NUMBER 13-26-00266-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF V.C., A CHILD
ON APPEAL FROM THE 267TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West
The trial court terminated the parental rights of appellant P.G. (Mother), V.C.’s
biological mother, under Subsections (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(F) of the involuntary termination
statute. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(C), (F). Mother asserts by two issues that
1 We refer to the parties and child by their initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(a), (b)(2); see also TEX.
FAM. CODE § 109.002(d).
the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination under each
subsection. 2 We reverse and render.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellee V.M.C. (Father) is the biological father of V.C, and appellee S.C. is
Father’s wife. Appellees initiated this suit, seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights
and S.C.’s adoption of V.C.
V.C. was born in December 2017. Mother was incarcerated for four years and
released in March 2024. 3 Appellees filed their petition on May 14, 2024.
A bench trial took place in March 2026, wherein appellees submitted no evidence
and proffered one witness, Father. He testified Mother gave V.C. to him when V.C. was
about six months old because Mother “couldn’t handle him anymore.” According to
Father, in a 2021 legal proceeding that occurred while Mother was incarcerated, V.C.’s
maternal grandmother sought but was denied “possession or at least access rights” to
V.C., and Father obtained an order requiring Mother to pay child support. Mother never
paid. Father testified that the 2021 order also gave him the authority to allow Mother to
have contact with V.C. as he saw fit. 4 Father stated Mother lived in a halfway house after
her prison release. He acknowledged Mother reached out expressing her desire to see
V.C. when she was released from prison, but he thought that was not in V.C.’s best
2 Mother also asserts the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to find termination was in the
best interest of V.C. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Because we dispose of this appeal on Mother’s first two issues, we need not address the third. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
3 The record provides that Mother was incarcerated for conspiracy related to a drug offense.
4 An order admitted into evidence by Mother states that, after Mother is released from prison, she
may access and possess V.C. “at times and locations agreed upon in advance by [Father] and under the direct supervision of any person(s) designated by [Father].”
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interest. He testified V.C. does not even know that Mother or her family exists and that
V.C. would have a lot of questions if he had to see them because “all he knows is his
mom, you know, my wife [S.C.].” He testified V.C. would “more than likely” need
counseling if he had to see Mother. Father stated Mother was just a “donor,” and S.C. “is
[V.C.’s] mother” and the person he refers to as “Mom.” Father further testified that V.C. is
a “great[] A and B student,” that Father and S.C. attend V.C.’s school functions and help
V.C. with his homework, and that S.C. carries V.C. on her employer’s health insurance
and takes V.C. to the doctor when needed. Father said that while Mother would ask to
see V.C., she was only “worried about what she wants, not, you know, his well-being.”
Mother testified that when V.C. was around six months old, she and Father split
up. She denied leaving V.C. with Father but stated they operated under a co-parenting
agreement after splitting up. She testified that while she was incarcerated, she “did send
letters and . . . tr[ied] to call.” She also testified her mother tried to keep “communication
going” as well but was “blocked off” by appellees. After her prison release, she reached
out to appellees regarding V.C. multiple times, but appellees blocked her from seeing
V.C. She stated she was unable to provide any support while she was in prison. Appellees
met her on one occasion after her release, but “the conversation was just about that they
want me to sign my rights over.” Mother acknowledged Father and S.C. had “done a
wonderful job” taking care of V.C. and that V.C. had a “a good life.” She also stated she
was not interested in taking V.C. away from them but just “want[ed] a chance to be there.”
Mother stated she was “doing very good now” and had a job, a car, and was renting a
place to live.
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The trial court admitted into evidence text messages from Mother to Father and
S.C. that go back to early April 2024. In several text messages to Father, Mother asked
how V.C. was, how he liked school, pleaded for Father to communicate with her, and
asked for pictures of V.C. There are no responses from Father. In several text messages
to S.C., Mother asked how V.C. was, pleaded for communication and photos of V.C.,
asked S.C. to give V.C. a hug and kiss from her, asked S.C. to tell V.C. she loves him,
and thanked S.C. for her care of V.C. She also explained “how hurtful” it is that she cannot
see or talk to V.C., that she is shut out of his life, and that appellees “are not open to
letting [her] see him or be a[ ]part of his life.” S.C. responded by stating that is out of her
control, and she will not do anything to make Father upset with her. In one text, S.C.
acknowledged that she has saved all the letters and drawings that Mother has sent to
V.C.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights as discussed above, and this
appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
“Because the natural right between a parent and his child is one of constitutional
dimensions, Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), termination proceedings
must be strictly scrutinized.” In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). In parental
termination cases, our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor this elevated burden
of proof while respecting the factfinder’s role. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018)
(citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002)). “The distinction between legal and
factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may
be considered.” Id. “Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light
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most favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a
reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.
at 631 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
Factual sufficiency, on the other hand, requires us to weigh disputed evidence
contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. Id. We “must consider
whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved
it in favor of the finding.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006)).
Therefore, “[e]vidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so
significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
finding was true.” Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
To terminate parental rights, a court must find two elements by clear and
convincing evidence: (1) that the parent committed one of the statutory grounds for
termination found in Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code; and (2) that termination is
in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Because of the fundamental
rights at issue, due process requires that parental termination be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014); In re K.M.L., 443
S.W.3d at 112. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007; see also In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 264.
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III. SUBSECTION C
By her first issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support termination under Subsection C. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(C).
Subsection C permits termination of parental rights on clear and convincing
evidence that the parent “voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another
without providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at least
six months.” Id. Subsection C merely requires that the parent “make arrangements for the
adequate support rather than personally support the children.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 21.
Subsection C is unsatisfied when a parent placed their child or consented to their child’s
placement with caregivers who can provide adequate support for the child. A.C. v. M.B.,
No. 01-20-00294-CV, 2021 WL 3729106, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).
Here, the evidence presented by appellees merely provides that Mother left V.C.
with appellees. Both Father and Mother testified that V.C. was well supported in
appellees’ care. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could not form a firm belief or conviction that
Subsection C was satisfied. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630; A.C., 2021 WL 3729106,
at *5.
We sustain Mother’s first issue.
IV. SUBSECTION F
By her second issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support termination under Subsection F. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(F).
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Subsection F permits termination of parental rights on clear and convincing
evidence that the parent “failed to support the child in accordance with the parent’s ability
during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition.”
Id. A party seeking termination under this provision must show that the parent, for a period
of twelve consecutive months beginning no earlier than eighteen months before the
petition was filed, had the ability to support the child but failed to do so. In re J.G.S., 574
S.W.3d 101, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); In re F.E.N., 542
S.W.3d 752, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (providing that where
the petition was filed on March 1, 2013, the twelve-month period must fall “between
September 1, 2011 and March 1, 2013”). Here, the petition was filed on May 14, 2024;
thus, the twelve-month period must fall between December 14, 2022, and May 14, 2024.
While Mother testified that she had a job, a car, and was renting a place to live at
the time of trial in 2026, this evidence does not apply to the relevant statutory period.
Instead, the evidence is undisputed that Mother was imprisoned for four years until her
release in March 2024, and she lived in a halfway house after her release. Thus,
appellees failed to present any evidence that Mother had the ability to provide support
within the statutory period. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 118 (holding Subsection (F)
was unsatisfied where appellant was incarcerated during the statutory period, and there
was no evidence of his access to funds during that time); In re T.B.D., 223 S.W.3d 515,
518 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (same).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we
conclude a reasonable factfinder could not form a firm belief or conviction that Subsection
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F was satisfied. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630; In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 118; In re
T.B.D., 223 S.W.3d at 518.
We sustain Mother’s second issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Because appellees failed to prove any statutory grounds for termination, see TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1), we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment
denying appellees’ petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3.
JON WEST
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
6th day of August, 2026.
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