[Cite as Meade v. Balzer, 2026-Ohio-3070.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
DEJUAN MEADE
844 US 42 North
Delaware, OH 43015
Case No. 26 CA D 05 0052
Petitioner
Opinion And Judgment Entry
VS.
Original Action: Habeas Corpus
JEFFREY C. BALZER Judgment: Denied
Delaware County Sheriff
Date of Judgment Entry: August 10, 2026
Respondent
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: Dejuan Meade, for Petitioner; Melissa A. Schiffel, Delaware County Prosecutor, Katheryn L. Munger, Assistant Prosecutor, for Respondent;
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Petitioner, Dejuan Meade, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging he
is being held by an unreasonable bond and alleging the bond condition that restricts his use
of social media violates his rights under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. We disagree.
{¶2} Petitioner faced multiple indictments stemming from a purported criminal
enterprise involving alleged fraud and the use of social media to recruit participants in
fraudulent schemes. It appears the State continues to investigate allegations against Meade and seeks new indictments as additional evidence comes to light. When a new indictment is
filed, the State dismisses the old indictment and elects to proceed on the new indictment.
Petitioner’s most recent indictment charges him with Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt
Activity, a felony of the first degree, six counts of Telecommunications Fraud, felonies of the
third, fourth, and fifth degree, twelve counts of Identity Fraud, felonies of the third, fourth,
and fifth degree, and two counts of Misuse of a Credit Card, felonies of the fourth degree.
{¶3} During the pendency of Meade’s series of cases, the State attempted to have
Meade’s bond modified or revoked multiple times. The requests for bond modification
primarily rested on allegations Petitioner was continuing to engage in criminal activity while
on bond. The State also alleged Meade mislead the trial court about where he was living,
which was a violation of the conditions of his bond. The trial court resisted modifying the
bond finding the State had not presented sufficient evidence linking Petitioner to the social
media accounts being used to recruit participants for criminal activity.
{¶4} At the third bond revocation hearing, the trial court was satisfied that the State
had presented sufficient evidence linking Petitioner to ongoing criminal activity which was
occurring while Petitioner was out on a personal recognizance bond. The trial court
specifically found “This isn’t proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and there certainly is really
good circumstantial evidence now that it is him [making the comments on social media].”
The trial court further explained, “[G]iven what’s given rise is a blatant disregard because I’ve
decided that there is sufficient linkage to what we’re seeing online to the Defendant. It’s
circumstantial evidence. There’s no doubt that it’s circumstantial, but it’s a lot of
circumstantial evidence. And it’s circumstantial evidence to me that’s very legitimate and
raises concerns, especially in light of the court’s order that he’s supposed to stay off social media.” The trial court set the bond in the current case in the amount of $200,000 with GPS
monitoring. As a further condition of bond, Petitioner is prohibited from using social media.
{¶5} Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We denied
the motion to dismiss and granted the parties leave to file additional dispositive motions and
evidence. Neither party has filed a dispositive motion, however, both parties have submitted
various filings which this court will consider in issuing this decision pursuant to Loc.R. 45(E).
{¶6} The most recent decision from the Supreme Court of Ohio regarding habeas
corpus and excessive bail established a de novo standard of appellate review. The Supreme
Court stated, “Whether a particular bail determination is unconstitutionally excessive is a
question of law appropriate for de novo review." DuBose v. McGuffey, 2022-Ohio-8, ¶ 15.
{¶7} The Supreme Court of Ohio also explained, “in an original action for a writ of
habeas corpus, an appellate court may receive evidence and exercise its own discretion
concerning a petitioner’s bail.” Mohamed v. Eckelberry, 2020-Ohio-4585, ¶ 5. This is not to say
that every case warrants review. As with any action for habeas relief, the burden is on the
petitioner to establish his right to release, Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325 (2001), and
the petitioner must demonstrate "with particularity the extraordinary circumstances entitling
him to habeas corpus relief," State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 412, 414, (1996);
DuBose, ¶ 16.
{¶8} Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubose, the Ohio Constitution was
amended to allow courts to consider public safety. This amendment provides, “When
determining the amount of bail, the court shall consider public safety, including the seriousness of the offense, and a person's criminal record, the likelihood a person will return
to court, and any other factor the general assembly may prescribe.” Ohio Const., art. I. § 9.
{¶9} Following the passage of this amendment, the Ohio Legislature enacted R.C. §
2937.011.
{¶10} Revised Code § 2937.011 provides:
(A) . . . [T]he court shall release the defendant on the least restrictive conditions that,
in the discretion of the court, will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in
court, the protection or safety of any person or the community, and that the defendant
will not obstruct the criminal justice process. If the court orders financial conditions of
release, those financial conditions shall be related to public safety, the defendant's risk
of nonappearance in court, the seriousness of the offense, and the previous criminal
record of the defendant.
(B) Any financial conditions shall be in an amount and type that are least costly to the
defendant while also sufficient to reasonably assure the defendant's future appearance
in court.
(E) . . . [I]n determining the types, amounts, and conditions of bail, the court shall
consider all relevant information, including the following:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the crime charged[;]
(2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant;
(3) The confirmation of the defendant's identity;
(4) The defendant's family ties, employment, financial resources, character,
mental condition, length of residence in the community, jurisdiction of residence,
record of convictions, record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid
prosecution;
(5) Whether the defendant is on probation [or the like][;]
(6) The considerations required under Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9.
{¶11} While the Dubose Court held the appellate standard of review for excessive bail
cases is a de novo review, this holding was issued prior to the enactment of R.C. 2937.011.
Revised Code 2937.011 allows the terms of bail to be set “in the discretion of the court.” We
question whether the enactment of R.C. 2937.011 has changed the standard of review in these
cases to an abuse of discretion standard – particularly where no new evidence has been
presented to the appellate court. Under either standard, we decline to issue the requested writ.
{¶12} In evaluating the bail set in this case under an abuse of discretion standard, we
must consider whether the trial court’s decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶13} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the bond in this
case in light of the seriousness of the offenses, the evidence that Meade violated the terms of
his initial bond, and public safety concerns.
{¶14} We now turn to consideration of the petition under a de novo standard of
review. We have reviewed the evidence presented by Petitioner and find he has failed to
present sufficient evidence establishing his right to release. The only “evidence” presented by
Petitioner is purported photocopies of his discovery from the criminal cases. Much of this
evidence is illegible. There is no explanation as to what the photocopies depict. Petitioner
argues he is not seen in the photographs which are contained in the discovery material;
however, even assuming this is true, this does not demonstrate the case against him is weak. Petitioner is charged with a conspiracy involving multiple participants. The State argues
Petitioner recruited participants on social media and that he instructed them how to commit
the fraud including advising participants on what to say and what to wear. A participant in a
conspiracy does not need to be present for every portion of the criminal activity. Petitioner
argues many of the charges against him are essentially duplicates. Again, he has presented
no actual evidence regarding this contention.
{¶15} Having considered the lack of evidence presented by petitioner, the safety of
the public, the seriousness of the offenses, Petitioner’s inability to abide by the terms of bond
previously set, and the risk of harm to the public, we find the bond of $200,000 is not
excessive.
{¶16} Petitioner also contends that the bond condition ordering him to refrain from
using social media violates his first amendment right to freedom of speech. First, we note the
restriction is only in effect should Petitioner post bond. Assuming Petitioner does post bond,
we find this restriction is narrowly tailored to protect the public from additional potential
criminality. A “[d]efendant's First Amendment right to freedom of speech is not absolute.”
State v. Eal, 2012-Ohio-1373, ¶ 104 (10th Dist.). Here, we find there is a sufficient nexus
between social media usage and the crimes charged which warrants the prohibition against
using social media to prevent the possibility of future crimes.
{¶17} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the request for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
{¶18} Costs to Petitioner.
By: Popham, J.
King, P.J. and
Hoffman, J., concur