In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00129-CV
JOHN-HENRY GARBER, Appellant
V.
COOPER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, DELTA COUNTY, DELTA COUNTY
MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, AND DELTA COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES
DISTRICT #1, Appellees
On Appeal from the 62nd District Court
Delta County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24-060-DCCV-11711
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John-Henry Garber failed to pay local land- and business-personal- property taxes for tax
years 2022 through 2024. Garber sought to invalidate the tax assessments by renouncing his
citizenship, attempting to separate himself from his name in favor of being a “living man,” and
claiming that he sold his property to an unnamed “[p]rivate [o]wner.”
These strategies were rejected by the taxing authorities comprised of Cooper Independent
School District, Delta County, the Delta County Emergency Services District #01, and the Delta
County Municipal Utility District (Appellees), who initially sued to collect around $7,153.68 in
delinquent ad valorem taxes for the tax years of 2022 and 2023, plus penalties, interest, costs,
and fees. Garber submitted over a dozen preliminary filings in the suit, including a special
appearance. Garber then failed to attend the trial. The trial court denied Garber’s motions and
then rendered a judgment in favor of the Appellees for the amounts owed.
On appeal, Garber raises four issues, alleging that (1) the trial court failed to rule on his
special appearance, (2) the trial court entered judgment before disposing of his motions, (3) the
trial court proceeded irregularly, and (4) the district clerk acted beyond her authority. In a fifth
issue, Garber maintains that the absence of a reporter’s record does not defeat this appeal.
Because the reporter’s record was subsequently filed, the fifth issue is moot. We overrule
Garber’s remaining issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
Garber owned five acres of land located at 2665 Farm-to-Market Road (FM) 2068 in
Klondike, Texas, as well as business-personal property with an assessed value of $17,500.00.
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Appellees imposed taxes on both the land and the business-personal property. Garber did not
pay the taxes owed. After delinquencies in tax years 2022 and 2023, the Appellees filed suit to
recover.
Garber was served with a petition and summons at 2665 FM 2068 on October 3, 2024. A
return of service was filed the same day. In response, Garber filed an affidavit of distinction, a
challenge to standing affidavit, and a reject for cause on October 15, 2024. In August 2025, ten
months later, Appellees filed an amended petition, adding tax year 2024 to the suit, and
confirmed the scheduling of a hearing. Garber responded with fourteen distinct filings. Garber’s
filings included a special appearance, motions to quash, dismiss, strike, stay, quiet title, suppress,
judicial notice, and for declaratory judgment, request for disclosures, a counterclaim, and an
affidavit of service. The trial court required a hearing to consider and rule on Garber’s motions.
Garber requested such a hearing, and the trial court set the matter for trial on all issues on
November 21, 2025.
Garber changed course and filed a “Rebuttal to Notice of Setting and Final Demand for
Ruling on Submissions Only” the day before trial. Garber did not attend the trial. Despite his
absence, the Appellees asked the trial court to first rule on Garber’s motions that potentially
required preliminary consideration, including Garber’s special appearance. After evidence was
submitted and testimony heard, the trial court denied Garber’s motions. The trial court then
proceeded to render a judgment in favor of Appellees totaling $9,988.83, plus penalties, interest,
costs, and fees.
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On December 1, 2025, more than a week after the conclusion of the trial, Garber again
asked the trial court to issue a ruling on submissions. Garber noticed his appeal, stating that the
judgment was void and sought sanctions for fraud upon the trial court, ultra vires acts, and due
process violations.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Rule on Garber’s Special Appearance
In his first issue, Garber contends that the trial court erred by not ruling on his special
appearance prior to proceeding forward with the case.
A. Standard of Review
Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes a procedure for a “special
appearance”—a means by which a party may make a limited appearance in the case for the
purpose of challenging personal jurisdiction without making a general appearance that will waive
the challenge. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a; see First Oil PLC v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 264 S.W.3d
767, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). “We review the trial court’s ruling
on a special appearance, including any determination of whether the defendant waived his
special appearance, under a de novo standard of review.” Vinson v. Civelli, No. 09-24-00182-CV, 2026 WL 391740, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, Feb. 12, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013)).
“A party availing itself of Rule 120a must strictly comply with its terms or risk waiver of
its special appearance.” Walmart, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. 06-20-00071-CV, 2021 WL 3572728,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, Aug. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a;
First Oil PLC, 264 S.W.3d at 776). “The Texas Supreme Court has ‘held that a party enters a
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general appearance when it (1) invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the
court’s jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks
affirmative action from the court.’” Id. (quoting Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304
(Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1998))).
“Even if the party obtains a hearing on its special appearance, if it seeks affirmative action from
the court on an inconsistent motion before obtaining a ruling on its special appearance, the party
waives its challenge to personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Glob. Paragon Dallas, LLC v. SBM
Realty, LLC, 448 S.W.3d 607, 612–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Trenz v.
Peter Paul Petroleum Co., 388 S.W.3d 796, 801, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
pet.); SBG Dev. Servs., L.P. v. NuRock Grp., Inc., No. 02-11-00008-CV, 2011 WL 5247873, at
*1, *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Landry v. Daigrepont, 35
S.W.3d 265, 266–68 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.); Phoenix Fireworks
Mfg., Inc. v. DM Plastics, Inc., No. 04-98-00209-CV, 1998 WL 354927, at *3 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio June 30, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication)). “This is [called] the ‘dueorder-of-pleading’ requirement.” Klingenschmitt v. Weinstein, 342 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (quoting Exito Elecs., 142 S.W.3d at 305).
B. Analysis
A defendant who timely files a pro se answer by a “signed letter [that] ‘identifie[d] the
parties, the case, and the defendant’s current address,’” has sufficiently appeared by answer and
deserves “notice of any subsequent proceedings . . . [in] the case.” Unger Tex. Stone, LP v.
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Deere Credit, Inc., 735 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Smith v. Lippmann, 826 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)).
Here, Garber filed an affidavit of distinction, a challenge to standing affidavit, and a
reject for cause. Within those filings, Garber responded to the merits of the claims and sought
affirmative actions from the trial court. Garber’s denial of the claims constituted an answer and
general appearance. Furthermore, Garber requested the petition and summons be struck
(“nullif[ied]”) and for damages consisting of 30,000 silver eagles, among other relief. Nearly a
year later, on September 8, 2025, Garber filed his special appearance.
Because Garber responded to the merits of the claims and sought affirmative actions from
the trial court, we find that those filings constituted a general appearance. As a result, we
overrule Garber’s first point of error.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err When it Entered Judgment
In his second point of error, Garber contends that the trial court erred by entering
judgment before ruling on Garber’s dispositive motions.
On October 8, 2025, the trial court set all of Garber’s motions for hearing on November
21. The case was also set for trial for that same date, and Garber was served with notice of the
trial date. Even so, Garber failed to attend trial and make any arguments regarding his pending
motions.
At the hearing, Elmo Robinson, the trial court bailiff and Delta County Constable,
testified that he served Garber, which is not disputed by Garber on appeal. Appellees then
discussed Garber’s pending motions and asked the trial court to deny them. The trial court
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granted Appellees’ request, thereby ruling on all of Garber’s motions. The case then proceeded
on the merits, and judgment was entered at the conclusion of the trial.
Because the record directly refutes Garber’s claim and shows that the trial court ruled on
all his motions prior to proceeding on the merits, we overrule Garber’s second point of error.
See Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (“[W]e do
not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported by the record.”
(quoting Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006))); In re
R.M.H., No. 05-13-01426-CV, 2014 WL 5581042, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Unifund, 262 S.W.3d at 797) (refusing to address appellant’s assertions
which were not factually supported by the record).
IV. No Contradictions Existed in the Clerk’s Record to Demonstrate Procedural Error
In his third point of error, Garber complains of irregularities in the record that require
reversal. Garber alleges that the judgment was entered before the date of the final hearing.
Garber confuses the common filing practices that are familiar to trial courts. Appellees
filed a proposed order on November 19, 2025. Filing a proposed order before trial is a matter of
judicial efficiency, as it allows the trial court to have documents ready to sign on the day of trial,
should the trial court choose to rule accordingly. The district clerk marked the proposed order as
“[f]iled” on November 19, 2025, which is the date of receipt. The trial court did not sign and
order judgment until November 21, 2025, and same was filed at 9:36 a.m., which was after the
trial court ruled on Garber’s motions at 9:19 a.m. and then proceeded to conduct the trial that
same day.
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As no judgment was issued until after the trial, there is no procedural irregularity
regarding the judgment. As a result, we overrule Garber’s third point of error.
V. Garber Failed to Adequately Brief His Issue Regarding the District Clerk Exceeding
Her Authority
In his fourth point of error, Garber contends that the district clerk took actions that
exceeded her authority.
Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Garber’s “brief must contain a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Delta Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. PPF Gin & Warehouse, LLC,
632 S.W.3d 637, 652 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied). “Failure to cite legal authority
or provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of the complaint.”
PPF Gin & Warehouse, 632 S.W.3d at 652 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)). Furthermore,
because “[w]e are not to construct an argument for a party,” we must overrule a “blanket,
conclusory argument.” Trimble v. Luminant Mining Co., No. 06-15-00004-CV, 2016 WL
234483, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). “And we are not
responsible for doing the legal research that might support a party’s contentions.” Bolling v.
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)
(citing Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)). “Were we to do so, even for a pro se litigant untrained in law, we
would be abandoning our role as judges and become an advocate for that party.” Id. (citing
Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)).
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Garber presents this point of error without specificity. Garber claims that “[t]o the extent
the record reflects clerk actions beyond ministerial authority, such actions are ultra vires and
void.” Yet, Garber fails to provide any legal authority or substantive analysis regarding this
point of error. Because Garber has failed to adequately brief this issue, we overrule his fourth
point of error.
VI. Garber’s Fifth Issue is Moot
Finally, Garber argues that the absence of a reporter’s record does not defeat his appeal
because the issues are apparent from the face of the clerk’s record. When an appellant fails to
request or pay for a reporter’s record, an appellate court may “consider and decide those issues
or points that do not require a reporter’s record for a decision.” TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c).
However, because Appellee provided the reporter’s record, which is now before us, Garber’s
fifth issue is moot.
VII. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: June 29, 2026
Date Decided: August 4, 2026
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