USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 1 of 10
FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-10460
MT. HAWLEY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
H&M BUILDERS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee,
PERSONAL REP. GLORIA ESCALANTE,
Intervenor Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-23091-KMM
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
KIDD, Circuit Judge:
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10460
Mt. Hawley Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify its insured,
H&M Builders, LLC, in a state-court action. After both parties
moved for summary judgment, the district court granted summary
judgment to H&M on the duty-to-defend claim. The district court
reserved ruling on the duty-to-indemnify claim. Mt. Hawley then
filed the present interlocutory appeal of that decision. While this
appeal was pending, H&M settled the state-court action, and the
state court dismissed the action pursuant to the settlement. The
district court then dismissed the duty-to-indemnify claim as moot
and entered final judgment.
We lack jurisdiction for three independent reasons: 1) the
state-court action is no longer pending, 2) this appeal was improperly brought on an interlocutory basis, and 3) the district court has
now entered a final judgment. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Alexander Aguilar was electrocuted while installing rebar at
a construction site. H&M Builders, LLC, was a subcontractor on
the same project. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to H&M that was in effect
on the day of the incident. Gloria Escalante, as personal representative of Aguilar’s estate, filed a wrongful death action in state court
against H&M and other entities, alleging that their negligence in
failing to maintain the worksite caused Aguilar’s death.
Mt. Hawley provided H&M a defense in state court, but reserved its right to challenge any obligation to do so. Mt. Hawley
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then asked a federal court to declare, pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), that Mt. Hawley had no duty to
defend or indemnify H&M in the state-court action that Escalante
had filed. The district court reserved ruling on the duty-to-indemnify issue until the parties resolved the state-court action. Then
each of the parties filed motions for summary judgment on the
duty-to-defend issue. The district court denied Mt. Hawley’s motion and granted H&M’s and Escalante’s motions, finding that Mt.
Hawley had a duty to defend H&M in the state-court action. Mt.
Hawley then filed this interlocutory appeal.
Now comes the critical part of the timeline: After Mt. Hawley filed its opening brief, but before H&M filed a response brief,
the parties in the state-court action settled. The state-court action
was then dismissed because of the settlement. And the district
court subsequently dismissed the duty-to-indemnify claim as moot
and entered a final judgment in the case below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the parties do not challenge our jurisdiction to
hear this appeal, we are nevertheless obligated to review “sua
sponte whether we have jurisdiction.” James River Ins. Co. v. Ultratec
Special Effects Inc., 22 F.4th 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified).
III. DISCUSSION
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1; see also Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 4 of 10
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1262, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001). In all federal cases, the threshold question is whether a justiciable controversy exists. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir. 1991).
The existence of a justiciable controversy is a jurisdictional requirement. See Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 409,
414 (11th Cir. 1995). “There are three strands of [the] justiciability
doctrine—standing, ripeness, and mootness—that go to the heart
of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Zinni v. ER Sols.,
Inc., 692 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). “A
case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with
respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Ethredge v.
Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Declaratory Judgment Act states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added); see Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co.
v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Declaratory
Judgment Act is ‘an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on
courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.’” (quoting
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995))).
We lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal for three reasons.
First, this interlocutory appeal no longer presents an “actual controversy” under the Declaratory Judgment Act because the statecourt action has been settled and dismissed. In the joint response USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 5 of 10
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to our jurisdictional question, the parties concede that the settlement and dismissal “put an end to any go-forward defense obligation Mt. Hawley owed to H&M” in the state-court action.
The parties nonetheless attempt to stipulate to our jurisdiction. But “parties may not stipulate to federal jurisdiction.” Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2013). Perhaps recognizing that, the parties take two more swings at the jurisdictional ball. First, they argue that Mt. Hawley could potentially
recover defense costs if the duty-to-defend ruling is reversed. Second, they argue that H&M could recover attorney fees under Florida law if the ruling is affirmed. Both arguments miss the ball—a
jurisdictional strikeout.
The parties attempt to distinguish our unpublished decision
in Medmarc Casualty Insurance Co. v. Yanowitch, No. 22-11092, 2023
WL 5527761 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2023). Though Medmarc is not binding in the present case, we nevertheless find its reasoning to be
sound. In Medmarc, the insurers appealed an interlocutory order
declaring that they owed a duty to defend. Id. at *1. While the appeal was pending, the underlying state-court action was dismissed
with prejudice. Id. The insurers argued that a live controversy remained because affirmance could entitle the insureds to an award
of attorney fees under Florida law. Id. We rejected that argument,
explaining that we “cannot provide meaningful relief when the insurers have already provided a defense and the underlying state and
federal actions have since been dismissed.” Id.
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The parties argue that Medmarc is different from the present
case because the district court below did not dismiss the federal
coverage action. That distinction is immaterial. In a duty-to-defend
declaratory action, the existence of a live controversy depends on
whether there is an actual dispute over a present defense obligation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 931 F.2d at 747–48 (“The
controversy must be live throughout the case; federal jurisdiction
is not created by a previously existing dispute. . . . Indeed, the settlement of a dispute generally renders a case moot.”) (citation modified). No live dispute remains when the state-court action giving
rise to the alleged duty to defend has been resolved and dismissed.
Because determining whether Mt. Hawley has a duty to defend
H&M will not affect the closed state-court case, this action no
longer presents a live controversy. Ethredge, 996 F.2d at 1175; U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 931 F.2d at 747–48.
The second reason we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal is
that, even if the state-court action were still pending, the district
court’s summary judgment order did not contain any injunctive
qualities. And we require those injunctive qualities before we review this type of order on an interlocutory basis.
“Ordinarily, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final
decisions of the district courts that end the litigation on the merits
and leave nothing more for the district court to do but execute the
judgment.” APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n,
AFL-CIO, Local 1410, 159 F.4th 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2025) (alteration
adopted) (citation modified). But we have jurisdiction to review a USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 7 of 10
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nonfinal order granting or denying an injunction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1); James River, 22 F.4th at 1252. Recognizing this principle, we exercise jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from a district court’s summary judgment order when the order has injunctive qualities. James River, 22 F.4th at 1252. Otherwise, “in ordinary
circumstances an interlocutory declaration of rights does not support appeal under § 1292(a)(1). . . . However, a declaration may
take on such directive qualities that appeal is permitted notwithstanding the formal failure to provide for enforcement by contempt.” 16 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3922
(3d ed. 2025) (citation modified).
An order has injunctive qualities when, for example, it is directed at a party, contains mandatory language enforceable by contempt, and provides relief on the merits. See James River, 22 F.4th at
1252–53. Along those lines, we have said that a district court’s summary judgment order stating that the insurer “was required to pay
the [i]nsureds’ defense costs . . . constituted an injunction for purposes of § 1292(a)(1).” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Sahlen,
999 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). And even in the absence of
mandatory language enforceable by contempt, we have found injunctive qualities in a summary judgment order that granted an insured’s counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief. James
River, 22 F.4th at 1253. Thus, we must examine on a case-by-case
basis whether an order has injunctive qualities, considering the language of the order and the claims and counterclaims of the parties. USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 8 of 10
8 Opinion of the Court 24-10460
Mt. Hawley moved for reconsideration of the court’s summary judgment order, or alternatively, for Rule 54(b) certification.
Mt. Hawley maintained, and the court agreed, that the order was
immediately appealable based on Addison Insurance Co. v. 4000 Island Boulevard Condominium Ass’n, 721 F. App’x 847, 853 (11th Cir.
2017). That case is unpublished and therefore nonbinding. See
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority
and are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”).
And we decline to adopt Addison Insurance to the extent that it may
be read to treat as immediately appealable any partial summary
judgment order on the duty to defend, rather than only those with
injunctive qualities. 721 F. App’x at 853 (citing Sahlen, 999 F.2d at
1535). Instead, we find that Sahlen and James River support our conclusion that § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction arises only when a district
court’s order on an insured’s duty-to-defend claim has injunctive
qualities––for example, the order contains language mandating
that an insurer must provide its insured a defense in an underlying
action, or must pay defense costs in such action, or rules on an insurer’s request for injunctive relief, or an insured’s counterclaim
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
Here, the district court’s summary judgment order does not
contain any mandatory language directed at Mt. Hawley, Mt. Hawley did not seek injunctive relief, and H&M did not file a counterclaim seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Without any injunctive qualities, the order is not akin to an injunction that would be
reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we lack jurisdiction to USCA11 Case: 24-10460 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2026 Page: 9 of 10
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consider it. James River, 22 F.4th at 1252–53; Sahlen, 999 F.2d at
1535; 16 Wright & Miller § 3922.
Finally, the third reason we lack jurisdiction to consider this
appeal on an interlocutory basis is that the district court has now
entered a final judgment. After the state-court action was dismissed
and while this appeal was pending, the district court dismissed the
duty-to-indemnify claim as moot. It then entered final judgment
against Mt. Hawley and in favor of H&M based on its summary
judgment ruling. Therefore, any appeal is properly taken from the
final judgment. See Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550, 1563 (11th
Cir. 1993) (“When a district court enters a final judgment, all prior
non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment are
merged into the judgment and subject to review on appeal.” (citation modified)).
IV. CONCLUSION
We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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24-10460 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 1
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in part:
The majority opinion says that “[w]e lack jurisdiction for
three independent reasons.” Maj. Op. at 2. One is plenty; accordingly, I concur only in the majority’s “[f]irst” reason, the discussion
of which spans pages 5–6 of its opinion. “Reasonable minds can
differ, of course, but my own view . . . is that federal appellate
courts should issue fewer alternative holdings.” United States v.
Files, 63 F.4th 920, 931 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring).