[Cite as State v. Sims, 2026-Ohio-3119.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116012
v. :
LEJUAN SIMS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 13, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2025-CRB-006287
Appearances:
Mark D. Griffin, City of Cleveland Director of Law, and
Maria Herrel, Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
Wargo Law, LLC, and Leslie E. Wargo, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Lejuan Sims appeals his conviction for first-degree misdemeanor
assault claiming the municipal court erred by accepting his guilty plea because he
was not informed of the effect of his plea under Crim.R. 11(D). For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Sims pleaded guilty to an assault stemming from an incident
described by the prosecutor as follows:
[T]he defendant was observed walking towards two female RTA
operators. [The victim] stated the defendant appeared to be holding his
penis, which was erect and making moves toward her and her coworker. . . . Video evidence, from RTA, showed the defendant touching
the victim on her right breast and striking her on the face.
In exchange for the guilty plea, the city dismissed the sexual-imposition charge in
the underlying case, as well as a second case that included criminal trespass and
assault charges for another unrelated incident involving different victims. Sims was
sentenced to 180 days in jail, along with a $300 fine and court costs. He was credited
with 50 days of time served. The financial sanctions remain unpaid.
In his sole assignment of error, Sims claims that the municipal court
erred by accepting his guilty plea without informing him of the effect of the plea
using the language of Crim.R. 11(B)(1), as required by Crim.R. 11(D). Indeed, at the
change-of-plea hearing, the municipal court addressed all advisements under
Crim.R. 11, save the one — an express advisement that the guilty plea is a complete
admission of guilt.
We review to determine whether the trial court accepted a plea in
compliance with Crim.R. 11 de novo. State v. Meadows, 2022-Ohio-4513, ¶ 18 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Cardwell, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.); see also
Lakewood v. Hoctor, 2023-Ohio-375, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.). Crim.R. 11, which outlines the
procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an
adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is
understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11,
quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). The rule includes a
requirement of informing the defendant of the effect of a plea. State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, ¶ 20-21, citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), (D), and (E).
For the purposes of Crim.R. 11(D), which applies to misdemeanor
pleas, a guilty plea is an obvious admission of guilt. State v. Fontanez, 2024-Ohio4579, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19. “[A] defendant
who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to
understand that he has completely admitted his guilt.” Id. Therefore, in situations
in which there is no explicit advisement “that a guilty plea constitutes a complete
admission of guilt during a Crim.R. 11 colloquy but the court otherwise complies
with the rule and the defendant does not assert actual innocence, [courts] may
presume that the defendant understood that his guilty plea was a complete
admission of guilt.” Id. at ¶ 20. Although Fontanez is currently pending before the
Ohio Supreme Court on this conclusion, see 01/22/2025 Case Announcements,
2025-Ohio-156, State v. Fontanez, Ohio Supreme Court No. 2024-1464, the
authority remains binding.
Importantly, Sims has not addressed Fontanez and the impact on his
argument. He instead claims that because there was no advisement on the effect of
the plea, his plea was invalid based on case authority predating Fontanez. See
Hoctor at ¶ 8 (concluding that the failure to advise of the consequences of the nocontest plea was grounds to reverse the conviction). Because that argument conflicts
with Fontanez as it pertains to guilty pleas, it cannot be sustained.
Further, after the trial court accepted Sims’s guilty plea, the
sentencing was delayed, enabling the victim to appear. Sims personally objected to
the continuance asking to be sentenced immediately because in his words, “he
already pleaded guilty” to the assault, an independent consideration in assessing
Sims’s awareness of the effect of entering his plea. See, e.g., State v. Washington,
2025-Ohio-5755, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.) (following Fontanez and concluding that the
defendant presumptively understood that his guilty plea was a complete admission
of guilt). At no point did Sims profess innocence, which would have been difficult
given the video evidence confirming the victim’s allegations, and there is no dispute
that the remainder of the Crim.R. 11 advisements were provided. The city’s reliance
on Fontanez to affirm the conviction is well founded.
This is not to say that courts should altogether omit the advisement
when conducting change-of-plea hearings. The better practice is to include an
advisement regarding the effect of the guilty plea in rote adherence to the rule even
though not required by rule or law. See State v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 17
(noting that the Ohio Supreme Court has never mandated particular words to
comply with Crim.R. 11). Nevertheless, under Fontanez, the sole assignment of
error is overruled.
The conviction is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR