Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
DISSENTING OPINION
No. 04-26-00467-CV
IN RE CHRISTUS SANTA ROSA HEALTH CARE CORPORATION D/B/A CHRISTUS
SANTA ROSA CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, Relator
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2025-CI-26425
Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Dissenting Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 5, 2026
Because I believe that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling relator to produce
that which was not requested or that is broader than what had been requested, I would conditionally
grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus in part and order the trial court to vacate its order
compelling production of “all policies in effect on” March 30, 2025, through June 2, 2025.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to deny the petition for
writ of mandamus in toto.
DISCUSSION
The majority’s denial appears to rest on the fact that the trial court’s oral ruling was never
reduced to writing. However, our rules provide that the appendix to a petition for writ of mandamus
04-26-00467-CV
must contain either “a certified or sworn copy of any order complained of, or any other document
showing the matter complained of.” 1 And mandamus relief may be based on a trial court’s oral
ruling which is clear, specific, and an enforceable order that is adequately shown by the record. 2
Here, the mandamus record contained the reporter’s record transcribing the trial court’s
oral ruling. At the RPIs’ hearing on its motion to compel production, the trial court ordered relator
to produce “all of [its] policies in effect” from March 30, 2025, through June 2, 2025. 3 Because I
conclude the trial court’s oral order is sufficiently clear, specific, and enforceable for consideration
on mandamus, I respectfully depart from the majority’s denial.
Turning to the merits of relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, generally, the scope of
discovery is within the trial court’s discretion, given that it imposes reasonable discovery limits. 4
But the Supreme Court has long held that trial courts abuse their discretion by ordering discovery
that exceeds that permitted by the rules of procedure. 5 Additionally, our sister courts have stated
that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order discovery that has not been requested
or that is broader that what has been requested.” 6
In this case, RPIs served relators with requests for production, with Request No. 19
seeking:
1
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l)(b) (emphasis added).
2
In re Hale, No. 06-25-00116-CV, 2025 WL 3466616, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 3, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
3
Unlike In re Rhew, which the majority cites to, the trial court’s order in this case was not “articulated over the course of several pages in the reporter’s record . . . and obscured by discussion of a number of contingencies.” No. 05–16– 00411–CV, 2016 WL 1551724, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 15, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court’s decision is clear, and even when clarification was sought, remained the same: relator was to disclose all of its policies in effect during the time period specified.
4
In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curium).
5
Id.
6
In re Methodist Primary Care Group, 553 S.W.3d 709, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding); In re Exmark Mfg. Co., Inc., 299 S.W.3d 519, 531 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Langley v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 191 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); In re Treatment Equip. Co., No. 02-19-00202-CV, 2019 WL 3295633, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
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[A]ll nursing manuals, nursing policies, nursing procedures, nursing guidelines,
and nursing requirements in the actual or constructive possession, custody, or
control of Defendant CHRISTUS SANTA ROSA HEALTH CARE
CORPORATION d/b/a CHRISTUS SANTA ROSA CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL
applicable to the medical, nursing, rehabilitative, and/or therapeutic care and
treatment rendered to [RPIs].
By its plain language, this request contained two meaningful limitations. First, it is restricted to
nursing manuals, policies, procedures, guidelines, and requirements. Second, those materials must
be applicable to the care and treatment rendered to the plaintiffs. The request did not seek every
policy maintained by relator, every policy in effect during the relevant period, nor every policy
that might be referenced somewhere within another policy.
It was not until the hearing on their motion to compel production that RPIs argued for the
production of all of relator’s policies and procedures. Specifically, the RPIs contended that since
their petition alleged relator’s “hiring and training of staff led to the injury” complained of, they
were entitled to all of the relator’s policies and procedures. And counsel for RPIs made clear that
this discovery entailed the production of “thousands of policies of procedures,” since—in a
different case—relator had inadvertently disclosed a “table of contents” with “thousands of
policies and procedures for [her] to go through.”
In response, relator argued that it has policies and procedures which are completely
irrelevant and have no bearing on the issues involved in the case at hand, such as breastfeeding,
cesarean section, and any other policy which involves the treatment and care of children that does
not relate to childbirth. In the end, the trial court ordered relator to produce “all of [its] policies in
effect” from March 30 through June 2 of 2025. And when relator’s counsel sought clarification
and asked whether the ruling extended to the “entire Children’s Hospital,” the court responded: “If
they are referenced in any way, yes. Yes, for the dates in question.”
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Nothing in Request No. 19 authorized production of “all” policies in effect during the
relevant period. Nor did it encompass every policy that may be “referenced in any way” by another
policy. Such an order eliminates the limiting language chosen by the requesting party and replaces
it with a substantially broader command. While I recognize that a trial court has broad discretion
in managing discovery, this discretion does not extend to rewriting discovery requests or
compelling production of categories of documents never requested. Discovery orders must be
confined to the documents actually requested. 7 By requiring relator’s to produce all of its policies
in effect during the relevant period, the trial court disregarded the narrowing language contained
in Request No. 19 and compelled production of categories of documents that the request did not
seek.
Accordingly, because the trial court’s discovery order is overly broad, contains no
discovery limitations and is not narrowly tailored, 8 and orders discovery that was not properly
requested, 9 I would find that the trial court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Concluding that the trial court discovery order constitutes an abuse of its discretion, I would
conditionally grant the relator’s petition for writ of mandamus in part and order the trial court to
vacate its order compelling production of “all policies in effect on” March 30, 2025, through June
2, 2025. Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
Velia J. Meza, Justice
7
Methodist Primary Care Group, 553 S.W.3d at 721; Exmark Mfg. Co., Inc., 299 S.W.3d at 531; Langley, 191 S.W.3d at 915; Treatment Equip. Co., 2019 WL 3295633, at *5.
8
See Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curium) (holding that trial court ordering production “beyond that permitted by the rules of procedure was a clear abuse of discretion.”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3 (stating that a party may generally obtain discovery regarding any matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action).
9
Methodist Primary Care Group, 553 S.W.3d at 721; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 196(a)–(b) (requiring “[a] party . . . serve on another party . . . a request for production . . . within the scope of discovery” which “must specify the items to be produced.”).
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