[Cite as State ex rel. Papp v. Spellacy, 2026-Ohio-3121.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. :
TIMOTHY PAPP,
:
Relator,
: No. 116583
v.
:
HON. JOHN J. SPELLACY, JUDGE,
:
Respondent.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: PETITION DISMISSED
DATED: August 12, 2026
Writ of Prohibition
Motion No. 597159
Order No. 598055
Appearances:
Timothy Papp, pro se.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Craig M. McClelland, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J.:
Relator Timothy Papp (“Papp”), pro se, asks this court to issue a writ
of prohibition that (1) bars the respondent Judge John J. Spellacy (the “respondent”) and the state from exercising jurisdiction over him in any case,
(2) dismisses his indictment in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-704425-C with prejudice,
(3) orders the recusal of respondent and disqualification of the Cuyahoga County
Prosecutor’s Office, and (4) refers the matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the
Ohio Supreme Court for a conspiracy investigation.
For the following reasons, this court grants the respondent’s
dispositive motion and dismisses Papp’s petition for a writ of prohibition.
I. Procedural and Factual History1
On August 20, 2025, Papp was named in a multiple count indictment
with his codefendants, Peter Papp and Timothy Papp, II, in Case No. CR-25-704425-C.2 Relevant here, the indictment identified Papp as “Timothy Papp, Sr.,” and
charged him with a single count of having weapons while under disability.
(Count 8).
Following a pretrial held on March 11, 2026, the trial court granted
the State’s motion to amend the indictment to reflect Papp’s legal name, “Timothy
1 As this court is permitted to do, the facts and procedural history are derived, in
part, from court filings that are publicly available on the internet. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fischer Asset Mgt., L.L.C. v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-3891, ¶ 3, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (observing, in original action, that “[t]his court is permitted to take judicial notice of court filings that are readily accessible from the internet”); Patterson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2019-Ohio-110, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (setting forth procedural history relevant to an original action based on review of “publicly available dockets”), citing Cornelison v. Russo, 2018-Ohio-3574, ¶ 8, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8.
2 Papp was initially indicted on January 27, 2025, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-698734-C. Following Papp’s reindictment in Case No. CR-25-704425-C, the original indictment was dismissed without prejudice.
Papp.” Accordingly, the indictment was amended to remove the “Sr.” designation
from Papp’s name in Count 8 of the indictment. Despite this corrective action, Papp
subsequently filed a pro se motion to dismiss pursuant to Crim.R. 12, raising
analogous claims to those presented in this original action.
On June 6, 2026, Papp commenced this prohibition action against
the respondent. In pertinent part, Papp argues that the indictment’s improper
reference to “Timothy Papp, Sr.” precluded the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over his case. Papp further asserts that he has been deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel throughout the pendency of the criminal proceedings
because the order appointing counsel also referred to “Timothy Papp, Sr.”
According to Papp, the continued prosecution of an “unindicted person” evidences
the respondent and the State’s conspiracy to “violate rights, commit[] fraud, and
threaten[] false arrest.”
While this original action was pending, Papp appeared before the trial
court, with counsel, and accepted the terms of a negotiated plea agreement with the
State. On July 6, 2026, Papp pleaded guilty to a single count of attempted having
weapons while under disability, with forfeiture specifications, as amended in
Count 8 of the indictment. On the same date, the trial court sentenced Papp to a
two-year term of community-control sanctions. Papp’s judgment and conviction
were entered before the trial court had an opportunity to rule on his pending motion
to dismiss.
On July 9, 2026, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss this
prohibition action, arguing that Papp’s petition fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In support of the motion, respondent contends that the
petition must fail, “as [Papp] has pleaded guilty to the amended indictment, thereby
waiving any challenge to personal jurisdiction and voluntarily subjecting himself to
the authority of the court.” Respondent further asserts that Papp “maintains the
adequate remedy at law by way of appeal.”
Papp did not file a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Original actions in prohibition ordinarily “proceed as any civil action
under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.” Loc.App.R. 45(D)(2)(c). This case is
before this court on respondents’ motion to dismiss. “A motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the
complaint.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 2010-Ohio-2057, ¶ 11.
“Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
is appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and
all reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that
relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief.” Clark v. Connor, 82 Ohio St.3d
309, 311 (1998). “While we must accept factual assertions as true, ‘unsupported
legal conclusions, even when cast as factual assertions, are not presumed true for
purposes of a motion to dismiss.’” State ex rel. Gordon v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2025-Ohio-2927, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4777, ¶ 12; see also State ex rel. Sands v. Court of Common Pleas Judge, 2018-Ohio-4245, ¶ 8 (“‘[U]nsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered
admitted and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.’”), quoting State
ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490 (1994).
B. Writ of Prohibition
A writ of prohibition is an order of a superior court to an inferior one
“‘commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions.’” Lundeen v.
Turner, 2020-Ohio-274, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Burtzlaff v. Vickery,
121 Ohio St. 49, 50 (1929). A writ of prohibition generally tests the subject-matter
jurisdiction of a judicial officer or one acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. State ex
rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). “The writ will not issue to prevent
an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to correct mistakes of
the lower court in deciding questions within its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Sparto v.
Juvenile Court of Darke Cty., 153 Ohio St. 64, 65 (1950). Moreover, the writ is an
“extraordinary remedy which is customarily granted with caution and restraint, and
is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies.”
State ex rel. Henry v. Britt, 67 Ohio St.2d 71, 73 (1981); see also Gowdy v. Reali,
2024-Ohio-6196, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.) (A writ of prohibition “should be used with great
caution and not issue in a doubtful case.”).
The principles governing prohibition are well established.
Its requisites are (1) the respondent against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there
is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher, 43 Ohio St.3d 160
(1989).
In most cases, prohibition provides a preventative rather than a
corrective remedy, i.e., the relator only seeks to prevent an anticipated judicial
action. State ex rel. Taylor v. Miday, 2024-Ohio-6203, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). Where a
relator seeks a writ of prohibition to correct a past action, the relator must
demonstrate that the respondent “patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction”
to take the action of which the relator complains. Id. Where a court patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to act, “the availability or adequacy of a remedy is
immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition,” and the relator need not
establish that element. Id.; see also State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of
Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-4569, ¶ 13 (“If jurisdiction was patently and
unambiguously lacking, a writ of prohibition will issue to correct a judgment issued
by a court that lacked jurisdiction.”). “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous
lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine
its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate
remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 2002-Ohio-4907, ¶ 18.
In this case, Papp’s petition suggests that the trial court patently and
unambiguously exceeded its jurisdiction by proceeding with criminal proceedings
against him when the criminal indictment and trial court docket referred to an
unknown individual, “Timothy Papp, Sr.” As previously stated, Papp contends that as a result of these procedural errors, he, “Timothy Papp,” was never indicted or
appointed counsel, and was subjected to judicial misconduct and malicious
prosecution during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. Thus, Papp claims
that he is entitled to an order from this court that instructs the respondent to dismiss
his criminal case with prejudice, and bars the refiling of criminal charges against
him based on the attachment of double jeopardy.
“The general term ‘jurisdiction’ can be used to connote several
distinct concepts, including jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over
the person, and jurisdiction over a particular case.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta,
2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 18, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11-12. “Subjectmatter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to
adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio5220, ¶ 14. “A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to
the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Kuchta at ¶ 19.
“Rather, the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the
controversy.” State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. A judgment issued by a court
lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. State v. Reed, 2022-Ohio-3461,
¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
In contrast, “personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to
render a valid judgment against a particular individual.” State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 36. “In a criminal matter, the court acquires jurisdiction over a person
by lawfully issued process, followed by the arrest and arraignment of the accused and his plea to the charge.” Id., citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481 (1927). If the
court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, any sentence or judgment based
on an error in the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction is voidable. Id. at ¶ 37.
“Generally, a voidable judgment may be set aside only if successfully challenged on
direct appeal.” Harper at ¶ 26.
As mentioned, Papp pleaded guilty to a single count of attempted
having weapons while under disability in Case No. CR-25-704425-C during the
pendency of this original action and before this court could consider the merits of a
preventative remedy. By entering a plea of guilty, Papp waived any challenge to
personal jurisdiction and voluntarily subjected himself to the authority of the court.
See, e.g., In re State ex rel. Winn, 2026-Ohio-566, ¶ 18, citing State v. Talbott, 2013-Ohio-534, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.) (“[A] guilty plea does waive a challenge to personal
jurisdiction.”). As such, Papp’s jurisdictional arguments are limited to the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e. the jurisdiction commonly tested in a prohibition
action. State v. Jensen, 2020-Ohio-1411, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.) (where defendant entered
a guilty plea to the charges in the indictment, he “waived any error committed by the
trial court, with the exception of subject matter jurisdiction”).
It is well settled that the General Assembly, through the power vested
in it by Article IV, Section 4(B), of the Ohio Constitution, has given the common
pleas courts original jurisdiction over “all crimes and offenses, except in cases of
minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the
court of common pleas.” R.C. 2931.03. This includes subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases. Smith v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-1677, ¶ 8. The jurisdiction of a court
of common pleas is invoked by the return of an indictment. Click v. Eckle, 174 Ohio
St. 88, 89 (1962).
In this case, Papp was named in a criminal indictment in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, charging him with a felony offense based
on an alleged criminal act occurring within Cuyahoga County. Although the
indictment originally designated Papp as being “Timothy Papp, Sr.,” the misnomer
was corrected by order of the trial court on March 16, 2026. See Crim.R. 7(D)
(“The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the indictment . . .
in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form or substance . . . provided
no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged.”). (Emphasis
added.) See also State v. Stuckman, 2018-Ohio-4050, ¶ 56 (6th Dist.) (finding the
trial court was well-within its discretion under Crim.R. 7 when it amended the
indictment before trial to include the defendant’s real name.”). Moreover, while
Papp continues to disregard the trial court’s March 16, 2026 order and couches his
arguments in terms of jurisdiction, the alleged defects he identifies in the indictment
and docket are merely clerical errors that did not divest the trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Logan, 2026-Ohio-2076, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Parker, 2021-Ohio-1090, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). Likewise, Papp’s veiled
allegations of deprivation of counsel, malicious prosecution, fraud, judicial
misconduct, conspiracy, and prosecutorial misconduct are issues that are dependent
on the rights or obligations of the parties and do not refer to the classes of cases falling within the respondent’s adjudicatory authority. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ogle v.
Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2023-Ohio-3534, ¶ 21 (finding that a violation
of the defendant’s right to counsel does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter
jurisdiction any more than any other constitutional or trial error does.); Rolfe v.
Galvin, 2006-Ohio-2457, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (“[B]road accusations . . . of bias,
conspiracy, and corruption are insufficient to establish such a specific abrogation of
a specific statute that would render an order void under Ohio law, much less deprive
the judge entirely of jurisdiction over the case.”).
On this record, we find the respondent, as a sitting judge of the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, unquestionably possessed subjectmatter jurisdiction over Papp’s criminal case. See R.C. 2931.03; State ex rel. Pruitt
v. Donnelly, 2011-Ohio-4203. Thus, Papp’s petition fails to demonstrate a patent
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction. At the very most, Papp’s claims allege error
only in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. This is not a proper basis upon
which this court can grant prohibition relief. See State ex rel. Schwarzmer v.
Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-1246, ¶ 13 (“If a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, any
error in the invocation or exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case cannot be
challenged in prohibition but instead must wait to be challenged until appeal of the
final judgment.”); Harper at ¶ 26 (“When a specific action is within a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s
judgment voidable, not void.”); State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-4569, ¶ 15 (extraordinary relief is not available to attack
a voidable judgment).
Having determined that the trial court did not patently and
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Papp’s criminal case, a writ of prohibition will
not issue unless Papp can show that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, 2024-Ohio-2693, ¶ 22, citing
State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 2015-Ohio-3628, ¶ 13.
In this case, Papp did not respond to the motion to dismiss and has
not otherwise disputed that he has an adequate remedy at law. Nevertheless, we
find Papp has or had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law to raise the
errors to which he complains by way of motions before the trial court, direct appeal
from his criminal conviction, a petition for postconviction relief, a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, or, as it relates to his conclusory allegations of judicial
misconduct, filings with the Supreme Court of Ohio and/or Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. See State v. Malone, 2024-Ohio-6195, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel.
Jerninghan v. Gaughan, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 6227, *3 (8th Dist. Sept. 26, 1994);
Smith v. Warren, 89 Ohio St.3d 467, 468 (2000) (“Appeal, not prohibition, is the
remedy for the correction of errors or irregularities of a court having proper
jurisdiction.”). His adequate remedies at law preclude a writ of prohibition. Thus,
the respondent’s motion to dismiss on this basis is well taken.
Based on the foregoing, we find Papp’s petition fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted in prohibition. Accordingly, this court grants the respondent’s dispositive motion and dismisses the petition for a writ of prohibition.
Costs assessed against relator; costs waived. This court directs the clerk of courts to
serve all parties notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal as
required by Civ.R. 58(B).
Writ dismissed.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR