United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-2054
NATASHA URENA, Administrator of the Estate of Juliana Rodriguez
Morel; DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, Administrator of the Estate of Juliana
Rodriguez Morel,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Gelpí and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin T. King, with whom Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C.,
Megan E. Douglass, and Backus, Meyer & Branch, LLP were on brief, for appellants.
Kathleen F. Adams, with whom Aaron P. Cruz, Christopher J.
Seusing, and Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP were on brief, for
appellee.
August 11, 2026
BARRON, Chief Judge. This case concerns an appeal by
the administrators of the estate of Juliana Rodriguez Morel1 from
a judgment on the pleadings in favor of her former employer's
insurer. The judgment rested on the determination that her
pleadings provided no basis for finding that the insurer's policy
with the former employer covered her pregnancy-related
discrimination claims against that employer. We affirm.
I.
In March 2019, Rodriguez Morel filed an administrative
complaint with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights and
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In it,
she alleged that her former employer, Mammoth Tech, Inc.
("Mammoth"),2 discriminated against her on the basis of sex and
retaliated against her during her pregnancy.
The New Hampshire Commission notified Mammoth of the
administrative complaint that same month. It then dismissed the
administrative complaint in October 2020. However, later that
month, the EEOC provided Rodriguez Morel with a letter, on which
Mammoth was copied, "authorizing" her to sue Mammoth.
Rodriguez Morel passed away after filing the suit that
1
underlies this appeal, and the administrators of her estate
subsequently became parties to the suit.
Mammoth Tech, Inc., was previously an entity called Credit
2
Adjustments Inc. We refer to it by its current name, Mammoth.
- 3 -In January 2021, Rodriguez Morel filed suit against
Mammoth in the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire, bringing various claims -- including claims
alleging sex- and pregnancy-based discrimination and
retaliation -- that were rooted in the company's treatment of her
while she was pregnant. The district court entered a default
judgment in March 2023 against Mammoth on all of Rodriguez Morel's
claims and ordered the company to pay her $303,592.20 in back pay,
damages, and attorney's fees.
Nearly two years later, in 2025, Rodriguez Morel filed
a different action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire. This time she named as the defendant
Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America ("Travelers"),
which was the insurer from which Mammoth had purchased insurance
to cover losses stemming from wrongful employment practices.
In that suit, Rodriguez Morel sought a declaratory
judgment that Travelers must, under its insurance policy with
Mammoth, pay for losses that Mammoth incurred as a result of her
January 2021 suit against Mammoth. More specifically, she alleged
that Travelers had to "pay on behalf of Mammoth the amount" ordered
in the March 2023 judgment.
Days after Rodriguez Morel filed her amended complaint,
Travelers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It
contended that its insurance policy with Mammoth did not require
- 4 -it to pay for the March 2023 judgment. That was so, according to
Travelers, because Mammoth received constructive notice of
Rodriguez Morel's claims under Mammoth's insurance policy before
the start of the policy period, which ran from December 4, 2020,
to August 5, 2021.
The District Court agreed with Travelers and granted its
motion for judgment on the pleadings in September 2025. That
ruling is the subject of this appeal.
II.
We review the District Court's entry of judgment on the
pleadings de novo. Sevelitte v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
55 F.4th 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2022). We accept as true the non-moving
party's well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences in
their favor. Rezende v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 869 F.3d 40,
42 (1st Cir. 2017). Additionally, we review the District Court's
interpretation of the insurance policy de novo, applying the
substantive law of New Hampshire. Hansen v. Sentry Ins. Co., 756
F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2014).
III.
To explain the basis for the challenge to the District
Court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Travelers,
we first need to provide some further background about the
insurance policy between Mammoth and Travelers, as well as their
dealings over time. We then will explain why the challenge fails.
- 5 -A.
We start with the initial insurance policy executed by
Mammoth and Travelers, in which Mammoth purchased "Private Company
Directors and Officers Liability" ("PCDOL") insurance. A portion
of that policy is titled, "Liability Coverage Terms and Conditions"
("LCTC").
As the name suggests, the LCTC section contains an
overarching set of "[t]erms and [c]onditions." It provides that
they "apply to all [categories of] liability coverages" purchased
by the insured. It further states that "if any provision in the[]
[LCTC] is inconsistent or in conflict with the terms and conditions
of any particular [category of] liability coverage, such liability
coverage's terms, conditions, and limitations will control for
purposes of that liability coverage." (Citation modified.)
Among the LCTC's terms and conditions are those set forth
in a section titled, "Related Claims." (Citation modified.) That
provision states that "All Claims . . . for Related Wrongful Acts
will be considered as a single Claim . . . for purposes of [the
insurance policy]. All Claims . . . for Related Wrongful Acts
will be deemed to have been made at the time the first of such
Claims . . . was made . . . ." (Emphases removed.)
The LCTC also provides a definition of "Related Wrongful
Act[s]." That provision defines them as "all Wrongful Acts" -- as
- 6 -defined in the separate subject-matter coverages -- "that have as
a common nexus . . . any fact, circumstance, situation, event or
decision."3
Mammoth later purchased two additional insurance
coverages from Travelers -- Fiduciary Liability ("FL") and
Employment Practices Liability ("EPL"). Both were executed in
separate "endorsements" to the initial insurance policy, which, to
repeat, contained the Related Claims provision.
The EPL endorsement provides that Travelers "will pay on
behalf of [Mammoth], Loss for any Employment Claim first made
during the Policy Period." 4 (Emphases removed.) The EPL
endorsement's policy period ran from December 4, 2020, to
August 5, 2021. The EPL endorsement provides that an "Employment
Claim" is "first made" on "the earliest date that any [qualifying
Mammoth] officer first receives written notice of such
[Employment] Claim." (Emphases removed.)
3 The insurance policy provides a list of employment practices
that the policy deems "wrongful" for purposes of Travelers's
liability for payment. Because the parties do not dispute that
the conduct underlying Rodriguez Morel's 2019 administrative
complaint and January 2021 suit constitute wrongful employment
practices, we need not provide that list.
4 Qualifying losses stemming from "Employment Claims"
encompass "[d]efense [e]xpenses and money which . . . [Mammoth] is legally obligated to pay as a result of a[n] [Employment] Claim,
including settlements; judgments; back and front pay; compensatory damages; punitive or exemplary damages."
- 7 -The EPL endorsement also sets forth a definition of an
"Employment Claim." That definition includes:
1. a written demand for monetary damages or
non-monetary relief;
2. a civil proceeding commenced by service of
a complaint or similar pleading;
3. a criminal proceeding commenced by filing
of charges;
4. a formal administrative or regulatory
proceeding commenced by the filing of a notice
of charges, formal investigative order,
service of summons or similar document,
including a proceeding before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or any
similar governmental agency; provided that in
the context of an audit conducted by the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs, Employment Claim will be limited to
a Notice of Violation or Order to Show Cause
or written demand for monetary damages or
non-monetary relief;
5. an arbitration, mediation or similar
alternative dispute resolution proceeding if
the Insured is obligated to participate in
such proceeding or if the Insured agrees to
participate in such proceeding, with the
Company's written consent, such consent not to
be unreasonably withheld; or
6. a written request to toll or waive a statute
of limitations relating to a potential civil
or administrative proceeding, against an
Insured by or on behalf of or for the benefit
of a Claimant, or against an Insured Person
serving in an Outside Position by or on behalf
of or for the benefit of an Outside Claimant,
for a Wrongful Employment Practice; provided
that Employment Claim does not include any
labor or grievance arbitration or other
proceeding pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.
- 8 -(Emphases removed.)
Finally, the EPL endorsement contains what the parties
refer to as the "Prior and Pending Proceeding" provisions. Those
provisions state that Travelers "will not be liable for [l]oss for
any [Employment] Claim based upon . . . any" set of circumstances
that also "underl[ie] . . . any prior or pending civil, criminal,
administrative, or regulatory proceeding . . . against [Mammoth]
as of or prior to" December 4, 2015. (Emphases removed.)
B.
The administrators' arguments against Travelers allege
that the insurance company is liable for the losses attributable
to Rodriguez Morel's judgment against Mammoth solely based on the
EPL endorsement. And, as the administrators see things, under the
EPL endorsement, Rodriquez Morel's 2019 administrative complaint
and her January 2021 suit are separate "Employment Claims" that
each were "first made" whenever Mammoth received notice of them.5
So, because Mammoth received notice of the January 2021 suit during
Mammoth's EPL policy period, the administrators contend it is clear
5 The administrators separately contend that "a written demand
for monetary damages or non-monetary relief" that was sent from
Rodriguez Morel's counsel to Mammoth's counsel itself constitutes an "Employment Claim" that was "first made" within the policy
period. They make no separate argument, however, that this
"Employment Claim" reveals that the District Court erred in
granting judgment on the pleadings to Travelers if its other
arguments for our so concluding fail to persuade.
- 9 -that Travelers is liable for the losses arising from the judgment
entered in Rodriguez Morel's favor against Mammoth in the
January 2021 suit.
In making that argument, the administrators do not
dispute that the January 2021 suit is rooted in the same set of
actions by Mammoth as the 2019 administrative complaint, which
Mammoth had notice of before the EPL endorsement's policy period
began. Nor do the administrators dispute that (1) the
2019 administrative complaint is an "Employment Claim" under the
EPL endorsement or (2) the 2019 administrative complaint was
"first made" before the policy period for the EPL endorsement.
Thus, the administrators do not dispute that, under the
Related Claims provision, the January 2021 suit qualifies as a
"Related Claim" to the former "Employment Claim," which was the
2019 administrative complaint and so was "first made" prior to the
policy period. As a result, they do not dispute that, if the
Related Claims provision applies here, then Travelers was entitled
to judgment on the pleadings, just as the District Court
determined.
The administrators contend, however, that the Related
Claims provision does not apply here. They point out that the EPL
endorsement was executed after Mammoth executed the initial policy
with Travelers that contained the LCTC section -- and thus, the
Related Claims provision itself. In consequence, the
- 10 -administrators argue, the EPL endorsement supersedes the LCTC
portion of the initial policy, or at least its Related Claims
provision, thereby rendering the Related Claims provision
irrelevant here.
In pressing this argument, the administrators rely on
what they contend is the "widely recognized principle of law" that
"when a rider or endorsement modifies, qualifies, or restricts the
terms of the original policy, the rider or endorsement controls."
(Quoting 2 Couch on Insurance § 21:22 (3d ed. 2024).) But the
applicable rule is not that categorical.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear that the
rule that "the provisions contained in [an] endorsement or rider
will prevail over those contained in the body of the policy"
applies only where the two provisions at issue are in "conflict."
Santos v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 201 A.3d 1243, 1249 (N.H.
2019) (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 385 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 2004)); see 45 C.J.S. Insurance
§ 607 (2026) (noting that only where "the provisions in the policy
proper and those in the rider or endorsement are in conflict" does
"the latter control in construing the contract"). So, the
administrators must show that there is a basis in the pleadings
- 11 -for concluding that such a conflict exists. And while they attempt
to do so in three ways, we are not persuaded.6
1.
First, the administrators contend that there is a
conflict between the EPL endorsement and the LCTC because the EPL
endorsement's definition of "Employment Claim" conflicts with the
LCTC's general treatment of "Claim[s]." This is so, they reason,
because the LCTC's Related Claims provision could backdate an
"Employment Claim." By contrast, they point out, the EPL
endorsement does not itself contain a similar related claims
provision. Thus, they contend, the LCTC's Related Claims
provision requires the backdating of an "Employment Claim" even
when the EPL endorsement does not.
6 We note that the administrators advance an argument that
they may intend to be distinct from their contention that the EPL endorsement controls over the LCTC -- or, at least, its Related
Claims provision -- because the two conflict with one another.
Specifically, they argue that "an internal inconsistency in the
provisions of an insurance policy can create an ambiguity" that
warrants resolving such ambiguity "against the insurer, who
drafted the policy." (Citation modified.) But the administrators
do not sufficiently develop any arguments on appeal for there being such an ambiguity-creating inconsistency that are distinct from
the arguments that we consider below in addressing whether there
is a "conflict" between the Related Claims provision and the EPL
endorsement that renders the former inapplicable here. Thus, if
the administrators do mean to be making a separate argument based on there being an internal inconsistency that creates an ambiguity, that argument fails for the same reasons that their "conflict"-based argument fails.
- 12 -But, while the administrators are right that the EPL
endorsement provides that Travelers will pay for losses stemming
from "any Employment Claim" "first made" by an aggrieved employee
during the EPL policy period, the LCTC's Related Claims provision
expressly applies to "All Claims." And there is no language in
the EPL endorsement that suggests that the LCTC's Related Claims
provision means anything other than what it expressly says in that
regard.
Nor do the LCTC's overarching provisions suggest
otherwise. One such provision does provide that "if any provision
in the[] [LCTC] is inconsistent or in conflict with the terms and
conditions of any particular [category of] liability coverage,
such liability coverage's terms, conditions, and limitations will
control for purposes of that liability coverage." (Emphasis
omitted.) But, nothing in the EPL endorsement indicates that even
though the LCTC's Related Claims provision applies to "All Claims,"
its "Employment Claims" are not subject to it just as any claim
is. We therefore do not see how that provision suggests that the
EPL endorsement supersedes the LCTC in that regard.
In other words, by the plain terms of the insurance
policy at issue, when read as a whole, if more than one "Employment
Claim" has been made within the meaning of the EPL endorsement,
then the LCTC's Related Claims provision makes clear that, so long
as those claims are "Related," the "first made" date for those
- 13 -"Employment Claims" is the date that the earliest of those "Related
Claims" was made. Therefore, the provisions that the
administrators claim conflict in fact easily work together.
2.
The administrators separately argue that there is a
conflict between the EPL endorsement and the LCTC because the EPL
endorsement's Prior and Pending Proceeding provisions conflict
with the LCTC's Related Claims provision. Under the EPL
endorsement's Prior and Pending Proceeding provisions, the
administrators contend, Travelers would be obligated to pay for
the judgment against Mammoth that arose from her January 2021
suit -- which, on its own, was noticed during the EPL policy period
and independently qualifies as an "Employment Claim" -- even
though that suit was "Related" to the 2019 administrative
complaint. This is so, according to the administrators, because
the Prior and Pending Proceeding provisions create "a 5-year look
back window" for "Employment Claims" " with 'prior and pending
proceeding' dates long before the coverage effective
date . . . starting from December 4, 2015." 7 In contrast, the
administrators argue, under the LCTC's Related Claims provision,
The administrators also invoke the EPL endorsement's
7
"Continuity Date," but do not develop an argument about how that
date is relevant to the interpretive question in this case, much
less one that is distinct from its Prior and Pending
Proceeding-based argument.
- 14 -Mammoth would have "received notice" of the January 2021 suit
before the policy period and so Travelers would not be obligated
to cover the losses attributable to the judgment stemming from the
January 2021 suit.
This purported conflict arises, however, only because
the administrators misread the Prior and Pending Proceeding
provisions. The text of those provisions provides, in relevant
part, that Travelers "will not be liable for [l]oss for any Claim
based upon or arising out of, any fact, circumstance, situation,
event or Wrongful Act underlying or alleged in any prior or pending
civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory
proceeding . . . against . . . [Mammoth] as of or prior to"
December 4, 2015. (Emphases removed.) As a result, the Prior
and Pending Proceeding provisions operate differently from the
LCTC's Related Claims provision.
The latter details how the broader policy determines
when Mammoth first receives notice of certain "Employment
Claims" -- backdating a set of "Employment Claims" that are deemed
"Related" to the earliest date that one of those "Employment
Claims" was "made." The former provides that Travelers is not
obligated to pay for losses in certain circumstances without regard
to when or whether an "Employment Claim" was "first made" during
the EPL's policy period -- when, as the District Court put it,
those losses arise from certain acts "underlying or alleged in a
- 15 -prior . . . proceeding made before December 4, 2015." In
consequence of the different ways the provisions in question
operate, the alleged conflict does not exist.
Insofar as the administrators mean to suggest that the
alleged conflict arises because the Prior and Pending Proceeding
provisions affirmatively create liability for Travelers in the
circumstances described -- and so even when the LCTC's Related
Claims provision would spare Travelers from such liability -- we
also cannot agree. The language of the Prior and Pending
Proceeding provisions, by its own plain terms -- that is, by virtue
of its use of the phrase "will not be liable" -- creates an
exclusion from coverage in the identified circumstances. As the
District Court pithily put it, the administrators' argument
"essentially relies on the logical fallacy that because a
particular statement is true, the converse of that statement must
also be true."
This reading is further supported by the location of the
operational Prior and Pending Proceeding provision in the EPL
endorsement. Specifically, that provision appears within a
section titled, "EXCLUSIONS." (Emphasis removed.)
Despite these problems with the administrators' attempts
to show that the LCTC's Related Claims provision does not apply
here due to the Prior and Pending Proceeding provisions, the
administrators contend that we still must conclude that is the
- 16 -case based on a Texas state appellate court decision -- Gastar
Expl., Ltd. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 412 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex.
App. 2013). But that out-of-state, intermediate-level court
precedent fails to persuade us.
Even assuming it is of no consequence that the provisions
at issue in Gastar contained somewhat different language than those
at issue here, the court there did not identify a reason for us to
conclude that a related claims provision and prior and pending
proceeding provisions cannot work together. And, as we have just
explained, the LCTC's Related Claims provision and the Prior and
Pending Proceeding provisions in the EPL endorsement do not
conflict but instead work independently in two different
circumstances. So, we fail to see how Gastar gives us a reason
to conclude that there is the kind of conflict that the
administrators claim.
3.
The administrators offer one additional argument that
they contend shows that there is a conflict between the LCTC's
Related Claims provision and the EPL endorsement's Prior and
Pending Proceeding provisions, such that the latter controls and
the former is of no relevance here. This argument depends on the
fact that one of the EPL endorsement's Prior and Pending Proceeding
provisions is titled, "Prior and Pending Proceeding Date," and
that this provision identifies that date as "December 4, 2015."
- 17 -The administrators note that this date precedes the
start date for the EPL endorsement's policy period. By contrast,
they note, the date given as the "Prior and Proceeding Date" in
the prior and pending proceeding provisions in both the PCDOL and
FL coverages "matche[s] the inception or coverage effective dates"
for those coverages.
The administrators contend that "[t]his new and
different treatment for Employment Claims under [the] EPL
[endorsement] was presumptively chosen and indicative of the
parties' intent." In so asserting, we understand the
administrators to be arguing that the differing approach to the
prior and pending proceeding dates across the coverages means that
the parties intended the EPL endorsement's Prior and Pending
Proceeding provisions to work in a way that requires us to conclude
that the LCTC's Related Claims provision does not apply here.
But, as we have just explained, the EPL endorsement's
Prior and Pending Proceeding provisions can comfortably work
together with the LCTC's Related Claims provision. And we fail
to see how our reasons for reaching that conclusion are undermined
by the fact that the Prior and Pending Proceeding date set forth
in the EPL endorsement precedes the start date for that
endorsement's policy period. We thus fail to see how that feature
of the EPL endorsement's Prior and Pending Proceeding date provides
- 18 -a basis for our concluding that the LCTC's Related Claims provision
has no application in this case.8
IV.
For all these reasons, we affirm the District Court's
judgment.
8 The administrators also contend that "Travelers
demonstrated ambiguity about the applicability of the related-claims exclusion, by avoiding any discussion of it in its denial letter." But the administrators fail to develop an
argument explaining how Travelers's actions could bear on the
interpretation of the text of the insurance policy provisions at
issue. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990).
- 19 -