("the father") appeal from judgments
of the Macon Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating their
parental rights to M.A.J. and H.L. ("the children"). We hold that the
father's appeals are untimely and have failed to invoke the appellate
jurisdiction of this court. We also hold that the juvenile court could have
reasonably found that the evidence regarding the mother's inability to
consistently implement parenting skills clearly and convincingly
established that she had failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the
needs of the children in accordance with an agreement with the Macon
County Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). The juvenile court
could have also reasonably found that the evidence regarding the lack of
beneficial bond between the mother and the children clearly and
convincingly established that maintaining the status quo was not a viable
alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights. Furthermore,
there is no support for the mother's argument that the juvenile court
improperly considered the children's best interests or her rehabilitation
efforts when it determined that there were no viable alternatives to
terminating her parental rights. Therefore, we dismiss the father's
appeals for a lack of appellate jurisdiction and affirm the juvenile court's
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judgments insofar as they terminate the mother's parental rights to the
children.
Background and Procedural History
In May 2022, DHR received a report from the Georgia Department
of Family and Children Services indicating that the mother had tested
positive for marijuana when giving birth to M.A.J. As a result, the mother
was found to be "indicated" for child abuse/neglect. See § 26-14-8(a)(1),
Ala. Code 1975. Three months later, DHR investigated a report regarding
domestic violence, drug use, and inadequate supervision of the children
in the family home. The mother was then found to be "indicated" for
neglect and inadequate supervision of the children. DHR implemented
an out-of-home safety plan for the children and placed them with their
maternal grandmother. However, the maternal grandmother did not
have stable housing and eventually moved into the family home with the
parents. The children were then placed in foster care with S.G. ("the
foster mother"), where they have remained since August 2022.
On December 18, 2024, DHR filed petitions to terminate the
parental rights of the mother and the father to the children. DHR alleged,
among other things, that the mother was unable to care for the children
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because of an emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency and
that the father had been convicted of and imprisoned for a felony and had
failed to maintain consistent contact or communication with the children.
The foster mother filed a verified motion to intervene in the matters on
April 21, 2025, which was granted. The foster mother subsequently filed
a motion for custody of the children and requested that the juvenile court
terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.
The juvenile court conducted a trial on DHR's petitions and the
foster mother's motion for custody on July 8, 2025, and July 9, 2025. The
juvenile court entered judgments on July 23, 2025, terminating the
parental rights of the mother and the father and awarding "legal and
physical care, custody, and control" of the children to the foster mother
"for her to pursue adoption of [the children]." Among other things, the
juvenile court made the following findings:
"As it pertains to the mother … the court commends her
for attempting to comply with most of the services offered by
[DHR]. But the Court is concerned about the mother's current
pregnancy that has caused her to be noncompliant with her
required mental health medication regimen. It is undisputed
that the mother has a history of mental illness and now she is
expecting another child, which based on the mother's
testimony, she must raise with little to no support from this
[expected] child's father. The mother previously had trouble
coping with raising [the children] when [they] were in her care
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and custody. It was apparent from the mother's demeanor and
testimony at the hearing that she would have very little
support, with the raising of three young children, and such
circumstances would prove to be very stressful for the mother.
The Court finds that the mother's untreated mental illness
would render her unable to care for the needs of [the children],
in her home, without a safety plan being in place, with in
home services being warranted, according to the testimony of
Licensed Psychologist, Dr. Bridget Smith, who performed
psychological evaluations on the mother … and [the children].
Dr. Smith further found that when she observed the mother
with the children during the mother's supervised visitations,
the mother appeared distant, uninvolved, tired, lethargic,
bored and demonstrated no positive affect towards the
children, and that the mother appeared depressed.
"….
"… Based on the application of … case law, the Court
finds that maintaining the status quo is not a viable
alternative under the facts before this Court.
"The Court finds that at some point, the need for
permanency and stability for [the children], overcomes any
good faith but unsuccessful attempts by the mother to become
a suitable parent. …
"….
"The Court finds that severing the ties between [the
children] and the current foster mother is contrary to the best
interest of [the children], and based on the findings discussed
above, there are more than one other ground to terminate the
rights of both the mother … and the father … so that [the
children] can be adopted by [the foster mother] …."
The mother filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court's
judgments on August 2, 2025. The mother subsequently filed a motion to
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alter, amend, or vacate the judgments. DHR filed a postjudgment motion
on August 6, 2025, arguing that the judgments were not final because the
juvenile court had not awarded "permanent legal custody" of the children
in compliance with § 12-15-320(b), Ala. Code 1975.1 The mother
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss her appeals, in part, because she
wanted to "preserv[e] her right to refile an appeal following the entry of
a final judgment in the [j]uvenile [c]ourt."
After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order on August 17,
2025, granting DHR's postjudgment motion and noting that it had
inadvertently omitted the word "permanent" when it awarded "legal and
physical custody, care, and control" of the children to the foster mother.
The juvenile court stated in that order that it had lost jurisdiction to
1
"If the juvenile court determines that the parents of a child
are unwilling or unable to act as parents and terminates their
parental rights, it may do the following:
".…
"(2) Transfer or continue the permanent
legal custody of the child to the petitioner who,
after study by [DHR], is found to be able to
properly receive and care for the child."
§ 12-15-320(b).
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dispose of the mother's postjudgment motion when she filed her notice of
appeal.2
On August 21, 2025, the mother filed another motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the judgments that was virtually identical to her first
postjudgment motion. The father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the judgments on August 22, 2025. After a hearing, the juvenile court
entered an order purporting to deny those postjudgment motions. The
father filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 2025.
2We note that the filing of a notice of appeal from a final judgment
does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on timely filed
postjudgment motions.
"As a general rule, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the
juvenile court of jurisdiction over the case, except as to
collateral matters. See S.H. v. Macon Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 195 So. 3d 311, 313 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). As a narrow
exception to that rule, however, a juvenile court retains
jurisdiction to receive and rule on a timely postjudgment
motion to amend a judgment that is filed by a party after the
filing of a notice of appeal. See Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d
507, 510 (Ala. 1987); Herring v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 279 So. 3d 1151, 1160 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)."
A.R. v. T.R., 375 So. 3d 1259, 1262-63 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).
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The Finality of the Judgments
As we have noted, DHR argued in its postjudgment motion, and the
mother appeared to agree, that the July 23, 2025, judgments were not
final because the juvenile court had not awarded "permanent legal
custody" of the children in compliance with § 12-15-320(b). If the
judgments were nonfinal, the mother's notice of appeal would have
divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction to enter any subsequent orders,
and the parties' respective appeals would be due to be dismissed. See
Erskine v. Guin, 384 So. 3d 583, 598 (Ala. 2023). Thus, we address the
finality of the judgments before addressing the parties' arguments.
We have stated that when "there has been no disposition of the
permanent legal custody of the child or children at issue in accordance
with § 12-15-320(b), this court will dismiss any appeal from that
judgment as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment." S.H. v. Macon
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 195 So. 3d 311, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). The
term "permanent legal custody" is not defined in § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975. However, the terms "permanent legal custody" and "legal
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CL-2025-0638, CL-2025-0639, CL-2025-0751, and CL-2025-0760
custody" are used interchangeably in §§ 12-15-320 and -321, Ala. Code
1975.3
When entering a judgment terminating parental rights, the best
practice for juvenile courts is to track the language of § 12-15-320(b) and
specifically award "permanent legal custody" of the child at issue to an
appropriate party. Although the juvenile court did not use the phrase
"permanent legal custody" in the judgments, the juvenile court awarded
"legal and physical custody, care, and control" of the children to the foster
mother "for her to pursue adoption of [the children]." Even if that could
be construed as a nonpermanent custody award, which we do not think
that it can be, we have said that "a 'temporary custody award' or a
'temporary order' as to custody is a 'final' custody award or judgment."
T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Furthermore,
the juvenile court simultaneously awarded custody of the children to the
3Compare Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-320(b) ("If the juvenile court
determines that the parents of a child are unwilling or unable to act as
parents and terminates their parental rights, it may do the following: (1)
Transfer or continue the permanent legal custody of the child to the
Department of Human Resources …." (emphasis added)), with § 12-15-321 ("Where the juvenile court has terminated the parental rights and
has placed legal custody of the child with the Department of Human
Resources …." (emphasis added)).
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foster mother when it terminated the parental rights of the parents,
which we have described as an "immediate, permanent, and irrevocable"
disposition. K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910,
914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of these cases, we
hold that the juvenile court complied with the requirements of § 12-15-320(b) when it awarded "legal and physical custody, care, and control" of
the children to the foster mother. As a result, the juvenile court's July 23,
2025, judgments were final.
The Father's Appeals -- CL-2025-0751 and CL-2025-0760
Although the parties have not raised the issue, we can take notice
of whether the father's appeals are timely because the timeliness of his
appeals implicates this court's appellate jurisdiction. See Rule 2(a)(1),
Ala. R. App. P.; see also Gunnison-Mack v. Alabama State Pers. Bd., 923
So. 2d 319, 320 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (" ' "[J]urisdictional matters are of
such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even
ex mero motu." ' " (citations omitted)).
The juvenile court entered the judgments on July 23, 2025. The
father had 14 days from that date to file a postjudgment motion, see Rule
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CL-2025-0638, CL-2025-0639, CL-2025-0751, and CL-2025-0760
1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P., or a notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App.
P. The 14-day period within which the father was required to file a notice
of appeal was suspended when the mother timely filed her first
postjudgment motion on August 5, 2025. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.;
see also Matherly v. Citizens Bank, 375 So. 3d 776, 782 (Ala. 2022)(" 'The
running of the time for taking an appeal is tolled as to all parties, not just
the one who filed the post-judgment motion.' " (citation omitted)). The
mother's first postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on
August 19, 2025, after it had been pending for 14 days. See Rule 1(B),
Ala. R. Juv. P. Thus, the father had 14 days from that date, or until
September 2, 2025, to file a notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App.
P.
The August 17, 2025, order did not give the father another 14-day
period within which to file a postjudgment motion. As we have explained,
the judgments were final. By adding the word "permanent" to the custody
award, the juvenile court merely corrected a clerical error in the
judgments. See Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Thus, the August 17, 2025,
order related back to the date of the judgments. See A.T. v. D.M., 265 So.
3d 294, 299 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). As a result, the father had 14 days from
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the date of the judgments -- not 14 days from the date of the August 17,
2025, order -- to file a postjudgment motion. See Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv.
P. The father did not file a postjudgment motion until August 22, 2025.
Hence, the father's postjudgment motion was untimely and did not affect
the timeliness of his appeals. See F.G v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 988
So. 2d 555, 557 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(holding that the parents'
postjudgment motion that was filed 30 days after the entry of the
termination-of-parental-rights judgment was untimely and did not
suspend the time for filing their notice of appeal).
Likewise, the mother's second postjudgment motion did not affect
the timeliness of the father's appeals because it was an impermissible,
successive postjudgment motion. See BancTrust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d
106, 109 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).
Because the father did not file a notice of appeal until September 8,
2025, his appeals are untimely and, thus, have failed to invoke the
jurisdiction of this court. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pettway,
401 So. 3d 298, 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)("This court has no appellate
jurisdiction over an untimely appeal."). Therefore, we dismiss the father's
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appeals for a lack of appellate jurisdiction. See Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App.
P.
The Mother's Appeals -- CL-2025-0638 and CL-2025-0639
Standard of Review
"The ore tenus rule applies to a termination of parental rights
case." In re Colbert, 474 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). Under
the ore tenus rule, " '[t]he juvenile court's judgment based on ...
ore tenus evidence is presumed to be correct and will not be overturned
absent a showing that the judgment is plainly and palpably
wrong.' " Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. T.S., 218 So. 3d 1252,
1261 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)(citation omitted). " 'The presumption of
correctness, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where there is
insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its
judgment.' " Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala.
2005) (citation omitted). Evidence is insufficient to sustain a judgment
when it fails to meet the "clear and convincing" standard of evidence. C.C.
v. C.T., 375 So. 3d 38, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)("This Court will reverse
' "a juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights only if the
record shows that the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing
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evidence." ' " (quoting S.P. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 315 So.
3d 1126, 1130 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020))).
" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate
affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
finding in the context of a case in which the
ultimate standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing evidence is
evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to
clearly and convincingly establish the fact sought
to be proved. Even if an appellate court in
considering the evidence of record would reach its
own conclusion that the evidence presented does
not clearly and convincingly establish the fact
sought to be proved, it is not for that court to act
upon its own factual determination but to
determine instead whether the fact-finder below
reasonably could have made a different finding
based on the same evidence." '
"Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d [767,] 776 [(Ala. 2008)] (quoting
KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInish, 47 So. 3d 749, 761 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2006)(Murdock, J., concurring in the result))."
Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022).
Analysis
I. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the mother was unable
or unwilling to discharge her responsibilities to and for the children
The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the
grounds to terminate her parental rights. The mother specifically argues
that there was no evidence indicating that her mental or other condition
14
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rendered her unable to care for the children at the time of the
termination-of-parental-rights trial. We disagree.
A juvenile court may terminate parental rights
"[i]f the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing
evidence … that the parents of a child are unable or unwilling
to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that
the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable
to properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition
is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future …."
§ 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975. A juvenile court is required to consider a
list of nonexclusive factors when determining whether a parent is unable
or unwilling to discharge responsibilities to and for their child and, thus,
whether to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court relied on the
following factors, among others, when it terminated the mother's
parental rights:
"(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or mental
deficiency of the parent … of a duration or nature as to render
the parent unable to care for the needs of the child.
"….
"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his or her
circumstances to meet the needs of the child in accordance
with agreements reached, including agreements reached with
local departments of human resources or licensed childplacing agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial
review."
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§ 12-15-319(a).
One of the reunification goals agreed to by DHR and the mother
was for the mother to consistently implement parenting skills and
practices during supervised visits with the children. In July 2024, the
mother completed a parenting class designed to teach parents how to
listen, empathize, and redirect children from dangerous or harmful
behaviors. However, DHR presented evidence during the termination-ofparental-rights trial indicating that, even after completing the parenting
class, the mother was disengaged from the children and was unable to
consistently implement parenting skills during supervised visits.
Miyosha Curry, a DHR employee who had supervised the mother's visits
with the children, testified that the mother had not improved her ability
to engage with the children during supervised visits. Curry testified that
the mother was more reactive than proactive during visits and that the
mother was "usually real quiet, nonverbal" during visits. Curry further
testified that the mother "kind of like … zones out a bit" during visits and
paid attention to Curry rather than the children. Angelique Woods, a
DHR employee, testified that she was concerned with the mother's
"inattention to the kids" and that the mother would let the children "run
16
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off" during supervised visits. Woods also testified that DHR employees
"had to intervene on several visits with the kids, screaming, kicking,
throwing over tables, throwing over chairs. We[, DHR employees,] have
had to try to stop the kids from hitting [the mother]." Dr. Bridget Finlen
Smith, a psychologist, testified that she had observed a visit between the
mother and the children in October 2024. Dr. Smith testified that she
"didn't see a lot of skill demonstrated [from the mother] on how to interact
with children and try to prevent tantrums or how to redirect when they
are upset or how to be reactive" during that visit.
The mother testified that she had been diagnosed with "bipolar
depression" during one of her hospitalizations at East Central Alabama
Mental Health Center. Dr. Smith testified that she had performed a
psychological evaluation of the mother in September 2024 and had
diagnosed the mother with "bipolar 1" disorder, in partial remission, and
posttraumatic stress disorder. According to Dr. Smith,
"[b]ipolar [disorder] is a very serious mood disorder. It's
chronic. …
"Bipolar 1 [disorder] is the more serious of the bipolar
disorders. Bipolar 2 [disorder] would often be people that are
fairly high functioning in the community that might be on
medication and lots of people might not know that they have
bipolar [disorder].
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"Bipolar 1 [disorder] generally is considered [to be]
people who may be at high risk for hospitalization, who have
more extreme mood swings; and when they are manic, may be
quite impulsive and use poor judgment."
Dr. Smith testified that, when she observed a visit between the
mother and the children in October 2024, the mother "appeared
depressed and flat and not interactive with the children." Dr. Smith
testified that, "if [the mother] was in a depressive episode, that would
have been [a typical] interaction between her and her children" but that,
"[i]f she was not in a depressive episode, then it would have been a clear
sign … of [a] lack of intuitive parenting, [a] lack of bonding and affection,
a lack … of [an] awareness of what your children need when you are
interacting with them."
We acknowledge that there was some evidence in the record
indicating that, during her supervised visits with the children, the
mother had been able to implement some of the parenting skills that she
had learned. However, it is not the role of this court to reweigh the
evidence. D.M. v. Dale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 413 So. 3d 750, 752 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2024). Based on our review of the evidence in the record, the
juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that DHR had clearly and
convincingly established that the mother had demonstrated a lack of
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effort to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the children
because she had been unable or unwilling to consistently implement
parenting skills and practices during supervised visits with the children.4
II. Whether there was sufficient evidence that there were no viable
alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights
The mother argues that leaving the children in foster care was a
viable alternative to terminating her parental rights. We disagree.
"[A]s a general rule, ' "maintaining a child in indefinite foster care
is not a viable alternative to termination of parental rights." ' " B.T. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 432 So. 3d 32, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)
(citations omitted). "[M]aintaining the status quo is a viable option to
terminating parental rights when the parent and the child enjoy a
relationship with some beneficial aspects that should be preserved such
that it would be in the child's best interests to continue that relationship."
S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).
At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights trial, the children
had been in foster care for nearly three years, and the evidence indicated
4We pretermit discussion of the other factors on which the juvenile
court could have based its decision to terminate the mother's parental
rights. See K.A.P. v. D.P., 11 So. 3d 812, 819 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
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that the foster mother was willing and able to adopt the children. The
foster mother testified that she had bonded with the children and
considered them to be part of her family.
The evidence also indicated that the children did not have a
beneficial relationship with the mother. Dr. Smith testified that, during
the supervised visit that she observed in October 2024, the children did
not treat the mother as their mother, the mother was distant and
disengaged, and the children showed minimal affection toward the
mother. Woods testified that "right now there appears to be no bond with
[the mother]." Woods also testified that the children are not generally
uncontrollable but that, "[w]hen the children are in the visits with [the
mother], they are out of control." Curry also testified that she had
observed the children acting out of control only during the mother's
supervised visits.
Based on that evidence, the juvenile court could have reasonably
concluded that DHR had presented clear and convincing evidence
establishing that maintaining the status quo was not a viable alternative
to terminating the mother's parental rights.
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III. Whether the juvenile court erred by considering the best interests
of the children and the mother's rehabilitation efforts in its viablealternatives analysis
The mother argues that the juvenile court improperly considered
the best interests of the children and her rehabilitation efforts when it
determined that there were no viable alternatives to terminating her
parental rights. Specifically, the mother argues that the "children's need
for permanency should not outweigh rehabilitation efforts of DHR and
[that] the sufficiency of DHR's rehabilitation efforts is not relevant to
whether no viable alternative exists" to terminating her parental rights.
The mother's brief, p. 65.
The mother relies exclusively on former Chief Justice Parker's
special writing in Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d at 1064-69 -- the purpose of
which was to provide "a suggested framework" regarding terminating a
parent's parental rights -- as the basis for her argument. Id. at 1064
(emphasis added). However, no other Justice joined that writing, so it has
limited persuasive authority. Cf. Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So.
2d 842, 845 (Ala. 2001)("The precedential value of the reasoning in a
plurality opinion is questionable at best.").
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The main opinion in Ex parte Bodie, which was joined by eight of
the supreme court's nine Justices, favorably cited propositions of law
indicating that it had considered the best interests of the children in its
viable-alternatives analysis. 377 So. 3d at 1063 (" '[M]aintaining a child
in foster care indefinitely is not a viable alternative to termination of
parental rights.' … 'At some point [a child's] need for permanency must
outweigh repeated efforts by [the Department of Human Resources] to
rehabilitate [a parent].' " (citations omitted)). Furthermore, our supreme
court noted in its viable-alternatives analysis that, in addition to
abstaining from drug use, H.P., the mother in that case, would have had
to address her lack of suitable housing and employment before being able
to properly care for her children and held that "the juvenile court could
have reasonably determined that the time frame for adequate
rehabilitation was indefinite." Id. Thus, in Ex parte Bodie, our supreme
court considered the best interests of the children in that case and H.P.'s
rehabilitation efforts when determining whether there were viable
alternatives to terminating H.P.'s parental rights. Therefore, the
mother's argument that, based on Ex parte Bodie, the juvenile court
22
CL-2025-0638, CL-2025-0639, CL-2025-0751, and CL-2025-0760
improperly considered the best interests of the children and the mother's
rehabilitation efforts in its viable-alternatives analysis is not persuasive.
Conclusion
The father's appeals are untimely and, thus, have failed to invoke
the appellate jurisdiction of this court. The juvenile court could have
reasonably found that the evidence regarding the mother's inability to
consistently implement parenting skills clearly and convincingly
established that she had failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the
needs of the children in accordance with an agreement with DHR. The
juvenile court could have also reasonably found that the evidence
regarding the lack of a beneficial bond between the mother and the
children clearly and convincingly established that maintaining the status
quo was not a viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental
rights. Furthermore, there is no support for the mother's argument that
the juvenile court improperly considered either the children's best
interests or her rehabilitation efforts when it determined that there were
no viable alternatives to terminating her parental rights.
23
CL-2025-0638, CL-2025-0639, CL-2025-0751, and CL-2025-0760
Therefore, we dismiss the father's appeals for a lack of appellate
jurisdiction and affirm the juvenile court's judgments insofar as they
terminate the mother's parental rights to the children.
CL-2025-0638 -- AFFIRMED.
CL-2025-0639 -- AFFIRMED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.
Fridy, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
CL-2025-0751 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
CL-2025-0760 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
24