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Mirror Metals, Inc. v. United States

2026-08-11

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Slip Op. 26-89

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

MIRROR METALS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge

v.

Court No. 24-00260

UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

[Granting Plaintiff’s motion and remanding Commerce’s denials of Plaintiff’s requests for exclusion from Section 232 tariffs on steel imports.]

Dated: August 11, 2026

Erik D. Smithweiss, Katherine Anne Dobscha, and Sarah Ellen Raymond, Grunfeld Desiderio Lebowitz Silverman & Klestadt, LLP of New York, NY and Los Angeles, CA for Plaintiff Mirror Metals, Inc.

Tara Kathleen Hogan, U.S. Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch – Civil Division of Washington, D.C. for Defendants United States and United States Customs and Border Protection. Of Counsel were Billie Kathryn Debrason and Rachel M. Morris, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and Security of Washington, D.C. for Defendant United States Department of Commerce.

Kelly, Judge: Before the Court is Plaintiff Mirror Metals, Inc.’s (“Mirror

Metals” or “Plaintiff”) Rule 56.1 Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record. Pl. 56.1

Mot. J. Agency Rec., Jan. 14, 2026, ECF No. 31 (“Pl. Mot.”). Mirror Metals challenges

the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) denial of its requests for certain

flat rolled stainless steel products to be excluded from tariffs imposed pursuant to Court No. 24-00260 Page 2

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, Pub. L. 87-794, § 232,

76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962) (“Section 232”), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2024). See id.

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is granted and Commerce’s

determinations are remanded for reconsideration or further explanation.

BACKGROUND

Acting pursuant to Section 232, 1 the President issued Proclamation 9705,

imposing a 25 percent tariff on imports of certain steel products and directing

Commerce to exclude a steel article determined not to be “produced in the United

States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality,”

or based on specific national security considerations. See Proclamation No. 9705 at

cls. 1–2, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625, 11,627 (Mar. 15, 2018). It also directed Commerce to

issue procedures for exclusion requests within ten days. Id. Commerce, acting

through its Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), promulgated regulations

establishing the exclusion process. See Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff

Exclusions Process, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,060, 81,073–78 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 14, 2020)

(codified at former 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1) (“15 C.F.R. pt. 705 supp. 1” or “the

regulations”). 2 The regulations specified “[a]n exclusion will only be granted if an

1 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 empowers the President to adjust imports of articles that may threaten to impair the national security of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2024).

2 The former regulations, effective December 14, 2020, applied when Plaintiff filed

(footnote continued)

Court No. 24-00260 Page 3

article is not produced in the United States in a sufficient, reasonably available

amount, and of a satisfactory quality, or for specific national security considerations.”

Id. at § (c)(5)(i). On February 10, 2025, the President issued Proclamation 10896,

revoking the provisions of the prior proclamation that authorized Commerce to grant

exclusions from Section 232 tariffs with respect to imports of steel articles. See

Proclamation No. 10896 at cl. 7, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,817 (Feb. 18, 2025) (directing

Commerce to “take all necessary action to rescind the product exclusion process”).

Mirror Metals provides flat-rolled stainless steel with specialized textures and

surface treatments to customers in North America. See Compl. at ¶¶ 3–4, Dec. 20,

2024, ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”). It imports three varieties of flat-rolled stainless steel:

# 8 nondirectional finish steel, bright annealed finish steel, and # 4 satin finish steel

(collectively, “subject steel”). See id. at ¶ 4. Between October 2022 and March 2024,

Plaintiff submitted 63 exclusion requests from the Section 232 tariffs on the subject

steel. See id. at Ex. 1; Pl. Mot. at 16. Domestic companies Outokumpu Stainless USA

(“Outokumpu” or “the Objector”), North American Stainless, and Cleveland-Cliffs

Steel Inc. objected to Plaintiff’s exclusion requests. 3 Id. at ¶¶ 7–8. The International

the exclusion requests between 2022 and 2024. See Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusions Process, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,060 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 14, 2020). Citations to the regulations at 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 are to the December 14, 2020 version, unless otherwise stated.

3 Because Commerce determined that Outokumpu was “at least one objector [who]

could meet the “quality, quantity, and timeliness criteria,” Defendants note it did not

(footnote continued)

Court No. 24-00260 Page 4

Trade Administration (“ITA”) reviewed the exclusion requests and corresponding

objections, rebuttals, and surrebuttals for the subject steel products and

recommended to BIS that Mirror Metals’ requests for exclusion be denied. Id. at ¶

88. BIS accepted the ITA’s recommendations and provided decision memoranda

explaining its rationale for denying the requests. Id.

Mirror Metals submitted 29 exclusion requests for “#8 non-directional finish”

steel products. See id. at Ex. 1. Outokumpu submitted objections to the requests

indicating that it could manufacture the product in its Calvert, Alabama facility

within 60 days. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0027. 4 The Objector

described #8 non-directional steel as “standard product.” See, e.g., id., AR0028. For

each request, Commerce concluded that at least one objector could meet the “quality,

quantity, and timeliness criteria,” and therefore denied the request. See, e.g., id.,

AR0004.

Mirror Metals submitted three exclusion requests for “bright annealed finish”

steel products. See Compl. at Ex. 1. Outokumpu filed objections, indicating that it

could produce a “mirror finished product with domestically melted steel” in its

consider submissions from the other objectors, North American Stainless and Cleveland-Cliffs Steel Inc., to make its determinations. See, e.g., Defs. Resp. at 9 (“Because Commerce found Outokumpu met the quality, quantity, and timeliness criteria, Commerce did not evaluate NAS’ submissions. AR1282.”).

4 “AR__” refers to pages of the public version of the administrative record, which

contains all public documents pertaining to each exclusion request. See Public Admin. Rec. for U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Apr. 15, 2025, ECF Nos. 15-1–8; Amend. Admin. Rec., Nov. 25, 2025, ECF No. 27 (collectively, “Exclusion Requests”). Court No. 24-00260 Page 5

Calvert, Alabama facility. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 356053, AR1305. The

Objector reported that it could manufacture and deliver bright annealed finish

products within 55 days. See, e.g., id., AR1307–08. For each request, Commerce

concluded that at least one objector could meet the “quality, quantity, and timeliness

criteria.” See, e.g., id., AR1280.

Mirror Metals submitted 31 requests for exclusions for “#4 satin finish” steel

products. See Compl. at Ex. 1. Outokumpu filed objections, stating that it “produces

the product in the exclusion request.” See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 334672,

AR1485. The Objector indicated that it could manufacture and deliver the product

within 55 days. See, e.g., id., AR1487–88. Commerce denied the exclusion requests,

concluding that “[At least one] objector meets the quality, quantity, and timeliness

criteria.” See, e.g., id., AR1464.

On December 20, 2024, Mirror Metals filed a complaint against Defendants,

challenging Commerce’s determinations denying the exclusion requests. See Compl.

On April 16, 2025, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint. See Defs. Answer,

Apr. 16, 2025, ECF No. 11. On January 14, 2026, Mirror Metals filed its Rule 56.1

motion for judgment on the agency record. See Pl. Mot. On April 17, 2026,

Defendants responded to Mirror Metals’ Rule 56.1 motion. See Defs. Resp. to Mot.

for J. on Agency Rec., Apr. 17, 2026, ECF No. 34 (“Defs. Resp.”). On June 5, 2026,

Mirror Metals filed its reply in support of its Rule 56.1 motion. [Pl.’s] Reply Brief in

Supp. of Pl.’s R. 56.1 Mot. for J. on the Agency Rec., June 5, 2026, ECF No. 37. Court No. 24-00260 Page 6

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2024). The Court reviews

an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) pursuant to the standards provided by

section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(e)

(2024). The Act states that a reviewing court shall:

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions

found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law . . .

(F) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556

and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency

hearing provided by statute.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (F). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency

considered impermissible factors, ignored an important aspect of the problem,

contradicted the record evidence, or offered an implausible explanation. Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Courts

ask whether the agency considered the relevant factors and data and articulated a

satisfactory explanation for its action. Id. at 43; Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).

DISCUSSION

I. Denied Section 232 Exclusion Requests

Plaintiff argues that Commerce’s determinations to deny Plaintiff’s 63

exclusion requests are unlawful and arbitrary and capricious because Commerce

accepted and considered the Objector’s statements that were deficient under the Court No. 24-00260 Page 7

regulations and refused to consider Plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence demonstrating that

the subject steel could not be produced domestically. See Pl. Mot. at 2, 8–11, 47–49.

Defendants argue that Commerce reasonably denied Plaintiff’s exclusion requests by

considering the relevant regulatory criteria and offered reasoned explanations for its

decisions consistent with the evidence before it. Defs. Resp. at 13–20. Because

Commerce’s determinations ignore the regulatory requirements for objections and

fail to explain the denials of Plaintiff’s exclusion requests in light of the rebuttal

evidence, its determinations are remanded for reconsideration or further explanation.

A. Failure to Comply with Regulations Regarding Objections

Acting under Section 232, the President issued Proclamation 9705 which

imposed an additional 25 percent ad valorem tariff on certain steel imports and

authorized Commerce to consider exclusion requests for steel products determined to

be unavailable domestically in sufficient quantity or satisfactory quality or based on

specific national security considerations. See Proclamation No. 9705 at cls. 1–4. The

President also instructed Commerce to issue procedures creating a process by which

Commerce could consider affected parties’ requests for “exclusions” from Section 232

tariffs. See id. at cls. 3–4. Commerce, acting through the BIS, promulgated

regulations governing requests for exclusions from Section 232 tariffs. See generally

15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1. Commerce relied on BIS as “the lead agency” in deciding

whether to grant a request, and the ITA “analyz[ed] requests and objections to

evaluate whether there [was] domestic production available to meet the requestor’s Court No. 24-00260 Page 8

product needs.” See Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted

Requests for Steel and Aluminum, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,026, 46,027 (Dep’t of Commerce

Sept. 11, 2018). 5 ITA then provided Commerce with a recommendation as to whether

it should grant an exclusion request. Id.6

During the relevant time period, the regulations permitted domestic

manufacturers of steel or aluminum in the United States to object to an exclusion

request. 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (d)(1). The regulations stated:

(4) Substance of objections to submitted exclusion requests. The

objection should clearly identify, and provide support for, its opposition

to the proposed exclusion, with reference to the specific basis identified

in, and the support provided for, the submitted exclusion request.

5 Only directly affected individuals or organizations located in the United States— including entities engaged in construction, manufacturing, or supplying steel products to users—could submit exclusion requests. 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (c)(1). The fillable form required requesters to supply specific factual information, including: (1) the product type and class for which the exclusion is requested, (2) the 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule Code of the United States for the single product covered by the request, (3) the quantity of product required (stated in kilograms) under a oneyear exclusion, (4) estimates of the number of days required to take delivery of, manufacture, and ship the product covered by the request, (5) a full description of the physical properties and chemical composition of the product the requestor seeks to import, (6) any standards organizations that have set specifications for the product, (7) the application for the product, (8) why similar products manufactured in the United States are not suitable, and (9) domestic product availability information. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0009–0014.

6 Under the regulations in effect at the time, Commerce reviewed each exclusion

request to determine whether the requester’s steel product met any of three criteria: (1) “the article is not produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount;” (2) “the article is not produced in the United States in a satisfactory quality;” or (3) “specific national security considerations” warrant relief. 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (c)(6). Exclusion requests that did not satisfy the requirements specified in the regulations would be rejected. 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (h)(1)(i).

Court No. 24-00260 Page 9

Id. at § (d)(4). Where an objector was not currently producing the product but could

produce and “immediately” (i.e., within eight weeks or, if after eight weeks, a date

earlier than when the requester could obtain the quantity from the foreign supplier)

make available the requester’s required product quantity, the regulations required

the objector to explain the anticipated timeline to start production of the steel

included in the exclusion request to which it was objecting, with supporting evidence

substantiating its claimed delivery schedule. Id.

Specifically, the fillable objection form required an objector to: (1) indicate

whether the objector currently manufactures or can immediately manufacture the

product, (2) state the time period within which the objector can produce the product,

(3) state whether the objector manufactures, or can immediately manufacture, a

substitute product, (4) discuss the suitability of the objector’s product, (5) provide a

technical description of the product’s characteristics, (6) state what percentage of the

requested tonnage the objector can manufacture, and (7) detail the total delivery

time. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0025–0028.

The regulations also required Commerce’s decision memoranda to respond to

any objections, rebuttals, and surrebuttals concerning the requests. 15 C.F.R. pt.

705, supp. 1 § (h)(2)(i). Although an agency generally may rely on certified factual

statements, it must still consider countervailing evidence that “create[s] doubt” about

those statements’ veracity. Seneca Foods Corp. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 3d

1325, 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023) (“Seneca I”) (citing Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United Court No. 24-00260 Page 10

States, 649 F.3d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Ultimately, “[a]n exclusion will only be

granted if an article is not produced in the United States in a sufficient, reasonably

available amount, and of a satisfactory quality, or for specific national security

considerations.” 7 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (c)(5)(i).

Here, Commerce accepts the Objector’s conclusory statements despite their

failure to satisfy the objection requirements in subsection (d)(4) and therefore fails to

give effect to the regulations’ requirements for valid objections. The regulations

require an objector to clearly explain and substantiate its claims by addressing the

specific grounds and evidence presented in the exclusion request. See id. at § d(4).

More specifically, the “objection should clearly identify, and provide support for, its

opposition to the proposed exclusion.” Id. Further, with respect to timing, the

regulations provide, “[i]t is incumbent on both the exclusion requester, and objecting

producers, to provide supplemental evidence supporting their claimed delivery

times.” See id. at § (c)(6)(i). Yet, the Objector in this case does not support its

assertions and provides no supplemental evidence regarding delivery times. See

generally Exclusion Requests. Defendants argue that the regulations were intended

only to remind the parties that it was their burden to create an adequate record. See

Defs. Resp. at 25 (citing QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed.

Cir. 2011)). However, the regulations state their purpose:

7 Here, Plaintiff does not request an exclusion based on national security concerns, and Commerce does not identify any national security concerns as a basis for denial of Plaintiff’s exclusion requests. See generally Exclusion Requests. Court No. 24-00260 Page 11

(a) Scope. This supplement specifies the requirements and process for

how directly affected parties located in the United States may submit

requests for exclusions from the duties and quantitative limitations

imposed by the President. This supplement also specifies the

requirements and process for how parties in the United States may

submit objections to submitted exclusion requests for relief from the

duties or quantitative limitations imposed by the President and the

process for rebuttals to submitted objections and surrebuttals

(collectively, “232 submissions”). This supplement identifies the time

periods for such submissions, the methods of submission, and the

information that must be included in such submissions.

15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (a). The phrase “specifies the requirements” means the

regulation delineates what parties must supply in support of their positions. See

Requirement, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/requirements (last visited Aug. 6, 2026) (defining “requirement” as

something required, necessity, “something essential to the existence or occurrence of

something else”).8

Here, the Objector repeats the same general response in each of its objections—

the product in the exclusion request is a “standard product” that it can produce

domestically in its Calvert, Alabama mill. 9 Contrary to subsection (d)(4)’s

8 QVD Food Co. reminds the parties that they bear the burden of creating an adequate record, and the regulations remind the parties of what is specifically required to create that adequate record. See QVD Food, 658 F.3d at 1324; 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1.

9 For example, in response to the prompt, “[i]ndicate what type of order the Exclusion

Request that is the subject of the Objection Filing would pertain to,” the Objector states, “Standard Product,” and under comments, “Outokumpu can produce the product in the exclusion request.” See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0024–

(footnote continued)

Court No. 24-00260 Page 12

requirements, the Objector’s statements fail to substantiate the claim that it can

produce the subject steel by addressing the specific grounds and evidence presented

in the exclusion request. 10 See 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (d)(4). For example, in

Exclusion Request No. 324905, Plaintiff requests an exclusion related to the “#8 nondirectional finish steel” product it claims is not domestically available. See Exclusion

Request No. 324905, AR0009–0023. In the exclusion request, Plaintiff identifies

what it claims is the closest domestically available product which has a “#8

directional finish,” and explains why it is an inadequate substitute for the subject

steel by citing different physical characteristics relating to, e.g., polishing method,

reflectivity, and clarity, which depart from Plaintiff’s quality standards for #8 nondirectional finish steel. See id.

0025. In response to the prompt, “discuss the suitability of your organization’s steel product compared to that identified by the Exclusion Requestor,” the Objector states, “[t]he product in the exclusion request is standard product. Outokumpu can produce the product in the exclusion request domestically in its mill in Calvert, Alabama.” See, e.g., id., AR0025. In response to the prompt, “identify the reasons your organization objects to an exclusion request being granted to the applicant,” the Objector states, “Outokumpu can produce the product in this exclusion request domestically in its mill in Calvert, Alabama.” See, e.g., id., AR0027. 10 The regulations also required the substance of surrebuttals to “address a rebuttal

to an objection to the exclusion request made by the requester.” 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (g)(3). In many of its surrebuttals, the Objector claims generally, “the product in the exclusion request is standard product,” and adds “Outokumpu can meet all of the specifications of the product in this exclusion request.” See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0035–0036. Although the surrebuttal mentions “specifications,” it does not identify the product specifications Plaintiff offers in its rebuttal, evidence to demonstrate that the subject steel is not domestically available. See, e.g., id. Therefore, the Objector’s surrebuttals likewise failed to meet the regulatory requirements. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 §§ (g)(3), (h)(1)(iv). Court No. 24-00260 Page 13

According to the regulations, to successfully object to a requester’s claim that

its subject steel product is “[n]ot produced in the United States in a satisfactory

quality,” an objector must demonstrate that “the steel . . . being produced by an

objector can meet . . . the quality (e.g., industry specs or internal company quality

controls or standards)” standards. 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (c)(6)(ii). Here, the

objection does not address or even mention Plaintiff’s support for its request, such as

Plaintiff’s explanation that the nearest domestically available product, “#8

directional finish” steel product, fails to meet its quality standards for polish,

reflectivity, and clarity. See Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0024–0028. Thus, the

objection fails to meet the regulatory requirements to successfully demonstrate that

the subject steel is domestically available. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (d)(4). In

the decision memorandum, even though the objection fails to meet the regulation’s

subsection (d)(4) requirements, Commerce denies the exclusion. Exclusion Request

No. 324905, AR0005. Notably, Commerce acknowledges that the Objector fails to

meet subsection (d)(4)’s requirement that it address the basis and supporting

evidence for the exclusion request, i.e., a “type 304 #8 non-directional mirror finish,”

yet it still accepts the Objector’s vague statements as basis for denial:

The request specifies type 304 #8 non-directional mirror finish.

Outokumpu’s product matches the specifications of the request;

however, Outokumpu does not specifically mention the type 304 #8 nondirectional mirror finish in the objection offering. ITA notes that

Outokumpu includes a statement that, “The product in this exclusion

request is standard product. Outokumpu can meet all of the

specifications of the product in this exclusion request.” As such, ITA has

determined that the specific statement made by the objector satisfies Court No. 24-00260 Page 14

and meets the specifications listed in the exclusion request. Therefore,

Outokumpu meets the quality criterion.

Id.; see 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (d)(4).

Defendants argue that Commerce reasonably relied on the Objector’s

statements because “[a] written statement made under penalty of perjury is

considered reliable evidence in situations with even more consequence than a nonprejudicial denial of an exclusion request.” Defs. Resp. at 16. They argue that “[i]n

the absence of contrary record evidence . . . Commerce may consider an objector’s

statement, certified under penalty of perjury, to be reliable evidence.” Id. at 15 (citing

Seneca Foods Corp. v. United States, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1346, 1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade

2024) (“Seneca II”), aff’d, Fed. Cir. No. 25-1310). Although the regulations require

parties making submissions to “legally certify the veracity of the submission,” the

purpose of the regulations titled “Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Exclusions

Process,” was to delineate a process for making exclusion requests, objections,

rebuttals, and surrebuttals. See generally 85 Fed. Reg. 81,060, 81067 (Dep’t of

Commerce Dec. 14, 2020). Even in the absence of contrary evidence, which as

discussed below is not always the case here, certified statements are of no value if

they do not tend to support the determination. The Court did not hold, in Seneca I

nor in Seneca II, that Commerce may accept certified statements uncritically; rather,

it held that Commerce must consider countervailing evidence and may rely on parties’

factual representations only where that reliance reflects “reasoned decision-making.”

Seneca I, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 1339; see also Seneca II, 740 F. Supp. 3d at 1346 (“The Court No. 24-00260 Page 15

problem with Commerce’s denials in Seneca I . . . was not that the agency accepted

[the objector’s] representations, but rather that it failed to make apparent its

rationale for crediting [the objector’s] representations despite Seneca’s email

submissions.”). Here, it is unclear whether the Objector’s statement that it can meet

“the specifications of the product” means that the Objector certified its ability to meet

Mirror Metals’ quality requirements for each product. Indeed, a certified ambiguous

statement proves little and cannot supplant Commerce’s obligation to provide a

reasoned basis for its determinations.

The regulations state that “[o]bjection filings that do not satisfy the

requirements specified in paragraphs (b) and (d) will not be considered.” 15 C.F.R.

pt. 705, supp. 1 § (h)(1)(ii). Because Commerce denied Mirror Metals’ exclusion

requests based on its determinations that the subject steel was domestically

available, and those determinations relied on objections that failed to comply with 15

C.F.R. pt. 705, supp. 1 § (d)(4), the matter is remanded to Commerce for further

explanation or reconsideration.11

B. Failure To Assess Rebuttal Evidence

Even if the Objector satisfied subsection (d)(4)’s substantive requirements for

objections, Commerce does not address Plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence that may

11 Should Commerce, on remand, find that the objections raised are insufficient and thus the exclusions should have been granted, Commerce’s failure to consider countervailing rebuttal evidence is moot. However, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court addresses the issue.

Court No. 24-00260 Page 16

undermine the Objector’s assertions. Therefore, even if Commerce explains on

remand why the Objector’s submissions satisfy subsection (d)(4), it must also address

the evidence bearing on whether the subject steel is domestically available and

reasonably explain why it credits the Objector’s evidence over Plaintiff’s evidence.

The regulations require Commerce’s determination to include an explanation

responsive to any objections, rebuttals, and surrebuttals. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 705, supp.

1 § (h)(2)(i) (“[t]he U.S. Department of Commerce[‘s] response to an exclusion request

will also be responsive to any of the objection(s), rebuttal(s) and surrebuttal(s) for

that submitted exclusion request.”). Plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence contains business

information and communications it contends undermine the Objector’s statements

that it can make the subject steel. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No. 346364, AR0690

(the Objector’s managers confirmed in a telephone conference in 2022 that the

Objector could not make the #8 non-directional finish but rather could add reflective

gloss to base steel); Exclusion Request No. 324905, AR0033 (the Objector’s website

explains that the reflective gloss is not polishing, and therefore different from Mirror

Metals’ polished and finished product, and that the website does not mention #8

finish at all); Exclusion Request No. 341039, AR0689 (a November 2022 email from

the Objector to Plaintiff which stated that it can only produce a “#8 finish” using

third-party processors).

In many instances, Commerce’s reason for disregarding the rebuttal evidence

is that it consulted a “subject matter expert,” who it claims, “could not definitively Court No. 24-00260 Page 17

connect the information . . . to the requested product.” See e.g., Exclusion Request

No. 324905, AR0005. For example, the Exclusion Request No. 324905 decision

memorandum states, in part:

ITA notes Mirror Metals provided [confidential business information] to

support its claim that Outokumpu cannot provide the requested

product. [Subject matter expert] guidance was requested to determine

if the information in the emails referenced the requested product. The

[subject matter expert] could not definitively connect the information in

the emails to the requested product. ITA finds that nothing in the sales

correspondence contradicts the certified statements made by

Outokumpu in its objection.

Id. 12 For this denial, Commerce does not explain why the subject matter expert could

not “definitively connect” the rebuttal evidence to the subject steel or why “nothing

in the sales correspondence contradicts” the Objector’s statements.

In other instances, Commerce refuses to consider Plaintiff’s evidence

indicating that the Objector can only produce the subject steel outside the United

States. For example, in the Exclusion Request No. 341039 decision memorandum,

the ITA’s recommendation disclaims any authority to consider “country-of-origin”

evidence in its analysis and recommendation and instead defers to BIS. Exclusion

12 See also, e.g., Exclusion Request Nos. 324938, AR0037; 38231, AR0076; 338228, AR0114; 338379, AR0149; 339249, AR0190; 339250, AR0231; 339256, AR0273; 339242, AR0310; 339240, AR0351; 346185, AR0437; 346215, AR0479; 346220, AR0524; 346225, AR0569; 334672, AR1355; 334673, AR1405; 334674, AR1454; 334675, AR1503; 334676, AR1552; 334677, AR1602; 339264, AR1652; 339269, AR1702; 339271, AR1749; 339540, AR1796; 339616, AR1843; 339627; AR1890. Court No. 24-00260 Page 18

Request No. 341039, AR0660. 13 However, BIS concludes without confronting the

issue that there is no “country of origin” question and accepts the Objector’s

unsupported claim that it can or does produce the subject steel in the United States.

Id., AR0657.

However, in some instances, Commerce reasonably disregards certain rebuttal

evidence for staleness, reasoning that Plaintiff’s email evidence was dated more than

90 days prior to the date of the exclusion request. See, e.g., Exclusion Request No.

356061, AR1281. 14 Commerce, as a fact-finder, may reasonably consider the

evidence’s currency or staleness in evaluating its reliability and probative value. See

5 U.S.C. § 556(d); see also, e.g., Seneca II, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1336 at 1354 (finding

Commerce’s internal 90-day “cutoff” “reasonable”). Although Commerce addresses

some rebuttal evidence, its decision ignore other rebuttal evidence without

explanation is arbitrary and capricious.

II. Remedy

Defendants note that on remand, if Commerce determines that Plaintiff should

have been granted the exclusion requests, there is a question as to how Commerce

13 See also, e.g., Exclusion Request Nos. 342642, AR0700; 342653, AR0739; 342672, AR0779; 342668, AR0819; 342650, AR0858; 391496 AR1026–27; 357875, AR1301; 416927, AR1111.

14 See also Exclusion Request Nos. 355972, AR0900; 359427, AR0941; 386011, AR0982; 386019, AR1994; 390092, AR2043; 390578, AR2095; 390582, AR2147; 390585, AR2407; 390589, AR2251; 390591, AR2303; 390594, AR2355; 390598, AR2199; 390599, AR2459; 390883, AR2511; 390900, AR2563; 356053, AR1196; 356061, AR1251; 357875, AR1301; 416927, AR1111; 418325, AR1068; 429045, AR2664; 429057, AR2768; 429034, AR2716; 390408, AR2615.

Court No. 24-00260 Page 19

may provide a remedy because Proclamation 10896 has since revoked Commerce’s

authority to grant Section 232 tariff exclusions for steel imports. See Defs. Resp. at

28 n.13. At oral argument, Defendants stated that, “[i]f Commerce were to reach a

contrary decision on remand, it would document its reasons for doing so, and

[Commerce] would probably need some sort of court order to effectuate that.” Oral

Argument at 53:34–44, July 22, 2026, ECF No. 41 (“Oral Argument”). Likewise,

Plaintiff stated that “[w]e would probably need a court order along the lines of the

AM/NS Calvert decision, requiring reliquidation of some entries . . . .” Id. at 51:05–

14. If, on remand, Commerce reconsiders its determination and concludes that it

should have granted the exclusions, Commerce shall undertake whatever action is

necessary to effectuate them, including directing United States Customs and Border

Protection to reliquidate the subject entries as necessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1)

(the Court may “order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action . .

.”).

CONCLUSION

Commerce’s denial of Plaintiff’s exclusion requests was arbitrary and

capricious because Commerce improperly relied on invalid objections, failed to

critically examine Plaintiff’s countervailing evidence, and did not reasonably explain

the connection between its determinations and the evidence before it. Therefore,

Commerce’s determinations denying the 63 exclusion requests are remanded for

reconsideration or further explanation. In accordance with the foregoing, it is Court No. 24-00260 Page 20

ORDERED that Commerce’s denials of Mirror Metals’ exclusion requests,

specifically Exclusion Request Nos. 324905, 324938, 338231, 338228, 338379, 339249,

339250, 339256, 339242, 339240, 346176, 346185, 346215, 346220, 346225, 346364,

341039, 342642, 342653, 342672, 342668, 342650, 355972, 359427, 386011, 391496,

418325, 416927, 369673, 356053, 356061, 357875, 334672, 334673, 334674, 334675,

334676, 334677, 339264, 339269, 339271, 339540, 339616, 339627, 342310, 386019,

390092, 390578, 390582, 390598, 390589, 390591, 390594, 390585, 390599, 390883,

390900, 390408, 429045, 429034, 429057, 452856, 452861, are remanded; and it is

further

ORDERED that Commerce shall either explain further or reconsider its

determinations, and shall file its remand redetermination with the Court within 90

days of this date; and it is further

ORDERED that if Commerce concludes that it should have granted the

exclusions, Commerce shall undertake whatever action is necessary to effectuate

them, including directing United States Customs and Border Protection to

reliquidate the subject entries as necessary; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file comments on the remand

redetermination; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file their replies to the

comments on the remand redetermination; and it is further

Court No. 24-00260 Page 21

ORDERED that the parties shall file the Joint Appendix within 14 days after

the filing of replies to the comments on the remand redetermination; and it is further

ORDERED that Commerce shall file the administrative record within 14 days

of the date of filing its remand redetermination.

/s/ Claire R. Kelly

Claire R. Kelly, Judge

Dated: August 11, 2026

New York, New York