Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00384-CR
Leticia Z. MENDEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 2, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2025CC001863
Honorable Melissa Saenz, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 5, 2026
AFFIRMED
A jury convicted appellant Leticia Z. Mendez of one count of assault, and the trial court
sentenced her to six months of probation. In four issues, Mendez asserts: (1) her due process rights
were violated because the State relied on false testimony; (2) time limits on jury selection rendered
her counsel ineffective; (3) the trial court erred by entering inadmissible hearsay; and (4) the
alleged inadmissible hearsay violated her right to confrontation of witnesses. We affirm.
04-25-00384-CR
I. BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2025, Mendez was arrested for assaulting her neighbor, Orfa Trevino, by
striking Trevino’s hand with a hammer.
At the start of jury selection, the trial court announced that each side would receive thirty
minutes to conduct voir dire. The State conducted its examination within the allotted time. When
the trial court informed Mendez’s counsel that their thirty minutes had elapsed, counsel requested
“one or two more minutes.” The trial court granted the request. When those two minutes expired,
the trial court called time and counsel responded, “all right, Judge.”
The jury was removed from the courtroom so that the attorneys could exercise their strikes.
Mendez asked the trial court to call in venireperson fifteen for further questioning because she did
not complete the juror form. The trial court denied the request because Mendez did not ask
venireperson fifteen about the blank form; Mendez responded that she failed to ask because she
ran out of time, and the only response venireperson fifteen gave related to the challenge was that
she had a doctor’s appointment. The parties then individually questioned venirepersons two, three,
ten, and twelve. After individual questioning, the State challenged venireperson three for cause
because she had a hard time understanding English. Mendez’s counsel objected on the grounds
that her testimony indicated she could be fair and understand what was being asked. The trial
court overruled Mendez’s objection and excluded venireperson three. Mendez’s counsel then
requested an additional strike in light of venireperson three being removed, arguing the State
received four rather than three strikes. The trial court denied the request.
After the parties conferred and signed off on jury selection, Mendez’s counsel objected to
the time constraint, arguing she rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not have
enough time to properly question venirepersons four and fifteen, whom she struck, or venireperson
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sixteen, who served on the jury. Mendez’s counsel requested additional strikes. The trial court
noted the objection and denied the request.
At trial, the State called two witnesses: Trevino and Officer Brianne Flores. Mendez called
one witness: her daughter, Miriam Mendez.
Trevino testified that she and Mendez were neighbors, and she replaced the wire fence that
separated their properties with a wooden privacy fence. On January 20, 2025, Trevino observed
Mendez using a hammer to remove wooden panels from the new privacy fence because it blocked
the entrance to her water heater shed. After calling law enforcement, Trevino used her cellphone
to record Mendez removing the wooden panels. The five second video captures Mendez working
with a hammer to remove the panels. The last image on the video is Mendez holding the hammer
with both hands, angling the hammer toward Trevino. Trevino testified that Mendez “got upset
and swung the hammer,” causing the video to end abruptly because Trevino dropped the phone
when Mendez struck her hand. The alleged strike was not recorded. Trevino also testified that, in
preparation for construction, she received permission from neighbors to cross property lines during
construction of the fence. Mendez objected to the statement as backdoor hearsay and to lack of
confrontation since the other neighbors were not witnesses. The trial court overruled the objection.
Officer Flores testified that she was dispatched to Trevino’s home and interviewed both
Trevino and Mendez. Officer Flores asked Mendez if she hit Trevino, to which Mendez responded
that she “pushed [Trevino] with a hammer.” Trevino showed Officer Flores the video she recorded
on her cellphone. Shortly thereafter, Officer Flores arrested Mendez.
Prior to trial, the State provided Mendez with a Brady disclosure memorandum that
memorialized a meeting between Trevino and the State’s victim’s advocate, Vickie Lopez. The
Brady disclosure reflected that Trevino told Lopez that Mendez’s daughters gave her permission
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to build the fence over the property line. On cross-examination, Trevino recalled speaking to
individuals from the District Attorney’s Office but did not recall speaking to victim advocate
Lopez, and that the office may have misunderstood what she told them. Trevino testified that she
told the District Attorney’s Office that she requested permission to cross the line during
construction, not permission to build a fence over the property line.
At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Mendez argued the inconsistencies between
the Brady disclosure and Trevino’s testimony would leave a false impression on the jury as to
whether she met with victim advocate Lopez or received permission from Mendez to build the
fence. Mendez further argued that the State had a duty to correct the alleged inconsistencies in
Trevino’s testimony. The State countered that most of Trevino’s testimony was consistent with
the disclosure, did not amount to lying, and the facts related to building the fence were not relevant
to assault. The trial court allowed the trial to continue and left it up to the jury to assess Trevino’s
credibility.
The jury found Mendez guilty of assault and the Court sentenced her to six months of
probation.
Mendez then filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the State violated her right to due
process by “allow[ing] false testimony from the complaining witness to go uncorrected…” and
that her “trial counsel was rendered ineffective by time constraints on voir dire, thereby depriving
her of effective assistance of counsel.” After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Mendez
timely appealed.
II. Due Process
In her first issue, Mendez contends the State violated her due process rights by presenting
false or misleading testimony from Trevino.
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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“The use of material false testimony to procure a conviction violates a defendant’s due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”
Ukwuachu v. State, 613 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Ex parte De La Cruz,
466 S.W.3d 855, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). In reviewing a claim alleging the use of material
false testimony, we must determine whether: (1) the testimony was actually false, and (2) whether
it was material. Id. (citing Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).
“To establish falsity, the record must contain some credible evidence that clearly undermines the
evidence adduced at trial, thereby demonstrating that the challenged testimony was, in fact, false.”
Ex parte Reed, 670 S.W.3d 689, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Ukwuachu, 613 S.W.3d at
156).
“Whether evidence is false turns on whether the jury was left with a misleading or false
impression after considering the evidence in its entirety.” Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 263
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 665–66). False testimony is
material if there is a reasonable likelihood that it could have affected the jury’s judgment. Ex parte
Reed, 670 S.W.3d at 767 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Ex parte Chavez,
371 S.W.3d 200, 206–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
B. Analysis
Mendez argues Trevino’s testimony was false because it was inconsistent with the Brady
disclosure, and as a result, “the jury was unable to accurately judge Trevino’s credibility because
the state allowed her testimony to go uncorrected.” Inconsistencies in testimony do not
demonstrate falsity but instead go to the weight and credibility of the evidence for the jury to
decide. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding, in case
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involving contradictory testimonial evidence, that it was for jury to determine whether two
witnesses were lying or telling truth); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 038.04 (“The jury,
in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and of the weight to be given to the
testimony . . . .”).
Furthermore, any false impression is immaterial because Mendez cross-examined Trevino
about whether she received permission to replace the wire fence, what she told the District
Attorney’s office, and whether she spoke to victim advocate Lopez. The record contains video
evidence of Mendez removing the wooden panels and events immediately preceding the alleged
assault, Trevino’s testimony that Mendez struck her with the hammer, and a photo of Trevino’s
hand after the alleged assault.
The record contains no credible evidence that clearly undermines Trevino’s testimony as
actually false; the Brady memorandum discrepancy was explored on cross and attributed by
Trevino to a misunderstanding about crossing property lines during construction, which goes to
weight. Therefore, Mendez failed to show how any discrepancy in Trevino’s testimony was false
or material. See Valdez v. State, No. AP-77,042, 2018 WL 3046403, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. June
20, 2018) (not designated for publication) (finding any false impression was not material because
defense counsel effectively cross-examined the witness about the inconsistencies in her statements
and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming).
Accordingly, we overrule Mendez’s first issue.
III. Restriction of Voir Dire
In her second issue, Mendez argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting her
counsel’s time to conduct voir dire, preventing her counsel from exercising her peremptory
challenges intelligently.
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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s decision to limit voir dire questioning for abuse of discretion.
Ganther v. State, 848 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). Absent
abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel additional
voir dire time. Smiley v. State, 129 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.).
“The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel encompasses the right to question
prospective jurors in order to intelligently and effectually exercise peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause during the jury selection process.” Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 482
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc). This right must be balanced with the trial court’s broad
discretion over the process of selecting a jury, including imposing reasonable time limitations on
the amount of time each party can question the jury panel. Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597, 599
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
“To preserve error concerning the manner of voir dire, appellant must point to a question
the trial court did not allow the panel to answer.” Cordova v. State, 296 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d).
B. Analysis
Mendez argues that, had she not run out of time, she would have further questioned
venirepersons four, five, fifteen, and sixteen. Turning to the record, the trial court gave Mendez’s
counsel a two minute warning, and when that time was up, Mendez requested an additional two
minutes, which the trial court gave her. Mendez’s counsel did not object, nor did she indicate that
she needed additional time to ask specific questions.
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Although Mendez’s counsel later objected that she was rendered ineffective due to the time
constraint, she did so after the parties had conferred and signed off on a jury list. Furthermore,
Mendez’s counsel did not inform the trial court of the specific questions she wished to ask if given
additional time. Because counsel neither objected before time expired nor proffered specific
questions she was prevented from asking — and raised her objection after signing off on the jury,
Mendez failed to preserve this issue. See Clemments v. State, 940 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d) (“it is essential that the record reflect what questions the complaining
party was prevented from asking”); S.D.G. v. State, 936 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (holding that the appellant did not preserve error because “[r]ather
than propound specific questions that he wished to ask, appellant merely identified general topics
for potential questions”).
Therefore, we overrule Mendez’s second issue.
IV. Hearsay
In her third issue, Mendez alleges the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
hearsay through Trevino’s testimony that she received permission from her neighbors to build the
wooden fence. The State contends that any error by the trial court in admitting the testimony was
harmless.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). A trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless the decision “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which
reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). A
statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter, but offered for some other reason, is not
hearsay. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The erroneous admission of a hearsay statement constitutes non-constitutional error subject
to a harm analysis, and it must be disregarded unless the error affected a substantial right of the
defendant. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “A
substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the
verdict.” Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 4). However, if, after
examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error had no influence or only
had a slight effect, the conviction will stand. Id. “In considering the likelihood that the error
adversely affected the jury’s verdict, appellate courts should consider everything in the record,
including the evidence admitted, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of
the alleged error, and how it might be considered with other evidence in the case.” Eggert v. State,
395 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d
862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
B. Analysis
Mendez contends Trevino’s statement in response to the State’s question on what
preparations she made prior to building the fence was backdoor hearsay. Specifically, Mendez
argues Trevino’s statement “We had gotten permission from — we had informed neighbors and
gotten permission from neighbors to be able to work on our fence[,]” bolstered Trevino’s
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credibility and “was important because a major fact in contention was that Trevino had not
received permission from Mendez to build any part of the fence on Mendez’s property.”
The State elicited the statement for the purpose of explaining what preparations Trevino
made prior to building the fence, and the court admitted it for the purpose of explaining her
conduct. It was not offered to prove the truth that any neighbor — including Mendez — gave
Trevino permission to build a fence over a property line. Accordingly, Trevino’s statement does
not constitute hearsay. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“An
extrajudicial statement or writing which is offered for the purpose of showing what was said rather
than for the truth of the matter stated therein does not constitute hearsay.”).
Even if Trevino’s statement was inadmissible hearsay, from our review of the record, we
cannot conclude Mendez suffered harm. See Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779 (citing
Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 4). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
Mendez’s hearsay objection to the statement.
Therefore, we overrule Mendez’s third issue.
V. Confrontation
In her fourth issue, Mendez argues that admission of the alleged hearsay violated her right
to confrontation because the neighbors were not witnesses. The Confrontation Clause applies only
to testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); Langham v. State,
305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[A]n out-of-court statement, even one that falls
within [the] definition of ‘testimonial’ statements, is not objectionable under the Confrontation
Clause to the extent that it is offered for some evidentiary purpose other than the truth of the matter
asserted.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576.
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Because we found Trevino’s statement was properly offered and admitted for a nonhearsay purpose, Mendez’s right of confrontation was not implicated. See Del Carmen Hernandez
v. State, 273 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding statement, as non-hearsay, did
not implicate right of confrontation). Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by
admitting this statement over Mendez’s objection.
Therefore, we overrule issue four.
VI. CONCLUSION
We overrule all issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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