IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHRISTOPHER PORTER, §
§ No. 241, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 2112006391 (K)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: August 12, 2026
Decided: August 12, 2026
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and record on appeal, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) Christopher Porter appeals his convictions for robbery first degree and
murder second degree in the death of Richard George. The parties agree that his
convictions should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. We concur.
(2) The facts relevant to the appeal have been found by the Superior Court
after remand from this Court and are not challenged by the State.1 In July 2022, a
1
State v. Porter, 2026 WL 852249 (Del. Super. March 27, 2026).
Kent County grand jury indicted Porter for robbery first degree and murder first
degree. George was killed by blunt force trauma and asphyxiation.
(3) Office of Defense Services (“ODS”) attorneys J’Aime Rau and Joseph
Halsey represented Porter. Just before trial, the State disclosed that it intended to
call two “jailhouse informants,” one of whom was Cary Green. The State knew that
Rau through ODS represented Green in another criminal matter and that the late
notice might create a conflict with trial counsel.2
(4) At trial, the Superior Court judge pursued the conflict issue to ensure
that it would not upend the trial. During an office conference on the first day of trial,
Rau told the court that the State provided Rau a letter from Green received by the
State offering to testify against Porter. Counsel assured the court, and the State
agreed, that a conflict was a non-issue because Rau’s attorney-client relationship
with Green terminated before Porter’s trial.3
(5) As the court continued to inquire about the conflict, Rau once again
assured the court that she did not currently represent Green.4 She also stated that she
discussed with Porter her prior representation of Green and confirmed that Porter
2
App. to Opening Br. at A161 [hereinafter A__] (Nov. 22, 2023 Pre-Trial Conf. Tr. at 25:7–21). 3
A184–86 (Nov. 27, 2023 Pre-Trial Conf. Tr. at 12:19–14:19).
4
A465 (Nov. 30, 2023 Off. Conf. Tr. at 8:12–16).
2
was “apprised of the intricacies of that situation.”5 Eventually, the Superior Court
found, based on Rau’s representations, that Green’s and Porter’s criminal matters
were not substantially related, and that Porter’s interests were not materially adverse
to Green’s.6 Thus, the court concluded that no actual conflict of interest existed and
trial counsel could continue representing Porter.7 After trial, the jury convicted
Porter of second degree murder and first degree robbery. The court sentenced Porter
for the murder conviction to 85 years’ incarceration at supervision Level V,
suspended after 65 years, and for the robbery conviction to 25 years’ incarceration
at supervision Level V, suspended after five years.8
(6) After an appeal was filed, Porter mailed the Supreme Court a letter
claiming that he did not know until the sentencing hearing about trial counsel’s
representation of Green.9 He requested that his convictions be reversed. ODS
appellate counsel investigated and informed the Court that (i) contrary to the
representations of trial counsel, a Rule 1.7 current client conflict existed because
trial counsel represented both Green and Porter at the same time; (ii) the conflict was
5
A468 (Nov. 30, 2023 Off. Conf. Tr. at 11:5–12).
6
A466 (Nov. 30, 2023 Off. Conf. Tr. at 9:4–8).
7
A466 (Nov. 30, 2023 Off. Conf. Tr. at 9:9–10).
8
Opening Br. Ex. B (Sentence Order).
9
See A886–88 (Porter Letter).
3
ongoing and imputed to the Appellate Division; (iii) the conflict “may rise to an issue
of merit arguable on direct appeal;” and (iv) ODS should be allowed to withdraw
and appoint conflict counsel.10
(7) We appointed conflict counsel and remanded the case to the Superior
Court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the client conflict
issue. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found that Rau
concurrently represented Porter and Green, and their interests were adverse once
Green offered to testify against Porter. The court also concluded that concurrent
representation of clients with adverse interests violates Delaware Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7, which provides that an attorney cannot represent clients
concurrently when “(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client[.]”11
(8) The court also found that a Rule 1.7 conflict is imputed to all lawyers
of the same firm, and that Delaware law “regards ODS as a law firm for purposes of
determining conflicts of interest.”12 Without deciding whether the specific conflict
10
A890–91 (Mot. to Withdraw as Couns.).
11
Porter, 2026 WL 852249, at *6 (quoting DLRPC 1.7(a)).
12
Id.
4
here was waivable, the Superior Court held that, under Rule 1.7, to continue
representing either client after a concurrent conflict arises, each affected client must
give their informed consent in writing.13 A written waiver was never signed. And,
according to the Superior Court, Porter could not intelligently waive the conflict
because defense counsel did not understand that her representation was imputed to
ODS.14
(9) We agree with the State and Porter that, based on the Superior Court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, Porter was denied a fair trial.15 Thus, his
convictions must be reversed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Porter’s convictions
are reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial with
conflict-free representation. Jurisdiction is not retained.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
13
Id.
14
Id. at *7.
15
See Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1105 (Del. 2021) (observing that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation). Ordinarily, in a criminal case, we would not consider an actual conflict claim until postconviction relief proceedings. In this case, however, the State agrees with the result and no benefit would be gained by awaiting a motion for postconviction relief. See Dobson v. State, 80 A.3d 959, 2013 WL 5918409, at *2 (Del. Oct. 31, 2013) (TABLE) (remanding for a new trial and observing “where the ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record that this Court can fully consider obvious deficiencies in representation, we will address the issue on direct appeal”).
5