J-S21042-26 2026 PA Super 180
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CARL ERIC GOULD :
:
Appellant : No. 1685 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 6, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0003256-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 10, 2026
Carl Gould appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing two-and-ahalf to five years’ incarceration, after a jury convicted him of possessing crack
cocaine with intent to deliver.1 He contends the suppression court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress the evidence. Because a Pennsylvania State
Trooper smelled cannabis in Gould’s vehicle and Gould had no right to possess
or use cannabis, the magisterial district court permissibly issued a search
warrant for Gould’s vehicle. Thus, we affirm.
On April 18, 2024, Gould drove a rental car through Dauphin County on
Pennsylvania Route 283, a known drug-trafficking route between the cities of
Harrisburg and Lancaster. See N.T., 4/25/24, at 7-8. Proceeding eastbound
on the divided highway, Gould stayed in the passing lane for an extended
period. A Pennsylvania State Trooper stopped him for failing to keep his car
1 See 35 P.S. § 780—113(a)(30).
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in the righthand lane.2 A dashboard camera on the trooper’s patrol car
recorded the traffic stop. See Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 at 1:00-1:55.
As the trooper approached Gould’s vehicle, Gould stuck his empty hands
out the driver’s side window. See id. at 2:47-2:52. The trooper interpreted
this gesture as indicating consciousness of guilt and a surrender, as if Gould
were offering his hands for cuffing. See N.T., 4/25/24, at 8. The trooper
walked to Gould’s passenger-side window and immediately smelled the aroma
of cannabis wafting from inside. See id. at 10-11. He asked Gould where he
was going. Gould said he was headed to Lancaster to visit a woman he met
online. See Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 at 4:15-4:40.
The trooper returned to his vehicle and ran Gould’s information through
the in-patrol-car computer. He learned that Gould was a repeat offender for
drug dealing. A few minutes later, the trooper returned to the passenger’s
side window of Gould’s rental car. He asked, “Do you have a Medical Marijuana
Card, at all? The reason I ask is [be]cause there’s a little bit of an odor of
marijuana in the car. That’s why I’m asking.” Id. at 10:25-10:33.
Gould said, “I had a person in the car; he was smoking in the car.” Id.
at 10:34-10:39. Gould then admitted that he did not have a Medical Marijuana
Card. Due to this development, the trooper directed Gould to exit the vehicle.
See id. at 10:56-11:02. Gould got out, met the trooper in front of the patrol
vehicle, and reiterated that he did not have a Medical Marijuana Card. See
2 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3313(d).
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id. at 11:14-11:16. The trooper said that, because Gould’s rental car smelled
of cannabis, and because Gould did not have a Medical Marijuana Card, “I
wouldn’t be doing my job if I didn’t ask to search your car.” Id. at 11:31-11:34. The trooper requested consent to search Gould’s car.
Gould replied, “No.” Id. at 11:59.
The trooper answered, “If you say, ‘No,’ that’s your right; I’ll explain it
to you. Okay? If you refuse the search, . . . I’m gonna tow your car back to
get a search warrant. Okay? At that point, if it’s granted, I’ll search the car.”
Id. at 12:00-12:12.
Gould still denied his consent to search the rental car. He then changed
his story regarding where he was headed. Now, Gould contended that he had
to get to Lancaster, because “I got therapy at one o’clock.” Id. at 12:30.
They then discussed what Gould would do while the police were towing
the rental car and obtaining the search warrant. The trooper informed him
that the State Police would take him to a gas station, where he could have a
friend or family member get him.
Gould asked to take his belongings from the car, and the trooper
explained that everything had to remain in the rental vehicle until after the
tow and possible search. Gould also wanted to take his two phones from the
vehicle, which the trooper refused. The trooper again asked if Gould was still
denying consent to search the rental car, and Gould said, “Get the tow truck.
This is b.s. I didn’t do anything wrong.” Id. at 16:01-16:06.
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The trooper radioed headquarters to send a tow truck to seize Gould’s
vehicle. See id. at 16:17-16:20. Twenty-six minutes later, the tow truck
arrived and took Gould’s rental car. See id. at 42:20.
Next, the trooper applied for a search warrant in the magisterial district
court. In his sworn affidavit of probable cause, the trooper, after reciting his
training and experience in drug investigations, deposed as follows:
On 04/18/23, I was on patrol working a 0600 to 1400
hour shift, utilizing a marked Pennsylvania State Police SUV
H1-28 . . .
At approximately 1103 hours, I was traveling East on
PA [Route] 283, when I observed a Gold Chevrolet Malibu
bearing Pennsylvania registration KSW0384, traveling in
front of my patrol vehicle. I observed the vehicle traveling
in the left lane while the right lane was available . . . I
conducted a query of the registration, and it was found to
be a Hertz Rental vehicle.
At approximately 1105 hours, I activated my
emergency lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop on the
above vehicle . . . The operator stuck his hands up out of
the driver’s side window, which is abnormal. I approached
the vehicle from the passenger’s side, introduced myself,
and advised the operator of the reason for the stop. The
operator provided me his Pennsylvania Driver’s License,
which identified him as Carl Gould. While speaking with
Gould, there was an odor of marijuana emanating from the
vehicle. I returned to my vehicle and conducted a query of
Gould’s criminal history, which indicated he has been
convicted for Possession With Intent To Deliver on ten (10)
separate occasions. I messaged a backup unit to come to
my stop to assist. Further, I noticed Gould was queried by
Bethlehem PSP on 01/17/23.
I approached the vehicle again and spoke with Gould.
I advised him that there was an odor of marijuana
emanating from his vehicle. Gould related that a friend was
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allegedly in the vehicle with marijuana prior to our traffic
stop, but he had just dropped him off. Gould continually
stated he does not smoke marijuana. I asked Gould if he
possessed a Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Card, at which
time he stated that he did not. I requested Gould to exit
the vehicle to speak with me.
I requested consent to search the car from Gould.
Gould denied consent to search the car. I explained the
options for Gould, at which time he reaffirmed that he was
denying consent. Gould stated he allegedly has a number
to obtain a Medical Marijuana Card but does not possess one
yet. He could not provide me proof of having the number
as he explained. I requested a tow to our location at that
time to tow the vehicle back to our barracks to apply for a
search warrant.
Tpr. Archulet transported Gould off the next exit of PA
283 East. Hershey Auto responded to the scene and towed
the vehicle back to the PSP Harrisburg barracks, located at
8000 Bretz Drive, West Hanover Township, Dauphin County.
Based upon the totality of circumstances described
within this affidavit, your affiant believes that probable
cause exists to conduct a search of the vehicle . . . .
Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1-2 (cleaned up).
The magisterial district court issued a search warrant for Gould’s rental
car. Upon execution of the warrant, the trooper discovered 19 bags of crack
cocaine and drug paraphernalia in the car.3 The police arrested Gould.
Five-and-a-half months after Gould’s formal arraignment, he filed a
facially untimely omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the Commonwealth’s
3 The warrant expressly authorized the seizure of controlled substances and
related paraphernalia, among other things related to the sale of drugs. See Warrant, 4/18/23, Attachment A, ¶5.
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evidence.4 Therein, Gould asserted (1) the trooper violated his constitutional
rights by extending the traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation and (2) the
magisterial district court erred by finding probable cause to issue the search
warrant for Gould’s rental car. The suppression court conducted a hearing on
the motion, and the trooper testified to the above facts. The suppression court
denied the motion to suppress.
Thereafter, a jury convicted and the court sentenced Gould as described
above. This timely appeal followed.
Gould raises two appellate issues:
1. Did the suppression court err when it held that there
was reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop?
4 “Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 578, unless otherwise required in the interests of justice, all pretrial requests, including a request for suppression of evidence, must be included in one omnibus pretrial motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 578, Comment. Rule 579 states that an omnibus pre-trial motion must be filed within 30 days of arraignment.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2011). Typically, an untimely motion to suppress results in wavier of the issues therein. See id.
Gould’s omnibus pretrial motion included a request for leave of court to file the untimely motion. He contended that he did not receive all of the discovery necessary to file the motion to suppress until three months after his formal arraignment. See Gould’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion at 2. Although the record contains no order or acknowledgment from the suppression court granting his request, the Commonwealth did not object to the untimeliness of the motion. Nor did it rely upon the untimeliness of Gould’s motion as a basis for the suppression court to deny suppression. Moreover, the suppression court addressed Gould’s motion on the merits. See Suppression Court’s Opinion and Order, 11/8/24. Thus, we presume the Commonwealth has acquiesced to and the suppression court impliedly granted Gould’s request for leave to file his untimely motion to suppress for the reasons that he stated therein.
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2. Did the suppression court err in determining that
there was probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant?
Gould’s Brief at 4.
First, Gould contends that the suppression court erroneously ruled the
trooper had reasonable suspicion to convert the failure-to-keep-right traffic
stop into a drug-based-investigative detention. He argues that, because the
smell of cannabis wafting from a vehicle is no longer, in and of itself, probable
cause in Pennsylvania, that same smell, standing alone, cannot serve as the
basis for reasonable suspicion. See id. at 15-17. Based on that premise,
Gould contends that the trooper unreasonably extended the traffic stop to ask
him if he had a Medical Marijuana Card. See id. at 19. He believes that the
trooper had to write him a citation or warning when the trooper first returned
to his patrol car, return his license and registration to him, and let him proceed
upon his way to Lancaster. We disagree.
Initially, we observe Gould does not claim he is entitled to heightened
protections under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 5
Thus, we must treat the protections contained in our state charter as
coextensive with those found in the federal constitution. As a result, this
Court will apply federal constitutional law in conducting our review.
5 See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (holding that
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may, in certain cases, provide a party with greater rights than Constitution of the United States and laying out the test to determine if those greater rights exist).
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In his first issue, Gould challenges an act of law enforcement that
occurred prior to securing a warrant. Where the challenged law-enforcement
action occurred without a warrant, the suppression court’s “determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on
appeal.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). That said,
“a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact
only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those
facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)).
If the trooper had seized Gould’s person at the time he questioned Gould
concerning the Medical Marijuana Card, the trooper’s “conduct in doing so was
constitutional only if [he] reasonably suspected [Gould] of wrongdoing.”
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980). “Obviously, not
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of
persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude
that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
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An investigatory detention occurs whenever “a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.” Commonwealth v. Livingstone,
A.3d 609, 619 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
Here, the trooper took Gould’s license and registration from him to do a
background check into Gould’s criminal history. After doing so, the trooper
returned to Gould’s rental car, failed to return the license and registration,
and began questioning him about the cannabis smell in the rental car. A
reasonable person in Gould’s position at the time that the trooper started to
question him about the smell of cannabis would not believe he was free to
leave, because the trooper had not returned the documentation needed to
drive away. See Livingstone. Thus, Gould was “seized” for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and the trooper’s interrogation of him concerning the
smell of cannabis “was constitutional only if [the trooper] reasonably
suspected [Gould] of wrongdoing,” under Terry. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
552.
The Supreme Court has held that a traffic “stop exceeding the time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). An initially constitutional traffic stop may
become unconstitutional if law enforcement “prolong[s it] beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the
violation.” Id. at 350–51.
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Yet, “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations
that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Id. at 354. “An officer, in
other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful
traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent
the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual.” Id. at 355.
Gould rightly contends that, after the trooper returned to his patrol
vehicle, the trooper had sufficient time to issue Gould a ticket or warning for
driving in the left-hand lane. Thus, the record indicates that, when the trooper
returned to Gould’s rental car and decided to start questioning him about the
smell of cannabis in the car, the trooper deviated into a drug investigation
that was unrelated to the purposes of the initial traffic stop. Hence, Gould is
correct that the trooper extended the detention of Gould’s person beyond the
time necessary to complete the traffic stop. Nevertheless, like the suppression
court, we conclude that the trooper’s decision to extend the traffic stop to
inquire into the smell of cannabis was based upon reasonable suspicion that
other crimes may have been afoot.
“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is an inherently fluid
concept. It deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016, 1032 (Pa. 2025) (quoting
Ornelas, supra) (citations and some punctations omitted). “As such,
reasonable suspicion is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
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legal rules.” Id. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has “rejected
rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more
flexible, all-things-considered approach.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237,
244 (2013).
A trooper has reasonable suspicion if he possesses “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380, (2020). While a mere hunch
does not create reasonable suspicion, “the level of suspicion the standard
requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id.
“The reasonable suspicion inquiry ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy
. . . .” Id. at 381. Courts “must permit officers to make commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Id. at 380.
In this case, the trooper smelled the odor of cannabis emanating from
inside Gould’s rental car both times he approached it. The trooper also took
the time to investigate Gould’s criminal history and learned that he had a
string of prior drug-trafficking convictions. Furthermore, the trooper knew
from his experience and training that Gould was driving a car that did not
belong to him on a main drug-trafficking route between Harrisburg and
Lancaster. Additionally, the trooper knew that the state police had recently
also ran Gould’s plates on Interstate 71, near Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. That
interstate, the trooper knew, was another major drug-trafficking route out of
Harrisburg.
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Based on this totality of the circumstances before him, the trooper could
rationally suspect that Gould might well have been in the process of moving
cannabis from Harrisburg to Lancaster. It was perfectly logical, based on the
trooper’s training, experience in the field of drug interdiction, and knowledge
to convert the traffic stop into a drug-investigative detention. The trooper
was within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment when he detained Gould for
a few more seconds to ask him if he had a Medical Marijuana Card. Such an
inquiry was perfectly legitimate police work, because the trooper knew that,
if Gould had the requested card, he was required to carry the card with him.
If Gould had a Medical Marijuana Card on him, the smell of cannabis would
have had a legal explanation, thereby dispelling the trooper’s suspicion of a
potential ongoing crime.
But, absent such a card, the smell would have created probable cause
that a crime of delivering or using cannabis was potentially in progress,
because, without such a card, a person may not legally possess or consume
cannabis in this Commonwealth. Cannabis remains a scheduled, controlled
substance. See 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(iv).
Thus, we hold that the trooper did not violate Gould’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures of his person, when the
trooper detained Gould for a few moments to ask him whether he had a
Medical Marijuana Card. We dismiss Gould’s first appellate issue as meritless.
As his second issue, Gould contends that, based on all the arguments
that he asserted in his first appellate issue, “the issuance of a warrant for
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probable cause faces the same analytical problems as the reasonable
suspicion analysis.” Gould’s Brief at 22. If that were true, we would have
reversed the order denying suppression based on Gould’s first claim of error.
Indeed, Gould’s contention that the magisterial district court erroneously
issued the search warrant fairs no better than his claim that the trooper lacked
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.
Because the trooper obtained a search warrant prior to searching the
rental car, our standard of review shifts to one of deference to the magisterial
district court. “[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an
affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by
reviewing courts.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (emphasis
added). “A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants
. . . is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate
warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hyper technical, rather than a
commonsense, manner.” Id. (cleaned up). “If the affidavits submitted by
police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed
appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope
of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might
develop at the time of the search.” Id.
Thus, because the trooper took the time to seek pre-search judicial
authorization of his conduct, the federal constitution rewards his patience and
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adherence to proper procedure. As a result, this Court does not review the
underlying question (as Gould incorrectly frames it) of whether the trooper
had probable cause to search his car. The Fourth Amendment committed that
determination solely to the magisterial district court, when the trooper applied
for the search warrant.
Instead, our “standard for review of an issuing magistrate’s probablecause determination [is whether] the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, [because]
the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id. (some punctuation omitted).
As mentioned, by the time the trooper towed Gould’s rental car and
petitioned the magisterial district court for a search warrant, Gould admitted
that he did not have a Medical Marijuana Card. We hold that such knowledge
by law enforcement, when coupled with the fact that police smell cannabis
wafting from a suspect’s vehicle, give the magisterial district court “a
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing” inside the vehicle. Id. As we have explained above, a person
who does not have a Medical Marijuana Card has no right to possess or use
cannabis in this Commonwealth. Therefore, the holding in Commonwealth
v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021) – i.e., that the smell of cannabis alone is
insufficient to form probable cause – has no bearing on this case. Gould’s
reliance upon Barr to attempt to undermine the magisterial district court’s
finding of probable cause is misplaced.
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Because the odor of cannabis was emanating from Gould’s vehicle with
only one occupant, an occupant who conceded he had no right to possess
cannabis, the magisterial district judge reasonably could have inferred that
(1) there may have been cannabis in Gould’s rental car and (2) the search
would have uncovered it. Hence, the magisterial district court rationally could
have believed that the search of Gould’s rental car would uncover cannabis
that Gould had no right to possess.
Thus, under the Gates Court’s deferential standard of review for the
magisterial district court’s probable-cause determinations, the suppression
court correctly rejected Gould’s second argument in his motion to suppress.
We dismiss Gould’s second appellate issue as meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/10/2026
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