[Cite as State v. Niro, 2026-Ohio-3067.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-L-0001 CITY OF EASTLAKE,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the
Willoughby Municipal Court
- vs -MEGAN L. NIRO, Trial Court No. 2025 CRB 01708
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 10, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Jacqueline O’Donnell, City of Eastlake Prosecutor, 35150 Lakeshore Boulevard, Eastlake, OH 44095 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Cory R. Hinton, Hanahan & Hinton, L.L.C., 7351 Center Street, Suite 1, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Megan L. Niro, appeals her conviction for domestic violence
following a bench trial in the Willoughby Municipal Court.
{¶2} Appellant raises a single assignment of error, arguing that her conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
assignment of error is without merit. Appellant has not established that the trier of fact
clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting her of domestic violence. Rather, Appellant appears to be attempting to improperly raise a selfdefense claim for the first time on appeal.
{¶4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Willoughby Municipal Court.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} Appellant was convicted of committing domestic violence against her
husband, S.N., on August 26, 2025, at their family home in Eastlake, Ohio.
{¶6} The couple had been separated for nearly two years. However, they had
agreed that on days S.N. worked, Appellant would take their two young children to school
and pick them up after school. That morning, S.N. left for work with the understanding
that Appellant would wake up the children and take them to school. While he was at work,
S.N. received several calls from the school because the children did not arrive and no
one contacted school officials. S.N. tried to call Appellant several times but she did not
answer.
{¶7} S.N. left work and drove home. After he arrived home, S.N. went to an
upstairs bedroom and saw that everyone was still asleep. S.N. woke everyone up and
told the children to get ready for school. Appellant was sitting in a recliner, and she and
S.N. began arguing. S.N. asked Appellant to leave the house three to four times, but she
did not.
{¶8} According to S.N., he kicked the recliner to “kind of jostle” Appellant, i.e.,
“to get her to get up.” Appellant stood up, and she and S.N. continued arguing. Appellant
pushed S.N., which caused him to knock into one of the children. Appellant tried pushing
S.N. again, at which point she grabbed his neck and scratched it. S.N. grabbed
Appellant’s hands to restrain her. As he did so, he pushed Appellant backwards, causing
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her to hit the wall and leave a dent. S.N. pushed Appellant into a bedroom to “get her out
of the way.” Appellant angrily approached S.N. and took “a couple of swings,” striking the
right side of his head. S.N. was then able to “break free,” at which time he went downstairs
and called 911. According to S.N., he sustained scratches to his neck, jaw line, and lower
back from Appellant’s fingernails.
{¶9} Patrolmen Nagy from the Eastlake Police Department responded to the call.
He encountered S.N. sitting in the front yard speaking on the phone with 911 dispatchers.
He observed that S.N. had “fresh, red” scratches on his cheek and neck.
{¶10} Appellant exited the residence and began yelling at Patrolman Nagy.
Patrolman Nagy advised Appellant to stand by the garage door, but she refused.
Appellant used vulgar language, said she was going to leave, and opened the driver’s
side door of a vehicle parked in the driveway. Patrolman Nagy pulled Appellant out of the
vehicle, closed the door, and told her that she was not free to leave. He instructed
Appellant to turn around and put her hands behind her back. Appellant did not comply
and instead tensed up and her arms and flailed them around. Patrolman Nagy attempted
to radio other responding officers for assistance, but he was not able to “key up” his
microphone and control Appellant’s arms. Patrolman Nagy took himself and Appellant
“to ground” to be “able to better control the situation.”
{¶11} Patrolman Mastrocola arrived and ran over to assist Patrolman Nagy. The
two officers attempted to handcuff Appellant’s arms behind her back, but she would not
comply. The officers eventually succeeded in handcuffing Appellant. Patrolman Nagy
told Appellant that she was under arrest and placed her in the back of his police cruiser.
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Patrolman Nagy transported Appellant to the police department and booked her into jail,
while Patrolman Mastrocola stayed at the residence and investigated the incident.
{¶12} Patrolman Mastrocola spoke with S.N. and obtained his statement. The
officer observed “fresh red marks” on S.N.’s cheek, neck, and Adam’s apple. The officer
took photographs of the red marks and had S.N. prepare a written statement. Appellant’s
parents arrived to take care of the children, and Appellant returned to work.
{¶13} The next day, on August 27, 2025, three complaints were filed in the
Willoughby Municipal Court charging Appellant with domestic violence, a first-degree
misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) (count 1); obstructing official business, a
second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2921.31 (count 2); and resisting arrest,
a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A) (count 3).
{¶14} On the same date, Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
{¶15} On December 2, 2025, the matter was tried to the bench. The State
presented testimony from S.N. and Patrolmen Nagy and Mastrocola. As exhibits, the
State submitted the recording of the 911 call and photographs of S.N.’s injuries. After the
State’s case-in-chief, Appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial
court denied. Appellant rested and renewed her Crim.R. 29 motion, which the trial court
denied.
{¶16} The trial court found Appellant guilty on all three charges and ordered her
to immediately report to the probation department for a drug screen. Appellant tested
positive for cocaine. The trial court then proceeded to sentencing. On count 1 (domestic
violence), the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in jail, with 177 days suspended
and credit for three days, a $250 fine, and costs. On count 2 (obstructing official business)
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and count 3 (resisting arrest), the trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent sentences
of 90 days in jail with 80 days suspended. The trial court also imposed 12 months of
community control.
{¶17} On January 2, 2026, Appellant timely appealed her domestic violence
conviction and raises a single assignment of error.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶18} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: “The jury’s finding of guilt and
[Appellant’s] subsequent conviction for Domestic Violence was contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence; therefore, [Appellant’s] conviction for said charge should be
overturned, and [Appellant] should be remanded to the trial court for a determination
consistent with this ruling.”
{¶19} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing
belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25. “[A] reviewing court asks whose evidence
is more persuasive—the [S]tate’s or the defendant’s?” Id. In considering whether a
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “‘[t]he court, reviewing the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact]
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio- 52, ¶ 24,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “‘The discretionary
power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting Martin at 175.
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{¶20} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), which provides, “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to a family or household member.” Appellant argues that the trial court
should have found S.N. to be the “primary aggressor” and that Appellant’s resulting
conduct was “justified.” According to Appellant, S.N.’s testimony demonstrates that she
only struck him in the face after S.N. violently kicked her chair, blocked her in the hallway,
and threw her into a wall.
{¶21} S.N.’s testimony indicates that he likely contributed to escalating the
situation; however, it does not compel the conclusion that Appellant merely reacted to
S.N.’s conduct. In addition, R.C. 2919.25 does not exclude a conduct from a non-primary
aggressor. To the extent Appellant is arguing that her actions were legally excused as
self-defense, she may not raise that claim for the first time on appeal. See State v. Myles,
2013-Ohio-1821, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.)
{¶22} Appellant next argues that S.N. was not injured as a result of her conduct.
In support, she cites S.N.’s trial testimony that he did not receive medical attention and
that he went back to work.
{¶23} R.C. 2919.25(A) encompasses both “caus[ing]” and “attempt[ing] to cause”
“physical harm.” Therefore, S.N. did not have to sustain actual injuries. See State v.
Chasteen, 2025-Ohio-5546, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (actual injuries not required for conviction). In
addition, “‘[p]hysical harm to persons’ means any injury, illness, or other physiological
impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
Therefore, even if S.N. sustained only minor injuries, they qualified as “physical harm.”
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State v. Hamrick, 2017-Ohio-323, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.) (a minor injury constitutes physical
harm).
{¶24} Appellant has not shown that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created
a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting her of domestic violence. Accordingly,
Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶25} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Willoughby Municipal Court
is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s assignment of error
is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Willoughby Municipal Court is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against Appellant.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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