[Cite as State v. Ayers-Moore, 2026-Ohio-3114.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115652
v. :
CARVELL AYERS-MOORE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 13, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-696461-C
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Adrienne E. Linnick, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Faith M.R.
Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Carvell Ayers-Moore appeals his convictions for involuntary
manslaughter and related offenses stemming from his part in causing the death of
Kentada Todd. Todd was fatally shot while asleep in bed next to her fiancé during a drive-by shooting carried out from a stolen vehicle driven by Ayers-Moore, then age
14. The record indicates that Todd was not the intended target; that appears to have
been a minor residing in the home known to the assailants. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
After the matter was bound over to the general division following the
probable-cause and amenability hearings, Ayers-Moore pleaded guilty to
involuntary manslaughter, improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation,
felonious assault, improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle, and receiving
stolen property. As part of the plea agreement, Ayers-Moore agreed to a
mandatory, stated minimum term of 15 to 18 years, with the understanding that
the maximum term associated with that jointly recommended term was required
by law and would be determined by his conduct in prison under the Reagan Tokes
sentencing scheme.1
The trial court imposed an aggregate stated minimum term of 16
years, but improperly imposed “maximum terms” independently calculated on
each qualifying felony instead of using the calculation formula in R.C. 2929.144:
1 Although the record does not contain the transcripts of the change-of-plea or sentencing proceedings, the docket reflects that Ayers-Moore was provided the Reagan Tokes sentencing advisements in both docket entries memorializing the two hearings. In the journal entry memorializing the change-of-plea hearing, the court noted that AyersMoore was notified of the “mandatory advisements regarding Reagan Tokes” that included the maximum term and the impact of the law on the final sentence to which he agreed. By jointly recommending a range for the stated minimum term, Ayers-Moore implicitly agreed that the stated minimum term was inextricably tied to a maximum term to be calculated at sentencing under R.C. 2929.144.
The court imposes a prison sentence at the Lorain Correctional
Institution of 16 year(s). This is an agreed recommended sentence.
Defendant is sentenced in count 2 to a minimum of 10 years, a
maximum of 15 years, in count 3 to a minimum of 5 years and a
maximum of 7.5 years, in count 4 to a minimum of 5 years and a
maximum of 7.5 years, in count 10 to 1 year and in count 11 to 1 year.
Count 2, 3, and 10 shall run consecutive to each other. Count 4 and 11
shall run concurrent to each other.
That statement creating multiple maximum terms does not adhere to the statutory
calculation for consecutive sentencing under R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.144(B)(2). See
State v. Jenkins, 2025-Ohio-2143, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.) (S. C. Gallagher, J., concurring in
judgment only).
In this case, the minimum stated term under R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a),
as jointly recommended by the parties, is 16 years. The maximum term for the
qualifying felony offenses, however, should have been 21 years under R.C.
2929.144(B)(2); the maximum term being the aggregate of all consecutively
imposed minimum or definite terms (16 years) plus 5 years (half of the longest term
on the most serious qualifying offense consecutively imposed, which in this case is
the 10-year term imposed on the first-degree involuntary manslaughter count). See
Jenkins. There is only one calculated maximum term for all qualifying felony
offenses per case file. Id. at ¶ 76. The final sentence should have been imposed as
follows: The court imposes a minimum stated term at the Lorain Correctional
Institution of 16 year(s). This is an agreed recommended sentence. Defendant is
sentenced in count 2 to a minimum of 10 years, in count 3 to a minimum of 5 years,
in count 4 to a minimum of 5 years, in count 10 to 1 year and in count 11 to 1 year. Counts 2, 3, and 10 shall run consecutive to each other. Counts 4 and 11 shall run
concurrent to each other. The maximum term for the qualifying felony offenses is
21 years.2 See id. The imposition of separate maximum terms, calculated separately
for each individual qualifying felony count by the trial court in this case, is incorrect
and not in compliance with the formula in R.C. 2929.144.
This observation is academic. Neither Ayers-Moore nor the State
appealed the final sentence. Because the sentencing error was not appealed, it
remains as imposed. See State v. Sailor, 2021-Ohio-2277, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.); see also
State v. Wilson, 2006-Ohio-2750, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). The impact of this is unclear but
not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. Ayers-Moore presented two
assignments of error for review.
In the first, he claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in
relinquishing jurisdiction to the general division based on the juvenile court’s
determination that Ayers-Moore was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within
the juvenile system under R.C. 2152.12(B). According to Ayers-Moore, his “actions
were indicative of his youthful nature and rehabilitative potential within the
2 The maximum term is a single calculation that applies to all qualifying felony
offenses, so in addition to this method of imposing the sentence, the trial court could impose a non-life indefinite term of 10-21 years on Count 2, 5-21 years on Counts 3 and 4, and one year on Count 10, for an aggregate term of 16-21 years for those offenses. Because only Counts 2, 3, and 10 are consecutively imposed, the stated minimum term on Count 4 is not included in the maximum-term calculation, but the maximum term is nonetheless imposed on that count as well despite the concurrent service. The sentence on Count 4 is simply not operative, but the term must be imposed. Imposing multiple maximum terms for each qualifying felony offense based on an individual calculation for that offense does not comply with the calculation under R.C. 2929.144(B). juvenile system” and on the night of the fatal shooting, he was merely “[h]anging
with friends and smoking in the stolen car[,]” events he describes as partaking in
“a teenage thrill.” He additionally argues that his lack of a criminal record
predating the fatal shooting is evidence of his amenability to the juvenile system, a
statement not supported by the record because Ayers-Moore was on probation at
the time of the shooting. The primary issue with Ayers-Moore’s appellate
argument is that it is divorced from the juvenile court’s amenability determination.
The amenability determination is driven by statutory factors. R.C.
2152.12(B)(3) requires a juvenile court to weigh the aggravating factors under
subdivision (D) of that statutory section against the mitigating factors in subdivision
(E) favoring retention of jurisdiction. State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 29.
Whether a juvenile is amenable to treatment in the juvenile system is determined by
the greater weight of the evidence introduced at the hearing. Id. “By requiring only
a simple outweighing, R.C. 2152.12(B) by its terms establishes a preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard for deciding a juvenile’s amenability.” Id. “The greater
weight may be infinitesimal, and it is only necessary that it be sufficient to destroy
the equilibrium.’” Id., citing State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 (1987), and
Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut v. Gath, 118 Ohio St. 257, 261 (1928).
But that preponderance burden, or the reweighing of evidence in support of
individual factors, is not the appellate standard of review.
The juvenile court’s amenability determination is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion is defined as “conduct that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. And an
‘arbitrary’ decision is one made without ‘consideration of or regard for facts or
circumstances.’” State v. J.B., 2026-Ohio-1405, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Beasley,
2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, and Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014). “A decision is
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that
decision.” AAAA Enters., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). “It is not enough that the reviewing court, were
it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be
persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would
support a contrary result.” Id. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court. J.B. at ¶ 13, citing Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169
(1990). “So long as the juvenile court considers the appropriate statutory factors
and the record provides a rational and factual basis to support its decision, the
juvenile court’s amenability determination cannot be reversed.” State v. F.S., 2025-Ohio-1251, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Nicholson, 2022-Ohio-2037, ¶ 206 (8th
Dist.), and State v. Crosby, 2019-Ohio-2217 (8th Dist.).
Ayers-Moore claims that the juvenile court’s reliance on the statutory
consideration of accomplice liability was “in tension” with the rehabilitative nature
of the juvenile system. Any concerns with that claimed tension are for the legislature
to resolve, not the courts reviewing statutory factors that include consideration of
whether the offender was the principal actor or complicit in others’ commission of
the crimes. Minors complicit in criminal conduct are subject to transfer to the general division under R.C. 2151.26(C). That statutory provision provides that a
minor may be bound over “if he is fourteen years of age or older and the results of
an investigation and hearing indicate reasonable grounds to believe that the child is
not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system” and the child should
be “placed under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for a period extending
beyond the child’s majority.” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 93 (2000). One
of the amenability factors, weighing in favor of juvenile court’s retention of
jurisdiction, is whether the juvenile is the principal offender or an accomplice.
R.C. 2151.26(E). Ayers-Moore claims that the juvenile court erred in concluding
that he caused the harm to the victim because he was an accomplice to the shooting;
according to him, he did not actually pull the trigger or possess or handle a firearm,
and therefore, he is amenable to the juvenile system.
No authority was provided to support his contention that only the
principal actors are responsible for the harm caused to the victim. As the State
recognizes, whether the juvenile is the principal actor is an amenability factor
considered in favor of the juvenile court retaining jurisdiction. R.C. 2152.12(E)(3).
That one factor is not alone dispositive. The juvenile court further acknowledged
that Ayers-Moore was not the principal actor with respect to the shooting itself. He
facilitated the shooting and the codefendants’ flight by driving to and from the crime
scene. Notwithstanding the undeniable proposition that Ayers-Moore actively
participated in the transportation necessary to committing the crime, the trial court
considered his not being the primary shooter as required under R.C. 2152.12(E)(2). The juvenile court noted, however, that that was the only factor weighing against
relinquishment of jurisdiction.
All other factors weighed in favor of the transfer, including in
particular, Ayers-Moore’s criminal history of gun or physical violence committed on
separate occasions, his being on probation at the time of the murder, and the
severity of the harm he caused to the victims being shot at in the sanctity of their
home.3 Because Ayers-Moore’s focus is on one factor to the exclusion of the others,
it cannot be determined that the juvenile court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction for felony prosecution. Ayers-Moore’s argument is more an invitation
for de novo reweighing of the evidence than adhering to the limitations of the abuseof-discretion standard. The first assignment of error is overruled.
In the second assignment of error, Ayers-Moore claims the trial court
deviated from the agreed sentencing recommendation presented as part of his guilty
plea and, therefore, he should be resentenced to delete the maximum term imposed.
This argument conflates two standards of review and seeks a remedy neither
provides.
When a defendant and the State jointly recommend a sentence as part
of the plea process, a trial court must inform the offender of the possibility of an
3 Inasmuch as Ayers-Moore claims that he had no criminal history, the record indicates otherwise. Ayers-Moore was on probation for another crime at the time of the shooting, and he had two separate cases for shooting a victim and also for shooting into a Taco Bell with the bullet ricocheting into a car occupied by a man and a baby. Tr. 71:1-17. Any arguments derived from the misplaced emphasis on the alleged lack of a criminal history are disregarded based on the record.
upward deviation from the recommendation in order to render the plea valid should
the jointly recommended sentence or sentencing range be rejected by the trial court
at the sentencing hearing. See State v. Swortchek, 2020-Ohio-2831, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Dunbar, 2007-Ohio-3261, ¶ 140 (8th Dist.) (concluding that a
sentencing court must notify the offender of an intent to deviate in order to sustain
the guilty plea). The failure to do so permits withdrawal of the plea since the
deviation impacts the validity of the plea itself. The remedy is not to resentence by
deleting the portion of the sentence that constitutes upward deviation as AyersMoore seeks in this appeal. See id.
Ayers-Moore is not asking to vacate his plea, nor is he otherwise
claiming that the plea was involuntarily entered, which would be the relief for an
unadvised deviation from the jointly recommended sentencing. This complicates
the analysis because the relief requested is not compatible with the argument
presented. See, e.g., State v. Rembert, 2025-Ohio-5227, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Because
Ayers-Moore is not claiming that the alleged deviation impacted his guilty plea, the
cited case authority regarding the deviation from the jointly recommended sentence
is inapplicable.
Inasmuch as Ayers-Moore is challenging the sentence imposed and is
seeking that the maximum term be vacated from the final sentence, that argument
implicates R.C. 2953.08(D)(1): “A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject
to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been
recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” In other words, if there was a deviation from the
jointly recommended sentence, the sentence would be reviewable on appeal under
the unambiguous language of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). See State v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-4825, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.) (concluding that a jointly recommended sentence if
imposed, is not reviewable on appeal). Without a deviation, however, the sentence
is not reviewable unless it is contrary to law, the argument waived by Ayers-Moore
in this appeal as noted earlier. Id.
R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) establishes a statutory limit on an appellate
court’s ability to consider an appeal from a sentence. State v. Gwynne, 2019-Ohio4761, ¶ 9, fn. 1. As the Ohio Supreme Court has expressly concluded, if the
conditions under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) are established, an appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id., quoting State v. Noling, 2013-Ohio-1764, ¶ 22.
Further, “‘[t]hat appellant agreed to a sentencing range or sentencing cap, as
opposed to a specific sentence, is immaterial.’” State v. Andrews, 2021-Ohio-1719,
¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Grant, 2018-Ohio-1759, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). The trial
court’s imposition of a jointly recommended sentencing range, as with a jointly
recommended sentence, precludes appellate review of the imposed sentence.
The trial court accepted the jointly recommended aggregate stated
minimum term of 15 to 18 years. The imposed stated minimum term of 16 years is
within that range. In addition, the trial court advised Ayers-Moore at the changeof-plea colloquy that the jointly recommended sentencing range necessarily
included the maximum term under the Reagan Tokes Law sentencing structure. Although no specific maximum term was provided, according to the parties, the trial
court explained the practical effect of the maximum term — that application of the
maximum term depended on his prison conduct. Ayers-Moore does not challenge
the trial court’s description of the maximum term under the Reagan Tokes Law,
codified in R.C. 2929.144, nor the inclusion of an unspecified maximum term as part
of his agreement. His argument presumes that there was a departure from the
jointly recommended sentence solely based on his narrow focus on the agreed range
for the stated minimum term.
The parties jointly recommended a range for the stated minimum
term that included a maximum term as required by law. Ayers-Moore has not
claimed that the plea agreement did not include the statutorily required maximum
term, nor does he challenge the trial court’s explanation of the maximum term
during the plea colloquy. There was no deviation from the jointly recommended
sentence according to the record and arguments presented for our review, and as
noted earlier, there is no other challenge to the maximum terms imposed under R.C.
2929.144. The second assignment of error challenging the final sentence is
overruled.
Ayers-Moore’s convictions are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR