[Cite as Allen-Story v. Story, 2026-Ohio-3118.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
MONIQUE L. ALLEN-STORY, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115979
v. :
JIMMY STORY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 13, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-17-365966
Appearances:
Jimmy Story, pro se.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jimmy Story (“Father”), proceeding pro se,
appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, that overruled his objections to the magistrate’s
decision and adopted the magistrate’s decision following a post-divorce decree
hearing held on September 9 and 12, 2025. Father raises several issues challenging the magistrate’s rulings. However, he has failed to provide this court with a
transcript of the relevant proceedings necessary to address the issues raised. As a
result, we must presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts
A. Divorce Decree
{¶ 2} On September 5, 2018, Father and plaintiff-appellee Monique L.
Allen-Story (“Wife”) were divorced pursuant to a final decree issued by the trial
court. Father appealed, challenging multiple aspects of the divorce decree. This
court overruled Father’s challenges and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Allen-Story v. Story, 2019-Ohio-3888 (8th Dist.).
B. Post-Decree Litigation
{¶ 3} On December 26, 2024, Father filed a “communication” with the trial
court, requesting Wife be held in contempt of court for interfering with his parenting
time in violation of the trial court’s order. Additional motions were filed by Father,
including a motion titled: “Restore physical custody, regain all lost parental rights,
or any term which apply/right to not pay for a privilege established by God and the
USA Constitution” filed on May 7, 2025; a motion to “hold mother in contempt for
denial or visitation for a month” filed on July 11, 2025; and a motion to “award
50/50 split physical shared custody to father; where father picks up child from
schools” filed on September 12, 2025.
{¶ 4} On May 30, 2025, Father also filed a motion for the judge and
magistrate to recuse themselves from the case, in which he accused the magistrate
and judge of bias. On June 11, 2025, the trial court denied his motion, noting that
Father “presents nothing evidencing bias on the part of this Court.”
{¶ 5} On August 27, 2025, Mother filed a motion requesting Father be
declared a vexatious litigator. A guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was also appointed by
the court for the couple’s minor child. The GAL filed a report and request for fees
on September 12, 2025. A post-decree hearing was held before the magistrate on
September 9 and 12, 2025.
{¶ 6} Following the post-decree hearing, the magistrate issued a decision
on October 30, 2025, granting Father’s contempt motion, finding that Mother
acknowledged that she did withhold parenting time from Father on some occasions,
and ordering 14 days of makeup time to occur over the summer of 2026. The
magistrate’s order denied the remainder of Father’s motions.
{¶ 7} On November 13, 2025, Father filed his objections to the magistrate’s
decision. Five days later, Father filed a request for additional time to complete
additional objections to the magistrate’s decision. The court denied his request for
additional time to file additional objections.
{¶ 8} On December 16, 2025, the trial court overruled Father’s objections
and adopted the magistrate’s decision in its entirety. In doing so, the court observed
that Father “failed to file a Praecipe for the transcript nor an affidavit of evidence.
Therefore, the Court must accept the Magistrate’s findings of fact and limit its review to the Magistrate’s conclusions of law.” The court determined that there were no
errors of law in the magistrate’s decision.
C. Appeal
{¶ 9} On December 29, 2025, Father filed a timely notice of appeal from
the trial court’s judgment. On the same day, he filed a motion to have the transcript
of the proceedings prepared at the state’s expense that was denied the following day,
noting that “transcripts at state expense are not granted for civil appeals.” Father
did not file a transcript of the proceedings with this appeal.
{¶ 10} In his brief, Father raises the following assignments of error read as
follows:
1. The trial court committed an abuse of discretion and violated due
process by failing to award Father 50/50 shared parenting, despite the
mother being convicted of contempt for denying visitation on 12-14
occasions, accepting the mother [sic] word over the father, and
minimizing the mothers conviction form [sic] 80 days stated by the
mother, 28 to 35 days stated in the guardian report, and only 12 stated
by the mother. The judgment should be vacated and remanded back to
court.
2. The trial court erred as a matter of law and fact by relying upon a
fraudulent and incomplete Guardian ad Litem (GAL) report that failed
to meet the mandatory requirements of Ohio Sup.R. 48 and modifying
parenting time away from the father when the mother was convicted of
contempt of court. The judgment should be vacated and remanded
back to court.
3. The trial court erred by failing to recuse the Magistrate and Judge
despite evidence of a conflict of interest and personal bias, specifically
regarding the court’s financial interest in Title IV-D child support
funding. The judgment should be vacated and remanded back to court.
4. The trial court violated the Appellant’s due process rights by muting
the Appellant during the hearings, limiting testimony to 45 minutes,
and preventing the cross-examination of the mother. The judgment
should be vacated and remanded back to court.
{¶ 11} Mother has not filed an answer brief in this appeal.
II. Law and Argument
{¶ 12} As preliminary matter, we note that Father acted pro se in the trial
court and represents himself pro se on appeal. This court recognizes that “a pro se
litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent oneself. Although a
pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude, there are limits to a court’s
leniency.” Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7
(8th Dist.), citing Henderson v. Henderson, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). As
a result, “[p]ro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal
procedures, and are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by
counsel.” Id., citing In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, 2013-Ohio-5478,
¶ 22. Thus, we presume that Father “had knowledge of the law, legal procedures,
and appellate process, including App.R. 9, regarding [the] burden of demonstrating
error on appeal.” Gilles v. Castelli, 2025-Ohio-460, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 13} Father raises multiple issues in this appeal that arise from the postdecree hearing requiring us to review factual determinations presented to and made
by the trial court. To determine the merits of Father’s assignments of error, we must
consider the underlying facts and determine whether the evidence and testimony
presented at the post-decree hearing support the magistrate’s decisions and the
court’s decision adopting the magistrate’s order. It must be noted, that when Father objected to the magistrate’s order below, he failed to file a praecipe for the transcript
of the hearing or an affidavit of evidence, limiting the trial judge’s review to the
magistrate’s conclusions of law.
{¶ 14} App.R. 9(B)(4) provides that “[i]f the appellant intends to present an
assignment of error on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the
evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the appellant shall include in
the record a transcript of proceedings that includes all evidence relevant to the
findings or conclusion.” As such, “the appellant . . . is responsible for providing this
court with the complete record of the facts, testimony and evidentiary matters
necessary to support his [or her] assignment of error so that we can properly
evaluate the trial court’s decision.” Pedra Props., L.L.C. v. Justmann, 2015-Ohio5427, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of
assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass
upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume
the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.” Knapp v. Edwards
Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980).
{¶ 15} Here, Father has failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings or
an appropriate substitute as permitted under App.R. 9(C) or (D). As a result, we are
required to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings and overrule
Father’s first, second, and fourth assignments of error since each of those
assignments of error challenge the magistrate’s order arising from factual findings
produced at the post-decree hearing held on September 9 and 12, 2025. Gilles, 2025-Ohio-460, at ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) (holding that the appellant’s failure to provide
the court with a transcript or an App.R. 9 alternative requires the reviewing court
“to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings and overrule [the
appellant’s] assignments of error”).
{¶ 16} Accordingly, Father’s first, second, and fourth assigned errors for
review are overruled.
{¶ 17} With respect to Father’s third assigned error for review, he argues
that the trial court erred when it failed to recuse itself from this matter alleging a
conflict of interest on the basis that the judge and Mother “previously worked for the
child support agency.” Father also alleges that the magistrate’s attendance at the
“original five-day trial suggests an improper interest in the case or a personal
relationship with the Mother.”
{¶ 18} “‘The avenue for redress when a party alleges a violation of the Ohio
Code of Judicial Conduct or error in a judge’s failure to recuse is to file an affidavit
of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court under R.C. 2701.03.’” Crenshaw v.
Howard, 2022-Ohio-3914, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Murrill, 2021-Ohio1449, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.); R.C. 2701.03(A)(“If a judge of the court of common
pleas allegedly . . . has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding
pending before the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified
to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or
the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the
supreme court in accordance with [R.C. 2701.03(B)].”) As a result, a court of appeals generally lacks “authority to void the judgment of a trial court on [a claim that the
judge is biased or prejudiced.]” Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, ¶ 62 (8th
Dist.), quoting Fisher v. Fisher, 2011-Ohio-5251, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). Only the chief
justice of the Ohio Supreme Court has the authority to make such a determination.
Fisher at ¶ 43. We note, however, that “‘alleged due-process violations . . . may be
addressed on appeal.’” Bertalan at ¶ 63, quoting State v. Hunt (In re Thomakos),
2020-Ohio-6874, ¶ 4. But to the extent that Father alleges that his due-process
rights were violated, we are unable to evaluate whether Father was denied a fair
proceeding since he failed to file a transcript of the post-decree hearing.
{¶ 19} In sum, we do not have authority to address Father’s claims that the
trial court had a conflict of interest or was biased against him. And to the extent that
he claims his due-process rights were violated, we are unable to evaluate that claim
because he failed to file a transcript of the relevant proceedings.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, Father’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR