RENDERED: AUGUST 7, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0371-MR
CAMERON OSBORNE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01047
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
STORMEY PRIESKOP, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST II; AND HEATHER
MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0372-MR
EDWARD HALE, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01012
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND ALLASANDRA
CUNNINGHAM, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS OFFENDER INFORMATION
SUPERVISOR APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0373-MR
ROBERT D. SMITH APPELLANT
-2-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01011
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND LORETTA
B. NEW, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST II APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0393-MR
THOMAS DAVIDSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01053
-3-COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND MICHAEL
R. AMMONS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST II APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0435-MR
KEVIN BOYD APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01073
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
-4-OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND WINFREY
MOORE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OFFENDER
INFORMATION SPECIALIST APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0436-MR
CARLOS BROOKS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01036
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND LORETTA
B. NEW, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
-5-AS OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST II APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-0714-MR
AARON JACKSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01018
COOKIE CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AMY ROBEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN
OF THE LUTHER LUCKETT
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX;
HEATHER MCMANIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I; AND JULIA
WOLLUMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OFFENDER INFORMATION
SPECIALIST I APPELLEES
-6-OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ECKERLE, A. JONES, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, L., JUDGE: The above-captioned Appellants seek to overturn a February
12, 2025 order of the Franklin Circuit Court that collectively dismissed their
consolidated declaratory actions pursuant to CR1 12.02(f). Upon review, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellants are all inmates at the Luther Luckett Correctional
Complex, each serving sentences for first-degree robbery. See KRS2 515.020. All
Appellants committed their crimes and were convicted well after July 15, 2002.
All Appellants initiated administrative actions with their correctional complex and
the Kentucky Department of Corrections, asserting that a July 15, 2024 amendment
to KRS 439.3401 “retroactively” converted their first-degree robbery convictions
into nonviolent offender convictions; and, as a consequence, they were now all
eligible for additional credit on their sentences beyond what KRS 197.045(1)(a)1.
provided, making Appellants eligible for probation without having to serve 85% of
their sentences.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-7-Appellants’ administrative actions were unsuccessful. Appellants
then sought declaratory relief from the Franklin Circuit Court. Their declaratory
actions were then consolidated, considering their identical claims. Following a CR
12.02(f) motion from Appellees (hereinafter referred to collectively as the
Department of Corrections), all of the Appellants’ actions were dismissed by the
circuit court. These consolidated appeals followed. We will discuss the finer
points of Appellants’ claims, the Department of Corrections’ motion to dismiss
their claims, and the circuit court’s dispositive order in our analysis below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When ruling upon a CR 12.02(f) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, “the circuit court is not required to make any factual determination; rather,
the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the
facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to
relief?” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002). A CR 12.02(f)
motion is properly granted if, and only if, accepting all of plaintiff’s allegations as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the pleading party
would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in
support of his claim. See Shaw v. Handy, 588 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky. App. 2019).
Our standard for reviewing the propriety of a circuit court’s decision to grant a CR
12.02 motion is de novo. See Shaw, 588 S.W.3d at 461.
-8-ANALYSIS
The Appellants’ claims and the Department of Corrections’ CR 12.02
motion involved the following relevant sections of the current version of KRS
439.3401, which has been effective since July 15, 2024:3
(1) As used in this section, “violent offender” means any
person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the:
(b) Commission of:
1. A felony involving the death
of the victim or serious
physical injury to a victim; [or]
10. Robbery in the first degree
as described in KRS 515.020;
(2) The court shall designate in its judgment if:
(a) The victim suffered death or serious
physical injury;
(4) A violent offender with a sentence of a term of years
shall not be released on probation, shock probation,
parole, conditional discharge, or other form of early
3
KRS 439.3401 was recently amended again in 2026. See 2026 Ky. Acts ch. 68 § 27 (eff. Jul. 15, 2026). That amendment, however, did not affect any subsections of KRS 439.3401 on review in this appeal.
-9-release until he or she has served at least eighty-five
percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.
(5) A violent offender shall only be awarded credit on his
or her sentence authorized by KRS 197.045(1)(a)1.
(9) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section
extending the definition of “violent offender” to persons
convicted of or pleading guilty to robbery in the first
degree shall apply only to persons whose crime was
committed after July 15, 2002.
Appellants’ claims (i.e., that KRS 439.3401 now instructs that a
person who commits first-degree robbery is not a “violent offender”) are rooted in
KRS 439.3401(1)(b)1., which provides that the meaning of “violent offender”
includes a person who commits “[a] felony involving the death of the victim or
serious physical injury to a victim[.]” Appellants focused exclusively upon that
singular meaning of “violent offender” provided in KRS 439.3401(1)(b)1.
According to Appellants’ understanding of KRS 439.3401(9), only a person who
commits a first-degree robbery that involves a victim who suffers death or serious
physical injury can qualify as a “violent offender.” Therefore, because their
respective judgments of conviction did not specifically indicate whether their
victims “suffered death or serious physical injury” per KRS 439.3401(2)(a),
Appellants argue their convictions could not have involved any such victims.
Thus, Appellants believe they should now be considered nonviolent offenders.
-10-To be clear, Appellants’ claims stem from a collective misreading of
KRS 439.3401. As the Department of Corrections properly noted in its CR 12.02
motion, KRS 439.3401 provides several definitions of “violent offender,” and
Appellants, in making their claims, ignored the definition most applicable to
themselves. Pursuant to KRS 439.3401(1)(b)10., a “violent offender” is also a
person who commits “[r]obbery in the first degree as described in KRS 515.020[.]”
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, there was no need for Appellants’ respective
judgments of conviction to specify whether the victims “suffered death or serious
physical injury” because the General Assembly had designated persons who
commit first-degree robbery as “violent offenders” regardless.
Furthermore, the language of KRS 439.3401(9) – which Appellants
seized upon in support of their claims – only supports that Appellants were indeed
violent offenders within the meaning of the statute. To review, KRS 439.3401(9)
provides:
The provisions of subsection (1) of this section extending
the definition of “violent offender” to persons convicted
of or pleading guilty to robbery in the first degree shall
apply only to persons whose crime was committed after
July 15, 2002.
Relative to this provision, prior to July 15, 2002, first-degree robbery
was not specifically designated in KRS 439.3401 as a violent offense. Instead, the
version of the statute preceding that date provided:
-11-“[V]iolent offender” means any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital
offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the
death of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim,
or rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of
the victim. The court shall designate in its judgment if
the victim suffered death or serious physical injury.
See KRS 439.3401(1) (version effective from July 14, 2000, through July 14,
2002).
In other words, under that earlier version of the statute one could
theoretically have committed robbery and not have been designated a “violent
offender” if the victim did not suffer death or serious physical injury. Since July
15, 2002, however, every subsequent version of KRS 439.3401 – including the
versions in effect when each of the appellants committed their crimes – has
specifically designated persons who commit robbery in the first degree as “violent
offenders” regardless of whether the victim suffers death or serious physical
injury. The version of KRS 439.3401(1) which was effective July 15, 2002
through July 11, 2006 provided:
As used in this section, “violent offender” means any
person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the
commission of a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class
B felony involving the death of the victim or serious
physical injury to a victim, or rape in the first degree or
sodomy in the first degree of the victim, burglary in the
first degree accompanied by the commission or attempted
commission of a felony sexual offense in KRS Chapter
510, burglary in the first degree accompanied by the
commission or attempted commission of an assault
-12-described in KRS 508.010, 508.020, 508.032, or 508.060,
burglary in the first degree accompanied by commission
or attempted commission of kidnapping as prohibited by
KRS 509.040, or robbery in the first degree. The court
shall designate in its judgment if the victim suffered
death or serious physical injury.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, KRS 439.3401(9) did not have any “retroactive” effect, much
less the “retroactive” effect Appellants have projected upon it. Rather, the sole
function and plain language of KRS 439.3401(9) simply clarifies that as of July 15,
2002, the law of Kentucky has considered persons who have committed firstdegree robbery to be “violent offenders” irrespective of whether the victim
suffered death or serious physical injury.
This, in turn, dooms Appellants’ claims that they are not “violent
offenders.” Each Appellant committed first-degree robbery after July 15, 2002.
Therefore, all Appellants are “violent offenders” within the meaning of KRS
439.3401. None of them, even assuming the truth of the factual allegations in their
complaints, could have been entitled to the relief they requested, which was
premised upon their assertions that they are not “violent offenders.” Thus, the
circuit court committed no error in granting the Department of Corrections’ CR
12.02(f) motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims.
Appellants additionally argue the circuit court abused its discretion or
otherwise erred by failing to grant various motions they filed below, i.e., motions
-13-for default judgment, summary judgment, and to strike the Department of
Corrections’ pleadings. In each of those motions, appellants argued – or sought
relief stemming from the same arguments – that under the current version of KRS
439.3401 they are no longer considered to be “violent offenders.” In light of our
disposition, these additional arguments lack merit and are otherwise moot.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the February 12, 2025 order of
the Franklin Circuit Court which collectively dismissed the consolidated
declaratory actions filed by Appellants pursuant to CR 12.02(f).
ALL CONCUR.
-14-BRIEF FOR APPELLANT CAMERON BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
OSBORNE:
Crystal L. Thompson
Cameron Osborne, pro se Frankfort, Kentucky
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT EDWARD HALE,
JR.:
Edward Hale, Jr., pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ROBERT D.
SMITH:
Robert D. Smith, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT THOMAS
DAVIDSON:
Thomas Davidson, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT KEVIN BOYD:
Kevin Boyd, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT CARLOS
BROOKS:
Carlos Brooks, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT AARON
JACKSON:
Aaron Jackson, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
-15-