2026 IL App (1st) 251325
SECOND DIVISION
August 11, 2026
No. 1-25-1325
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SMS FINANCIAL CH, LLC, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 2010 L 50115
)
CHRISTOPHER FEURER, )
)
Defendant )
)
and )
)
HUDSON INVESTMENT, LLC, Citation Respondent )
)
(Florida Financial Group, LLC and Lucky Lumper ) Honorable Stephen A. Swedlow, Recovery, LLC, Adverse Claimants-Appellees). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction the appeal from the order denying
plaintiff’s petition to set aside certain third-party liens as violative of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. Dismissed.
¶2 Plaintiff SMS Financial CH, LLC (SMS), filed a petition seeking an order (1) directing
citation respondent Hudson Investment, LLC (Hudson), to turn over defendant Christopher
Feurer’s assets that had been transferred to Hudson, and (2) setting aside as fraudulent various
liens on Feurer’s assets asserted by adverse claimants Florida Financial Group, LLC (FFG) and 1-25-1325
Lucky Lumper Recovery, LLC (Lucky Lumper). After granting SMS’s summary judgment
motion regarding count I of its petition (regarding the assets that Hudson had transferred), the trial
court subsequently held a hearing on count III of the petition (regarding setting aside FFG and
Lucky Lumper’s liens). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied count III of SMS’s
petition, and SMS now appeals, contending that it met its burden to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that FFG and Lucky Lumper violated certain provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA) (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 2022)). For the following reasons, we dismiss
this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 This court has detailed the underlying facts of this case in an earlier decision. See SMS
Financial CH, LLC v. Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, appeal denied, No. 132662 (March 25,
2026) (Table). The following background is thus limited to those facts relevant to this appeal.
¶5 On January 28, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment by confession in favor of Amcore
Bank, N.A. (Amcore), and against Feurer for $245,627.15, in connection with a loan default (the
Amcore judgment). This judgment was subsequently assigned to SMS.
¶6 On August 12, 2011, FFG filed two breach-of-contract complaints (case Nos. 2011 L
008478 (the 8478 case) and 2011 L 008479 (the 8479 case)) 1 alleging breach of contract with
respect to the nonpayment of promissory notes. The trial court entered “agreed judgment” orders
of $3,572,183.53 in favor of FFG and against Feurer in the 8478 case, and $518,246.58 in favor
of FFG and against Feurer and Kristen Feurer (Feurer’s wife) in the 8479 case. Both agreed
judgment orders indicated that “the parties consent to the entry of this [o]rder.”
1
This court may take judicial notice of the public documents that are included in the records of other courts. See In re Linda B., 2017 IL 119392, ¶ 31 n.7; Empire Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus, 2013 IL App (1st) 112346, ¶ 20 n.4; Ill. R. Evid. 201 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); R. 803(8) (eff. Jan. 25, 2023).
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¶7 On May 18, 2012, Northbrook Bank & Trust (Northbrook Bank) filed a complaint (case
No. 2012 L 005488) against Feurer, alleging breach of contract with respect to an unpaid $500,000
promissory note. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Northbrook Bank and against Feurer
in the amount of $594,055.44. Lucky Lumper subsequently purchased this judgment.
¶8 In April 2021, SMS filed (1) a petition to revive the Amcore judgment, stating that the
judgment and accrued interest totaled $248,417.12; and (2) a motion for leave to commence
subsequent supplemental proceedings. The trial court granted the petition and motion.
¶9 In July 2021, the trial court entered wage deduction orders against Feurer and in favor of
Lucky Lumper and FFG. In February 2022, the court additionally entered written “charging
orders” stating in substance that SMS’s interest in both (1) Jameson’s (Feurer’s employer’s)
distributions to Feurer and (2) Feurer’s interest in one of Feurer’s limited liability companies
(Cohiba) is subordinate to “any prior orders and liens imposed,” including the charging orders.
¶ 10 On September 28, 2023, SMS filed a petition (1) for a turnover order of Feurer’s assets that
had been transferred to Hudson and (2) to deny the liens of FFG and Lucky Lumper. SMS’s
petition consisted of three counts: (1) a claim Hudson violated the third-party citation by
transferring various assets of Feurer’s, (2) a claim that the transfers of Feurer’s assets from
Jameson to Hudson were void pursuant to the UFTA, and (3) a claim that FFG’s and Lucky
Lumper’s liens on Feurer’s assets must be set aside as fraudulent pursuant to the UFTA.
¶ 11 In count I, SMS alleged that Hudson violated the restraining provision of the third-party
citation “by paying over or otherwise disposing over $292,801 belonging to Feurer” after service
of the citation on May 6, 2022. In its prayer for relief, SMS asked the court to enter a judgment
against Hudson “in the amount of the unpaid portion of the judgment or the amount of value of the
property transferred, whichever is lesser,” pursuant to section 2-1402(f)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-1402(f)(1) (West 2022)).
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¶ 12 With respect to count II, SMS alleged that Feurer and Hudson intentionally engaged in
actual fraud to delay, hinder, and defraud SMS by “attempting to conceal over $1,550,000 that
Feurer directed Jameson to pay to Hudson[,] to the detriment of [SMS].” SMS alleged that the
transfer of Feurer’s compensation from Jameson to Hudson was also fraudulent in law because
SMS had an existing judgment and “Feurer receive[d] nothing of value from Hudson in exchange
for over $1,550,000 that he directed Jameson to transfer to Hudson in an account separate from
Feurer,” rendering Feurer insolvent. In its prayer for relief on this count, SMS asked the trial court
to enter judgment against Hudson “for the amount of assets fraudulently transferred by Feurer up
to the amount of [SMS’s] outstanding judgment[,] which is $530,268.22” plus interest.
¶ 13 On April 17, 2024, SMS filed its motion for summary judgment on count I of its petition.
On May 29, 2024, Hudson filed its combined cross-motion for summary judgment on count I and
motion for summary judgment on count II. As to count II, Hudson argued that Feurer could not
fraudulently transfer exempt property because it was unavailable to satisfy creditor claims in the
first instance. On December 17, 2024, the trial court issued a written decision granting SMS’s
motion for summary judgment on count I and denying Hudson’s motion for summary judgment
on both counts. The court’s decision included a finding, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), that there was no just reason to delay appeal.
¶ 14 Hudson subsequently appealed, challenging the trial court’s judgment on both counts I and
II. See Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶ 1. With respect to count II, we noted that there were
no cross-motions for summary judgment on count II (only the denial of Hudson’s summary
judgment motion). Id. ¶ 37. We thus dismissed Hudson’s appeal from the denial of its summary
judgment motion on count II for want of jurisdiction. Id. We subsequently affirmed the judgment
of the trial court on count I. See Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, appeal denied, No. 132662
(March 25, 2026) (Table).
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¶ 15 On March 20, 2025, the trial court issued a written order setting the matter for an in-person
evidentiary hearing on FFG and Lucky Lumper’s notice of adverse claim and “Count III of the
Petition of SMS to Deny the Liens of the Adverse Claimants.” On May 13, 2025, the evidentiary
hearing began, and counsel for SMS, FFG, Lucky Lumper, Feurer, and Hudson appeared. On June
10, 2025, the court entered a written order denying SMS’s petition. The court found that SMS
“failed to meet their [sic] burden” and stated, “This court previously held that Third Party Citation
Respondents[’] adverse claim takes priority over Petitioner, SMS Financial CH, LLC [sic] and
nothing presented during the hearing caused the court to revisit that finding.”
¶ 16 This appeal follows.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, SMS contends that the trial court erred in denying its summary judgment motion
on count III. In particular, SMS argues that it showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of various “badges of fraud,” which in turn established that FFG and Lucky Lumper
created the liens “with the actual intent” to delay, hinder, and defraud SMS in violation of section
5 of the UFTA. SMS further argues that it also established a “presumption of fraud” pursuant to
section 6 of the UFTA, which FFG and Lucky Lumper failed to rebut.
¶ 19 As a preliminary matter, we address this court’s jurisdiction. Regardless of whether a party
has raised the issue, we have an independent duty to consider whether we have jurisdiction and
dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶ 33 (citing Williams
Montgomery & John Ltd. v. Broaddus, 2017 IL App (1st) 161063, ¶ 32 (citing Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984))).
¶ 20 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) allows appeals from final judgments
as a matter of right. See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. “Subject to certain exceptions, an appeal
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can be taken in a case only after the circuit court has resolved all claims against all parties.” State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet Metal Co., 394 Ill. App. 3d 548, 556 (2009).
¶ 21 Rule 304(a) provides one such exception: It states in relevant part that
“[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an
action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court
has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for
delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a)
(eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
The written finding may be made either at the time of, or after the entry of, a final judgment. See
Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶ 34.
¶ 22 “By the rule’s own terms, a Rule 304(a) finding can confer appealability only on a judgment
that is already final.” (Emphases added.) In re Marriage of Duggan, 376 Ill. App. 3d 725, 735
(2007). A judgment or order is “final” if it disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire
case or on some definite and separate part of the controversy. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty
Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1997). In other words, a final order terminates “ ‘the
litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so that, if affirmed, the trial court has only
to proceed with execution of the judgment.’ ” Kellerman v. Crowe, 119 Ill. 2d 111, 115 (1987)
(quoting Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48 (1958)).
¶ 23 In this case, as noted above, SMS’s petition comprised three counts: Count I alleged a
claim that Hudson’s transfer of certain monies to Feurer violated both the Wage Deduction Statute2
2
As in our prior decision, we refer to the various statutory sections under article XII, part 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-801 to 12-819 (West 2022)) as the “Wage Deduction Statute.” See Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶ 1, n.1.
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and also the citation orders issued pursuant to section 2-1402 of the Code, count II alleged that
Jameson’s transfers to Hudson violated the UFTA, and count III alleged that FFG and Lucky
Lumper’s adverse claims should be set aside because they also violated the UFTA. The trial court
issued a final judgment on count I as well as a Rule 304(a) finding, which allowed this court to
resolve the appeal of that decision. See Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶¶ 28-29.
¶ 24 The trial court subsequently issued a final judgment on count III of SMS’s petition, but
there was no order—final or otherwise—disposing of count II. Although count I and count II both
sought relief against the same party (Hudson), count I asserted a claim pursuant to the Wage
Deduction Statute and the citation orders issued pursuant to section 2-1402 of the Code (and sought
at most $292,801), count II alleged that Jameson’s transfers to Hudson violated the UFTA (and
sought $530,268.22 “as of September 28, 2023,” in addition to accrued interest). As such, this
separate claim for relief remains unresolved. Therefore, to invoke appellate jurisdiction over count
III (the issue now before us), the court was required again to have either (1) issued a final order on
count II, or (2) made a Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason for delaying either
enforcement or appeal or both of its decision as to count III. Since the trial court failed to do either,
appellate jurisdiction is lacking and we must dismiss this appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 We dismiss SMS’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment
on count III for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
¶ 27 Dismissed.
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