MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 86
Docket: Pen-25-318
Argued: December 9, 2025
Decided: August 13, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JEFF BELONY
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Following a motor vehicle stop on March 15, 2021, during which law
enforcement officers recovered illegal drugs on Jeff Belony’s person, the State
charged Belony with aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A),
17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D) (2021), 1 and criminal forfeiture, 15 M.R.S. § 5826
(2021). 2 Belony moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic
stop and search; the trial court (Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.) denied the
1Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D) has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. See P.L. 2021, ch. 396, § 4 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D) (2026)).
2 Title 15 M.R.S. § 5826 has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. See P.L.
2021, ch. 454, § 13 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2026)); P.L. 2023, ch. 196, § 1 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2026)).
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motion. Belony entered a conditional guilty plea and now appeals from the
judgment of conviction, challenging the court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
[¶2] Belony puts forward three arguments in support of his assertion
that the court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence: (1) law enforcement
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle; (2) law
enforcement prolonged the traffic stop beyond what was reasonable; and
(3) law enforcement lacked probable cause to search Belony’s person. Because
we conclude that the trial court did not make sufficient findings to support the
reasonableness of the investigatory stop’s duration, we vacate the judgment of
conviction and vacate the order denying Belony’s motion to suppress evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order
denying Belony’s motion to suppress, the record, including a video recording,
supports the following facts. See State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 2, 143 A.3d 124;
see also State v. Athayde, 2022 ME 41, ¶ 29, 277 A.3d 387 (indicating that, when
reviewing a trial court’s findings, we can review video recordings admitted at
the suppression hearing); State v. King, 2016 ME 54, ¶ 3, 136 A.3d 366 (relying
on a video recording played at a suppression hearing when setting forth the
facts of the case).
3
[¶4] At some point before March 15, 2021, two cooperating informants
provided information to law enforcement pertaining to alleged drug trafficking.
One informant told law enforcement that two Black men, “Heff” and “Mel,” were
involved in drug trafficking with a third person. Law enforcement had
information to support a belief that “Heff” might be Jeff Belony. Surveillance of
the scene of a supposedly planned drug transaction yielded nothing, however.
[¶5] Another informant told law enforcement in Milo that Heff was
traveling from New York to Maine on a certain bus line and would arrive in
Bangor on March 15, 2021. Agents from the primary investigating agency—the
Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA)—surveilled the bus terminal on
March 15. Informants had told the agents that Heff drove a Chevrolet Monte
Carlo; while no Monte Carlo arrived at the Bangor bus terminal, a Ford Focus
registered to a Milo resident did arrive there. Law enforcement had no
information connecting the Focus with the alleged drug trade. Law
enforcement officers observed a Black man leaving the bus and entering the
Focus.
[¶6] The MDEA agents decided that they wanted to stop the Focus. They
believed, however, that the information that they had about Heff’s involvement
in the drug trade did not provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the 4
vehicle. Law enforcement eventually seized upon two plausible rationales to
stop the car: the car’s rear license plate was so obscured by dirt that it could not
reasonably be read, and an MDEA agent believed that he observed the
passenger (later confirmed to be Belony) to not be wearing a seat belt, although
his belief was ultimately determined to be incorrect.
[¶7] At the request of the MDEA, an officer with the Bangor Police
Department followed the car a substantial distance before stopping the vehicle.
The Bangor officer had a drug-detecting dog with him, but he was not employed
by or working with the MDEA and did not know about the allegations connected
to Belony when he initiated the stop. After speaking with the driver of the car,
the officer returned to his cruiser and called the primary MDEA agent.
[¶8] At some point after the officer’s conversation with the MDEA agent,
the officer walked to the passenger side of the car and identified Belony, a
backup officer led the drug-detecting dog around the car, and the primary
officer provided Belony’s name to the MDEA agent. When the dog reached the
driver’s side—not the passenger’s side where Belony sat—it indicated that it
detected drugs. The primary officer removed both occupants from the car and
searched Belony, finding drugs on Belony’s person.
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[¶9] On May 26, 2021, the Penobscot County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Belony with aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs
(Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D), and criminal forfeiture, 15 M.R.S. § 5826.
On October 1, 2021, Belony filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the stop of the vehicle and search of his person. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A.
[¶10] The trial court (Anderson, J.) held a hearing on Belony’s motion to
suppress on February 16, 2022. On May 16, 2023, the court (Mallonee, J.)3
denied Belony’s motion to suppress. Belony did not file a motion for findings
of fact or conclusions of law under M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d).
[¶11] On May 10, 2024, Belony pleaded guilty to both counts,
conditioned on the right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). On June 26, 2025, Belony filed a notice of appeal,
which we deemed timely. 4
3 Justice Anderson retired before an order was issued, and the matter was reassigned to Justice Mallonee. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 25(a). No additional evidentiary hearings took place, and Justice Mallonee decided the motion on the existing record. The parties agreed to the procedure used and did not raise any issue about it on appeal, so we deem any arguments regarding irregularities in the procedure waived. See State v. Beaulieu, 2025 ME 4, ¶ 19 n.9, 331 A.3d 280.
4 Belony’s original notice of appeal was filed after the deadline had passed. See State v. Belony,
2025 ME 26, ¶ 9, 334 A.3d 633. Following the dismissal of his appeal, Belony petitioned for post-conviction relief; the court concluded that Belony’s trial counsel was ineffective and reinstated Belony’s right to appeal. See 15 M.R.S. § 2130 (2026).
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II. DISCUSSION
[¶12] Belony advances three reasons why the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence collected during the investigatory stop: first,
law enforcement lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing to
support the stop of the vehicle; second, law enforcement improperly prolonged
the stop; and third, law enforcement lacked probable cause to search Belony.
A. Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
[¶13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by police officers and other
government agents. 5 U.S. Const. amend. IV; State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 8, 162
A.3d 829. To support a brief investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, “a police
officer must have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either
criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur.” State v. Lovell, 2022 ME 49, ¶ 8, 281 A.3d 651
(quotation marks omitted). “[R]easonable articulable suspicion is considerably
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Belony did not develop an argument under the Maine Constitution before the trial court. Nor
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has he raised any argument regarding whether article 1, section 5 of the Maine Constitution includes an exclusionary rule, a prerequisite to the requested relief in this case. For these two independent reasons, any argument based on the Maine Constitution has been waived, and we focus only on the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Carter, 2025 ME 77, ¶ 22, n.6, 345 A.3d 38; State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 36, 302 A.3d 1.
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suspicion need only be more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch.”
State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 9, 960 A.2d 321 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
[¶14] Belony contends that the officer did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of a license plate violation because 29-A M.R.S. § 452
(2026) does not provide a distance from which a license plate must be visible,
and the officer testified that he could read the plate once he was “right on the
bumper.” Belony concurs with the trial court’s conclusion that, because the
MDEA agent was apparently mistaken in his belief that Belony was not wearing
a seat belt, the suspected seat belt violation did not provide sufficient grounds
to conduct an investigatory stop. Belony further contends that the officer’s
identification of him did not provide law enforcement with a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug trafficking sufficient to extend the length of the
stop beyond the time needed to investigate the suspected license plate and seat
belt violations.
[¶15] When considering whether law enforcement had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to justify an investigatory stop,
“[w]e first determine whether the record supports the factual findings made by
the motion court. We then review de novo the motion court’s conclusion that
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the officer’s subjective suspicion was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.”
Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 17, 143 A.3d 124 (citations and quotation marks omitted);
see State v. McLain, 2025 ME 87, ¶ 16, 345 A.3d 141 (stating that the suspicion
of criminal activity must be “more than mere speculation or an unsubstantiated
hunch”).
1. Suspected License Plate and Seat Belt Violations
[¶16] Title 29-A M.R.S. § 452 governs the manner of displaying a license
plate. Subsection 1 requires that, with limited exceptions not applicable here,
license plates “be attached to the front and the rear of each vehicle.”
Subsection 3 mandates that license plates “always be properly displayed.” And
subsection 4 requires that the “numbers, letters and words” on a license plate
“always be plainly visible and legible.” Section 1909 provides that “[a] vehicle
must have a white light capable of illuminating the rear registration plate so
that the characters on the plate are visible for a distance of at least 50 feet.”
29-A M.R.S. § 1909 (2021).6 Reading 29-A M.R.S. § 452 in context, it is
objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that a license plate which is so
obscured that it can be read from only a few feet away is not “plainly visible and
legible” as required by section 452. See State v. Lovejoy, 2024 ME 42, ¶ 17, 315
6 Title 29-A M.R.S. § 1909 has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. See
P.L. 2021, ch. 216, § 45 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 29-A M.R.S. § 1909 (2026)).
9
A.3d 744 (holding that it was objectively reasonable for officer to believe that
an inoperable rear license plate light of victim’s car, even with a second working
light, constituted a traffic violation).7
[¶17] Likewise, the MDEA agent’s belief that Belony was not wearing a
seat belt, presumably in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2081(3-A) (2026), amounted
to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a traffic infraction. That the MDEA
agent’s suspicion here was based on what was later determined to be a factual
mistake did not negate law enforcement’s prerogative to investigate it. See
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014) (“[A] search or seizure may be
permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable
factual mistake.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 794-95 (Me. 1992) (apparent
absence of rear license plate justified an investigatory stop of pickup truck even
though after initiating the stop, the officer realized that the truck had a license
plate in its rear window).
[¶18] As the court noted, the suspected license plate and seat belt
violations were pretexts for the traffic stop. Law enforcement sought to pull
7 Belony additionally contends that, if the purpose of 29-A M.R.S. § 452 is for law enforcement to be able to run license plates, then the fact that an agent had already run the plate number negated the officer’s need to read the plate. This argument is unpersuasive. The officer had an objectively reasonable belief that an obscured license plate amounted to a violation, which permitted the officer to initiate a stop even if he already knew the license plate number.
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over the car to investigate suspected drug trafficking; the primary objective
was not to enforce motor vehicle and traffic laws. Nevertheless, this does not
change our analysis that law enforcement had objectively reasonable bases to
initiate the stop. See Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶¶ 9-15, 143 A.3d 124; Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
2. Suspected Drug Trafficking
[¶19] The court concluded that Belony’s identification by law
enforcement, coupled with the quantum of information from informants,
provided law enforcement with a valid basis for prolonging the stop after
Belony’s identification. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that law
enforcement had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing separate
from the license plate and seat belt violations, since Belony’s suspected
connection to drug trafficking was unrelated to the original justifications for the
traffic stop. See State v. Fitzgerald, 2025 ME 65, ¶ 15, 340 A.3d 121. We
therefore must address the question of whether law enforcement had an
objectively reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking once an officer identified
Belony.
[¶20] The court’s findings regarding the information provided by the
confidential informants are sparse. The court described the information as
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“thin but not nonexistent.” It found that the MDEA was looking for a Black man
called “Heff,” that law enforcement’s search of a database yielded Belony as one
of several persons known as “Heff,” that law enforcement had received
information that Heff would be arriving in Maine from New York on a certain
bus line on March 15, 2021, and that the vehicle in which Belony departed from
the bus stop was registered in the town where a suspected drug sale was to take
place.
[¶21] Although this information alone was not sufficient to initiate the
stop, once the officer identified Belony as the passenger in the Focus, law
enforcement collectively had sufficient information to connect Belony to the
reports of drug transactions, which provided an objectively reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to justify further investigation of suspected
drug trafficking, including by use of the drug-detecting dog. See State v. Carr,
1997 ME 221, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 353 (“Reasonable and articulable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory stop can rest on the collective knowledge of the
police.”).
B. Reasonableness of the Investigatory Stop’s Duration
[¶22] We next consider, based on the trial court’s findings of fact,
whether law enforcement improperly prolonged the seizure beyond the actual
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time needed to investigate the suspected traffic violations. As just discussed,
once Belony was identified, the officers had a basis to continue their
investigation. Here, we focus on the reasonableness of the officer’s actions up
until the point of identification. We review the trial court’s findings of fact for
clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. See Lovejoy, 2024 ME 42, ¶ 16,
315 A.3d 744.
[¶23] “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter
for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against
unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015);
Fitzgerald, 2025 ME 65, ¶ 14, 340 A.3d 121. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
determined that, absent reasonable suspicion of a drug crime, a dog sniff
conducted after the completion of a traffic stop, where the officer had already
given the citation and documents to the driver and the original mission of the
stop was complete, was not permitted under the Fourth Amendment. 575 U.S.
at 350-58. The Court explained that “[a] seizure justified only by a policeobserved traffic violation . . . becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the
violation.” Id. at 350-51 (alterations and quotation marks omitted).
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[¶24] Here, the trial court concluded that law enforcement did not
improperly prolong the seizure because the officer identified Belony within the
usual timeframe for a traffic stop for a similar violation. Yet, as the Supreme
Court explained in Rodriguez, the reasonableness of a seizure’s timeframe
hinges on “what the police in fact do” during the seizure rather than merely
whether the seizure’s duration was typical. Id. at 357. An analysis that focuses
purely on a seizure’s timeframe, irrespective of how officers utilized this time,
would grant officers who expeditiously complete all traffic-related tasks “bonus
time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.” Id. The trial court’s
analysis here is thus inconsistent with the standard in Rodriguez.
[¶25] Moreover, the court’s key findings pertaining to the timeframe and
timeline of the stop are clearly erroneous. In determining that the duration of
the traffic stop prior to Belony’s identification was reasonable, the court found
that law enforcement identified Belony “within 5 or 6 minutes of the stop.” Yet
the evidence indicates that law enforcement did not identify Belony until at
least eight minutes and forty-eight seconds 8 after the two vehicles came to a
8 We offer no opinion as to whether this approximate duration was a reasonable amount of time for law enforcement to complete the initial mission of the stop; this issue is committed to the determination of the trial court in the first instance. The record before the trial court and this court provides little information on what the officers were actually doing during the traffic stop as the clock was ticking.
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halt. More consequential, however, is that the court confused the timeline of
events. The court found that “[a]fter the dog indicated on the car, both
occupants were removed, Mr. Belony was identified, then he was searched.”
But the evidence, including the video of the traffic stop, does not support that
the officer identified Belony after the dog indicated on the car and Belony had
been removed from the car.
[¶26] Although there is evidence in the record that could support the
reasonableness of the stop’s duration, the court did not make findings
pertaining to how law enforcement spent the time leading up to Belony’s
identification, nor did it address whether, before the officer identified Belony,
law enforcement’s efforts to investigate suspected drug trafficking extended
the traffic stop’s duration beyond the time necessary to investigate the
suspected license plate and seat belt violations.
[¶27] In denying a motion to suppress evidence, “the court shall make
findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and “[i]f the court fails to make such
findings and conclusions, a party may file a motion seeking compliance with the
requirement.” M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d). “[A]s the party responsible for an
adequate record, the appellant has the burden to request the court to make
findings if none are made or to expand on inadequate findings in order for the
15
record to be meaningful for appellate review.” State v. Kneeland, 552 A.2d 4, 6
(Me. 1988); see Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶¶ 18-19, 143 A.3d 124; State v. Izzo, 623
A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (Me. 1993). When neither party has filed a motion for
findings of fact and conclusions of law under M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d), as is the
case here, we may infer that the court “found all the facts necessary to support
its judgment if those inferred findings are supportable by evidence in the
record.” State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003.
[¶28] Here, the court did not make adequate findings to support its
determination. Complicating our analysis, however, is that some of the key
findings of fact that the court did make were clearly erroneous, and the court
reached its conclusions of law through flawed or incomplete legal analysis that
was premised upon its erroneous factual findings. Although we may affirm an
order on grounds different from the trial court’s reasoning, see Fitzgerald, 2025
ME 65, ¶ 2, 340 A.3d 121, doing so here would require us to infer that the court
found that, prior to identifying Belony, law enforcement’s actions to investigate
potential drug trafficking did not prolong the stop. Yet the court expressly
found that before the officer identified Belony, the dog indicated on the car and
the officer removed Belony from the car. This finding, which is clearly
erroneous, may be contrary to an inference that law enforcement did not
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prolong the stop by investigating matters outside of the initial mission.
Critically, the video recording of the traffic stop does not definitively answer
the question of what the officer was doing during the initial portion of the stop.
Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-80 (2007) (drawing facts from video
evidence where a party’s assertions, adopted by the lower court, contradicted
the video evidence). We therefore cannot here infer that the court made the
necessary findings, based upon competent evidence in the record, to support
its denial of Belony’s motion to suppress evidence.
[¶29] For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of conviction and the
court’s order denying Belony’s motion to suppress evidence. 9
The entry is:
Judgment of conviction and order denying
motion to suppress evidence vacated.
Remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 10
Although we do not reach the issue of whether law enforcement had probable cause to search
9
Belony, we note that a dog alert on a vehicle may support a search of the vehicle and the vehicle’s occupants, particularly when additional evidence supports that a search may uncover drugs. See State v. Martin, 2015 ME 91, ¶ 14, 120 A.3d 113 (holding that probable cause to believe that drugs would be found on the driver or in the driver’s vehicle extended to the passenger); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372-73 (2003) (holding that, because the officer located drugs in the back seat of the vehicle, he had probable cause to arrest the front seat passenger).
Further proceedings may include reopening the evidentiary hearing on Belony’s motion to
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suppress.
17
Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant Jeff Belony
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jason Horn, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-692
For Clerk Reference Only