In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00293-CV
SCOTT MITCHELL OBEGINSKI, Appellant
V.
JAUL RAY ELIZONDO, Appellee
On Appeal from the 284th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-08-12296-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After his home was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, Scott Mitchell
Obeginski acting pro se sued Jaul Ray Elizondo for what he characterizes as a
“trespass to rights case.” In ten issues, Obeginski challenges the trial court’s
judgment in favor of Elizondo and various pre-trial rulings, along with complaining
that the trial court did not properly notify him of the trial setting. Obeginski filed
two notices of appeal. He filed the first notice of appeal at 7:27 a.m. on August 26,
2024, the day trial was scheduled to begin. In the first Notice of Appeal, he expressed
1
his desire to appeal certain rulings in the trial court’s Order signed August 25, 2024,
which denied Obeginski’s: Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution; Motion to
Show Authority; Motion to Reconsider Objection to Evidence; and Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing. Those motions were heard on August 23, 2024. In his
second Notice of Appeal filed on August 27, 2024, the day after trial, Obeginski
complained of the trial court’s Final Judgment. He contended that the trial proceeded
without proper notice after being reset in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
245. As discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case involves disputed title to real property that Elizondo purchased at a
non-judicial foreclosure sale, which Obeginski and his wife previously owned.
Elizondo paid for the property with three cashier’s checks and received a deed from
the substitute trustee recorded in the Montgomery County records as document
number 2023065947 (“Foreclosure Deed”). Unfortunately, the substitute trustee’s
deed incorrectly spelled Elizondo’s name as “Elizando.” Although the substitute
trustee later attempted to fix this mistake by issuing a corrected deed, the damage
was done, as Obeginski seized on the error. Obeginski created various corporate
entities and trusts, and using an assumed name that matched the misspelling in the
substitute trustee’s deed, he began trying to transfer title to himself and prevent
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Elizondo from possessing the property. Obeginski refused to vacate the property and
filed this lawsuit against Elizondo.
Relevant Procedural History
Obeginski initially sued Elizondo in August 2023 in a one-sentence petition
that alleged, “I claim harm by way of trespass[,]” but as the proceedings unfolded,
he clarified that by “trespass” he meant that Elizondo allegedly harassed him.
Elizondo answered, then asserted counterclaims against Obeginski. 1 In Elizondo’s
statement of jurisdiction, he noted that the lawsuit involves title or interest in real
property located in Montgomery County, Texas, and the parties involved are in
Texas. Elizondo also claimed he is the record title holder of the property at issue,
which is located at 7086 Kingston Cove Lane in Willis, Texas. Elizondo also alleged
he purchased the property at a lawfully conducted foreclosure sale on July 5, 2023,
and received a Substitute Trustee’s Deed “recorded at Instrument No. 2023065947.”
Elizondo alleged that Obeginski and his wife owned the property until the
foreclosure sale occurred. Elizondo also claimed that Obeginski continued to reside
on the property, although Elizondo tried to unsuccessfully evict him.
In his Original and Amended Answer, Counterclaims, and Third-Party Claims,
Elizondo described the circumstances surrounding the foreclosure sale. Specifically,
1
Elizondo also asserted third-party claims against Obeginski’s wife, who was never served.
3
Elizondo explained that the Substitute Trustee’s Deed misspelled his name as
“Elizando.” According to Elizondo, Obeginski used this misspelling to his advantage
and on August 1, 2023, Obeginski formed a Texas limited liability company,
“primary equity real estate, LLC.” Elizondo alleged that the same day, using the
name “JAUL ELIZANDO, Scott Obeginski, Manager,” Obeginski executed and
recorded a Quitclaim Deed for the subject property placing it in the name of “Sclana
Properties, LLC, Scott Obeginski, Manager.” Obeginski recorded it “at Instrument
No. 2023071938 of the Official Public Records of Montgomery County, Texas.”
According to Elizondo, nine days later, on August 10, 2023, the substitute trustee
executed a corrected deed properly spelling “JAUL ELIZONDO” that was recorded
as Instrument No. 2023075276 (“Corrected Deed”). Elizondo pleaded that on
August 11, 2023, Obeginski registered an assumed name certificate with the Texas
Secretary of State in the name of “primary equity real estate, LLC” stating that the
company was doing business as “JAUL ELIZANDO.”
Elizondo asserted that Obeginski’s filings were part of a “plan, scheme or
design to cloud title to the Property and avoid eviction.” Elizondo also alleged that
Obeginski is the one committing trespass. Elizondo asserted causes of action for: (1)
trespass to try title; (2) quiet title/remove cloud from title; (3) trespass to real
property; (4) claim for relief for permanent injunction and writ of possession; (5)
declaratory judgment that Elizondo is the rightful owner of the property and entitled
4
to immediate possession; and (6) since Obeginski’s conduct is intentional, Elizondo
sought exemplary damages. He also sought attorney’s fees. Elizondo included copies
of the deeds as exhibits to his Original Answer, Counterclaims, and Third-Party
Claims.
In November 2023, Elizondo filed his First Amended Original Answer,
Counterclaims, and Third-Party Claims, which asserted the same causes of action
but included more detailed information about Obeginski’s corporate entities and
where they were located. He again attached the deeds as exhibits.
On November 27, 2023, Obeginski filed a Motion to Strike (1) Original
Answer, Counterclaims, and Third-Party Claims, and (2) First Amended Original
Answer, Counterclaims, and Third-Party Claims. Obeginski argued that the
pleadings violated an order signed by the 457th District Court on October 6, 2023,
which stated that Elizondo’s liens were fraudulent, expunged the Corrected Deed
from the Montgomery County Clerk records, along with another unrelated to the
claims asserted in this litigation, and barred Elizondo and the substitute trustee from
filing any future documents against the property. Obeginski attached a copy of the
order to his Motion to Strike. The trial court denied Obeginski’s Motion to Strike.
In December 2023 and January 2024, Obeginski filed amended answers to
Elizondo’s counterclaims. In his amended answers, among other things, Obeginski
pleaded that Elizondo’s counterclaims violated a previous order from the 457th
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District Court that “barred [Elizondo] from filing any future documents or causes
against the property[,]” and again asked the trial court to strike the counterclaims.
On April 24, 2024, Obeginski filed a Motion to Show Authority claiming that
Elizondo’s attorney lacked authority to represent him in violation of Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 12. In the motion, Obeginski questioned opposing counsel’s
licensure status and accused him of barratry. Obeginski then set the motion to be
considered via submission on May 10, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. On April 30, 2024,
Elizondo filed his Response on Motion to Show Authority, which he supported with
exhibits. Those exhibits included a printout of opposing counsel’s active licensure
status, counsel’s declaration describing the circumstances of his retention, and a
retainer contract executed by Elizondo and the attorney. The trial court denied
Obeginski’s Motion to Show Authority, finding that the evidence submitted
established counsel was a licensed attorney eligible to practice in Texas at all
relevant times and properly retained by Elizondo. The record shows that Elizondo’s
attorney submitted a proposed order denying these motions which was filed on April
30, 2024. Thereafter, on May 10, 2024, the trial court signed and dated the order.
The signature contains a date and time stamp. Seemingly not understanding the
distinction between the date the proposed unsigned order was filed (April 30, 2024)
and the date the trial court later signed it (May 10, 2024), Obeginski accused the trial
court of committing fraud by signing the order ten days before the hearing.
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On May 28, 2024, Obeginski filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of his
Motion to Show Authority, which was set for hearing on May 31, 2024, to be
considered with other pending motions before the trial court. He then filed a
Supplement to Motion to Reconsider Motion to Show Authority the day before the
hearing again questioning opposing counsel’s licensure status and accusing him of
barratry. On June 6, 2024, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Motion to
Show Authority.
Obeginski filed yet another Motion to Show Authority on August 13, 2024,
followed by an Amended Motion to Show Authority on August 19, 2024, after
Elizondo’s attorney moved to quash multiple subpoenas duces tecum issued by
Obeginski to relatives and entities related to Elizondo. The clerk’s record reflects
that these motions, along with Elizondo’s Motions to Quash, were heard on August
23, 2024. After the hearing, on August 25, 2024, the trial court denied Elizondo’s
Motions to Show Authority. In the same Order, the trial court also denied
Obeginski’s Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution, Motion to Reconsider
Objection to Evidence, and Motion to Dismiss as to Jurisdiction.
Obeginski also complains about the trial judge’s conduct in various hearings
addressing his motions. That said, Obeginski failed to request or designate and have
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the court reporter file a reporter’s record on appeal, despite having an opportunity to
do so.2
Trial, Judgment, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Per the trial court’s Docket Control Order entered on October 9, 2023, trial
was originally scheduled for June 17, 2024. On May 17, 2024, when the trial court
granted Obeginski’s Motion for Continuance, the matter was reset for trial on the
two-week rolling docket beginning August 19, 2024. The trial court notified the
parties of the reset in the Order granting the Motion for Continuance and in the trial
court’s Notice of Reset, both signed on May 17, 2024. On August 8, 2024, the trial
court filed a Trial Notification and emailed the parties that the matter was scheduled
for a bench trial on August 26, 2024, at 1:00 p.m.
2
Obeginski’s Docketing Statement shows that he did not request a reporter’s record or pay for its preparation. After Appellee complained in his brief that Obeginski failed to include record cites or file a reporter’s record, Obeginski asked for leave to re-file his brief to add record cites, which we (this Court) denied. He also asked to file a reporter’s record, which we did not deny; the clerk of this Court advised that we would not refuse to file a reporter’s record because of a failure to timely request it, although we would not delay issuing an opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(3), 35.3(c). Obeginski never requested or had the court reporter file the record. Instead, he tried to file a Reply Brief in which he attached a partial reporter’s record from a hearing that occurred on May 31, 2024. Yet the clerk informed him that the Reply Brief was marked “received” and not filed because, among other things, Obeginski improperly attached a hearing transcript as an exhibit. We advised that for the Court to consider the reporter’s record, Obeginski needed to have the court reporter submit it. See id. 34.6. We also instructed him that he would need to correct it and file a compliant Reply Brief by June 9, 2025. Despite admonishing Obeginski of this and allowing him to have the record filed late, he did not file a compliant Reply Brief, nor have the reporter file any portion of the record.
8
At 7:27 a.m. on the morning of trial, Obeginski filed a Notice of Appeal
stating he wished to appeal the trial court’s August 25, 2024, Order denying his
various motions on an interlocutory basis. About thirty minutes later, at 8 a.m.,
Obeginski filed his second Motion to Recuse/Disqualify Judge for Bias. Before 8:30
a.m. the same day, the trial court denied the Motion to Recuse and signed an Order
referring the Motion to the Presiding Judge of the Second Judicial Region. The
regional Presiding Judge signed an Order Denying Second Motion to Recuse, which
was filed by 11:25 a.m. on August 26, 2024. The clerk’s record shows that at 11:39
a.m. the trial court’s administrator emailed the parties, including two email addresses
for Obeginski, attached the signed Order Denying Second Motion to Recuse, and
advised the trial would proceed as scheduled at 1:00 p.m. A copy of the
administrator’s email was also filed in the clerk’s record at 1:14 p.m. Later, at 1:19
p.m. and 1:32 p.m., Obeginski e-filed two documents requesting notice of a trial
resetting.
The trial proceeded as scheduled at 1:00 p.m., Elizondo personally appeared
with counsel, and Obeginski failed to appear. The trial court signed a Final Judgment
that Obeginski take nothing by his claims and among other things, that it is
“ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, and DECLARED that Jaul Elizondo is the
true and lawful owner of the Property – namely, 7086 Kingston Cove Lane, Willis,
Montgomery County, Texas 77318[.]” It also awarded Elizondo title and possession
9
of the property, a writ of possession to the property, and stated that he was entitled
to immediate possession of the property. The Final Judgment also “judicially
corrected” the Foreclosure Deed document number 2023065947 to reflect “the
Grantee is Jaul Elizondo.” The Judgment further:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, and DECLARED that
the Quitclaim Deed executed in the name of “JAUL ELIZANDO, Scott
Obeginski, Manager” as Grantor and “Sclana Properties, LLC, Scott
Obeginski, Manager” as Grantee, dated August 1, 2023, recorded on
August 1, 2023, signed by Scott Obeginski, Document #2023071938
(the “Quitclaim Deed”) is a cloud on Jaul Elizondo’s title to the
Property, the Quitclaim Deed conveyed no title to or interest in the
Property, and the Quitclaim Deed is nullified by this Judgment, having
no legal or equitable effect whatsoever.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, and
DECLARED that the Warranty Deed executed in the name of “Sclana
Properties, LLC, Scott Obeginski, Manager” as Grantor and “Giza
Trust, Scott Obeginski, Trustee” as Grantee, dated August 23, 2023,
recorded on November 3, 2023, signed by Scott Obeginski, Document
#2023071938 (the “Warranty Deed”) is a cloud on Jaul Elizondo’s title
to the Property, the Warranty Deed conveyed no title to or interest in
the Property, and the Warranty Deed is nullified by this Judgment,
having no legal or equitable effect whatsoever.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, and
DECLARED that the Lis Pendens and its attachments executed by
“Scott Obeginski, a living sentient being” on pages 1 and 3, by “Scott
M. Obeginski”: with a thumbprint on page 5, and Scott Obeginski as
“beneficiary and sole heir of the SCOTT MITCHELL OBEGINSKI
OR ANY DERIVATIVE thereof trust” on page 11, dated April 23,
2024, recorded on April 23, 2024, signed throughout by Scott
Obeginski, Document #2024039377 (the “Lis Pendens”) is a cloud on
Jaul Elizondo’s title to the Property, the Lis Pendens conveyed no title
to or interest in the Property, and the Lis Pendens is nullified by this
Judgment, having no legal or equitable effect whatsoever. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, and DECLARED that the lien
claimed within the Lis Pendens is itself a cloud on Jaul Elizondo’s title
to the Property, is invalid, and is hereby RELEASED.
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The trial court awarded Elizondo attorney’s fees through trial and contingent
attorney’s fees in the event of an appeal, post-judgment interest, and required
Obeginski to post a supersedeas bond of $297,000.00 if he desired to stay execution
of the judgment.
The trial court issued detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Relevant to Obeginski’s complaint on appeal that he did not receive proper notice of
the trial being reset, the Findings of Fact included the following:
22. The Court finds that on August 26, 2024 at 8:00 a.m. - that being
the day set for trial and a mere 5 hours before the trial was scheduled
to begin - Obeginski filed (1) his second Motion to Recuse and (2) an
Interlocutory Appeal of certain Orders on motions heard on August
23, 2024, the Friday before trial.
a. The Court finds this was an effort by Obeginski to delay the
trial using a second motion to recuse which, like the first, had no
basis.
b. At 8:23 a.m., the Court declined to recuse itself and
immediately referred the Motion to Recuse to The Honorable
Robert H. Trapp, Presiding Judge of the 2nd Administrative
Judicial Region.
c. At about 8:30 a.m., Obeginski called the Court to alert the
Court that he had filed the Motion to Recuse and wanted to know
why the Court’s docket sheet still showed the trial going forward
at 1:00 p.m. As Judge Bays overheard, Amber Park, the Court
Administrator, informed Obeginski that Judge Bays had already
denied the motion and sent it to Judge Trapp, advised that she
would remove the trial from the docket sheet at his request while
the motion to recuse was pending, but insisted that he should
monitor the docket because, if the Motion to Recuse was ruled
upon before 1:00 p.m., the trial would go forward as scheduled
whether with Judge Bays or another appointed visiting judge.
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d. At 11:23 a.m., Judge Trapp entered an order denying the
Motion to Recuse as being untimely filed and not stating a legal
basis for recusal.
e. At 11:37 a.m., the Court emailed a copy of Judge Trapp’s order
to all parties, using the emails on file on eFile Texas and a second
email address Obeginski had on file with the District Clerk’s
office, to alert and inform the parties the trial would proceed at
1:00 p.m. as previously scheduled.
f. The trial was never reset. It was scheduled on May 17, 2024 at
4:13 p.m. to occur on August 26, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. and that is
when the case was called to trial.
23. At 1:00 p.m., the Court called the case for trial. Mr. Elizondo and his counsel, William Britton Hall, were present in the courtroom but Obeginski was absent. The Court, on the record, had Amber Park, Court Administrator, call Obeginski to find out where he was and if he was coming. He did not answer. Ms. Park left him a voicemail message
informing him that trial was about to start and that he needed to attend. 24. Following the phone call, the Court took a 10-minute break to give Obeginski time to arrive, email, or call back - he did none of these things. He never returned the call, he never arrived, he never emailed. So upon returning to the Bench at 1:18 p.m. with Obeginski still absent and incommunicado, Mr. Hall, counsel for Mr. Elizondo, moved for a post-answer default judgment. Mr. Hall then, on the record, noted that Obeginski had also filed that morning an Interlocutory Appeal and
stated his belief that nothing about the Interlocutory Appeal stayed the trial proceedings, to which this Court agreed.
25. Plaintiff then proceeded with its case in chief on liability and damages.
26. Though he never called, emailed, or appeared at the trial, during the course of the trial, Obeginski filed two documents through eFile, one at 1:16 p.m. requesting that he be notified of a trial reset date relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 246, and the other at 1:32 p.m. which was a “Correction to Notice of Setting” changing his reliance on Rule 246 to Rule 245. The first filing occurred before the trial began at 1:18 p.m., and the second, just minutes after the trial began.
a. The Court finds that these actions were gamesmanship.
Obeginski had been advised at 8:30 that morning that the case
would not be reset if his second motion to recuse was resolved,
his second motion to recuse was resolved at 11:25 a.m. by written
and filed Order, that Order and announcement that the trial would
12
occur as scheduled was sent at 11:39 am. directly to Obeginski
at not one but two email addresses he had on file (including the
one he designated for service), the Court called him to advise that
it was waiting for him, he did not take that call and he did not
return that call.
b. His willful ignorance of what was happening is a direct
contrast to the person who took the time and made the effort to
call the Court to complain that the trial was still on the docket
after he filed his second motion to recuse and who was then
advised over the telephone to continue to monitor that docket
because the trial would begin as scheduled if the second motion
to recuse was resolved in time. Rather than staying aware of the
case’s status with the Court, suddenly he turned a blind eye and
decided to ignore the docket, his email, and his telephone. That
is simply not plausible.
c. The very fact that Obeginski filed documents related to the
trial reset when, as evidenced by his 8:30 a.m. phone call, he
knew full well that the Court could take no action while the
motion to recuse was pending is interesting. He obviously knew
that the second motion to recuse was disposed so that the Court
was no[] longer without power to act on the case as evidenced by
the fact that he filed not one but two pleadings demanding to
know what the trial “reset” date was. The notion that he forgot to
watch the docket, his email, and/or his phone is tough to believe,
but the fact that he acted like a person who knew the stay was
over makes its untruthfulness readily apparent.
d. Clearly, he knew that the second motion to recuse was
resolved thereby permitting the Court to take action regarding the
case. Whether he got that information from monitoring the
docket, reading the emails, or listening to the phone message
matters not - he knew the case was going to trial as originally
scheduled and was playing games to avoid the trial via his
feigned ignorance.
27. In response to his request for information about a reset, the Court noted on the record that the Court did not reset the trial to a different date and had, in fact, informed Obeginski verbally twice and in writing twice that trial was going forward as scheduled.
28. Obeginski’s filings on the morning of trial were an effort to delay the trial and had no basis in fact or law.
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29. Obeginski did not reach out to the Court again until the following
day when he called the Court Administrator.
The trial court’s Conclusions of Law included that the trial was not reset from its
scheduled August 26, 2024, setting, and “Obeginski had actual and sufficient notice
that trial was proceeding as scheduled at 1:00 p.m. His failure to attend was
voluntary and the result of conscious indifference.”
ANALYSIS
Raising ten issues, Obeginski’s complaints fall into two broad categories: (1)
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case for various reasons;
and (2) the trial court gave him inadequate notice of the trial resetting in violation of
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245. 3
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Standing
Obeginski attacks jurisdiction based on opposing counsel’s purported lack of
authority to represent Elizondo, the absence of a controversy once his “harassment”
complaint was dismissed, what he characterizes as “fraud” by the trial court, and the
trial court exceeding its authority by issuing a writ of possession, which he claims
only a justice of the peace can do.
3
Obeginski’s “issues” are broadly framed questions unattached to any specific rulings. It is in his summary of the trial court proceedings that he provides an indication of the rulings he complains of. Nevertheless, we have tried to reach the merits of these arguments.
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Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a
case.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.
1993). “Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.; see
also Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (“A court has
no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.”). It
is “a constitutional prerequisite to suit,” and courts have no jurisdiction over and
thus must dismiss claims made by parties who lack standing to assert them. Heckman,
369 S.W.3d at 150–51. “The parameters of constitutional standing are well settled,
requiring ‘[1] a concrete injury [2] that is ... traceable to the defendant’s conduct and
[3] redressable by court order.’” Busbee v. Cnty. of Medina, 681 S.W.3d 391, 395
(Tex. 2023) (quoting Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 616
S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex. 2021)). We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction
and standing de novo. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d
237, 240 (Tex. 2021); see also Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
“Justice courts have original jurisdiction over suits for forcible detainer and
forcible entry and detainer, which are types of eviction suits.” Gonzalez v. Garza,
No. 09-25-00459-CV, 2026 WL 1690220, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 11,
2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(2); Tex. Prop.
15
Code Ann. § 24.004(a)). “A person commits forcible entry and detainer if the person
enters the real property of another without legal authority or by force and refuses to
surrender possession on demand.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.001(a). “An action for
forcible detainer is a ‘summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for the
determination of who is entitled to the possession of premises.’” Yarbrough v.
Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, no pet.) (quoting Scott v. Hewitt, 127 Tex. 31, 90 S.W.2d 816 (1936)) (other
citation omitted). “The only issue to be resolved in a forcible detainer action is the
right to immediate possession of the property; the merits of title are not adjudicated.”
Id. (citation omitted); see also Gonzalez, 2026 WL 1690220, at *5 (citations omitted).
Justice courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate title to land as does a county court
exercising appellate jurisdiction in a forcible detainer action. Yarbrough, 455
S.W.3d at 280. Thus, “where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires
resolution of a title dispute, the justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment
and may be enjoined from doing so.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citations omitted).
Application
While we do not have the benefit of a reporter’s record here, the clerk’s record
shows that Obeginski’s standing and jurisdictional arguments lack merit. At issue is
a dispute over who has title to the property sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. In
16
his answer to Obeginski’s one sentence original petition, Elizondo counterclaimed
and alleged he held superior title. He also claimed that Obeginski was unlawfully
possessing and refusing to vacate property Elizondo rightfully owned. Elizondo
described Obeginski’s exploiting a spelling error by the substitute trustee in the deed
and how Obeginski attempted to claim ownership through a series of entities using
the misspelling of Elizondo’s name. Elizondo attached the deeds issued in the
foreclosure sale to his original and amended counterclaims. As someone claiming a
concrete injury traceable to Obeginski’s conduct and redressable by court order,
Elizondo had constitutional standing to bring suit. See Busbee, 681 S.W.3d at 395;
Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 616 S.W.3d at 567.
The right to immediate possession depends on the resolution of the title
dispute, so contrary to Obeginski’s assertion, the justice court did not have exclusive
jurisdiction in this case. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709; see also Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d
at 280. The district court here had to first adjudicate the title dispute, and the right to
immediate possession hinged on that determination. See Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d at
280; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction
to consider this dispute. See Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d at 280; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
Despite Obeginski’s argument that the trial court’s dismissal of his harassment claim
deprived the court of jurisdiction because there was no longer a live controversy, the
17
clerk’s record shows otherwise since Elizondo’s counterclaims remained regarding
who held title to the property.
Jurisdiction Related to the Trial Court’s Denial of Specific Motions
We now turn to specific motions Obeginski claims impacted the trial court’s
jurisdiction. Obeginski’s arguments that opposing counsel lacks the authority to
represent Elizondo and that the trial court committed fraud in signing an order
denying Obeginski’s Motions to Show Authority somehow negated jurisdiction are
likewise unavailing.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Regarding opposing counsel’s authority to represent Elizondo, Obeginski
invokes Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 12. That rule states,
A party in a suit or proceeding pending in a court of this state may, by
sworn written motion stating that he believes the suit or proceeding is
being prosecuted or defended without authority, cause the attorney to
be cited to appear before the court and show his authority to act. The
notice of the motion shall be served upon the challenged attorney at
least ten days before the hearing on the motion. At the hearing on the
motion, the burden of proof shall be upon the challenged attorney to
show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of
the other party. Upon his failure to show such authority, the court shall
refuse to permit the attorney to appear in the cause, and shall strike the
pleadings if no person who is authorized to prosecute or defend
appears.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 12.
Rule 12’s primary purpose is to enforce a party’s right to know who
authorized the suit. In re Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP, No. 11-21-00234-CV, 2021
18
WL 5994365, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 17, 2021, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (mem. op.), mand. denied, 672 S.W.3d 27, 27 (Tex. 2023) (orig.
proceeding); Rosa v. Dep’t of Child Support Off. of Att’y Gen., No. 02-24-00529-CV, 2025 WL 1717282, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 26, 2025, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (citations omitted); see also Angelina Cnty. v. McFarland, 374 S.W.2d
417, 423 (Tex. 1964). “Rule 12 protects parties from groundless suits and permits
dismissal of suits instituted without authority.” Rosa, 2025 WL 1717282, at *4
(citations omitted); see also Angelina Cnty., 374 S.W.2d at 422–23. “The challenged
attorney has the burden of proof to show sufficient authority to represent the client.”
In re Kinder Morgan, 2021 WL 5994365, at *2 (citations omitted). Typically, an
attorney satisfies this burden by presenting evidence that the client retained him to
provide representation in the case. See id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to show authority under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Rosa, 2025 WL
1717282, at *4; Tanner v. Black, 464 S.W.3d 23, 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, no pet.).
Application
On May 10, 2024, as Obeginski requested, the trial court considered the
Motion to Show Authority via submission, which included the above-described
evidence. From the evidence submitted, the trial court could have reasonably
determined that counsel met his burden of showing that Elizondo retained him in
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this action and that he acted with authority. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 12; In re Kinder
Morgan, 2021 WL 5994365, at *2. Based on this record, given the evidence
provided by Elizondo’s attorney, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the Motion to Show Authority or his Motion to Reconsider
Motion to Show Authority. See Rosa, 2025 WL 1717282, at *4; Tanner, 464 S.W.3d
at 26. Regarding his later-filed Motions to Show Authority, which the trial court
heard on August 23, then denied on August 25, 2024, Obeginski has failed to request,
pay for, and have the court reporter file a record of the hearing. See Tex. R. App. P.
34.6; 35.3(b) (stating reporter is responsible for filing record if a notice of appeal
has been filed, the appellant requested that the reporter’s record be prepared, and the
responsible party paid or made arrangements to pay). Without this, we presume that
the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the trial court’s denial of the Motions
to Show Authority. See In re Guardianship of Berry, 105 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (stating same in context of guardianship proceeding
and plea in abatement).
We now address Obeginski’s claim that the trial court committed fraud by
signing the order ten days before the hearing which somehow negated jurisdiction.
The clerk’s record reflects that the unsigned proposed order denying the Motion to
Show Authority was filed on April 30, 2024. The clerk’s record also reflects that the
trial court signed the Order Denying the Motion to Show Authority on May 10, 2024,
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at 10:27 a.m., which was after Obeginski’s scheduled submission. The different
dates on the signed order reflect the date it was originally filed as an unsigned
proposed order and the later date that the trial court signed it. Obeginski’s allegations
of fraud committed by the trial court are unfounded.
We have addressed Obeginski’s complaints about the denial of his multiple
Motions to Show Authority and his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. As for
the trial court’s rulings on his Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution and his
Motion to Reconsider Objection to Evidence, Obeginski does not explain how the
trial court’s rulings probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or
prevented him from properly presenting his case to the court of appeals, even if
erroneous. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). We overrule issues one through ten as they
pertain to Elizondo’s standing and the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear this case.
Notice of Trial and Final Judgment
In his brief, Obeginski also challenges the trial court’s Final Judgment,
generally contending that the trial court improperly proceeded to trial without
complying with the notice requirements in Rule 245. Obeginski claims this violated
his due process right to be heard. Even so, he has failed to challenge any specific
finding of fact related to the notice issue. See Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5, 17
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing Zagorski v. Zagorski,
116 S.W.3d 309, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)) (“[A]n
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appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence offered in a nonjury trial must
challenge specific findings of fact.”). He has also failed to designate, request or pay
the fee to ensure that a reporter’s record was filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6, 35.3(b).
Despite this Court’s correspondence dated April 1, 2025, indicating we would not
refuse to file a reporter’s record even if it was requested late, Obeginski did not take
the necessary steps to have the reporter’s record filed. See id. 34.6(b)(3), 35.3(c).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v.
Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995). Due process is satisfied when notice is
“reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988). Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 245 provides in relevant part:
The Court may set contested cases on written request of any party, or
on the court’s own motion, with reasonable notice of not less than fortyfive days to the parties of a first setting for trial, or by agreement of the
parties; provided, however, that when a case previously has been set for
trial, the Court may reset said contested case to a later date on any
reasonable notice to the parties or by agreement of the parties.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 245.
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Application
Obeginski contends that Rule 245 expressly required this matter be reset at a
“later date” on reasonable notice to the parties. We disagree, as this presupposes,
that the matter was reset from the August 26, 2024, setting. 4
The trial court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicated that this
matter was not reset on August 26, 2024. The clerk’s record supports the trial court’s
findings and conclusions, as it confirms Obeginski’s late-filed Motion to Recuse was
resolved before the scheduled trial setting of August 26, 2024, at 1:00 p.m. The
clerk’s record also shows that the trial court’s administrator emailed a copy of the
Order Denying Second Motion to Recuse to the parties before noon and confirmed
that the trial would proceed as scheduled. The record also shows that Obeginski
continued to file documents with the trial court via e-file after the trial court
confirmed that trial would proceed as scheduled, which establishes that he had
access to a computer and electronic communications. Further, to the extent that
evidence is necessary to challenge any relevant findings, absent a reporter’s record,
Obeginski is unable to do so, and we must presume that sufficient evidence was
introduced to support the trial court’s findings of fact and judgment. See In re Tyler,
4
We note this was actually the second setting since the trial court continued the matter from the original June 17, 2024, setting at Obeginski’s request.
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408 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (stating same in context of
guardianship proceeding); Nelkin v. Panzer, 833 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
On this record, we conclude the trial was not “reset” on August 26, which is
a necessary component of Obeginski’s argument that it must be moved to “a later
date.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 245. Under the circumstances, the notice provided by the
trial court was reasonably calculated to apprise the parties, including Obeginski, of
the trial proceeding as scheduled and afford them an opportunity to be heard.
See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 84; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930. Consistent with the trial
court’s findings, the clerk’s record supports that Obeginski had constructive, if not
actual knowledge, that the trial would proceed as scheduled on August 26, 2024, at
1 p.m., and his failure to appear was intentional. We overrule each of Obeginski’s
issues implicating his alleged lack of notice of the trial setting.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Obeginski’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on February 27, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 6, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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