NUMBER 13-26-00125-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CITY OF FALFURRIAS, Appellant,
v.
JAVIER TOVIAS AND
HECTOR GARZA, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 398TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca
Appellant the City of Falfurrias (the City) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its
plea to the jurisdiction and motion for traditional summary judgment. Appellees Javier
Tovias and Hector Garza sued the City under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) after a
vehicular accident with an on-duty police officer. By two issues, the City contends that the trial court should have granted its plea to jurisdiction because (1) it had no timely notice
of appellee’s claim, and (2) its immunity is retained under the TTCA’s emergency
response exception. We reverse and render.
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of December 3, 2016, City police officer Gilbert Guzman Jr.
responded to a distress call reporting that another officer was being threatened with a
knife. Guzman activated the emergency lights on his vehicle and began driving south on
Business 281 in Falfurrias. As he approached West Adams Street, the traffic light was
red, so Guzman activated his siren and moved into the northbound lanes to go around
the vehicles ahead of him which were stopped at the light. Before Guzman traversed the
intersection, the light turned green, and as he crossed West Adams Street, he moved
back into the southbound lanes of Business 281 to avoid northbound vehicles which were
stopped at the light. At this time, Tovias was approaching the intersection travelling north
in his Chevrolet truck, with Garza as a passenger. Shortly after Guzman crossed the
intersection, Tovias turned left from the northbound lanes, attempting to pull into a parking
lot on the west side of Business 281. The vehicles collided.
Appellees filed suit on November 28, 2018, alleging in part that they suffered
injuries as a result of Guzman negligently driving the police vehicle at issue. They named
the City and Guzman as defendants. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion
for traditional summary judgment alleging the TTCA’s waiver of governmental immunity
does not apply because: (1) the City had no formal or actual notice of appellees’ claim,
see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.101; and (2) appellees’ claim falls within the
TTCA’s emergency response exception. See id. § 101.055(2).
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Evidence attached to the City’s plea included a video and audio recording of the
incident taken from Guzman’s bodycam. It also included a written police crash report
stating that appellees “failed to yield right of way turning left,” Tovias “had been drinking
and refused to provide a sample of his blood or breath,” 1 and three individuals were taken
by “AirMed EMS” to local hospitals. The crash report does not indicate that Guzman was
in any way at fault for the collision. The City also produced affidavits by its assistant police
chief and its city secretary, each stating there was nothing in the crash report “which either
did or does lead me to hold a subjective belief that either [Guzman] or the [City] was
responsible for the motor vehicle accident that occurred.” The secretary further averred
that “a claim was made against [Tovias's] insurance company for damage done to the
[City] vehicle” and “[Tovias’s] insurance company paid for the cost of repairing the [City]
vehicle.” 2
Appellees filed a response to the plea arguing in part that the City had “actual
notice” of their TTCA claim for the following reasons:
• Officer Guzman was acting in the course and scope of his employment.
• The accident involved serious injuries and vehicle damage, all
documented in the Crash Report and EMS records.
• The Crash Report . . . indicated Officer Guzman was operating his
vehicle southbound in a northbound lane and failed to yield the right-ofway. This contradicts the City’s claim that Tovias was solely at fault.
• The City’s own Assistant Chief and City Secretary acknowledged the
collision in their affidavits, demonstrating knowledge of the event and
the City’s involvement.
1 At the plea hearing, the City’s counsel noted that no citation for driving while intoxicated was
issued as a result of the collision.
2 Appellees did not object to any of the affidavit testimony.
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Appellees further argued the emergency response exception did not apply because:
• Officer Guzman drove southbound in the northbound lane of a major
highway at a high rate of speed (well above the posted limit), while
weaving through traffic.
• He ran a red light at the intersection of Business U.S. 281 and West
Adams Street.
• He failed to yield to northbound traffic with a green light and struck
Plaintiff’s vehicle head-on.
No additional evidence was attached to the response. The City filed a reply to the
response, and appellees filed a sur-reply, neither of which contained any additional
evidence.
After a hearing on June 17, 2025, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. This accelerated interlocutory appeal
followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing a governmental unit to appeal an interlocutory
order denying its plea to jurisdiction). 3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we
review de novo. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2020). The
plaintiff has the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing the trial court has
jurisdiction. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019); see
Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2022) (explaining a plea to the jurisdiction
may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both). We construe
the pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as
3 Appellees have not filed a brief to assist us in the resolution of this appeal.
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true the factual allegations in the pleadings. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004). When jurisdictional facts are challenged, our
standard of review mirrors that of a summary judgment. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018). If the evidence raises a fact issue regarding
jurisdiction, the plea cannot be granted, and a fact finder must resolve the issue. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 227–28. But if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the
plea must be determined as a matter of law. Id. at 228; Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012).
B. Applicable Law
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
over suits against political subdivisions of the State, such as the City, unless immunity
has been clearly and unambiguously waived by the legislature. City of Houston v. Hou.
Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018) (noting the doctrine is
referred to as “governmental immunity” when relating to subdivisions of the State); see
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. 2006) (“[N]o state can be sued in her
own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.”
(quoting Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847))); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 311.034. Immunity from suit is properly asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction. See
City of Houston, 549 S.W.3d at 576; Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d
371, 374 (Tex. 2006).
The TTCA clearly and unambiguously waives governmental immunity to suits for
damages “proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an
employee acting within his scope of employment” if the damages “arise[] from the
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operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle” and “the employee would be personally liable
to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021(1), .025.
But “[s]tatutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are
jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.” TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 311.034; see Colquitt v. Brazoria County, 324 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam)
(noting compliance with TTCA notice provisions is jurisdictional). And a governmental unit
is generally “entitled to receive notice” of a TTCA claim made against it “not later than six
months after the day that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 101.101(a). Such formal notice “must reasonably describe: (1) the
damage or injury claimed; (2) the time and place of the incident; and (3) the incident.” Id.
However, the formal notice requirement under TTCA section 101.101(a) “do[es] not apply
if the governmental unit has actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has
received some injury, or that the claimant’s property has been damaged.” Id.
§ 101.101(c). 4
Moreover, the TTCA’s waiver of immunity does not apply to a claim arising
from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or
reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the
laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of
such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference
or reckless disregard for the safety of others.
4 A governmental unit has “actual notice” under this statute if it has “knowledge of (1) a death, injury,
or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.” Reyes v. Jefferson County, 601 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). Knowledge of fault is established when the governmental unit has “subjective awareness connecting alleged governmental conduct to causation of an alleged injury to person or property in the manner ultimately asserted.” Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 65 (Tex. 2019). “Fault, as it pertains to actual notice, is not synonymous with liability; rather, it implies responsibility for the injury claimed.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Est. of Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2010); see Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 68 (“The critical inquiry is the governmental unit’s actual anticipation of an alleged claim rather than subjective confirmation of its actual liability.”).
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Id. § 101.055(2).
C. Analysis
As noted, the City asserted in its plea that the TTCA’s waiver of immunity does not
apply for two reasons: (1) lack of notice under section 101.101, and (2) the emergency
response exception under section 101.055(2). The City’s two issues on appeal parallel
these arguments. We address the second issue first because it is dispositive.
Appellees have never disputed that Guzman was “responding to an emergency
call or reacting to an emergency situation” at the time of the collision. See Jefferson
County v. Hadnot, 699 S.W.3d 787, 797 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2024, no pet.) (noting
“the TTCA’s emergency exception should be interpreted broadly to avoid excluding
‘emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include’” (quoting City of San
Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. 2006))); see also Jefferson County v.
Hudson, No. 09-11-00168-CV, 2011 WL 3925724, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 25,
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding the Legislature intended for “emergency” to mean
“unforeseen circumstances that call for immediate action”). Thus, for the emergency
response exception to apply, there must be proof that the Guzman’s actions were “in
compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the
absence of such a law or ordinance,” were “not taken with conscious indifference or
reckless disregard for the safety of others.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2).
Here, there are laws and ordinances applicable to Guzman’s actions. Specifically,
Texas Transportation Code section 546.001 permits the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle to “proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, after slowing as
necessary for safe operation”; to “exceed a maximum speed limit, . . . as long as the
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operator does not endanger life or property”; and to “disregard a regulation governing the
direction of movement or turning in specified directions.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 546.001(2)–(4). In general, when engaging in any of this conduct, the operator must
use “audible or visual signals” in accordance with his employer’s policy. See id.
§ 546.003. That said, the operator is not relieved of the “consequences of reckless
disregard for the safety of others.” Id. § 546.005(2).
Appellees argued in their summary judgment response that “[d]riving on the wrong
side of the road, into oncoming traffic, while running a red light raises a triable issue of
fact as to whether Officer Guzman acted with reckless disregard.” They cited cases which
they claim held that “driving on the wrong side of the road, through a red light, at a high
rate of speed, particularly in populated areas, can support a finding of recklessness.” See
Perez v. Webb County, 511 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied)
(finding there was a fact issue as to the emergency response exception where the officer
“entered the . . . intersection despite knowing he had a blind spot that blocked his view of
[appellant]” and the officer “agreed he should brake as necessary if he had a blind spot
blocking his view of oncoming traffic and had time to stop when driving through a red
light”); Quested v. City of Houston, 440 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2014, no pet.) (holding, where officer “almost went over the side of the bridge to try to
avoid hitting [appellant’s] vehicle,” that the evidence conclusively established the
emergency response exception applied even though the officer “would not have rearended [appellant] if he had been driving slowly enough and far enough away from
[appellant] to avoid hitting her”).
We disagree that the evidence generated a material issue of disputed fact in this
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respect. “[C]onscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others” means
that “a party knew the relevant facts but did not care about the result.” Hartman, 201
S.W.3d at 672 n.19. There must be a showing that the operator “committed an act that
the operator knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury.”
City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Sparks, 347 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2011, no pet.). In
assessing the operator’s conduct, courts may not engage in “judicial second-guessing for
momentary lapses in judgment by emergency personnel responding to emergency
situations.” Kaufman County v. Leggett, 396 S.W.3d 24, 28–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
pet. denied). The record lacks any evidence to support such a finding.
The bodycam recording shows that, as Guzman was travelling south on Business
281, there were vehicles stopped at a red light, so he temporarily moved into the
oncoming northbound lanes, with his emergency lights and siren activated. This conduct
is authorized by statute. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 546.001(4), .003. The light turned
green before Guzman entered the intersection, and as he crossed it, he reduced his
speed and returned to the southbound lane. 5 About one second later, Tovias pulled out
from behind a northbound vehicle which had stopped at the red light, turned in front of
Guzman, and made contact with Guzman’s patrol unit. Contrary to the representations
made in appellees’ plea response, the evidence shows Guzman did not run a red light,
nor was he “driving on the wrong side of the road” or “into oncoming traffic” at the time of
the collision. Perez is distinguishable on this basis. See 511 S.W.3d at 238.
5 The speed limit on this section of Business 281 is not discernable from the record, nor is Guzman’s
exact speed at the time of the collision.
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Further, though appellees claimed the crash report “indicated [Guzman] failed to
yield the right-of-way” to Tovias, it does nothing of the sort. Instead, the crash report
exclusively faults Tovias for failing to yield the right-of-way to Guzman, which is fully
consistent with the law applicable in this situation. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.156(a1) (“On the immediate approach of a[n authorized emergency vehicle], an operator,
unless otherwise directed by a police officer, shall: (1) yield the right-of-way;
(2) immediately drive to a position parallel to and as close as possible to the right-hand
edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection; and (3) stop and remain standing
until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed.”). The evidence does not support a
finding that Guzman knew or should have known his actions “posed a high degree of risk
of serious injury” or that he did not care about the result of his actions. See Hartman, 201
S.W.3d at 672 n.19; Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 429–30. On the contrary, it shows Guzman’s
conduct followed the law concerning emergency action.
We conclude the summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that
Guzman (1) complied with applicable laws and ordinances regarding emergency action,
and (2) did not act with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of
others. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005(2).
Therefore, the TTCA’s emergency response exception applies, and the City retained its
governmental immunity to appellees’ suit. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Garcia, 372
S.W.3d at 635. The City’s second issue is sustained. 6
6 In light of our conclusion, we do not address the City’s first issue regarding notice of the claim
under TTCA section 101.101. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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III. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is reversed. We render judgment granting the City’s plea
to the jurisdiction and dismissing all of appellees’ claims with prejudice.
YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
6th day of August, 2026.
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