FILED
Aug 10 2026, 9:15 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Cavallo Stable, LLC and Aleksandra Karl, Individually,
Appellants-Defendants
v.
Schwartz Boarding Farm, LLC,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 10, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-PL-3120
Appeal from the Adams Circuit Court
The Honorable Chad E. Kukelhan, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
01C01-2506-PL-18
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges Kenworthy and DeBoer concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 1 of 8
Mathias, Judge.
[1] The Adams Circuit Court issued a default judgment in favor of Schwartz
Boarding Farm, LLC, (“Schwartz”) and awarded damages in the amount of
$94,779.72 plus attorney fees and costs against Cavallo Stable, LLC and
Aleksandra Karl (collectively “the Appellants”). The Appellants filed a Trial
Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied. The
Appellants appeal and raise three issues, but we address only the following
dispositive issue: whether the trial court’s judgment is void for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the Appellants.
[2] We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On June 13, 2025, Schwartz filed a complaint for damages against the
Appellants claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The
complaint alleged that Schwartz and the Appellants had entered into a contract
for horse boarding and training services in December 2020. Specifically,
Schwartz had agreed to perform the services for Cavallo. Karl signed the
contract as the “owner” of Cavallo. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 22.
[4] In its complaint, Schwartz claimed that, in May 2023, the Appellants ceased
making payments to Schwartz despite repeated requests. Schwartz further
alleged that the Appellants had continually told Schwartz that payment was
forthcoming, but Schwartz never received any promised payment. And
Schwartz alleged that the Appellants’ outstanding balance owed under the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 2 of 8
contract was $31,593.24. Also, under the conversion count, Schwartz requested
treble damages.
[5] The Appellants did not file an answer or other responsive pleading to
Schwartz’s complaint. On August 11, Schwartz filed a motion for default
judgment. Schwartz alleged that it had made reasonable efforts to perfect
service on the Appellants and, “as a result of [the Appellants’] evasiveness,”
“the Court should deem service perfected upon [the Appellants] as of June 25,
2025.” Id. at 24-25. With the motion, Schwartz attached a certified mailing
marked as “refused.” Id. at 28. But the mailing does not include the name or
address of the person to whom it was sent; instead, it only has a QR code (or
similar type code). Id. Schwartz also attached tracking information for a
“shipment” to a Richton Park, Illinois, address, but there is nothing in that
document linking that tracking information to the certified mailing. Id. at 29.
[6] The trial court granted the motion for default judgment and scheduled a
damages hearing. The Appellants did not appear at that hearing. After the
hearing, the trial court granted Schwartz’s request for treble damages and issued
a judgment against Cavallo and Karl, “jointly and severally,” in the amount of
$94,779.72 plus attorney fees and court costs. Id. at 15.
[7] Two months later, on November 11, the Appellants filed a motion for relief
from judgment alleging that the default judgment and corresponding damages
award were void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 30. The Appellants
argued that they were never served process and had no actual or constructive
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 3 of 8
knowledge of the proceedings. The Appellants stated that they did not refuse
service of Schwartz’s complaint, and Schwartz’s “mere reliance on a stamped
envelope and USPS tracking screen is insufficient” to establish sufficient service
of process. Id. at 31. The Appellants claimed they learned of the judgment on
November 3 “when they were informed by the United States Trotting
Association that a judgment was in place.” Id. The trial court denied the
Appellants’ motion on November 20, and this appeal ensued.
The default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
[8] The Appellants claim that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for
relief from judgment because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
them. “[W]hile the decision to set aside a default judgment is largely the
province of the trial court, Indiana disfavors default judgments and prefers
resolution of a cause on its merits.” King v. United Leasing, Inc., 765 N.E.2d
1287, 1289-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling
on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and will reverse
only when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
inferences before it. Munster Cmty. Hosp. v. Bernacke, 874 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). But “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is a question of law.” LinkAmerica
Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 2006). “As with other questions of law,
a determination of the existence of personal jurisdiction is entitled to de novo
review by appellate courts.” Id. “We do not defer to the trial court’s legal
conclusion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 4 of 8 [9] We also observe that, where “only a paper record has been presented to the trial
court, we are in as good a position as the trial court to determine the existence
of jurisdictional facts and will employ de novo review as to those facts.” Munster
v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Here, the trial court’s Trial
Rule 60(B) judgment was based solely on a paper record, and, therefore, we
employ a de novo review as to the jurisdictional facts.
[10] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides: “On motion and upon such terms as are just
the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment,
including a judgment by default, for the following reasons: . . . (6) the judgment
is void.” “[A] judgment entered where there has been no service of process is
void for want of personal jurisdiction.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d
753, 759 (Ind. 2014).
[11] “The existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is . . . a constitutional
requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id.
“Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative
process and render a valid judgment over a person.” Keesling v. Winstead, 858
N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). Without effective
service of process, a trial court does not obtain personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. Goodson v. Carlson, 888 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[12] Because the Appellants challenged personal jurisdiction, Schwartz had to
present evidence that it established the court’s personal jurisdiction over the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 5 of 8
Appellants. See Norris v. Personal Fin., 957 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). However, the Appellants ultimately bore “‘the burden of proving the
lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, unless that
lack is apparent on the face of the complaint.’” See id. (quoting LePore v. Norwest
Bank Ind., N.A., 860 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
[13] Schwartz claimed that it served its complaint and summons in compliance with
Indiana Trial Rule 4.1(A)(1), which provides:
[s]ervice may be made upon an individual, or an individual
acting in a representative capacity, by . . . sending a copy of the
summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other
public means by which a written acknowledgement of receipt
may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business
or employment with return receipt requested and returned
showing receipt of the letter . . . .
[14] A person served with a complaint and summons in a manner that complies
with the Trial Rules has a duty “to cooperate, accept service, comply with the
provisions of these rules, and, when service is made upon him personally,
acknowledge receipt of the papers in writing over his signature.” T.R. 4.16(A).
“A person who has refused to accept the offer or tender of the papers being
served thereafter may not challenge the service of those papers.” T.R.
4.16(A)(2).
[15] Here, with its motion for default judgment, Schwartz submitted a copy of a
certified mailing that had been stamped “refused.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p.
28. Schwartz also submitted a purported tracking information for the certified
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 6 of 8
letter, which states it was available for pick up on June 20, 2025, and refused on
June 25. Id. at 29.
[16] However, the certified mailing submitted with the motion for default judgment
did not contain the name or address of the person or organization that it was
sent to. Id. at 28. There is simply a QR code (or similar type code) on the
mailing. Id. And the tracking information for the “shipment” does not have any
identifying information connecting the tracking information to the certified
mailing. Id. at 29. With the Appellants’ motion for relief from judgment, Karl,
both individually and as the manager of Cavallo Stable, submitted an affidavit
swearing that she never received or refused any certified mailing between June
20 and 25, 2025. Id. at 36. Karl swore that she had “no knowledge of the
existence of this case prior to November 3, 2025.” Id. Karl also stated that, to
the best of her knowledge, no person authorized to receive service on behalf of
Cavallo Stable, LLC, had knowledge of the case prior to November 3 or
received or refused a certified mailing between June 20 through 25. Id. at 36-37.
[17] Accordingly, we must conclude that Schwartz failed to present evidence to
establish that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the Appellants. An
unidentifiable certified mailing and the tracking document for a “shipment,”
which contains no information linking the tracking information to the certified
mailing, does not constitute adequate proof of service of process. Cf. King, 765
N.E.2d at 1290-91. Therefore, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the Appellants, and the default judgment entered against them is void. Thus,
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 7 of 8
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Appellants’ motion for
relief from judgment. See Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 759.
[18] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Lucas M. Ainsworth
DeVoss, Baker, Ainsworth & Razo, P.C.
Decatur, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Clayton J. Lengerich
Miller, Burry & Brown, P.C.
Decatur, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-3120 August 10, 2026 Page 8 of 8