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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 24-CF-0972
ANTONE WATKINS, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2022-CF3-05457)
(Robert A. Salerno, Judge)
(Argued November 13, 2025 Decided August 13, 2026)
Nancy E. Allen for appellant.
Timothy R. Cahill, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Daniel J. Lenerz, Gregory Evans, and Mark Levy, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.
BECKWITH, Associate Judge: Carlos Rodriguez was assaulted and robbed in
an alley in the District of Columbia by a group of men—one of whom he said had a
gun. The government prosecuted Antone Watkins in connection with the incident,
and after a jury trial, he was convicted of armed robbery, assault with a dangerous
2
weapon (ADW), two associated counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of
violence (PFCV), and unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV) for taking Mr.
Rodriguez’s truck.
On appeal, Mr. Watkins argues that the trial court erred in several respects
and further contends that the government presented insufficient evidence that he
committed the offenses while armed. We agree with Mr. Watkins as to his first two
claims of error—specifically, that the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed Mr. Rodriguez to testify as to his fear of Mr. Watkins and when it permitted
the investigating detective, David Naples, to testify about the contents of
surveillance footage of the crime that was lost after he viewed it. Because those two
errors, viewed together, were not harmless as to the counts that had a weapon as an
element, we reverse Mr. Watkins’s armed robbery, PFCV, and ADW convictions.
We affirm Mr. Watkins’s UUV conviction, however, because the evidence as to that
charge was overwhelming despite the serious errors.
I. Background
Mr. Rodriguez testified that on the night of the incident, he went in search of
marijuana, met up with a woman who said she could get him the drugs, and was
brought to a back alley where he was struck with a firearm and robbed by a group of
men he did not know. The government’s theory at trial was that the woman set Mr.
3
Rodriguez up to be robbed and that Mr. Watkins was the man who assaulted Mr.
Rodriguez with the gun. Because the D.C. Housing Authority (DCHA) failed to
preserve its surveillance footage of what occurred in the alley, 1 the government
primarily relied on Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony.
Specifically, Mr. Rodriguez testified that on the night of the incident, he drove
his truck to southwest D.C. “to get some weed.” There, he met up with a woman—
seen on surveillance footage from an MPD camera wearing a white T-shirt and blue
shorts—who told him she could help him acquire marijuana. Mr. Rodriguez stated
that the woman called someone on her cell phone prior to leading him to an alley. A
man dressed in all white entered the alley by foot and pointed a gun at the woman,
yelling at her to “get the fuck outta here before we kill you.” 2 That same man held
Mr. Rodriguez down and searched him while Mr. Rodriguez bit him. In testimony
that was corroborated by preserved surveillance footage of streets leading to the
alley, Mr. Rodriguez said that at some point during the encounter, two other men
1
Detective Naples testified that he “submitted a request to [DCHA] to preserve and send [him] the video footage” of the alley, but that DCHA had not preserved the recording. The United States explained to the trial court that the video was “not preserved” due to a “technical issue” and that it “was never in the Government’s possession.” As is discussed in greater detail infra in Part II.A, Detective Naples testified that he had seen the lost footage, and he was permitted over objection to testify as to the contents of that footage.
2
Mr. Rodriguez initially told police that the individual with the gun “[p]ossibly had dreads or had short hair,” but stated at trial that “[h]e had dreads.”
4
arrived in the alley on bicycles to assist the man with the gun. 3 The first man (the
one who entered the alley by foot) hit Mr. Rodriguez “multiple times” with a
“firearm,” pointed the weapon at him “a couple of times,” tried to hold him down
and searched him. The other two men also “reached in [his] pockets” during the
encounter. Mr. Rodriguez turned over his truck keys and other possessions 4 to the
assailant who entered the alley by foot because he saw the man’s “hands on the
trigger” of his gun. Mr. Rodriguez remembered the gun being “black-grayish,” 5 and
though he initially testified that the firearm was “probably like a .40 or .45,” he later
stated that it was definitely smaller than a 45-caliber because “that shit would have
knocked [him] out.” After the attack, Mr. Rodriguez arrived “bloody,” “hurt, dizzy,
drowsy,” and with a broken tooth to the home of a family friend named Mary
Thomas, who proceeded to call 911. Mr. Rodriguez was taken to the hospital, where
he spoke with an MPD detective.
3
Specifically, Mr. Rodriguez testified that “two little buddies” of the man with the gun “came around the corner” after the armed man got scared because he noticed that Mr. Rodriguez “was trying to reach for the gun.”
4
In addition to his truck keys, Mr. Rodriguez had $500 in cash, a “couple chains,” and a watch in his possession.
5
His description of the gun as “like black grayish” came in his interview with police after the incident, but at trial, he testified that “[a]ll [he] remember[ed] [wa]s black.”
5
Mr. Rodriguez could not identify the woman who offered to help him buy
marijuana or any of the men who attacked him in the alley. Detective Naples testified
that, through his investigation aided by surveillance footage, he was able to locate
and speak with the woman and identify her as Sherry Clark. The government also
introduced evidence identifying the first man—the one who entered the alley on foot
and instigated the attack on Mr. Rodriguez—as Mr. Watkins. Specifically, in
surveillance footage of the area surrounding the alley, the three male assailants are
each wearing all white, while the man who entered the alley first by foot has visible
a “red design with a black object in the center” on the back of his shirt, allowing him
to be tracked throughout the footage. Detective Naples showed still images of the
man with the distinctive shirt to Mr. Watkins’s ex-girlfriend and to Mr. Watkins’s
probation officer, Sean Stallman, and both identified the man in the image as Mr.
Watkins. The other two assailants were not identified.
The preserved surveillance footage shows that the man identified as Mr.
Watkins met up with the woman identified as Ms. Clark at a nearby recreation center.
The footage later depicts Mr. Watkins walking toward the alley, Ms. Clark entering
the alley with Mr. Rodriguez, and the two unidentified men cycling into the alley. A
few minutes later, the footage shows Ms. Clark leaving the alley, and later the men
on bicycles exiting as well.
6
In the footage from another camera, Ms. Clark can be seen arriving at Mr.
Rodriguez’s truck parked nearby and eventually getting in on the passenger side.
Mr. Watkins can then be seen “running from the alley” to “the driver side of [Mr.
Rodriguez’s] truck” and entering that side of the truck. The truck is then seen being
driven back to the recreation center, where Mr. Watkins exits the driver’s side of the
truck and Ms. Clark meets up with him at the recreation center about a minute later.
Mr. Watkins begins dumping objects out of the truck as Ms. Clark assists him, and
the two are seen rummaging through the truck’s contents.
The government also presented social media evidence, cell-site evidence,
DNA evidence, and Ms. Clark’s phone records. 6 Detective Naples testified that the
phone records showed a call from Ms. Clark to Mr. Watkins at the same time the
woman identified as Ms. Clark is seen on surveillance footage holding an object with
an illuminated screen in her left hand and then putting that hand up to her left ear.
Mr. Watkins’s probation officer, Mr. Stallman, testified that he watched a live video
Mr. Watkins streamed on Instagram approximately one month after the incident in
which Mr. Watkins lifted his shirt to show a black and gray gun in his waistband.
The government also admitted another Instagram post in which Mr. Watkins is
6
The phone records were for a person named “Cheryl Clark.” Detective Naples testified that he knew that Sherry Clark’s mother was named Cheryl Clark, so it was “possible” that the records were for someone else.
7
wearing shoes that match the shoes seen on the man identified as Mr. Watkins in the
surveillance footage.
A crime team scientist with the D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences
testified that DNA evidence recovered from Mr. Rodriguez’s jeans “provide[d]
limited support for [the] inclusion of Mr. Watkins,” and DNA evidence recovered
from the interior driver door handles, arm rests, and windowsill of Mr. Rodriguez’s
truck “provide[d] limited support for [the] exclusion of Mr. Watkins.” 7 Further, the
scientist testified that Mr. Watkins was “excluded as being a potential contributor”
from swabs of the truck’s steering wheel and gear shift because the DNA of only
one individual—Mr. Rodriguez—was detected. An expert in the field of historical
mobile device location analysis testified that cell-site data showed that between
10:33 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. on the night of the incident, it was “likely” that Mr.
Watkins’s cell phone was at the crime scene location (the alley) and the recovery
location (the recreation center) “during the relevant time periods.”
7
Inclusion “means the sample matches the reference sample taken directly from an individual”—here, Mr. Watkins—while exclusion “means the sample does not match.” Barber v. United States, 179 A.3d 883, 891 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
After deliberating for one day, the jury found Mr. Watkins guilty of armed
robbery, ADW, two related counts of PFCV, and UUV (of Mr. Rodriguez’s truck).
He now appeals his convictions.
II. Mr. Watkins’s Claims of Error
A. DCHA Surveillance Video
We begin with Mr. Watkins’s argument, with which the government agrees,
that the trial court erred when it allowed Detective Naples to narrate for the jury the
unauthenticated contents of the lost DCHA surveillance footage over defense
counsel’s objection. Specifically, Detective Naples was permitted to testify that the
DCHA video was “[c]onsistent with what [Mr. Rodriguez] said is being struck with
the firearm and then individuals going through his pockets and taking items from
him.” He went on to say that “the video shows actions consistent with the one
individual that’s identified as Mr. Watkins in this case, going up to the victim,
striking him, going through his pockets.”
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Blackson v. United
States, 979 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C. 2009). The government concedes this was error, and
we agree. Lay witnesses must have personal knowledge of that to which they testify.
Johnson v. United States, 116 A.3d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. 2015). Police officers who
9
have not “witnessed the events” in question do not “obtain[] personal knowledge”
of events “solely by watching recorded surveillance footage.” Callaham v. United
States, 268 A.3d 833, 848 (D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
defense counsel had opened the door to a limited range of questions about the DCHA
video footage by eliciting testimony (on cross-examination) from Detective Naples
that there was footage capturing the incident that was not presented in court. But
“[o]pening the door is one thing. . . . [W]hat comes through the door is another.
Everything cannot come through the door.” Furr v. United States, 157 A.3d 1245,
1252 (D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). Where Detective Naples did not testify on
cross-examination that he had viewed the unpreserved footage, the prosecutor went
beyond the bounds of what was needed “to remove any unfair prejudice [that] might
otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial
court therefore should not have permitted Detective Naples to testify as to what he
observed “solely by watching recorded surveillance footage,” Callaham, 268 A.32d
at 848, where that footage was not authenticated, the jurors and the defense were
10
unable to view it, and defense counsel could not effectively challenge Detective
Naples’s testimony on cross-examination.
The government nonetheless argues that the error was harmless. We address
harm cumulatively in Part III. See In re C.A., 186 A.3d 118, 126 (D.C. 2018)
(assessing harm by looking at the impact of two errors together).
B. Fear Testimony
Next, Mr. Watkins argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Mr.
Rodriguez to testify as to his fear of Mr. Watkins. On cross-examination, when
defense counsel was questioning Mr. Rodriguez on inconsistencies between his trial
testimony and his statements to police shortly after the incident, Mr. Rodriguez
blurted out that he was “trying to help” Mr. Watkins, but defense counsel was
“ticking [him] off.” On redirect, in an apparent attempt to clarify Mr. Rodriguez’s
peculiar testimony, the prosecution elicited the following testimony, which Mr.
Watkins contends was erroneously admitted:
Q. Why did you tell [defense counsel] that you were trying
to help him out—help out his client?
A. Me admitting who did it, that’s why.
Q. Sorry, what was that?
A. For me admitting to who assaulted me.
11
Q. Do you know who did that?
A. Gosh. No, I don’t.
Q. I see you looking to your right—
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
The court: Overruled.
By [the prosecution]:
Q. Are you being truthful?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Why do you say you don’t know? Are you scared?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
The witness: Yes, I’m scared for my life. Yes.
The court: Overruled.
By [the prosecution]:
Q. Why are you scared?
A. Because I don’t know if this individual might harm me
or my folks.
Q. And would you recognize him if you saw him out in the
streets?
A. No, I wouldn’t. I wouldn’t recognize him until this day
that y’all presented to me, yes.
The defense did not request a curative or limiting instruction, nor did the trial court
provide one sua sponte. The government argues that the line of questioning and
elicited testimony were permissible primarily because the prosecution was entitled
12
to explain to the jury Mr. Rodriguez’s odd demeanor and confusing statement that
he was trying to help Mr. Watkins, as well as to cure defense counsel’s attempted
impeachment of Mr. Rodriguez with prior inconsistent statements he made to police.
Like above, we review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.
Blackson, 979 A.2d at 10. “[E]vidence concerning a witness’[s] fear tends to be
extremely prejudicial because it appeals to the passions of the jury and may cause
the jury to base its decision on something other than rule of law.” Id. at 10-11
(quoting Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 586 (D.C. 2001)); see Mercer v.
United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1184 (D.C. 1999) (cautioning trial courts regarding
the “admission of potentially inflammatory evidence”). Therefore, “permissible
questioning and argument by prosecutors about witness fear—especially fear of the
defendants on trial—must be the limited exception rather than the rule.” Murray v.
United States, 855 A.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C. 2004); see also Parker v. United States,
797 A.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2002) (“[I]t is generally improper for a prosecutor to
elicit evidence that a witness has a fear of the defendant.”).
Where evidence is probative of a witness’s “generalized fear,” as opposed to
his specific fear of the defendant, that evidence may be admissible to help the jury
understand why “the witness has previously withheld information or makes
13
conflicting statements.” Parker, 797 A.2d at 1249-50 (collecting cases). 8 But even
where the testimony elicits only a generalized fear, we still caution trial courts to
conduct a “sensitive balancing of probative value versus prejudice” because a jury
may nonetheless hold the fear evidence against the defendant. Blunt v. United States,
959 A.2d 721, 725 (D.C. 2008). We have said that fear testimony can be prejudicial
in situations like this, where it is used to insinuate that the witness would otherwise
make an in-court identification but for his fear of the defendant. Cf. McClellan v.
United States, 706 A.2d 542, 552-53 (D.C. 1997) (holding that it was error where
the prosecutor asked the jury to infer that the witness would have identified the
shooter but for her fear of retaliation); Simpson v. United States, 877 A.2d 1045,
1048 (D.C. 2005) (relying on our holding in Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1184, that
“evidence concerning a witness’[s] fear tends to be prejudicial” to find prosecutorial
error where the government suggested in its closing that the witness had not
identified the shooter out of fear of the defendant).
8
Compare Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 964 (D.C. 2000)
(finding no abuse of discretion where testimony about fear of general “retaliation for snitching” used to explain why witness would not identify defendant), with Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1187-88 (finding error where government “attempt[ed] to link” courtroom spectators who it had “intimat[ed] . . . were friends” with the defendants and “created an impression that the spectators were there to influence the testimony of the witnesses” because it “implied that there was a threat coming from the defendants”).
14
In Blunt v. United States, we held that it was error to permit a witness to testify
that “she had been stabbed repeatedly for her prior testimony in the same case”
because that evidence “carried a serious risk of implying an unfounded link to [the
appellant].” 959 A.2d at 725. Even though the trial court in Blunt gave a cautionary
instruction, 9 we thought it likely that jurors might “speculate . . . that no one else had
the same motive to retaliate as did [the appellant] or persons acting for him.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Though the government argues that Blunt is
easily distinguishable because Mr. “Rodriguez’s testimony implied no similar
attempt by [Mr.] Watkins to threaten him,” we disagree. Here, the elicited testimony
was exactly the sort of specific fear testimony of which we are wary. See Gordon,
783 A.2d at 588; Blunt, 959 A.2d at 725. The prosecutor pointed out to the jury that
he saw Mr. Rodriguez “looking to [his] right”—where Mr. Watkins was apparently
sitting—prior to asking Mr. Rodriguez if he was telling the truth and if he was scared.
9
The government notes that “[a]lthough it may have been preferable for the trial court to issue a cautionary instruction,” here defense counsel did not request such an instruction. Mr. Watkins responds that any request would have been futile given that the trial court swiftly overruled the defense’s objections. Regardless, even where given, such an instruction may still be an inadequate remedy for the admission of prejudicial fear testimony. See Blunt, 959 A.2d at 724-25 (holding that “a limiting instruction was not an adequate substitute for exclusion of [fear] testimony in the circumstances” and emphasizing that “[a]lthough a forceful limiting instruction may serve to prevent . . . speculation in some cases, the likely efficacy of an instruction must be assessed in each case against the danger inherent in the explanation for fear that the witness is expected to give”).
15
The natural implication of the prosecutor’s intimation was that Mr. Rodriguez was
operating under implied or explicit intimidation by Mr. Watkins, thus “play[ing] on
the passions and fear of the jury, by suggesting that a threat exist[ed] against” him.
Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1187.
Even assuming this was the sort of fear testimony that we sometimes deem
permissible to “explain specific behavior of the witness,” Blackson, 979 A.2d at 11
(quoting Ebron v. United States, 838 A.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. 2003)), it is not apparent
that Mr. Rodriguez’s initial testimony on cross-examination that he was trying to
help Mr. Watkins actually hurt the government—making it doubtful that the
government had anything to “explain,” cf. McClellan, 706 A.2d at 551-52
(suggesting that it is not always error where a “witness’[s] credibility has been
attacked [by the defense] on the basis of her initial failure to tell the truth to the
police” and the government introduces “evidence that the real reason for her silence
was . . . self-protective fear”). To be sure, Mr. Rodriguez’s statement was confusing.
But that incoherence limited the testimony’s ability to cause the government a level
of prejudice that warranted such a potent “fix”—the jury might plausibly have
inferred, for example, that the odd testimony hurt the defense by insinuating that Mr.
Watkins had engaged in some form of inappropriate communication with the
witness.
16
Regardless, where the prosecution has an “alternative, less prejudicial method
to accomplish the same goal,” it should instead deploy that tactic in lieu of
introducing fear testimony. Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1187-88 (explaining that the
prosecution could instead have “established that [the witness] was only testifying
due to a subpoena, and that [the witness] did not want to be in the courtroom”). Here,
the government had already elicited testimony that Mr. Rodriguez did not want to
be there and that he had been “placed into custody by the U.S. Marshals for failing
to appear.” And the prosecution explained Mr. Rodriguez’s odd courtroom
demeanor in its closing without reference to the fear testimony, telling the jury:
Now, I want to take a moment and talk to you about Carlos
[Rodriguez]. I think in the kindest of words Carlos is a
character. He took the stand and he provided information
he had to be brought. Would the Government prefer that
he answered the question more directly? Yes.
Would the Government prefer that he showed His Honor
a little bit more deference? Yes. We readily admit that. We
don’t choose our victims. . . .
Now you have heard quite a bit but I want to tell you what
you have heard from Carlos both at the start of this case
and when he took the stand, is consistent with the charged
offenses.
The government therefore had a variety of other tools at its disposal—which it, in
fact, utilized—to help rehabilitate Mr. Rodriguez. Accordingly, admitting the
prejudicial fear testimony was error.
17
C. Other Asserted Errors
Mr. Watkins also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
(1) permitting Detective Naples to narrate other surveillance footage that was
preserved and shown to the jury and (2) allowing the government to identify Mr.
Stallman as Mr. Watkins’s probation officer.
As to the impermissible-narration argument, the government correctly notes
that our review is for plain error because defense counsel failed to object at trial.
Walker v. United States, 201 A.3d 586, 593-94 (D.C. 2019). Therefore, to prevail,
Mr. Watkins must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected [his]
substantial rights.” Id. at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lowery v.
United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1173 (D.C. 2010)).
As explained above, detectives do not gain personal knowledge “solely by
watching recorded surveillance footage.” Callaham, 268 A.3d at 848. We found
error, for example, in Geter v. United States, 306 A.3d 126, 135, 138-39 (D.C. 2023),
where investigating detectives who had no prior acquaintance with the appellant and
no knowledge of his “well-known bodily features or patterns of movement”
purported to identify him in surveillance video solely by their purported familiarity
with his clothing—which they gained after interviewing him on the night of the
incident—because the video did not capture a clear image of the assailant’s face. But
18
this case is unlike Geter. Here, Detective Naples did not purport to identify Mr.
Watkins solely based on the video footage but instead relied on identifications by
those who knew Mr. Watkins. And Detective Naples did exactly what Geter
condoned: He reviewed video footage from one point in time and, after proper
foundation was laid, testified “about the distinctive clothing the suspect was
wearing” and then “purport[ed] to identify that same clothing in the surveillance
footage.” Id. at 139. Here, even if there had been error, it would not have been plain.
See Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 2008) (“plain” means “clear or,
equivalently, obvious” error at the time of appeal (citation modified)).
As to Mr. Watkins’s probation-officer argument, we agree with the
government that any argument was waived 10 and that any error was invited. Mr.
Watkins not only failed to object to the testimony at trial, his counsel agreed with
the government that Mr. Stallman could testify that Mr. Watkins was on probation
under his supervision and also consented to the jury instructions proposed by the
10
While we use “forfeiture” to describe when a defendant “default[s]” or “fail[s] to raise a claim before the trial court,” we use “waiver” to mean an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Chew v. United States, 314 A.3d 80, 91 (D.C. 2024) (Easterly, J., concurring) (quoting Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1151 & n.11 (D.C. 1985) (en banc)). Whereas forfeiture does not preclude review, waiver does. Id. Here, we use “waiver” because defense counsel explicitly agreed to the prosecution’s line of questioning.
19
government, making only one edit. 11 Because a party may not “assert[] as error on
appeal” a claim based on “a course that he or she has induced the trial court to take,”
we decline to consider this argument. Preacher v. United States, 934 A.2d 363, 368
(D.C. 2007).
III. Harm
Even where the trial court erroneously admits evidence, we will affirm if we
conclude that the errors were harmless. E.g., Smallwood v. United States, 312 A.3d
219, 227 (D.C. 2024). “In assessing harm, we examine the trial court’s two erroneous
evidentiary rulings together,” In re C.A., 186 A.3d at 126, and consider the
“cumulative impact” of those errors to determine if they “substantially influenced
the jury’s verdict,” Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043, 1058 (D.C. 2002). In
so doing, “we evaluate the significance of the alleged errors and their combined
effect against the strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. Where “the errors
complained of [go] to critical issues at trial” and the evidence of guilt is not
overwhelming—that is, where we cannot say “with fair assurance, after pondering
all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
11
In fact, the prosecutor “defer[red]” to “whether the defense want[ed]” jury instructions on the matter at all. Therefore, we also do not consider Mr. Watkins’s argument that the jury instructions addressing the mention of Mr. Watkins being on probation were more prejudicial than they were curative, therefore compounding the asserted error.
20
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error[s]”—the error is not harmless,
and we must reverse. Id. at 1058-59 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (reversing where the evidence was not “overwhelming”
and there were multiple prejudicial errors that “went to critical issues at trial”); see
also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also Gordon, 783
A.2d at 588 (in determining if the errors “compromised the fairness of the trial” or
“had a possible substantial impact upon the outcome” we look at “the closeness of
the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects
of the error” (quoting Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1194)).
A. Armed Robbery, ADW, and PFCV
We start by considering whether Mr. Watkins’s convictions for armed
robbery, ADW, and PFCV were substantially swayed by the trial court’s errors. As
noted above, because there was no “plainly visible” firearm in any of the surveillance
footage shown to the jury, the government’s case that Mr. Watkins was armed with
a firearm hinged primarily on Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony that he saw a firearm and
that a man (identified by others as Mr. Watkins) pointed it at a woman, pointed it at
him, and struck him on the head with it. And Mr. Rodriguez was far from a perfect
witness—the government described him at trial as “a character.” He made clear that
he did not wish to testify, telling the jury, “I don’t go by the police. I don’t like
21
police,” and that he did not want to be in court “telling the stories that [he was]
telling” but was there only because he was “forced . . . because [he] got locked up
just because they want[ed] [him] to talk.” He used obscenities on the stand, at one
point asking the trial judge, “So what the fuck—what is the point of being a victim
if I’m going to still be criminalized . . . as an individual?” He was combative,
directing the trial judge to “[l]et [him] talk” when his testimony was interrupted and
warning defense counsel during cross-examination, “You gonna get me mad for real,
bruh, I swear,” and, “Swear, you going to get me wrong . . . when you say that shit,
bruh.”
In addition, Mr. Rodriguez’s “testimony was the cornerstone of [the
government’s] case, and he was not what anybody would call an unimpeachable
witness.” Dugger v. United States, 295 A.3d 1102, 1119 (D.C. 2023). He was
impeached with his prior convictions, including for second-degree assault and
possession of a handgun. He admitted to smoking marijuana prior to the assault, see
(Michael) Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 524 (D.C. 2012) (explaining that
“a witness’[s] use of drugs is not a collateral issue when an evidentiary foundation
can be established that the witness was using drugs at the time of the incident”
(alteration in original) (quoting Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318, 1326 (D.C.
1988))), that it was dark outside when the assault took place, and that his vision was
“impaired.” He also testified that being hit with the alleged gun the first time caused
22
him to “lo[se] conscious[ness],” and the second time caused him to “drop[] to the
ground” at which point his vision went “blurry” and “dark.” On cross-examination,
he changed his narrative, stating that he was not in fact “unconscious . . . but [he
was] trying to breathe and trying to hold on for [his] life.” Though Mr. Rodriguez
testified that he was certain that he was hit in the face with a firearm, and not another
object, there was reason for a factfinder to question his certainty beyond just his
erratic demeanor: it was nighttime, his vision was blurred, and he testified that “[i]t
fe[lt] like a fucking brick. Something—an iron.”
Other inconsistencies in Mr. Rodriguez’s statements cast further doubt on his
credibility. For example, Detective Naples testified that Mr. Rodriguez initially told
the police that “multiple people surrounded his car” and “that he was dragged out
[of] the car and into a[n] alleyway.” According to Detective Naples, it was only when
Mr. Rodriguez overheard officers talking about a security camera that he then
changed his story to one that matched his in-court testimony. 12 On
cross-examination, Mr. Rodriguez was questioned about his mental-health history,
which included psychosis and schizophrenia diagnoses causing him to “see and hear
things when they aren’t truly true, or accurate or present.” He testified at trial that
12
At trial, even after being shown body-worn camera footage, Mr. Rodriguez asserted that he had never told that alternative story to officers and that any officer who stated as much was lying.
23
his diagnoses affected his memory but did not affect his ability to tell the truth,
though he was impeached with his grand jury testimony where he stated the opposite.
On redirect, he clarified that, as to that grand jury testimony, he meant he had not
been “hearing or seeing anything on the night of this offense.”
Here, “[p]roof of the government’s case” as to the gun “depended essentially
upon the credibility of [one] witness[].” Ebron, 838 A.2d at 1150; see also United
States v. Coleman, 552 F.3d 853, 855-56, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that—even
where the central witness himself was a police officer—the government’s evidence
was not overwhelming because “[t]here was no independent corroborating
evidence” that an appellant was armed and that the error impermissibly bolstered
that officer’s testimony that he saw the appellant with a gun). By erroneously
permitting Detective Naples to testify that the lost DCHA surveillance footage
corroborated Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony including as to the firearm, the testimony
of the government’s key (and flawed) witness was impermissibly bolstered—by a
police officer, no less. See In re C.A., 186 A.3d at 127 (not harmless error where trial
court wrongfully precluded impeachment and allowed in rehabilitation evidence “on
the central question” because that “may have altered the trial court’s assessment of
[the witness’s] credibility”). Where a law-enforcement witness is allowed to
“bolster[] strongly what could reasonably be viewed as an otherwise marginal case
from the government’s standpoint” by “adding the weight of the police officer’s
24
status to the complainant’s testimony,” we have previously concluded that the error
was not harmless, Tibbs v. United States, 359 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C. 1976), and we
adhere to that same principle here.
On top of that, the impermissible fear testimony risked diverting the jury’s
focus on whether the government had satisfied its burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Watkins or one of his collaborators possessed a gun during
the attack and instead invited it to focus on the improper evidence of Mr. Rodriguez’s
asserted fear of Mr. Watkins. Contrary to what the government argues, the fear
testimony did not merely suggest to the jury “what they would ‘naturally have
understood anyway’—that the victim of a violent crime would fear testifying against
the man charged with that crime.” When we said as much in Murray v. United States,
we were referring to a prosecutor’s rhetorical question to the jury, “Is it reasonable
to assume that these people [the witnesses] were scared, that these people did not
want to testify because they’re scared and if that is reasonable to assume, who would
they be scared of? . . . Those three people. Right? Why else would they be
reluctant?” 855 A.2d at 1131. That summation was based on a witness’s statement
that she had tried to avoid testifying, as well as the fact that there were material
witness warrants issued so that other witnesses appeared. Id. at 1130-31. We
concluded that any error was harmless because “the reason the prosecutor gave for
why the witnesses were afraid of appellants” was that “they had watched . . .
25
appellants’ involvement in the crime or its antecedent events,” and thus the closing
did not “allude[] to conduct by the defendant(s) assertedly meant to intimidate him
or her as a witness.” Id. at 1134-35.
But here the error was not merely a suggestion that Mr. Rodriguez was scared
because he had been the victim of a violent crime. As explained supra in Part II.B,
his testimony was specific to Mr. Watkins and very well may have prejudiced the
jury against Mr. Watkins by creating the inference, without any factual basis, that
Mr. Watkins had threatened Mr. Rodriguez. Further, unlike in Murray, where the
prosecutor conjectured that the witnesses may have been scared, here the
government elicited direct testimony from Mr. Rodriguez that he was fearful, in fact
scared “for [his] life,” while leaving little doubt about whom he feared. 13 See
Foreman, 792 A.2d at 1051 (“This type of [fear] evidence could very well have
13
The government relies on the fact that the prosecution did not mention or rely on Mr. Rodriguez’s fear testimony during closing argument as proof that it was harmless. While a prosecutor’s reliance upon fear testimony in closing argument can lend support to an argument that that testimony prejudiced the defendant, such references are not a prerequisite to finding error or harm in this context. See Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1183 & n.3, 1194-95 (finding that fear testimony was not harmless even where it was not referred to in closing argument); Foreman, 792 A.2d at 1048-51, 1058-59 (in a cumulative-impact analysis, finding that fear testimony—in addition to other errors—was not harmless even where it does not appear to have been referred to in closing argument).
26
aroused the passions of the jury and suggested a conviction based on their aversion
to [the appellant], rather than on the evidence.”).
It is true that Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony was not the only evidence the
government introduced as to the gun. The government presented social media posts
showing Mr. Watkins in possession of a gun with coloring that was consistent with
Mr. Rodriguez’s account of being assaulted with a “black grayish” firearm. Despite
the government’s argument that the gun in the social media post was a color match,
that color is not so rare that the match—when combined with Mr. Rodriguez’s
problematic testimony—constitutes overwhelming evidence that Mr. Watkins was
armed with a gun. As the government itself acknowledged at oral argument, “black
and gray are not the most uncommon colors.” The government also offered
photographs of Mr. Rodriguez’s injuries, as well as testimony from Ms. Thomas that
Mr. Rodriguez arrived “a little bit disoriented” at her house with a chipped tooth and
“blood all over his face and his clothes.” To be sure, his injuries were consistent with
being hit in the face with a firearm, but they were also consistent with being hit in
the face with another hard object—as Mr. Rodriguez told the jury, the assault felt
“like a . . . brick.”
We therefore hold that the cumulative impact of the errors, one that reinforced
a flawed witness’s testimony as to the existence of a gun and the other that risked
27
the jury inferring that Mr. Watkins had threatened Mr. Rodriguez prior to his
testimony, was not harmless as to the gun issue where the errors went to a critical
question at trial and risked irreparably prejudicing the jury against Mr. Watkins, and
where the evidence that there was a gun at all was not overwhelming. The
government’s only theory at trial was that Mr. Rodriguez was assaulted with a gun,
and on appeal it did not advance an argument in its briefing as to why we should
affirm Mr. Watkins’s convictions for armed robbery or assault with a deadly weapon
if we found the errors not harmless as to the presence of a firearm. 14 As to armed
robbery, the government’s brief addresses only the possibility that the jury might
“have had reasonable doubt as to whether Watkins was the one who wielded the
gun,” arguing that the evidence was overwhelming because it presented an aidingand-abetting theory on armed robbery to the jury. But because we determine the
evidence was not overwhelming that there was a gun at all, not that the evidence
was not overwhelming that Mr. Watkins had a gun, we are unpersuaded. And as to
ADW, the government’s brief states that the conviction should be vacated based on
merger and does not independently argue that any error was harmless as to that
14
Though the government contended at oral argument that this court could affirm the armed robbery conviction on the theory that Mr. Watkins used a deadly weapon other than a firearm, “[i]n general, we do not consider points raised for the first time with this court at oral argument.” Lumbih v. Wilson, 328 A.3d 399, 401 (D.C. 2024).
28
count. In the absence of focused briefing by the government on these points, we do
not speculate regarding Mr. Watkins’s guilt of armed robbery or ADW on a theory
different from that presented to the jury, and we accordingly reverse Mr. Watkins’s
armed robbery, ADW, and PFCV convictions.
B. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
The evidence that Mr. Watkins committed UUV was overwhelming, however,
and we therefore conclude that the errors, even when considered cumulatively, were
harmless as to those convictions. The surveillance footage introduced at trial was
consistent with Mr. Rodriguez’s general narrative. Mr. Rodriguez testified that it
was the same man who entered the alley on foot rather than by bicycle who struck
him in the face with a hard object and who took the keys to his truck, and the
surveillance footage shows the man identified as Mr. Watkins driving Mr.
Rodriguez’s truck to the recreation center. Mr. Watkins’s cell phone records and the
cell-site data supported the inference that Mr. Watkins was in the relevant area
during the relevant time, communicating with Ms. Clark. Two individuals identified
Mr. Watkins in still images taken from the preserved surveillance footage stills and
the individual they identified can be easily tracked throughout that footage,
corroborating Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony. And though the DNA evidence was not
definitive, some of it did provide limited support that Mr. Watkins was involved.
29
In sum, as serious as they were, the trial court’s erroneous rulings allowing
Mr. Rodriguez to testify as to his fear of Mr. Watkins and permitting Detective
Naples to testify about the contents of the lost surveillance footage of the crime did
not substantially sway the verdict as to Mr. Watkins’s conviction for UUV.
IV. Sufficiency
Mr. Watkins argues lastly that the evidence that he was armed with a firearm
was constitutionally insufficient. See Mejia-Cortez v. United States, 256 A.3d 210,
218 (D.C. 2021) (“The right to be convicted only upon proof of each element beyond
a reasonable doubt is in fact a fundamental aspect of due process.”). We disagree.
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo” while considering “all
the evidence admitted at trial, including the evidence [Mr. Watkins] claims should
have been excluded, regardless of whether the court erred in admitting it.” In re T.B.,
331 A.3d 242, 248 (D.C. 2025) (emphasis in original) (first quoting Fitzgerald v.
United States, 228 A.3d 429, 436 (D.C. 2020); and then quoting Gore v. United
States, 145 A.3d 540, 545 n.7 (D.C. 2016)). In so doing, “[w]e view the evidence ‘in
the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment’” while affording equal weight
to direct and circumstantial evidence. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 834 A.2d
861, 866 (D.C. 2003)). We affirm if “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis in
30
original) (citation omitted). That is, we reverse where, based on the evidence, the
jury could have reached its verdict only by “cross[ing] the bounds of permissible
inference and enter[ing] the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation.” Id.
(quoting Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C. 1987)).
The jury had to do no such thing when it convicted Mr. Watkins of ADW or
armed robbery (or their associated PFCV charges). First, because we consider even
erroneously admitted evidence on sufficiency review, Detective Naples’s testimony
that the lost video contents were consistent with Mr. Rodriguez’s account provided
ample support for the jury’s verdict. Plus, as noted supra in Part II.B, the jury was
free to credit Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony that he was hit in the head with a firearm.
That testimony was further bolstered by the Instagram evidence that Mr. Watkins
owned a black-and-gray gun, Ms. Thomas’s testimony, and the photographs of Mr.
Rodriguez’s facial injuries. Though we hold that the evidence that Mr. Watkins was
armed with a gun was not overwhelming, the government presented sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he robbed and assaulted Mr.
Rodriguez with a gun.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we reverse Mr. Watkins’s armed robbery, ADW, and
PFCV convictions, affirm his UUV conviction, and remand for further proceedings
31
consistent with this opinion. 15 See (Leon) Robinson v. United States, 100 A.3d 95,
99 (D.C. 2014) (reversing, among other things, one appellant’s armed robbery
conviction and noting that on remand, in lieu of a retrial for armed robbery, the trial
court would have discretion, at the government’s request, to enter judgment of
conviction on the lesser included offense of unarmed robbery).
So ordered.
15
Because we reverse Mr. Watkins’s armed robbery, ADW, and PFCV
convictions, we need not address his merger arguments.