In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00169-CR
OSCAR JEOVANY ARDON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 367th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. F21-3008-462
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Appellant Oscar Jeovany Ardon of four counts of indecency
with a child by sexual contact. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), (d). The jury assessed
punishment at confinement for five years for each conviction, and the trial court
pronounced the punishment, ordering that the sentences run consecutively. See id.
§§ 12.32, 12.33, 3.03(b)(2)(A), (b)(2–a)(A). In his first issue, Ardon argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by designating an improper outcry witness under
Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In his second issue, Ardon
complains that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony about the
complainant’s prior sexual experiences under Texas Rules of Evidence 107 and 412.1
Because we will hold that, in both instances, any error was harmless, we will affirm the
trial court’s judgments.
1
The Texas Supreme Court repealed former Rule 412 and replaced it with a new
rule; the final amended version took effect on January 1, 2026. See Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval of Amendments to Texas Rule of Evidence 412, Misc. Docket No. 25-9102 (Dec. 19, 2025). But “[a]s stated in Misc. Dkt. No. 25-9064, for criminal proceedings commencing before September 1, 2025, the rule in effect on the date the proceeding commences governs.” Id. Thus, the new rule and amendments are inapplicable here. All citations to Rule 412 are to the prior version, which continues to govern those cases commencing before September 1, 2025.
2
II. BACKGROUND
The complainant, who was seventeen years old at the time of trial, testified that
when she was between ten and thirteen years old, Ardon—her stepfather—sexually
assaulted her multiple times. Ardon had married the complainant’s mother when the
complainant was two years old.
Ardon does not challenge the evidentiary sufficiency of his convictions; rather,
he argues that the trial court improperly designated Priscilla Valenzuela, the
complainant’s forensic interviewer, as the outcry witness and that the trial court erred
in excluding evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activities. Ardon claims that
these errors improperly bolstered the complainant’s testimony and prevented him from
presenting a meaningful defense.2
The trial court determined Valenzuela’s status as the outcry witness at a
preliminary hearing. During the preliminary hearing, Valenzuela testified that she had
been employed with the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) and had conducted a
forensic interview with the complainant on April 22, 2021. Valenzuela testified that she
believed she was the first person over eighteen to whom the complainant had shared
details about the offenses.
2
Ardon’s defensive theory throughout trial was that the complainant “had already been exposed to sexually explicit material, that she’d been looking into it, and that that could have influenced her experience.”
3
The complainant also testified during the preliminary hearing and stated that
although she had spoken to several adults about the abuse, including her counselor, her
father, her stepmother, and her mother, she had not given any of them all the details
about the prior abuse. But she also admitted that she could not recall exactly what
details she had shared with any of them. The complainant affirmed that the first adult
she had shared all “[t]he details” of the offenses with was Valenzuela during her CAC
interview.
After the preliminary hearing concluded, the trial court—without any
explanation of its reasoning—designated Valenzuela as the outcry witness. Ardon then
requested a running objection to Valenzuela’s testimony, and the trial court granted the
request.3
During trial, Valenzuela testified about the nature of the sexual assault against
the complainant: On multiple occasions, Ardon touched the complainant’s chest with
his hands and rubbed his genitals on the complainant’s genitals through each of their
clothing. The complainant testified to the same behaviors during her trial testimony.
The complainant also testified that—at one point—she had tried to talk to her
mother about the sexual abuse but her mother had “freaked out,” and the complainant
regretted talking to her mother. She did not tell her mother who had abused her, and
During trial, Ardon renewed his objection to Valenzuela’s testimony. The trial
3
court again overruled the objection, permitting Valenzuela to testify, and granted Ardon a running objection.
4
she had begged her mother not to tell the police or Ardon.4 Despite this request, the
complainant’s mother spoke to Ardon about it. Ardon then spoke to the complainant,
telling her that “he knew that [she] had told [her] mom” and that she needed “to be
careful” about what she said during therapy “because they’re trained to get things out
of people.” Ardon also told the complainant that “if [she] wanted to tell, that [she
could] and that he would own up to it and he would take responsibility.”
Carrollton Police Department Detective Erika Honeycutt, who was assigned to
the case after Valenzuela conducted the forensic interview, also testified. As part of her
investigation, Detective Honeycutt reviewed the forensic interview recording,
organized a one-party-consent phone call5 between the complainant’s mother and
Ardon, and interviewed Ardon about the complainant’s allegations. During the
interview, Detective Honeycutt told Ardon that the complainant had accused him of
sexual abuse. Whenever the detective told Ardon this, he “nodded and just said
4
During her testimony, the complainant expressed that she did not want her
mother and Ardon to “break up, divorce, or for [Ardon] to get in trouble by anyone,” because she considered him her dad and “loved him very much like a dad.” The
complainant also stated that by the time she had told her mother about the sexual abuse, Ardon “had stopped doing it.”
5
A portion of the recording of the call was played during trial. The complainant’s mother asked Ardon if he had touched the complainant, and he responded with eight seconds of silence; she asked him again, and again, he responded with about eight seconds of silence; finally, she asked him to “please tell [her],” and Ardon responded, “no, no, no.” On cross-examination, Detective Honeycutt confirmed that Ardon was at work—at a church—during this call, and defense counsel implied that his location might explain the long pauses on the phone call.
5
[‘]okay.[’]” Detective Honeycutt testified that Ardon seemed almost “speechless in a
way.”
Throughout the interview, Ardon maintained that he did not sexually abuse the
complainant and explained that he had played physical games with the children that
might have been misinterpreted.6 Ardon told Detective Honeycutt that “if [the
complainant] thought [Ardon] touched her inappropriately . . . while playing those
games, she never told [him].”
There was also testimony from Joanne Sulewski, the sexual assault nurse
examiner (SANE), who had compiled a report based on her examination of the
complainant in May 2021. A redacted copy of Sulewski’s SANE Report was offered
into evidence, and the defense objected on grounds of hearsay, optional completeness,
motive, and due process. The trial court overruled the objections, and the report was
admitted with redactions.7
Ardon described the “wiggle (sic) monster” game where he would “chase the
6
kids around” and “if he caught one of them, he would bear hug them and . . . wiggle them side to side.” The complainant also testified that she played games with Ardon— like tag and “tickle monster”—that gradually became inappropriate when “[Ardon’s] hands would wander towards [her] chest” and he would “get on top of [her].”
We will address the redactions in our discussion of Ardon’s second issue. See
7
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
6
Following the close of the evidence,8 the jury found Ardon guilty of the offenses
of indecency with a child as alleged in the indictment. Ardon was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment for each count, to run consecutively, and this appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Ardon raises two issues on appeal, both evidentiary in nature. Ardon alleges that
the trial court abused its discretion by naming Valenzuela the outcry witness and by
excluding evidence about the complainant’s prior sexual experiences. He claims that
these errors harmed him because Valenzuela’s testimony bolstered the complainant’s
testimony and because the exclusion of the evidence about the complainant’s prior
sexual experiences prevented him from fully developing his defensive theory.
The State responds that the trial court did not err, arguing that: (1) Valenzuela
was the proper outcry witness because there was evidence demonstrating that she was
“the first person over the age of eighteen to whom [the complainant] made statements
that described the alleged offenses in a discernible manner”; (2) the redacted statements
in the SANE Report were “irrelevant and not necessary to make [the complainant’s]
statements concerning the abuse in this case ‘fully understood’”; and (3) the
complainant’s prior access of pornographic websites “is a past sexual behavior that is
8
During cross-examination of the complainant, several defense exhibits were
admitted that depicted images of a sexual nature from a graphic novel that the complainant had read at some point close in time to the sexual abuse.
7
protected under Rule 412.” Alternatively, the State argues that all three alleged errors
were harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b).
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion and will not reverse the ruling of the trial court absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Bautista v. State,
189 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial
court’s ruling is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of
discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be upheld. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d
336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)).
Outcry-witness testimony is evaluated under the same standard. Because of the
difficulty that often arises in deciding who is a proper outcry witness, trial courts
maintain “broad discretion” over such decisions. Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990). Under this standard, a trial court’s ruling will only be deemed an
abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside “the zone of reasonable
disagreement,” Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), or is “arbitrary
or unreasonable,” State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The erroneous exclusion of evidence—including outcry testimony—is generally
subject to a nonconstitutional-harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
44.2(b). See Good v. State, No. 02-24-00239-CR, 2026 WL 547519, at *5 n.13 (Tex.
8
App.—Fort Worth Feb. 26, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(citing Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)); State v. Sanchez,
722 S.W.3d 58, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, pet ref’d) (applying Rule 44.2(b) to
outcry testimony). Nonconstitutional error is disregarded unless it affects a defendant’s
substantial rights. Nguyen v. State, 693 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b)). “If the error ha[s] no influence or
only a slight effect on the verdict, then it is harmless.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State,
967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). To determine the effect on the verdict,
we consider (1) the character of the alleged error and its connection with other
evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, (3) the existence and
weight of additional evidence supporting the verdict, and (4) whether the State
emphasized the error. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)
(citing Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
B. Outcry Witness Testimony
In his first issue, Ardon complains that Valenzuela was not “the ‘first person
over the age of 18’ [the complainant] informed about the alleged sexual abuse.” Ardon
argues that he proved that “the complainant informed no less than four separate,
trusted adults about the purported sexual abuse” before she ever met with Valenzuela,
raising “enough evidence to show that [the complainant] communicated the details of
the sexual abuse in a discernable manner to at least one of the [four] adults.” Ardon
alleges that Valenzuela’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and improperly bolstered
9
the complainant’s testimony—resulting in a substantial influence on the outcome of the
trial.
1. Applicable Law
“Hearsay statements, while generally inadmissible, may be admitted under
specific conditions when public policy supports their use, and the circumstances
surrounding the making of those statements [guarantee] their reliability.” Martinez v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Article 38.072, also known as the
outcry statute, creates a hearsay exception in certain child-sexual-offense prosecutions.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.072; Crump v. State, No. 02-24-00063-CR, 2025 WL 18288,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 2, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
Article 38.072 permits testimony from one outcry witness per event—that is,
“the first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the
child . . . made a statement about the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.072,
§ 2(a)(3); see Crump, 2025 WL 18288, at *2; Gibson v. State, 595 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). Courts construe “about the offense” to mean a statement
that “in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.” Garcia, 792 S.W.2d
at 91. “[T]he statement must be more than . . . a general allusion” of sexual abuse. Id.
Thus, the proper outcry witness is not necessarily the first adult to whom the child
revealed the abuse but, rather, the first adult to whom the child revealed specific details
concerning the offense. Id.; see, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 02-23-00152-CR, 2025 WL
10
353068, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (affirming trial court’s determination that because a child’s
prior statements to her mother lacked sufficient detail, the proper outcry witness was
an adult who later interviewed the child).
In addition, an adult who does not remember the outcry cannot be the outcry
witness. Petty v. State, No. 02-21-00130-CR, 2022 WL 4545532, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see, e.g.,
Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that
victim’s mother and stepfather were not proper outcry witnesses when they both
testified that they had no memory of the outcry). A trial court may allow hearsay
testimony from more than one outcry witness if each witness testifies about different
offenses. See Crump, 2025 WL 18288, at *2; Gibson, 595 S.W.3d at 326.
“In cases involving the improper admission of outcry testimony, the error is
harmless when the victim testifies in court to the same or similar statements that were
improperly admitted or other evidence setting forth the same facts is admitted without
objection.” Sanchez, 722 S.W.3d at 75 (quoting Galvan v. State, No. 08-23-00162-CR,
2024 WL 1599208, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication)); see also Gibson, 595 S.W.3d at 327 (collecting cases holding
the same).
11
2. Analysis
Assuming without deciding that the trial court improperly designated Valenzuela
as an outcry witness, such error did not harm Ardon.
During trial, there was unobjected-to testimony from the complainant in support
of the verdict. Additionally, the complainant’s testimony set forth details of the sexual
abuse that were very similar to those described in Valenzuela’s testimony,9 making any
error in the admission of Valenzuela’s testimony harmless. See Sanchez, 722 S.W.3d
at 75; Gibson, 595 S.W.3d at 327; Lamerand v. State, 540 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).
Thus, because the same or similar evidence about the sexual abuse that the
complainant suffered was admitted without objection, we cannot conclude that
Valenzuela’s outcry-witness testimony had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the jury’s verdict. See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(“Our rule . . . is that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when
other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the
complained-of ruling.”). Accordingly, any error in designating Valenzuela the outcry
9
Ardon acknowledges as much on appeal but argues that he “challenged [the
complainant’s] credibility and objected to the admission of the SANE report and [the complainant’s] hearsay statements to the [SANE].” However, none of these arguments establish harm.
12
witness was harmless. See Gibson, 595 S.W.3d at 327; Lamerand, 540 S.W.3d at 259. We
overrule Ardon’s first issue on appeal.
C. Excluded Evidence
In his second issue, Ardon complains about two areas of excluded evidence that
he alleges would show the complainant’s motive or interest. First, the trial court
admitted a redacted copy of Sulewski’s SANE Report, which excluded statements about
a prior sexual encounter the complainant had with another child while she was in first
grade. Second, the defense was restricted to asking Detective Honeycutt whether the
complainant’s phone had been taken away because she had accessed “inappropriate
websites,” rather than asking whether the complainant had accessed “pornographic
websites.” Ardon argues that the excluded evidence was admissible under Rule 107 and
Rule 412 and that the exclusion infringed on his right to present a meaningful defense.10
10
Ardon makes an argument that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when
he was not permitted to fully cross-examine Detective Honeycutt. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses “is not
unqualified . . . and the trial judge has wide discretion in limiting the scope and extent of cross-examination.” Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant does not have an absolute constitutional right to impeach the general credibility of a witness in any manner he chooses—but the constitution does require that a defendant be able to cross-examine “a witness concerning possible motives, bias, and prejudice” so that he might present a vital defensive theory. Id. at 562–63. However, “most questions concerning cross-examination may be resolved by looking to the Texas Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 561. Because here we can resolve the second issue by looking to the applicable Texas Rules of Evidence, we do not explore Ardon’s constitutional argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
13
1. Applicable Law: Rules 107 and 412
Under Rule 107, known as the rule of optional completeness, “[i]f a party
introduces part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an
adverse party may inquire into any other part on the same subject.” Tex. R. Evid. 107.
Additionally, “[a]n adverse party may also introduce any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is necessary to explain or allow the
trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the opponent.” Id. In other words,
“Rule 107 permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence when that
evidence is necessary to fully and fairly explain a matter ‘opened up’ by the adverse
party.” Rouleau v. State, No. 02-24-00247-CR, 2025 WL 1197379, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d
177, 182 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d) (per curiam)). The rule is designed
to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing only a part
of some act, conversation, or writing. Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218. Rule 107 does not
permit introducing other similar, but inadmissible, evidence unless doing so is necessary
to explain properly admitted evidence. Id.
Rule 412, known as the “rape shield” law, is designed to limit abusive,
embarrassing, and irrelevant inquiries into a complainant’s private life. Alvarez v. State,
No. 02-23-00108-CR, 2024 WL 2066361, at * 6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2024,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (first citing Hammer, 296 S.W.3d
14
at 566; and then citing Dees v. State, No. 02-12-00488-CR, 2013 WL 6869865, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Dec. 27, 2013, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated
for publication)). Generally, evidence of a “specific instance of a victim’s past sexual
behavior” is not admissible. Tex. R. Evid. 412(a)(2). But Rule 412(b) provides that a
defendant may offer evidence of a specific instance of an alleged victim’s past sexual
behavior if the trial court determines that the evidence’s probative value outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice to the alleged victim and that the evidence:
(A) is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence offered
by the prosecutor;
(B) concerns past sexual behavior with the defendant and is offered by the
defendant to prove consent;
(C) relates to the victim’s motive or bias;
(D) is admissible under Rule 609; or
(E) is constitutionally required to be admitted[.]
Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2), (3).
The Rule 412 balancing test generally favors excluding the evidence. Alvarez,
2024 WL 2066361, at *7 (citing Zamora v. State, No. 08-99-00284-CR, 2000 WL 1757960,
at *9 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 30, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)).
The burden is on the proponent of the evidence—in this case, the defendant—to show
that its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.
15
2. SANE Report
The SANE Report that was admitted into evidence included redactions; defense
counsel offered Defense Exhibit B, an unredacted version of the same report, for
record purposes only. The redactions all related to a single alleged prior sexual
encounter the complainant had with another child when she was in the first grade.
3. Detective Honeycutt’s Testimony
During cross-examination of Detective Honeycutt, the defense asked, “[I]n
[Ardon’s] interview, did you discover that [he] had to take away [the complainant’s]
phone because she was looking at pornographic –.” The question was cut off by the
State’s objection, and there was a discussion held out of the jury’s presence about the
admissibility of the question and any reference to the complainant’s prior sexual
experience. The defense argued that it was not attempting to “explor[e] [the
complainant’s] sexuality or any prior sex acts that she has done.” The trial court ruled
that the defense was permitted to ask Detective Honeycutt if the complainant “opened
up an inappropriate website, and [whether,] based on that, . . . her phone [was] taken
away.”
When the jury was seated again in the courtroom, the trial court instructed the
jury on the matter, stating, “The response to the last question, you are to disregard that.”
The defense then asked Detective Honeycutt, if, during her interview with Ardon, she
had “learn[ed] that [the complainant] had accessed inappropriate websites” and that her
phone had been taken away by Ardon. The detective responded in the affirmative.
16
4. Analysis
Ardon argues that both the redacted portions of the SANE Report and the
question about the complainant having accessed pornographic websites were admissible
under Rule 107. We disagree. First, Rule 107 only permits the introduction of
otherwise inadmissible evidence when it is necessary to fully and fairly explain a matter
“opened up” by the adverse party. See Rouleau, 2025 WL 1197379, at *2. This rule does
not permit introducing other similar, but inadmissible, evidence unless doing so is
necessary to explain properly admitted evidence. Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218.
Here, the redacted portions of the SANE Report, although also an allegation of
sexual contact, were not on the same subject as the admitted portions of the SANE
Report. See Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[T]he omitted
portion of the statement must be on the same subject and must be necessary to make
[the document] understood.” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing Sauceda v. State
129 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Hailey v. State, 413 S.W.3d 457, 468 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding the same); see also Tex. R. Evid. 107. The
alleged sexual contact that the complainant experienced when she was in first grade is
clearly unrelated to the allegations against Ardon, as the alleged contact was with
another child and happened several years before Ardon’s sexual abuse of the
complainant. Thus, because the redacted statements are not on the same subject as the
statements about Ardon’s abuse of the complainant, there is no logical argument that
would support Ardon’s claim that it was necessary to include the redacted portions to
17
better explain the portions of the report related to the abuse from Ardon. See Pena,
353 S.W.3d at 814; Tex. R. Evid. 107; see also Lang v. State, No. 02-22-00298-CR,
2024 WL 273591, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (holding that excluded portions of a SANE Report were
not necessary to understand the SANE testimony and there was no evidence that the
jury misunderstood the SANE testimony).
And as related to the cross-examination of Detective Honeycutt, there is no
“incompleteness” to correct or explain. See generally Tex. R. Evid. 107 (permitting the
introduction of evidence that is of the same subject as previously offered evidence
where it is necessary to explain such evidence). The trial court permitted Ardon to ask
if the complainant had accessed “inappropriate websites” on her phone, following an
instruction from the trial court that the jury was to disregard the response to the prior
question. There had been no response to the prior question about the complainant’s
viewing of pornography on her phone. Thus, despite the trial court’s intent with its
instruction, the jury was permitted to consider the prior question asked—in which
Detective Honeycutt was cross-examined about whether the complainant had accessed
pornography on her phone. See Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (relying on the established presumption that the jury follows the
trial court’s instructions unless there is evidence of the contrary); cf. Irsan v. State, 708
S.W.3d 584, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (holding lawyer’s questions are not themselves
18
evidence and that the alleged error that the lawyer asserted facts through a question did
not affect the appellant’s substantial rights).
Further, even if the jury understood the trial court’s misstatement, the context
of the question that was ultimately asked—about the complainant accessing
“inappropriate websites”—was not likely to be misunderstood by the jury in light of
the other sexually explicit evidence that had been introduced during trial.11 See Sauceda,
129 S.W.3d at 123 (requiring that the omitted evidence be necessary for the statement
to be understood or avoid any false impression from hearing only a part of the
evidence). Accordingly, Ardon’s Rule 107 argument fails.
Ardon also argues that both the redacted portions of the SANE Report and the
question about the complainant having accessed pornographic websites were admissible
under Rule 412. Again, we disagree.
First, there is no evidence in the record, or offered outside the presence of the
jury, to suggest that the complainant was motivated or biased to lie about the sexual
assaults. See Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(d)(C). Instead, the record supports the opposite—
that the complainant was distraught about the abuse and was unwilling to immediately
name Ardon as the perpetrator because she loved him like a father and did not want to
11
Twelve defense exhibits were admitted during the defense’s cross-examination
of the complainant, all of which depicted sexually explicit activities from a graphic novel that the complainant admitted she had read around the time that the abuse had allegedly occurred.
19
get him into trouble. Thus, to the extent that Ardon alleges that the excluded evidence
supports a potential bias or motive of the complainant, we find no support for that in
the record. See Rojas v. State, No. 02-15-00144-CR, 2016 WL 6648748, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“Moreover, to meet his burden, [a]ppellant had to show a definite and logical link
between [the complainant’s] alleged past sexual conduct and her alleged motive to lie.”
(citing Stephens v. State, 978 S.W.2d 728, 734–35 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d))).
Second, Ardon asserts that the redacted portions of the SANE Report “explain
a distinctly similar sexual experience” that could “explain the [complainant’s] knowledge
about the sexual matters in question,” making it admissible under Rule 412(b)(2)(E).12
But for evidence to be admissible to show a child’s alternative basis for knowledge of
sexual matters, “the defendant must establish that the prior acts clearly occurred and
that the acts so closely resembled those of the present case that they could explain the victim’s knowledge
about the sexual matters in question.” Estes v. State, 487 S.W.3d 737, 753 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (alteration in
12
A number of states have held that the United States Constitution compels the
admission of evidence to show an alternative basis for a child victim’s knowledge of sexual matters. See, e.g., State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 580 N.W.2d 181, 191 (1998); State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 593 A.2d 784, 791 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 507 N.E.2d 684, 688 (1987); State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (1981). The constitutional provisions most often implicated in cases of this type are the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial. See State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1984).
20
original) (citing Hale v. State, 140 S.W.3d 381, 396 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet.
ref’d)).
Additionally, before any evidence of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior may be
admitted under Rule 412(b)(2)(E), it must be relevant to a material issue in the case. See
Hale, 140 S.W.3d at 396; see also Tex. R. Evid. 401 (requiring that evidence be relevant
to be admissible). Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence
is not admissible. Tex. R. Evid. 402. In this case, whether the complainant was sexually
assaulted as a first grader does not make it more or less probable that she had
“knowledge about the sexual matters in question,” particularly in light of the sexually
explicit graphic novel pages that were already admitted into evidence.
And though it is conceivable that the complainant could have gained knowledge
of sexual matters from either “pornographic” or “inappropriate” websites—regardless
of the term used—rather than from Ardon, there is no evidence in the record that any
of the sexual acts the complainant allegedly viewed on these websites “so closely resembled
those of the present case that they could explain the [complainant’s] knowledge about the sexual matters
in question.” Estes, 487 S.W.3d at 753 (emphasis in original) (citing Hale, 140 S.W.3d at
396); see Bryan v. State, No. 2-08-379-CR, 2010 WL 1137038, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Mar. 25, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Hale
and concluding that evidence of the child victim’s prior sexual experience was
21
inadmissible because the defendant “failed to establish that the prior assault was
sufficiently similar to [the defendant’s] assault.”). Accordingly, Ardon’s Rule 412
argument fails.
However, even if we presume that the trial court erred, the record does not
demonstrate that the complained-of exclusions harmed Ardon. See Tex. R. App. P.
44.2(b). Here, the only complained-of evidence that was excluded—the redacted
portions of the SANE Report—would have merely shown that the complainant may
have also been sexually assaulted by another child once when she was in first grade. It
is unlikely that, had the jury known about the alleged abuse in first grade, this
information would have meaningfully supported Ardon’s defensive theory given that
the complainant was initially unwilling to name Ardon as her abuser and that she
provided detailed testimony about Ardon’s sexual abuse of her at trial.13 See Good,
2026 WL 547519, at *6–7 (holding that, where the State relied on the complainant’s
testimony and the defensive theory was that the allegations were fabricated in some
way, any error in excluding evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual abuse of his sister
was harmless); see also Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 221 (finding harmless error where the
13
The jury is the sole judge of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and was permitted to believe the complainant’s testimony about the sexual abuse, as well as her testimony about reading the sexually explicit graphic novel and her statement that the experience of the characters in that story was different from her experience with Ardon. See Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
22
excluded evidence did not prevent the defendant from presenting his defensive theory
to the jury).
Likewise, if we assume that the jury understood the trial court’s misstatement
about disregarding the prior response14 rather than the prior question during the defense’s
cross-examination of Detective Honeycutt, the context of the question about
“inappropriate websites” clearly implied the websites were of a sexual nature. And even
if it was not implied to the jury when the question was asked, during the defense’s
closing argument, the graphic novel pages and the complainant’s “inappropriate”
searches were discussed simultaneously—fully impressing upon the jury Ardon’s
defensive theory that the complainant may have been “influence[d by] and expos[ed] to
explicit material[,] creat[ing] a motive or interest in fabricating allegations of specific
sexual abuse and attributing them to [Ardon].” See Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234,
253 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Often error in the exclusion of
evidence is harmless if the evidence is cumulative of other evidence or the nature of the
evidence is established through other means.”); see also Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 221.
Considering the jury’s verdicts on all four counts, the jury did not find Ardon’s
As we have previously noted, Detective Honeycutt was not permitted to answer
14
the question, so there was no response to be struck, leaving the jury free to consider the lingering question about the complainant viewing pornography on her phone— providing the defense with its desired clarification of “inappropriate” websites.
23
defensive theory to be persuasive. See Nguyen, 693 S.W.3d at 740 (“If the error had no
influence or only a slight effect on the verdict, then the error is harmless.”).
Ultimately, there is nothing in the record to support that there was any substantial
or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict because of the complained-of evidentiary
exclusions, making any error on the part of the trial court harmless. See Tex. R. App.
P. 44.2(b); see also Macedo, 629 S.W.3d at 240; Nguyen, 693 S.W.3d at 740. We overrule
Ardon’s second issue on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Ardon’s issues, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 6, 2026
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