[Cite as State v. Mayle, 2026-Ohio-3088.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2026-0009
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
of Muskingum County,
LEERON MAYLE, Case No. CR2025-0672
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: August 11, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Craig R. Baldwin, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Joseph A. Palmer (Muskingum County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), Zanesville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; April F. Campbell, Dublin, Ohio, for DefendantAppellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Leeron Mayle challenges the trial court’s decision to impose
maximum consecutive prison terms for the four felony offenses to which he pled guilty. We
find no error in the trial court’s imposition of maximum sentences on the four charges, and
we likewise see no basis for overturning the trial court’s order that Mayle serve those sentences
consecutively.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In September and October 2025, Mayle and his codefendant took property out
of other persons’ vehicles in a hotel parking lot in Zanesville, Ohio. The two of them were
soon thereafter indicted on various criminal charges stemming from the alleged thefts.
{¶3} Weeks later, Mayle pled guilty in the case to four fifth-degree-felony charges:
three theft charges and one possession-of-criminal-tools charge. (He also pled guilty to a pair of related misdemeanor charges.) According to the written plea agreement that Mayle signed
on the day of his guilty-plea hearing, he agreed that the offenses “do not merge” and also
agreed to “the judicial findings necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences.” The
parties jointly recommended that the judge impose an aggregate prison term of 24 months in
the case.
{¶4} Mayle waived any request for a presentence investigation, but the trial judge
nonetheless ordered that one be conducted. At the sentencing hearing held several weeks
later once a presentence report had been prepared, the trial judge imposed 12-month prison
terms on each of the four F5 charges, and the judge also ordered that Mayle serve those prison
terms consecutively for an aggregate prison sentence of 48 months in the case. (Jail days on
the two misdemeanors were imposed concurrently with the prison terms.)
Mayle’s Failure to Object in the Trial Court Limits Our Review of the Sentence Here
{¶5} In his one assignment of error, Mayle challenges the trial court’s imposition of
maximum consecutive sentences.
{¶6} A defendant may, under R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), appeal a sentence that includes a
“maximum definite prison term” for an offense. But under the (G)(2) provision of that statute,
we are permitted to undo a felony sentence if and only if “clear[] and convincing[]” evidence
indicates either that the trial court’s sentencing-related findings are not supported by the
record or that the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶7} We recently reiterated that a trial court’s imposition of a maximum prison term
for a felony offense is not contrary to law “‘if the sentence is within the statutory range for the
offense’” and if the court “‘considers both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Deitenbeck, 2025-Ohio-4487, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Carbaugh, 2023-Ohio1269, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} With regard to our review of consecutive sentences, the Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]he plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer
to a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld
unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v.
Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5 (Kennedy, C.J., with two justices concurring in the opinion and
one justice concurring in the judgment).
{¶9} Before we turn to the merits of Mayle’s argument, we note that Mayle did not
object at the sentencing hearing once the trial judge announced the sentence. That misstep
now poses a significant hurdle for him because, as we reiterated just last year, “[a]n error ‘that
was not called to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been
avoided or corrected by the trial court’ is deemed forfeited absent plain error.” State v. Bright,
2025-Ohio-725, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).
See also Crim.R. 52(B) and State v. Whitaker, 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 166 (“because Whitaker failed
to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing, he has forfeited
this issue, absent plain error”).
{¶10} After the trial judge announced the sentence in the case and advised Mayle of
his right to appeal, Mayle responded that he was not going to appeal and even said aloud that
the trial judge “did the right thing.” The judge then asked Mayle’s attorney whether any other
matters needed to be addressed, and the attorney said that there were none. That exchange
tells us that Mayle was given “a meaningful opportunity to express the concerns that [he] now raises here.” Bright at ¶ 9. In light of that fact, and because Mayle did not object to the
sentence imposed, we review Mayle’s sentence solely for plain error.
We See No Plain Error in the Sentence
{¶11} “To constitute plain error, an error ‘must be on the record, palpable, and
fundamental, so that it should have been apparent to the trial court without objection.’” Id.
at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.). “Notice of plain error under
Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and
only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶12} When imposing sentences on multiple charges, a trial court should start with
the presumption that any prison term should be imposed concurrently with any other prison
term, unless certain circumstances listed in R.C. 2929.41(A) apply. State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio1083, ¶ 11. A trial court may require a criminal defendant to serve sentences consecutively if
the court finds that consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect the public from future
crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public” and
that one of the findings in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) or (b) or (c) applies. Id., quoting R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
{¶13} “‘[T]he record must contain a basis upon which a reviewing court can
determine that the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before it
imposed consecutive sentences.’” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-5274, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), quoting
State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 28. And the trial judge must make the findings at the
sentencing hearing and must incorporate those findings into the sentencing entry, though the judge “has no obligation to state reasons to support” the findings. Bonnell at ¶ 37. When a
trial court fails to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the sentence imposed is
contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶14} In this case, a presentence investigation was conducted by the trial court’s
probation staff, and the resulting presentence report was reviewed by the trial judge and by
Mayle’s counsel before the sentencing hearing. The record from the sentencing hearing also
indicates that the trial judge considered the presentence report when determining the sentence
to be imposed.
{¶15} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel indicated that Mayle was taking
responsibility for his actions, was using drugs when he committed the offenses, had been using
drugs for quite some time, and desired to receive treatment at some point. Mayle’s attorney
also acknowledged a lengthy criminal history for Mayle but told the trial judge that the parties
had taken that criminal record into account when they jointly recommended an aggregate
prison term of 24 months in the case.
{¶16} The trial judge asked Mayle at the sentencing hearing if he had paid any of
what the parties had agreed at the guilty-plea hearing was an $8,100 restitution obligation in
the case. He had paid none of it, Mayle acknowledged, just as he had paid nothing toward a
restitution obligation of more than $1,100 in a 2022 theft case in the same court. The trial
judge noted that instead of finding employment to pay that prior restitution order, Mayle had
been going out at night and stealing tools from vehicles.
{¶17} When summarizing aloud at the sentencing hearing Mayle’s criminal history,
the trial judge mentioned that Mayle had been previously convicted on similar charges
involving, as in this case, thefts of tools and other personal property from victims’ vehicles and homes. The trial judge then indicated that he was not inclined to follow the joint
recommendation of a 24-month prison term, and he instead sentenced Mayle to 12 months
in prison on each of the four F5 charges, with those sentences imposed consecutively for an
aggregate prison term of 48 months.
{¶18} Mayle contends that maximum consecutive sentences are not warranted in this
case because, according to his appellate brief, he “is not one of the ‘worst offenders’ for whom
maximum consecutive sentences are meant to be reserved.” In support of that view, Mayle
cites a Supreme Court opinion that construed the “purposes and intent of S.B. 2.” State v.
Comer, 2003-Ohio-4165, ¶ 21. In Senate Bill 2 — an overhaul of Ohio’s sentencing statutes
enacted 30 years ago — R.C. 2929.14(C) was amended to authorize trial courts in felony cases
to impose “the longest prison term” allowed by law, but only in those cases where the court
had made certain findings, one of which was that the defendant had committed “the worst
form[] of the offense.” That language that Mayle has now latched onto about the “worst”
form of an offense — which again addressed the imposition of the “longest” prison term rather
than consecutive prison terms — was stripped from the statute 15 years ago when the General
Assembly enacted House Bill 86 in 2011. Because the notion of the “worst form[] of the
offense” is no longer part of Ohio’s sentencing provisions, Mayle’s argument embracing it is
a nonstarter.
{¶19} In accordance with Ohio’s current statutory provisions on sentencing, the trial
judge imposed definite prison terms that are within R.C. 2929.14(A)(5)’s statutory range for
fifth-degree-felony offenses. A review of the record from the sentencing hearing also indicates
that the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing listed
in R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors spelled out in R.C. 2929.12. In short, the trial judge’s imposition of maximum prison terms for Mayle’s felony offenses is
supported by the record and is not otherwise contrary to law.
{¶20} And though Mayle stipulated to the consecutive-sentence findings as part of his
plea agreement with the State, the trial judge said aloud at the sentencing hearing his findings
that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and punish the offender and
were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Mayle’s conduct and the danger that he posed
to the public. The trial judge also found that consecutive sentences were warranted under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) because at least two of Mayle’s multiple offenses had been committed
as part of a course of conduct, and the harm caused by those multiple offenses was so great
or so unusual that no single prison term would adequately reflect the seriousness of Mayle’s
conduct. In addition, the judge mentioned that Mayle’s history of criminal conduct
demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future
crime by him.
{¶21} (That last finding — that, in the words of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), Mayle’s
“history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
the public from future crime” by him — was said by the trial judge but does not appear in the
sentencing entry. Even so, the judge’s alternative sentencing-hearing finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(b) about Mayle’s multiple offenses being part of a course of conduct and about
the harm caused by two or more of those offenses being so great or so unusual that no single
prison term for any of them would adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct does
appear in the sentencing entry. That alternative finding is sufficient to support the imposition
of consecutive sentences in the case, given that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) simply requires that “any of the following” — meaning R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) or R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) or R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c) — be found by the judge who imposes consecutive sentences.)
{¶22} Given that Mayle and his codefendant committed, over the course of several
weeks, a series of thefts of personal property from inside vehicles in the same parking lot, the
trial judge’s conclusion that the offenses were part of a course of conduct seems appropriate.
See State v. Bates, 2024-Ohio-2587, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.) (“A ‘course of conduct’ exists for purposes
of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) where two offenses share some connection, common scheme,
pattern[,] or psychological thread that ties them together”), citing State v. Evans, 2023-Ohio3656, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶23} As for the trial court’s finding that the harm caused by the offenses was — in
the words of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) — “so great or unusual” that no single prison term would
adequately “reflect[ ] the seriousness” of Mayle’s conduct, the trial judge noted at the
sentencing hearing that Mayle had taken tools from work vehicles. The judge commented
that Mayle’s crimes had deprived the victims of the tools those persons needed to earn a living,
and Mayle himself agreed that his restitution obligation for the crimes exceeded $8,000.
{¶24} We see no plain error in the trial judge’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) course-ofconduct and so-great-or-unusual findings (both of which were made at the sentencing hearing
and were incorporated into the sentencing entry), and those findings — along with the judge’s
additional findings that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future
crime or to punish Mayle and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and
the danger that he posed to the public — were sufficient to justify Mayle’s consecutive
sentences.
{¶25} For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum
County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Leeron Mayle.
By: Gormley, J.;
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.