[Cite as State v. Dhimal, 2026-Ohio-3059.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2026-01-005
Appellee, :
OPINION AND
v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
8/10/26
ACHYUT DHIMAL, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2024-02-0297
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.
OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Achyut Dhimal appeals an order issued by the trial court authorizing the
involuntary administration of psychiatric medication. Finding no error, we affirm.
Butler CA2026-01-005
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} In March 2024, a Butler County grand jury indicted Achyut Dhimal on one
count of burglary, one count of kidnapping, one count of abduction, and one count of
gross sexual imposition. The charges arose from allegations that Dhimal slipped under a
partially open garage door into a home in Monroe, moved a cordless drill from the garage
to the spot where he left his backpack and shoes near an interior doorway, and wrestled
with and groped a young woman who was asleep in the basement.
{¶ 3} At his arraignment, Dhimal filed a suggestion of incompetency and entered
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. After a hearing in April 2024, the trial court found
him incompetent to stand trial and ordered him into treatment. A review hearing in
February 2025 found his competency restored, but in May 2025 the court determined that
he had decompensated and was again unable to stand trial. The State then moved to
have the court retain jurisdiction under R.C. 2945.39. Following a hearing in June 2025,
the court granted the motion under R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) and ordered Dhimal placed at
Summit Behavioral Healthcare. Dhimal appealed that order, and we affirmed. State v.
Dhimal, 2026-Ohio-1805 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 4} While Dhimal was hospitalized, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. James Xidas,
asked the court by a December 2, 2025 letter to authorize the involuntary administration
of 60 medications. The court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on December 19,
2025. Dhimal attended with appointed counsel. The court admitted Dr. Xidas's letter as a
joint exhibit, and Dr. Xidas was the only witness.
{¶ 5} Dr. Xidas testified that Dhimal had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and
that, after his placement at Summit, Dhimal had been taking his medication and was
generally calm. In the weeks before the hearing, however, Dhimal's paranoia and
agitation increased. He became violent and threatening, throwing or attempting to flip
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furniture, threatening to kill Dr. Xidas and other staff, at times requiring the presence of
police, making inappropriate sexual comments, and claiming that he was God. According
to Dr. Xidas, Dhimal would not meaningfully discuss his treatment and could not give
informed consent to it, the requested medications were the least intrusive means of
treating him, and their benefits outweighed their risks. Dr. Xidas explained that the
medications were needed both to treat Dhimal's illness and to keep him from harming
himself or others. Dr. Xidas said that he did not intend to administer all 60 medications he
listed. He included all the medications that might be appropriate so that if a change was
necessary, it could be implemented without the delay of seeking court authorization. Dr.
Xidas also stated the medications on the list would be administered progressively, with
those medications presenting the least risks being administered before medications with
greater risks.
{¶ 6} On December 22, 2025, the trial court issued an order authorizing
involuntary administration of medication. Relying on Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community
Mental Health Bd., 90 Ohio St.3d 176, 2000-Ohio-47, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Dhimal lacked the capacity to give or withhold informed consent
to treatment, that the medication was in his best interest, and that no less intrusive
treatment would be as effective. It authorized Summit to administer 59 of the 60 requested
medications (prohibiting one), gradually and as necessary, to treat Dhimal's illness and
the behaviors creating a risk of harm to himself and others.
{¶ 7} Dhimal appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} The forcible injection of mind-altering drugs into a nonconsenting person's
body "represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty." Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). And the Ohio Supreme Court has described the right
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to refuse medical treatment as "a fundamental right in our country, where personal
security, bodily integrity, and autonomy are cherished liberties." Steele, 90 Ohio St.3d at
180. Because the stakes are high, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that an order
authorizing the forced medication of a defendant is final and immediately appealable.
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 2001-Ohio-93, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Dhimal's appeal is properly before us, and we address his two assignments of error in
turn.
A. The Requirement to Appoint an Independent Psychiatrist
{¶ 9} The first assignment of error alleges:
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DHIMAL OF HIS DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVES WHEN
IT FAILED TO APPOINT AN INDEPENDENT
PSYCHIATRIST TO EVALUATE HIM, REVIEW THE
PROPOSED MEDICATION PLAN, AND FILE A REPORT.
{¶ 10} Dhimal contends in the first assignment of error that the trial court deprived
him of procedural due process and departed from the directives of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Steele, when it ordered him forcibly medicated without first appointing an
independent psychiatrist to examine him, evaluate the proposed medication plan, and
report to the court.
1. Standard of Review
{¶ 11} A trial court's decision to grant a request to change the conditions of a
committed person's confinement, including a request to administer medication by force,
is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jung, 132 Ohio App.3d 369, 372
(6th Dist. 1999), citing State v. Johnson, 32 Ohio St.3d 109, 112-113 (1987). Dhimal,
however, does not challenge the trial court's exercise of discretion or the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting its findings. He raises a purely legal question, namely, whether
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the court was obligated to appoint an independent psychiatrist before ruling on Summit
Behavioral's request. Questions of law, including questions of procedural due process,
are reviewed de novo.
{¶ 12} We note at the outset a problem of preservation. Dhimal was present at the
December 19, 2025 hearing with appointed counsel. He received notice, cross-examined
Dr. Xidas, and had every opportunity to be heard. At no point did he request an
independent expert evaluation, object to the absence of one, or otherwise alert the trial
court to the argument he now makes. He has therefore forfeited all but plain error. Dhimal
implicitly concedes as much, for his argument is that the trial court was required to appoint
an independent psychiatrist sua sponte. As explained below, that argument fails under
any standard of review, so we need not decide how demanding the plain-error inquiry
would be in a proceeding that, though arising in a criminal case, is civil in nature. See
State v. Williams, 2010-Ohio-2453, syllabus; Dhimal, 2026-Ohio-1805, at ¶ 41, fn. 7 (12th
Dist.).
2. The Governing Substantive Framework
{¶ 13} Because the trial court retained jurisdiction over Dhimal under R.C. 2945.39
after finding him incompetent and unrestorable, this is not a case in which medication is
sought to restore a defendant's competency to stand trial. Instead, the request here was
made to treat Dhimal's mental illness and to address behavior endangering himself and
others. That is the territory of Steele, which holds that a court may authorize hospital
employees to administer antipsychotic drugs over the wishes of an involuntarily
committed mentally ill person if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that "(1) the
patient does not have the capacity to give or withhold informed consent regarding his/her
treatment, (2) it is in the patient's best interest to take the medication, i.e., the benefits of
the medication outweigh the side effects, and (3) no less intrusive treatment will be as
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effective in treating the mental illness." Steele, 90 Ohio St.3d at paragraph six of the
syllabus. The trial court expressly made all three findings, and Dhimal does not contest
them. His sole complaint is procedural. He contends that Steele also required the trial
court, on its own initiative, to appoint an independent psychiatrist to examine him,
evaluate Dr. Xidas's proposed treatment, and report to the court.
3. Steele Supplies the Governing Procedural Framework
{¶ 14} A state's parens patriae power "allows it to care for citizens who are unable
to take care of themselves." Id. at 185, citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979). Because the trial court invoked this power, making the three findings prescribed
by paragraph six of the Steele syllabus, the procedural discussion in Part V of Steele is
relevant to this case. That discussion distinguishes the police-power route, under which
"a trained physician determines the relevant facts," from the parens patriae route, under
which the forced-medication determination "is a uniquely judicial function." Id. at 189. It is
for that judicial function that the Supreme Court described the procedures Dhimal invokes:
appointed counsel if the patient is unrepresented, notice of all hearings, the opportunity
to be present, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the appointment
of an independent psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist and a licensed physician
"to examine the patient, to evaluate the recommended treatment, and to report such
findings and conclusions to the court." Id. at 189-190.
{¶ 15} The State urges us to disregard that discussion as dicta because it was not
carried into the syllabus. Under the reporting rules in effect when Steele was decided in
2000, the syllabus stated the law. See Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124
(1934), paragraph one of the syllabus. And the current rule treating the entire opinion as
authoritative, Rep.Op.R. 2.2, cannot be applied retrospectively. See LGR Realty, Inc. v.
Frank & London Ins. Agency, 2018-Ohio-334, ¶ 18. The discussion also addressed an
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issue the Steele court acknowledged was "not raise[d]" by the parties. Steele at 189. But
we agree that "[a] healthy regard should be maintained for considered dicta" of the
Supreme Court, and that a court disregarding such guidance "would be treading on
dangerous and unstable ground." (Emphasis sic.) State v. Boggs, 89 Ohio App.3d 206,
213 (4th Dist. 1993). We need not determine how much weight to give the discussion,
because Dhimal's argument fails even if we assume that Part V of Steele governs a
parens patriae medication proceeding involving a person committed under R.C. 2945.39.
{¶ 16} The key question is what Part V requires. In Steele itself, the independent
psychiatrist entered the case by operation of the civil-commitment statute, R.C. 5122.14,
at the commitment stage, and later testified at the forced-medication hearing. Steele, 90
Ohio St.3d at 178-179. After describing the requisite procedures, the court reviewed the
record and concluded that "the procedures followed by the probate court were sufficient."
Id. at 190. It rejected brightline rules, observing that each forced-medication case is
unique, that it would "not set specific guidelines" beyond periodic review, and that a court
"may implement additional procedures to protect the patient's rights as the court sees fit."
Id.
{¶ 17} Part V, in short, describes the elements of a constitutionally adequate
process. It does not establish a checklist whose omission renders an order void without
regard to whether the protection was ever sought, and it nowhere addresses the situation
presented here, in which a represented patient, with notice and full participation through
counsel, never requests the evaluation. Procedural due process rights secure an
opportunity, and a party who has the opportunity to exercise procedural rights but declines
to do so has not been denied due process. See State v. Brotherton, 2024-Ohio-5045, ¶
19-20 (12th Dist.). Were the rule otherwise, any patient could remain silent, await the
outcome, and claim automatic reversal. We recognize the concern that a person adjudged
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to lack capacity to make treatment decisions cannot personally waive a safeguard
designed to check his treating physician. But Steele answers that concern with the
mandatory provision of counsel, whose decisions are subject to review, as Dhimal's
second assignment of error illustrates.
{¶ 18} The case law confirms this understanding. In Jung, 132 Ohio App.3d at 371
(6th Dist.), the trial court "granted appellant's request for an independent psychiatric
evaluation at the state's expense" and withheld its decision until the report arrived. In
State v. Rowe, 2006-Ohio-1883, ¶ 39-40 (3d Dist.), the defendant "filed a motion to have
a licensed expert appointed," the trial court denied it, and the appellate court reversed
because the defendant "was improperly denied access to an independent expert
evaluation." Rowe establishes that a court may not refuse a committed person's request
for an independent evaluation before ordering forced medication. No Ohio court has held
that an order is invalid because the trial court failed to require an evaluation that no one
sought. Dhimal was not denied access to anything.
4. The Statutory Scheme Points the Same Way
{¶ 19} The structure of R.C. 2945.401 reinforces our reading of Steele. R.C.
2945.401(B) states that a commitment under R.C. 2945.39 (incompetent to stand trial) or
2945.40 (not guilty by reason of insanity) may not be changed "except by order of the trial
court." R.C. 2945.401(B). And courts have held that a facility's request for authority to
medicate a committed person by force is a recommended change in the conditions of
commitment. Jung at 372; Rowe at ¶ 36. At any hearing held under division (C) or (D)(1)
or (2) of R.C. 2945.401, the person has "all the rights of a defendant or person at a
commitment hearing as described in section 2945.40 of the Revised Code," R.C.
2945.401(F), which includes "[t]he right to have independent expert evaluation and to
have that independent expert evaluation provided at public expense if the person is
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indigent," R.C. 2945.40(C)(2). Because R.C. 2945.401 governs persons committed under
R.C. 2945.39 and R.C. 2945.40 in identical terms, Rowe is not distinguishable on the
ground that it involved a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.
{¶ 20} There is a textual wrinkle. R.C. 2945.401(D)(1) contemplates a
recommendation by "the designee of the department of mental health and addiction
services or the managing officer of the institution or director of the facility or program,"
made "after evaluating the risks to public safety and the welfare of the defendant or
person," and the request here was conveyed by Dr. Xidas, a staff psychiatrist. But the
request was captioned, litigated, and decided as Summit Behavioral Healthcare's
request, presented through the letter admitted as a joint exhibit, and nothing in the statute
requires that the facility's recommendation issue over the managing officer's personal
signature rather than through the treating physician who authored it. Nothing in the record
suggests Dr. Xidas acted without institutional authority. The statutory phrase "at any time
after evaluating the risks to public safety and the welfare of the defendant" describes the
deliberation that precedes and permits a recommendation, not a pleading requirement,
and Dr. Xidas's testimony recounting Dhimal's escalating dangerousness and
deteriorating condition documents such an evaluation. In any event, even if the December
19 hearing fell outside R.C. 2945.401(D)(1), the consequence would not help Dhimal. His
procedural rights would then rest on due process alone, that is, on Steele, and would fail
for the reasons already given. The trial court's authority to act would remain under R.C.
2945.401(B) and Steele itself. See Rowe at ¶ 42 (stating that the Revised Code confers
no special forced-medication powers in this setting; Steele supplies the governing
standards).
{¶ 21} Where the General Assembly wanted independent review to occur
automatically, it said so: a recommendation for nonsecured status or termination of
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commitment triggers a mandatory evaluation by the local forensic center without any
request by anyone. R.C. 2945.401(D)(1)(b). For other hearings, including this one, the
legislature conferred an independent-evaluation right that the court must announce and
the person may exercise, listing it in R.C. 2945.40(C) alongside the rights to subpoena
witnesses, present evidence, and testify or decline to testify—rights that are the person's
to invoke. Having expressly displaced the probate procedures of R.C. Chapters 5122 and
5123 for hearings under R.C. Chapter 2945, R.C. 2945.401(B), the legislature chose the
inform-and-invoke model over the automatic-appointment model for forced-medication
requests. We note that if the hearing was one to which R.C. 2945.40(C) applied, the trial
court was required to inform Dhimal of the enumerated rights, and the record before us
does not disclose whether it did so. Dhimal has not assigned or argued any failure to
inform, and we will not construct the argument for him. See Dhimal, 2026-Ohio-1805, at
¶ 56 (12th Dist.).
5. No Plain Error
{¶ 22} Because Dhimal never requested an independent evaluation or objected to
its absence, he must demonstrate plain error. He cannot. The trial court did not accept
Dr. Xidas's request uncritically. It heard his testimony, permitted cross-examination, made
each of the three Steele findings, refused authorization for one of the 60 requested
medications, ordered that the remaining medications be administered gradually and only
as necessary, and set the matter for further hearing on January 5, 2026, just two weeks
after its order was entered. That prompt review comports with Steele's admonition that all
such orders "should be periodically reviewed" and supported by competent medical
evidence. Steele, 90 Ohio St.3d at 190. And Dhimal remains free to invoke his right to an
independent expert evaluation at that hearing or at any later one. On this record, the
absence of an unrequested evaluation resulted in no miscarriage of justice.
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{¶ 23} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 24} The second assignment of error alleges:
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
MOVE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT
PSYCHIATRIST TO EVALUATE DHIMAL AFTER THE
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DO SO SUA SPONTE.
{¶ 25} Dhimal argues in the alternative that if the trial court had no sua sponte duty
to appoint an independent psychiatrist, then his counsel was ineffective for failing to
request one. A commitment proceeding under R.C. 2945.39 is civil in nature. Williams,
2010-Ohio-2453, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, Dhimal's right to counsel
at the December 19 hearing was statutory rather than constitutional. See R.C.
2945.401(F); R.C. 2945.40(C)(1). We assume, without deciding, that the familiar two-part
standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applies in this situation, since
Dhimal's claim fails even on that assumption.
{¶ 26} To prevail, Dhimal must show both that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland
at 687-688; State v. Hensgen, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). Counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and the failure to make an
adequate showing on either prong is fatal to the claim. Hensgen at ¶ 27. To establish
prejudice, Dhimal must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 27} Dhimal's argument runs into problems on both the first prong and the
second. As to performance, the failure to file a motion is not per se ineffective assistance.
State v. Schlosser, 2011-Ohio-4183, ¶ 34 (3d Dist.). Counsel here was not idle. He
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appeared, participated, and subjected Dr. Xidas to cross-examination that helped
persuade the trial court to strike one medication from the requested list. And counsel
could reasonably have calculated that an independent evaluation carried real risk. In
Jung, the court-appointed independent psychiatrist examined the patient and agreed with
the treating physician's diagnosis and recommendation for antipsychotic treatment. Jung,
132 Ohio App.3d at 371 (6th Dist.). Given the record of Dhimal's escalating behavior,
which included threats to kill Dr. Xidas, throwing furniture, attempts to follow staff off the
unit, and an inability to sustain any conversation about his own care, counsel might
sensibly have concluded that a second psychiatric voice was more likely to corroborate
Dr. Xidas than to contradict him. Decisions of that kind fall comfortably within the wide
range of reasonable professional judgment.
{¶ 28} Prejudice presents an even bigger problem, and Dhimal makes no serious
attempt to establish it. He establishes, at most, that a motion for appointment probably
would have been granted, and on that point we agree. Given R.C. 2945.40(C)(2) and
Rowe, a trial court presented with such a motion would have been hard pressed to deny
it. But the granting of the motion is not "the result of the proceeding" for Strickland
purposes. The result of the proceeding was the forced-medication order, and Dhimal must
show a reasonable probability that an independent evaluation would have changed it.
Nothing in the record suggests what an independent psychiatrist would have concluded
about Dhimal's capacity to give informed consent, the appropriateness of the proposed
medications, or the availability of less intrusive alternatives. The uncontroverted evidence
before the trial court pointed in one direction. Dhimal had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia; had decompensated markedly over several weeks; could not discuss his
treatment without yelling, threatening, or demanding discharge; and had engaged in
repeated episodes of violence. A claim of prejudice built on speculation about what an
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expert might have said cannot undermine confidence in the outcome. See Schlosser at ¶
36 (rejecting an ineffective-assistance claim supported by "nothing other than
conjecture"). And because the trial court's order remains subject to prompt and periodic
review, at which Dhimal may invoke his statutory right to an independent evaluation, any
residual concern about the one-sidedness of the medical evidence has a ready remedy
that does not require vacating the order now in place.
{¶ 29} Having failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice,
Dhimal has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. The second assignment of
error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 30} We have overruled both assignments of error. The trial court applied the
correct substantive standard, made each necessary finding, tailored its order, and
scheduled prompt further review. Dhimal possessed, but did not exercise, a statutory right
to an independent expert evaluation, and his counsel's decision not to invoke that right
was neither unreasonable nor shown to be prejudicial. The trial court's judgment is
affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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