SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
Borough of Seaside Park v. Shree Jyoti, LLC (A-2-25) (089599)
Argued March 16, 2026 -- Decided August 10, 2026
JUSTICE NORIEGA, writing for the Court.
In this condemnation action, the Court considers a question of first impression: whether a municipality must specify -- within the text of a municipal ordinance authorizing the taking of private property -- the particular public use intended for that property.
On November 15, 2021, the Borough Council of Seaside Park passed a resolution authorizing the acquisition by eminent domain and the appraisal of the Desert Palm Inn (the Property), which was owned by Shree Jyoti, LLC. Prior to the appraisal, a certified letter was sent to Shree Jyoti. A subsequent certified letter was sent by the appraiser. Both letters were signed “R. Kania”; the record reveals that Ramesh Kania was the principal of Shree Jyoti, and the owner of the Property.
On April 14, 2022, the Council passed an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of the Property. The ordinance stated that the taking would “promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the Borough” and that “the acquisition of the property is in the furtherance of a public use and purpose,” but it did not specify the intended public use of the Property. On April 25, three days before the ordinance was to be voted on, Kania wrote to the Council and mayor, claiming he had not received notice of the appraisal or negotiations and questioning the asserted public use. On April 27, Shree Jyoti’s counsel sent the Borough a letter reiterating the claims. The ordinance passed at the Council’s April 28 meeting. After exchanges of letters and emails between the Borough and Shree Jyoti, the Borough filed its complaint in condemnation on July 19, 2022.
Shree Jyoti challenged the complaint on the ground that the ordinance failed to specify a public use. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Borough promptly filed a second, amended complaint that identified the intended public use as “including, but not limited to, a public parking lot together with electric vehicle charging infrastructure.” The trial court denied Shree Jyoti’s second motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted certification. 261 N.J. 565 (2025).
1
HELD: The Court finds no support in the relevant statutes and case law for a requirement to specify, within the ordinance authorizing the taking, the public purpose for which private property is being taken. Neither the Eminent Domain Act (EDA) nor the Local Lands and Buildings Law (LLBL) requires a municipality to set forth the particular public purpose for a taking in the ordinance authorizing condemnation. In affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, however, the Court underscores that municipalities should, as a matter of best practice, identify the intended public use for properties they seek to condemn as early as practicable.
1. The power of eminent domain in New Jersey is rooted in the State Constitution, which further authorizes the Legislature to delegate that power to political subdivisions of the State, including municipalities. Once a municipality exercises its power of eminent domain, a reviewing court will not disturb that decision absent an affirmative showing of fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse. The New Jersey Constitution, like its federal counterpart, requires that private property be taken only for a public use and with just compensation. See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 20; U.S. Const. amend. V. The definition of “public use” is expansive. However, although case law addresses the scope of, and challenges to, an asserted “public use,” New Jersey courts have not directly addressed the specific question of whether the ordinance authorizing a taking must itself state the public use. The public use must be identified so that it can be evaluated for constitutional compliance, even if the courts defer to the legislative judgment in most cases. But no statute or case law in this State directly addresses when, precisely, the condemnor must state the public use contemplated. As a result, the issue must be resolved by reference to the statutory text and structure. (pp. 11-14)
2. The EDA, N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50, establishes the procedure for the legislative power of eminent domain. The Court reviews the EDA and notes that it makes no mention of the authorizing ordinance or what that ordinance must contain. The LLBL, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-1 to -30, meanwhile, provides that a municipality may acquire property “by ordinance,” but it does not require that the ordinance specify the public use for which the property is being acquired, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a). The statute does not set forth any requirements for the ordinance beyond the need for its adoption -- it is silent as to the contents of the ordinance. The Court finds the EDA and LLBL unambiguous in their silence. Neither establishes any requirement that the condemning municipality specify the intended public use for the property it is taking in the ordinance authorizing the acquisition of the property. Should the Legislature determine that such a requirement is appropriate, it remains free to amend the statute to expressly require that the authorizing ordinance specify the intended public use. Nevertheless, the absence of a statutory mandate does not relieve municipalities of their obligation to act fairly in the exercise of their eminent domain power. Accordingly, although the law does not require that the intended use be specified in the authorizing ordinance, municipalities should, as a matter of best
2
practice, express the public use as early in the process as possible. Doing so ensures transparency, facilitates meaningful participation of affected owners, and upholds the public trust inherent in the exercise of this extraordinary governmental power. (pp. 15-17)
3. Here, the Borough did not violate any statutory, constitutional, or common law principles by omitting a specific public use from its authorizing ordinance. As detailed above, no law requires a municipality to articulate the intended public use in the ordinance itself. And the record demonstrates that the Borough identified the public use -- specifically, a public parking lot with electric vehicle charging infrastructure -- at the time it filed its amended complaint. This disclosure was made in sufficient time for the trial court to consider any challenges to the stated public use. Shree Jyoti did not raise any substantive challenge to the validity of the Borough’s asserted public use, and the record casts doubt on the allegations that Kania was unaware of the pending condemnation. Even if, as the dissent highlights and the Borough conceded at argument, the Borough might have better “turned square corners” by disclosing the intended public use earlier in the process, the dispositive issue here is not whether the Borough could have acted with greater candor or efficiency, but whether the law required it to do so at the time. The Court notes that although the Borough’s actions in this case did not run afoul of any statutory requirement, the Borough has spent the last four years involved in a matter that likely could have been resolved by simply disclosing the intended public use at the earliest reasonable point. (pp. 17-21)
AFFIRMED.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting, finds that the Borough’s refusal to
answer Shree Jyoti’s April 27 inquiry about the public purpose for the taking --despite being aware of the intended public purpose by March 2022, at the latest -- is a failure of the Borough’s obligation to turn square corners. Justice Hoffman agrees that the LLBL and EDA do not expressly require a municipality to state the public purpose for the taking in the authorizing ordinance but would reverse on the basis of the square corners doctrine, which mandates that municipalities comport themselves with transparency, candor, and integrity. Justice Hoffman respectfully recommends that the Legislature consider requiring that municipalities disclose the intended public purpose for the property in question at the time of adopting an ordinance authorizing the taking of that property.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE, join in JUSTICE NORIEGA’s opinion.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN filed a dissent.
3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-2 September Term 2025
089599
Borough of Seaside Park,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Shree Jyoti, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided
March 16, 2026 August 10, 2026
Peter H. Wegener argued the cause for appellant
(Bathgate Wegener & Wolf, attorneys; Peter H. Wegener,
on the briefs).
Robin La Bue argued the cause for respondent
(Rothstein, Mandell, Strohm, Halm & Cipriani, attorneys;
Robin La Bue, on the brief).
Rudy Randazzo submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Casino Reinvestment Development Authority
(Riker Danzig, attorneys; Rudy Randazzo and Stuart M.
Lederman, of counsel, and Michael Antzoulis, on the
brief).
JUSTICE NORIEGA delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
In this condemnation action, we consider a question of first impression:
whether a municipality must specify -- within the text of a municipal ordinance
authorizing the taking of private property -- the particular public use intended
for that property.
Here, the Borough of Seaside Park issued an ordinance authorizing the
taking of the Desert Palm Inn (the Property), which was owned by Shree Jyoti,
LLC. The ordinance expressly stated that the taking was for a “public use,”
and no one challenges the validity of the public use that was ultimately
identified during the course of litigation. Shree Jyoti, however, argues that the
failure to identify a specific public use within the ordinance itself renders the
procedure constitutionally deficient.
We find no support for that contention in either the relevant statutes or
the case law. Neither the Eminent Domain Act (EDA), N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50,
nor the Local Lands and Buildings Law (LLBL), N.J.S.A. 40A:12-1 to -30,
requires a municipality to set forth the particular public purpose for a taking in
the ordinance authorizing condemnation. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the Appellate Division.
We also underscore, however, that municipalities should, as a matter of
best practice, identify the intended public use for properties they seek to
condemn as early as practicable. Doing so will ensure transparency, facilitate
2
meaningful participation by affected property owners, and conserve municipal
resources and uphold public trust in the government’s exercise of eminent
domain.
I.
A.
On November 15, 2021, the Borough Council passed Resolution 300-2021, authorizing acquisition of the Property by eminent domain and directing
the Borough’s appraiser to prepare an appraisal.1 The Resolution authorized
the preparation of “an appraisal for the property . . . known as 1505-17N
Ocean Avenue in the Borough of Seaside Park for the purpose of acquiring the
property through Eminent Domain for public use.” (emphasis added). Prior to
the appraisal, a certified letter was sent to Shree Jyoti, inviting the corporate
property owner to accompany the appraiser for the inspection. The certified
1
On October 28, 2021, the Borough adopted Resolution 285-2021,
authorizing a preliminary investigation under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL) to determine whether the Property should be designated as an area in need of redevelopment and subject to condemnation. This redevelopment pursuit initiated the process, but as evidenced by the operative, amended complaint, the Borough relied upon its condemnation power pursuant to the LLBL instead. The record does not reflect whether the LRHL efforts were ultimately carried to fruition. Although not relevant to this Court’s ultimate conclusions, the record reflects that the public hearing conducted pursuant to the LRHL process documented extensive code violations and a history of police incidents at the property; these findings are cited in the record as the basis for the Borough’s decision to pursue acquisition.
3
mail receipt, dated December 16, 2021, bears the apparent signature of an “R.
Kania.” The record reveals that Ramesh Kania was the principal of Shree
Jyoti, and the owner of the Property. A subsequent letter was sent by the
appraiser on December 23, 2021, which also included a certified mail receipt,
again bearing the signature of “R. Kania,” and dated December 27, 2021. The
appraiser’s report was returned to the Borough’s counsel on February 25,
2022, memorializing the efforts made to reach Shree Jyoti.
On April 14, 2022, at a Council meeting, the Borough adopted
Resolution 2022-127 to hire an engineering firm to assist the Borough with
completing an application related to New Jersey’s Electric Vehicle Charging
Station funding.
At that same meeting, the Council introduced and passed Ordinance
2022-08 -- the focus of Shree Jyoti’s objections -- authorizing the acquisition
of the Property under the EDA. The ordinance stated that the taking would
“promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the
Borough” and that “the acquisition of the property is in the furtherance of a
public use and purpose,” but it did not specify the intended public use of the
Property. The ordinance was not adopted until the next regular meeting of the
Council on April 28, 2022, during which it was scheduled for a second reading
and final vote.
4
Three days before the ordinance passed, on April 25, 2022, Kania wrote
to the Council and mayor, claiming he had not received notice of the appraisal
or negotiations and that he only learned of the Borough’s interest in
condemning the Property through a newspaper article.2 In the letter, he also
questioned the asserted public use. On April 27, 2022, the day before the
ordinance was set to be voted upon, Shree Jyoti’s counsel sent the Borough a
letter reiterating Shree Jyoti’s claims that there was insufficient notice of the
condemnation process and negotiations and listing a host of other alleged
procedural defects that it argued should prove fatal to the passage of the
ordinance. Finally, the letter asked the Borough to identify “the alleged public
purpose of any such proposed acquisition.”3
The public hearing was held on April 28, 2022, and Ordinance 2022-08
was passed. The record does not reflect the substance of that meeting, and
there is no indication that Kania attended.
2
The letter, dated April 25, 2022, was addressed only to the Borough and contains no indication whether it was sent in any other form than regular mail. 3
The letter, dated April 27, 2022, was addressed to the Borough and sent via Federal Express. It was also emailed to Jean Cipriani, Esq., counsel for the Borough.
5
The Borough sent Shree Jyoti a letter4 recounting the Borough’s
previous efforts to contact Shree Jyoti for negotiations. The letter included the
Borough’s fair market value offer, and indicated that the Borough was
acquiring the property for an unspecified “public project.” The letter also
provided Shree Jyoti an additional fourteen days to respond, warning that
failure to do so would be deemed a rejection and trigger condemnation
proceedings.
Email exchanges between counsel ensued. Throughout the month of
May, the Borough’s attorney repeatedly followed up to request a response to
the Borough’s offer, meanwhile Shree Jyoti’s counsel did not make a
counteroffer or engage in substantive negotiations, instead consistently
indicating that he was waiting to confer with his client.
The Borough filed its complaint in condemnation on July 19, 2022.
B.
Shree Jyoti challenged the complaint on the ground that the ordinance
failed to specify a public use. The trial court agreed and dismissed the
4
The letter is dated April 28, 2022, and states that it was sent via email that same day to Anthony DellaPelle, Esq., counsel for Shree Jyoti. The record does include an email exchange between Robin La Bue, Esq., counsel for the Borough, and DellaPelle, on April 29, 2022, which contains several attachments. However, there is no substantive discussion in these emails, nor is it clear that the April 28, 2022, letter was included among those attachments.
6
complaint without prejudice. The Borough promptly filed a second, amended
complaint on the very same day, this time identifying the intended public use
as “including, but not limited to, a public parking lot together with electric
vehicle charging infrastructure.”5 Shree Jyoti again moved to dismiss, arguing
that the defect persisted because the ordinance itself did not specify a public
use and that the complaint’s language was too open-ended. The trial court
denied this motion, finding the Borough’s actions legally sufficient, and it
appointed commissioners to determine just compensation.
Shree Jyoti appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint,
holding that neither the EDA nor the LLBL required the ordinance to specify
the public use and that the Borough’s process satisfied statutory and
constitutional requirements.
5
During the pendency of this litigation, the Borough identified the construction of a public drinking water well as an additional public use for the property. However, the issue before the Court is whether the original ordinance authorizing condemnation was required to specify a public use at the time of its adoption. The question of whether the Borough may later convert the property to an alternate public use, such as a water well, is governed by N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(c), which expressly permits conversion to another public use if the original use becomes unsuitable or inconvenient. Neither party disputes the Borough’s authority to change the public use under subsection (c); rather, the dispute centers on whether the initial ordinance must have specified a public use at all.
7
The appellate court emphasized that Shree Jyoti was at all times entitled
to challenge the validity of the Borough’s asserted public use but, notably,
never did so in these proceedings. The court held that the Borough’s
identification of the intended public use in its amended complaint did not
undermine the legitimacy of the condemnation. Relying on N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(c), the court explained that municipalities are expressly authorized to convert
acquired property to a different public use if the original purpose becomes
“unsuitable or inconvenient,” and thus, the inclusion of a public use statement
in the complaint, rather than the ordinance, was not a fatal defect. The
Appellate Division also rejected arguments that the Borough was “stockpiling”
the Property for an unspecified future use.
This Court granted Shree Jyoti’s petition for certification, which raised
the issue of whether the authorizing ordinance must specify the intended
public use for a municipal taking under the LLBL. 261 N.J. 565 (2025). We
also granted the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) leave
to participate in this matter as a friend of the Court.
II.
Shree Jyoti contends that the enabling statute, this Court’s prior
opinions, and the New Jersey Constitution require that an ordinance
authorizing a taking specify the intended public use. Shree Jyoti asserts that a
8
plain reading of N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5 supports this position, arguing that
subsection (c) of the statute, which permits a change in public use if the
property “become[s] unsuited or inconvenient” for its original use, would be
rendered meaningless unless subsection (a) is interpreted to require
identification of a specific public use at the outset. Shree Jyoti reasons that,
without an initial legislative determination of public use by a municipal
government, there would be no baseline from which to assess or authorize a
subsequent change in use under subsection (c).
Shree Jyoti further argues that the Borough’s amended complaint and the
mayor’s post hoc certification are not substitutes for the required legislative
determination of a public use by the governing body. According to Shree
Jyoti, this case exemplifies an impermissible “take it now and decide a use
later” approach, which undermines both statutory and constitutional
safeguards. Shree Jyoti also contends that the Appellate Division’s judgment
conflicts with recent case law, including Township of Jackson v. Getzel Bee,
LLC, 480 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2025), which the Court has since
affirmed, see ___ N.J. ___ (2026), and that the Borough’s failure to specify a
public use in the ordinance deprived Shree Jyoti of the opportunity to
meaningfully challenge the taking at the appropriate stage.
9
The Borough responds that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5 unambiguously requires
only that a municipality adopt an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of
private property and imposes no further requirements as to the form or content
of that ordinance. The Borough maintains that it fully complied with all
statutory and due process requirements, including providing notice and
engaging in bona fide negotiations, as required by the EDA. The Borough
emphasizes that Shree Jyoti failed to cooperate, respond, or participate
meaningfully in the negotiation process, despite repeated attempts by the
Borough and its appraiser to engage with the property owner.
The Borough further argues that its decision to exercise the power of
eminent domain is entitled to substantial deference and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny absent a showing of fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse, none
of which have been alleged, let alone established, by Shree Jyoti. The
Borough also notes that the public use for which the Property is being acquired
was clearly articulated in its amended complaint and that New Jersey law
permits a change in public use after acquisition if circumstances so require,
further supporting the flexibility inherent in the statutory scheme.
Amicus CRDA agrees with the Borough that neither the EDA nor the
LLBL imposes any requirement that a municipal ordinance authorizing
condemnation specify the intended public use. The CRDA emphasizes that the
10
statutory language is clear and unambiguous and argues that courts should not
read into the EDA or the LLBL requirements that the Legislature did not
expressly include. The CRDA contends that the Appellate Division’s
judgment appropriately recognizes the practical realities of public development
and redevelopment projects and that condemning authorities must be permitted
the flexibility to articulate the intended public use with sufficient generality to
allow for adjustments given changing circumstances and public needs.
III.
A.
The power of eminent domain in New Jersey is rooted in the State
Constitution, which provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 20. Our
Constitution further authorizes the Legislature to delegate the power of
eminent domain to political subdivisions of the State, including municipalities.
N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, ¶ 3; see, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214
N.J. 384, 388 (2013). The Legislature has exercised that authority by enacting
laws such as the LLBL, an enabling statute that empowers municipalities to
acquire property by condemnation for public use. N.J.S.A. 40A:12-4(a), -5(a).
Once a municipality exercises its power of eminent domain, this Court
has long held that a reviewing court will not disturb that decision absent “an
11
affirmative showing of fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.” See City of
Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 473 (1954); Township of West Orange v. 769
Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002). As the United States Supreme Court
explained, “[j]udicial deference is required because . . . legislatures are better
able to [assess] what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the
taking power.” 769 Assocs., 172 N.J. at 572 (omission in original) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
“New Jersey courts traditionally have granted wide latitude to
condemning authorities in determining what property may be condemned for
‘public use,’ reasoning that it is the province of the Legislature to shape the
contours of the ‘public use’ requirement.” Ibid. (citing Burnett v. Abbott, 14
N.J. 291, 294 (1954); Lenzner, 16 N.J. at 473). The New Jersey Constitution,
like its federal counterpart, requires that private property be taken only for a
public use and with just compensation. See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 20; U.S. Const.
amend. V. The definition of “public use” is expansive, encompassing any use
“that ‘tends to enlarge resources, increase the industrial energies, and . . .
manifestly contribute[] to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community.’” 769 Assocs., 172 N.J. at 573 (omission in original) (quoting
Julius L. Sackman, 2A Nichols’ The Law of Eminent Domain § 7.02[2] (3d ed.
rev. 1990)). Moreover, it is not necessary “that the entire community or even
12
a[] considerable portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in the condemned
property for the taking to constitute a ‘public use.’” Ibid.
Issues and challenges related to “public use” may arise for a variety of
reasons. Property owners may challenge a taking by arguing that the stated
public use is invalid, pretextual, or a cover for private benefit. See, e.g.,
Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 320 N.J. Super. 342, 344 (Law Div.
1998) (arguing that the primary purpose of the condemnation was to achieve a
private rather than a public benefit); Township of Readington v. Solberg
Aviation Co., 409 N.J. Super. 282, 289 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that
defendant presented sufficient facts to support the claim that the taking was a
pretextual attempt to limit the use of airport property).
At the same time, New Jersey law affords municipalities a degree of
flexibility regarding the use of condemned property. Once acquired for a
public use, a municipality may later convert the property’s use to another
public use if the original intended use becomes unsuitable or inconvenient,
without the need for a new ordinance. See N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(c); Township of
Millburn v. Pitt, 68 N.J. 424, 427-28 (1975) (holding that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(c) sets forth no formal requirements and noting that “the legislative intent to
forego the requirement of an ordinance is clear”). Nevertheless, courts have
rejected the practice of “stockpiling” land for some undefined future use, as it
13
does not establish necessity or public use. See Borough of Glassboro v.
Grossman, 457 N.J. Super. 416, 430-33 (App. Div. 2019); Casino
Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Birnbaum, 458 N.J. Super. 173, 191-92 (App. Div.
2019).
However, although our case law addresses the scope of, and challenges
to, an asserted “public use,” New Jersey courts have not directly addressed the
specific question of whether the ordinance authorizing a taking must itself
state the public use. Clearly, the identification of a public use is an axiomatic
requirement for the exercise of eminent domain. See 769 Assocs., 172 N.J. at
572-74. The public use must be identified so that it can be evaluated for
constitutional compliance, even if the courts defer to the legislative judgment
in most cases. See ibid. But no statute or case law in this State directly
addresses when, precisely, the condemnor must state the public use
contemplated. As a result, the issue must be resolved by reference to the
statutory text and structure. We therefore turn to the relevant legislation.
B.
Despite the deference afforded to legislative determinations regarding
the exercise of eminent domain, see 769 Assocs., 172 N.J. at 572, the question
of whether either or both the EDA and LLBL require a municipality to specify
the public use in the authorizing ordinance is one of statutory interpretation,
14
which we review de novo, see Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). We look first to a statute’s plain
language, and we look no further if that language is clear. DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). If the statute is ambiguous, however, we may rely
upon extrinsic evidence, such as related legislative schemes, to ascertain what
the Legislature intended with respect to the disputed provision. See State v.
Cromedy, 261 N.J. 421, 430 (2025). But we will not “read into a statute words
that were not placed there by the Legislature.” State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325,
332 (2009). With those principles in mind, we review the statutes the
Legislature enacted to enable municipalities to exercise the power of eminent
domain.
The EDA establishes the procedure for the legislative power of eminent
domain. Pertinent here, N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 provides that before instituting an
action to condemn, the condemnor must engage in “bona fide negotiations”
with the property owner, which must include a “written offer” that “set[s] forth
the property and interest therein to be acquired, the compensation offered[,] . .
. and a reasonable disclosure of the manner in which the amount of . . .
compensation has been calculated.” If a condemnee rejects the offer or fails to
accept it “within the period fixed in [the] written offer, which shall in no case
be less than 14 days from the mailing of the offer, [that] shall be conclusive
15
proof of the inability of the condemnor to acquire the property or possession
thereof through negotiations.” Ibid. If negotiations fail, only then may the
condemnor proceed to file a verified complaint in court. Ibid. The complaint,
in turn, must “demand judgment that [the] condemnor is duly vested with and
has duly exercised its authority to acquire the property being condemned.” Id.
at -8. The EDA thus establishes specific procedures that must be followed in
the takings process. But it makes no mention of the authorizing ordinance or
what that ordinance must contain. See generally N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50.
The LLBL, meanwhile, provides that a municipality may acquire
property “by ordinance,” but it does not require that the ordinance specify the
public use for which the property is being acquired. N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a).
The statute does not set forth any requirements for the ordinance beyond the
need for its adoption -- it is silent as to the contents of the ordinance. See ibid.
Subsection (c) of the same statute allows for a municipality to convert property
to “any other public use” if it becomes “unsuited or inconvenient for the use
for which it was acquired,” but does not specify when or how the original use
must be identified. See id. at -5(c).
In sum, we find the EDA and LLBL unambiguous in their silence.
Neither establishes any requirement that the condemning municipality specify
the intended public use for the property it is taking in the ordinance
16
authorizing the acquisition of the property. Should the Legislature determine
that such a requirement is appropriate, it remains free to amend the statute to
expressly require that the authorizing ordinance specify the intended public
use.
Nevertheless, the absence of a statutory mandate does not relieve
municipalities of their obligation to act fairly in the exercise of their eminent
domain power. See F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J.
418, 426 (1985). As our recent opinion in Township of Jackson v. Getzel Bee,
LLC, emphasized, the government must deal forthrightly with property owners
in condemnation actions, thus “turning square corners” in all dealings. ___
N.J. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op. at 23).
Accordingly, although the law does not require that the intended use be
specified in the authorizing ordinance, municipalities should, as a matter of
best practice, express the public use as early in the process as possible. Doing
so ensures transparency, facilitates meaningful participation of affected
owners, and upholds the public trust inherent in the exercise of this
extraordinary governmental power.
IV.
Applying those principles to the present case, we hold that the Borough
did not violate any statutory, constitutional, or common law principles by
17
omitting a specific public use from its authorizing ordinance. As detailed
above, no law requires a municipality to articulate the intended public use in
the ordinance itself. And the record demonstrates that the Borough identified
the public use -- specifically, a public parking lot with electric vehicle
charging infrastructure -- at the time it filed its amended complaint. This
disclosure was made in sufficient time for the trial court to consider any
challenges to the stated public use.
Notably, Shree Jyoti did not raise any substantive challenge to the
validity of the Borough’s asserted public use. The record reflects that prior to
the ordinance’s passing on April 28, 2022, Kania made no efforts to negotiate
in good faith. Under all reasonable inferences, Kania was made aware of the
Borough’s intentions to condemn the Property. Kania received two letters
inviting him to attend the appraisal for his property, as evidenced by the two
certified mail receipts bearing his signature, months before the ordinance
passed. The record casts doubt on the allegations contained in Kania’s April
25, 2022 letter, submitted to the Borough by his attorney on April 27, 2022,
claiming that he was unaware of the pending condemnation. Any claim of
inadequate notice is undermined by the evidence of multiple certified mailings
and the documented efforts by the Borough and its appraiser to engage with
18
him. Kania’s persistent lack of response renders his claim of inadequate notice
unpersuasive.
Even if, as the dissent highlights and the Borough conceded at argument,
the Borough might have better “turned square corners” by disclosing the
intended public use earlier in the process, the dispositive issue before us is not
whether the Borough could have acted with greater candor or efficiency, but
whether the law required it to do so at the time. More specifically, the
question is whether the applicable statutes mandated that the public use be
specified in the authorizing ordinance, and whether the Borough complied with
those statutory requirements, which it did.
Turning to the factual record underlying these statutory requirements,
however, we note that contrary to the dissent’s characterization, the Borough
made repeated timely efforts to contact Shree Jyoti throughout the
condemnation process. The dissent’s emphasis on the Borough’s letter, sent
after the Council hearing on April 28, 2022, overlooks the fact that the timing
of the letter was consistent with the sequence of events and does not support
the inference the dissent seeks to draw. The earliest independently
confirmable response from Shree Jyoti’s counsel occurred on April 27, 2022.
Notably, in that correspondence, any reference to the “public use” for which
the property was being acquired appears only in passing, buried in the letter
19
and not as a prominent purpose of the communication. Instead, the letter
focused on alleged procedural defects and notice issues. It did not seek
clarification or engage substantively regarding the Borough’s intended use for
the property.
The Borough’s response, authored by Jean Cipriani, is dated April 28,
2022, and states that it was sent via email to DellaPelle, counsel for Shree
Jyoti. Thus, the Borough responded within 24 hours of receiving
correspondence from Shree Jyoti’s attorney. There is no evidence in the
record of any further substantive response from Shree Jyoti, nor is there any
indication that Shree Jyoti or its representative appeared at the public hearing,
despite being aware of its occurrence. Moreover, the dissent’s claim that the
Borough was “stonewalling” Shree Jyoti was not an argument meaningfully
developed during the proceedings. Accordingly, the record does not support
the implication that the Borough purposely delayed its response until after the
hearing.
Moreover, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(c) provides the legislative body flexibility
by permitting a change in the public use of acquired property if the original
use becomes unsuitable or inconvenient, without the need for a new ordinance.
This does not imply, as Shree Jyoti contends, that the public use must be stated
in the original ordinance. Rather, this statutory protection ensures that
20
municipalities will not be unduly burdened by being bound to an early
declaration of their public purpose by granting them the ability to adapt to
changing circumstances. Pitt, 68 N.J. at 427-28.
Finally, we note that although the Borough’s actions in this case did not
run afoul of any statutory requirement, the Borough has spent the last four
years involved in a matter that likely could have been resolved by simply
disclosing the intended public use at the earliest reasonable point. Not only
does this align with the government’s obligation to “turn square corners” when
exercising the significant power of eminent domain, Getzel Bee, ___ N.J. at
___ (slip op. at 23), but it conserves resources for both municipalities and
affected property owners. It is therefore advisable for municipalities to
articulate the intended public use as soon as practicable -- ideally, at the
earliest opportunity after the public use has been determined, and before
litigation commences.
V.
The Appellate Division’s judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRELOUIS, WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE, join in JUSTICE NORIEGA’s
opinion. JUSTICE HOFFMAN filed a dissent.
21
Borough of Seaside Park,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Shree Jyoti, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting.
For decades, this Court has steadfastly held that, in the context of a
condemnation, a municipality must act with transparency and integrity by
“turn[ing] square corners.” F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,
100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) (quoting Gruber v. Mayor & Twp. Comm. of Raritan
Twp., 73 N.J. Super. 120, 127 (App. Div.), aff’d, 39 N.J. 1 (1962)); Township
of Jackson v. Getzel Bee, LLC, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op. at 23).
The majority purports to reaffirm this obligation, urging municipalities
to “identify the intended public use for properties they seek to condemn as
early as practicable,” reasoning that such disclosure “will ensure
transparency.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 2). In the case at bar, however, Seaside
Park (the Borough) has done precisely the opposite. The Borough was aware
of the intended public purpose for the condemnation of the Desert Palm Inn by
March 2022, at the latest. Despite Shree Jyoti specifically asking the Borough
1
for the public purpose on April 27, 2022, one day prior to the operative
hearing, the Borough refused to answer, opting to disclose the intended public
purpose only when it became necessary to save their dismissed complaint -- at
the end of September 2022. Such conduct is the antithesis of transparency.
Though I agree with the majority’s holding that the Local Lands and
Buildings Law (LLBL) and Eminent Domain Act (EDA) do not expressly
require a municipality to state the public purpose for the taking in the
authorizing ordinance, I cannot join an opinion that overlooks the Borough’s
intentional lack of candid engagement. By excusing such conduct, the
majority degrades the “square corners” doctrine that asks our public leaders to
operate with a baseline level of honesty and integrity.
I.
“[I]n a variety of contexts,” such as government contracts and
condemnation actions, our courts have “insisted that governmental officials act
solely in the public interest” and, therefore, “must ‘turn square corners’” “[i]n
dealing with the public.” F.M.C. Stores Co., 100 N.J. at 426 (emphasis added)
(quoting Gruber, 73 N.J. Super. at 127). Specifically in condemnation
proceedings, a municipality “has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly
and fairly with property owners,” and “[i]ts primary obligation is to comport
itself with compunction and integrity.” Id. at 426-27 (emphasis added). This
2
obligation is especially pertinent for a government taking, “when such drastic
action is visited on property owners.” Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J.
390, 413 (2010).
Central to this obligation is the requirement to deal “forthrightly” -- that
is, “free from ambiguity or evasiveness.” Merriam-Webster’s Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forthright (last
visited July 28, 2026). New Jersey courts have consistently recognized that a
“[l]ack of transparency may very well result in the legal conclusion that a
municipality’s actions did not turn square corners.” Blackridge Realty, Inc. v.
City of Long Branch, 481 N.J. Super. 183, 200 (App. Div. 2025); see also
State, by Comm’r of Transp. v. Siris, 191 N.J. Super. 261, 266 (Law Div.
1983) (noting that the Legislature, “through the history, the language and the
logic of our condemnation statutes,” intended “[f]ull disclosure by the State”).
This Court reaffirmed these principles recently in Getzel Bee, LLC,
where we concluded “the Township did not act forthrightly or turn square
corners in its dealings with the [property owners]” because “[t]he asserted
public purpose for the taking was, at times, vague, inaccurate, and pretextual.”
Getzel Bee, LLC, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 25). And the majority here,
likewise, reaffirms this mandate: “[T]he government must deal forthrightly
with property owners in condemnation actions, thus ‘turning square corners’ in
3
all dealings.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 17) (emphases added). Despite this
recognition, the majority’s decision excuses conduct that could not be further
from “forthright.”
II.
A.
Here, where the Borough unequivocally stated at oral argument that (1)
it knew the intended public purpose for Shree Jyoti’s property before April
2022, and (2) the “square corners” doctrine requires a municipality to state the
public purpose of a taking upon being asked, the Borough has failed to “turn
square corners.”
The Borough was expressly asked when it “kn[e]w that it wanted to take
[Shree Jyoti’s] property for an electric vehicle charging station and a parking
lot.” The Borough informed our Court that it “knew before April” -- prior to
adopting Ordinance 2022-08 on April 28, 2022 -- and at least six months
before this purpose was revealed for the first time in the Second Amended
Complaint on September 30, 2022.
The Borough, during oral argument, was also specifically asked whether
a “municipality [has] an obligation to articulate the public purpose,” if the
property owner asks. The Borough’s response was crystal clear and telling:
“There’s no statutory obligation, but I would say in order to turn square
4
corners, the municipality would say we intend to use this for public parking.”
(emphasis added).1
Thus, by its own account, the Borough failed to “turn square corners.”
The record before us confirms this failure. On April 27, 2022, Shree Jyoti’s
counsel requested, in a brief letter, that the Borough “identify the alleged
public purpose of any . . . proposed acquisition.” Yet, in its response dated
April 28, 2022, but sent on April 29, 2022, one day after the public hearing at
which Ordinance 2022-08 was adopted, the Borough, though aware of the
intended public purpose, stonewalled Shree Jyoti: “As you are aware the
Borough intends to acquire the property located at Block 73, Lot 34 for a
public project.” (emphasis added).
The majority downplays the significance of the Borough’s stonewalling
in light of its concession that its actions would constitute a failure to “turn
square corners” by stating that: (1) the letter did not “engage substantively
regarding the Borough’s intended use for the property”; (2) the public use was
1
The majority mischaracterizes the Borough’s critical concession. The Borough did not concede that it “might have better ‘turned square corners’ by disclosing the intended public use earlier.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). Rather, the Borough conceded that intentionally withholding the public purpose when asked constitutes a flat-out failure to “turn square corners.” In other words -- if/when asked -- the Borough was obligated to answer, and it did not.
5
not a “prominent purpose” of the letter, and any reference to “‘public use’ . . .
appears only in passing, buried” therein; and (3) “the Borough responded
within [twenty-four] hours of receiving correspondence from Shree Jyoti’s
attorney.”2 Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19-20).
I fail to see how Shree Jyoti’s explicit request for the Borough to
“identify . . . the public purpose” for the “proposed acquisition” -- one of only
two requests in a letter that is barely one page long -- is not “substantively”
engaging with the Borough “regarding the . . . intended use for the
property.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 20). None of the majority’s efforts to
downplay the Borough’s failure to abide by its admitted legal obligation can
alter the fact that it is the Borough that refused to substantively engage with
Shree Jyoti’s letter -- not the other way around -- and, therefore, and by its
own admission, the Borough failed to “turn square corners.” Withholding the
2
The majority claims that defendant did not “meaningfully develop[]” the argument that the Borough intentionally failed to respond to (i.e., “stonewalled”) the direct question raised in the April 27 letter regarding the Borough’s proposed public use. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 20). First, it is difficult to conceive of how much more the issue needed to be developed, once the Borough’s counsel conceded that such a failure to respond is also a failure to “turn square corners,” and second, at oral argument, Shree Jyoti’s counsel clearly argued: “The record is clear that [Shree Jyoti], before the ordinance was adopted, sent a letter to [the Borough] . . . and asked . . . . ‘What is the purpose of the taking?’ . . . . There was a response . . . which acknowledged receipt of the letter . . . but never answered the question.”
6
intended public purpose for the property in question when specifically asked is
not “deal[ing] forthrightly,” and is not abiding by the candor and transparency
required by the “square corners” doctrine.3 F.M.C. Stores Co., 100 N.J. at 426.
At the public hearing on April 28, 2022, the Borough introduced
Ordinance 2022-08 for a second reading,4 during which it sought to acquire
Shree Jyoti’s property. Despite its knowledge of the specific public purpose
for the taking, the Borough did not include it in Ordinance 2022-08, instead
again offering the generic statement “that the acquisition of the property is in
the furtherance of a public use and purpose.”
The Borough’s conduct after the passage of Ordinance 2022-08 only
underscores its lack of transparency. Upon filing its initial complaint on July
19, 2022, the Borough continued to withhold the public purpose intended for
Shree Jyoti’s property. The trial court accordingly dismissed the Borough’s
complaint without prejudice, “because it . . . indicated that the taking was for
3
Because this Court mandates that municipalities “turn square corners,” I disagree with the majority’s statement that “the dispositive issue before us is not whether the Borough could have acted with greater candor.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). Our mandate that municipalities “turn square corners” and act with “greater candor” makes the Borough’s conceded failure dispositive -- as it was in Getzel Bee, LLC, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 25).
4
As discussed by the majority, the first reading had occurred two weeks prior, at a Council meeting on April 14, 2022. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4). Similarly, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the Borough disclosed the intended public purpose for the taking in question at this meeting.
7
purposes of public use, but [did] not specify[] any particular public use.”
(emphasis added).
In fact, it was not until September 30, 2022, and for the purpose of
amending its dismissed complaint, that the Borough finally disclosed its
intention to use Shree Jyoti’s property for a “parking lot with electric charging
infrastructure.”
To be clear, I agree with the majority that there is no statutory
requirement to include the public purpose in the ordinance authorizing the
taking. I also acknowledge that Shree Jyoti could have better complied with
its obligations to negotiate prior to the April 28, 2022 hearing at which
Ordinance 2022-08 was passed. As we have recognized, “it takes at least two
to negotiate and the record should be reviewed with that in mind.” State, by
Comm’r of Transp. v. Carroll, 123 N.J. 308, 323 (1991) (quoting County of
Monmouth v. Whispering Woods at Bamm Hollow, Inc., 222 N.J. Super. 1, 9
(App. Div. 1987)).
That said, the “square corners” doctrine is not, nor has it ever been, a
balancing test. It is, as this Court has repeatedly held, a mandate that
municipalities comport themselves with transparency, candor, and integrity.
F.M.C. Stores Co., 100 N.J. at 426-27. Shree Jyoti’s intransigence with regard
8
to its property being condemned does not turn our Court’s “must” into a
“may.”
B.
I am unable to reconcile the Borough’s deliberate refusal to disclose its
intended public purpose for the taking of Shree Jyoti’s property either with its
well-established obligation to act forthrightly or with the majority’s stated
commitment to “ensure transparency.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 2). Indeed,
even counsel for the Borough appeared unable to justify the Borough’s
decision to withhold the intended public purpose for Shree Jyoti’s property,
conceding at oral argument that she was “not exactly sure why” the Borough
failed to specify the known public purpose in Ordinance 2022-08.
Furthermore, I find it difficult -- if not impossible -- to reconcile the
holding in this case with our recent decision in Getzel Bee, LLC, where we
found that a “vague, inaccurate, and pretextual” public purpose is unacceptable
and must be rejected. Getzel Bee, LLC, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 25). If a
municipality can be found to have failed to “turn square corners” by offering a
pretextual public purpose, it is unclear how, exactly, it can satisfy its
obligation to act “forthrightly” by refusing to disclose its known public
purpose for the property in question when asked.
9
While I concur with the majority’s conclusion that neither the LLBL nor
EDA imposes “any requirement that the condemning municipality specify the
intended public use for the property it is taking in the ordinance authorizing
the acquisition of the property,” ante at ___ (slip op. at 16-17) (emphasis
added), it is telling that the Borough itself acknowledged that these statutes, at
the very least, require the municipality to possess a public purpose at the time
of enactment -- even if the Borough is not obligated to disclose it. Though
neither I nor the majority can identify any statutory support for either
requirement, a mandate to disclose in the authorizing ordinance would be
consistent with the majority’s guidance that the public purpose be articulated
“at the earliest opportunity,” ante at ___ (slip op. at 21), and would serve to
prevent the very “stockpiling” of property that the majority cautions against,
ante at ___ (slip op. at 13).
Mindful that “‘the Legislature [is] free to decide’ what elements to
include in a statute and, perhaps more importantly, what elements not to
include,” I respectfully recommend that the Legislature consider requiring that
municipalities disclose the intended public purpose for the property in question
at the time of adopting an ordinance authorizing the taking of that property.
Blackridge Realty, Inc., 481 N.J. Super. at 200-01 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 490-91 (2015)).
10
III.
The “square corners” doctrine requires only that municipalities engage
with their citizenry in a “forthright” manner -- with transparency and candor
-- qualities that we have a right to expect and that this Court has been put in a
position to enforce. To ignore this principle at a time when the municipality,
itself, concedes that to not disclose the known public purpose when asked is a
complete failure to “turn square corners,” is a position that I simply cannot
join.
It is for these reasons that I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division.
11