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Carvel Johnson v. Ramona Denise Robinson

2026-08-06

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Opinion issued August 6, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-26-00637-CV

CARVEL JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

RAMONA DENISE ROBINSON, Appellee

On Appeal from the 165th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2023-28626

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Carvel Johnson, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the

trial court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment signed on June 8, 2026.

After we notified him that we lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, he requested that we treat his appeal as a petition for writ mandamus. We grant his request and deny

his petition for writ of mandamus.

Discussion

“[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”

Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale,

273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that

jurisdiction is fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have

jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v.

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An appellate court has jurisdiction

to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order only if a statute explicitly

authorizes an interlocutory appeal. CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48

(Tex. 2011); see, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (authorizing

appeals from certain interlocutory orders).

Johnson seeks to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion for

summary judgment. Because the order from which Johnson appeals is not a final

judgment or otherwise appealable order, we issued a notice directing him to file a

response, within 10 days of our notice, demonstrating—with citation to the record,

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statutes, rules, and case law—why this Court has jurisdiction over his appeal. See

Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg

2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals may be had only from final orders or judgments, and

interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute.”). Johnson filed a

timely response, but his response does not establish that our Court has jurisdiction

over his appeal.1 To the contrary, his response confirms that he is appealing from the

trial court’s denial of his summary judgment motion—an order over which we lack

appellate jurisdiction. Stuart v. Puente, No. 02-25-00641-CV, 2025 WL 3684003, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal

for lack of jurisdiction where appellant “attempt[ed] to appeal from the trial court’s

order denying his motion for summary judgment”).

Perhaps recognizing as much, in his response, Johnson also requests that we

treat his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. We grant his request and will

treat his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Bizkeeping Corp. v. Benton,

714 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (“When

appellants timely ask us to construe their appeal as a mandamus petition if appellate

jurisdiction is lacking, we do so rather than dismissing the appeal.”).

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Johnson also filed a “Verified Affidavit . . . Regarding Jurisdiction” on July 21,

2026 arguing, among other things, that the challenged June 8 order should be

considered final because it “dispose[d] of all claims and parties.”

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To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must establish that the trial court

committed a clear abuse of discretion or violated a duty imposed by law and there is

no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,

135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). With a few exceptions not applicable here,

orders denying motions for summary judgment are not subject to mandamus relief

because there is typically an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ooida Risk Retention

Group, Inc., 475 S.W.3d 905, 913 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (orig.

proceeding) (“Mandamus is generally unavailable when a trial court denies summary

judgment, no matter how meritorious the motion.”).

We thus deny Johnson’s petition for writ of mandamus and dismiss all

pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.

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