UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HIRAN RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25 - 2401 (LLA)
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Hiran Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, filed this suit against the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. ECF
No. 1. He challenges the FTC’s failure to produce records responsive to his FOIA request and its
denials of his requests for a fee waiver and for expedited processing. ECF Nos. 1, 13.
Mr. Rodriguez and the FTC have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 13, 17.
For the reasons explained below, the court will deny Mr. Rodriguez’s motion and grant the FTC’s
motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2025, Mr. Rodriguez submitted a FOIA request to the FTC, seeking “all records,
documents, emails, reports, or other materials from January 1, 2015 to the present, concerning”
the following topics:
1. Consumer complaints or FTC investigations regarding Meta
Platforms, Facebook, Instagram, or WhatsApp involving biometric
profiling, behavioral surveillance, or audio/video recording without
consent;
2. Internal memoranda or staff guidance regarding persistent
telemetry, Custom Audience targeting, or data harvesting SDKs
operating on Apple iOS devices;
3. FTC reports or internal documents referencing Hiran Rodriguez
(DOB: 08/09/1997), or usage of behavioral data modeling derived
from devices located at 820 Grove Ave, Metairie, LA;
4. Enforcement actions, proposed or closed, against Meta,
Facebook, or Instagram, for background surveillance, predictive
tracking, or dark patterns that resulted in reputational harm to
consumers;
5. Any third-party data broker disclosures, FTC complaints, or
redress efforts involving unauthorized Custom Audience inclusion
or inferred targeting of Plaintiff.
ECF No. 1-1, at 2-3; see ECF No. 13, at 2; ECF No. 16-3, at 1.1 Mr. Rodriguez also requested a
“fee waiver due to public interest, active civil rights litigation, and indigency” and “[e]xpedited
processing under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E), due to urgent need for use in federal litigation.” ECF
No. 1-1, at 3; see ECF No. 13, at 2; ECF No. 16-3, at 1. As support for his request for expedited
processing, Mr. Rodriguez explained that he was the plaintiff in a then-pending federal lawsuit
against Meta and other entities in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. ECF
No. 1-1, at 2.2
Later that month, the FTC sent Mr. Rodriguez a letter denying his requests for a fee waiver
and expedited processing. Id. at 5-6; see ECF No. 13, at 1; ECF No. 16-3, at 1-2; ECF No. 19-3.
The FTC explained that Mr. Rodriguez had not shown that disclosure of the requested information
1
When citing ECF Nos. 1-1, 16-3, and 21, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination.
2
That suit was dismissed with prejudice in May 2025. See Rodriguez v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-CV-197, 2025 WL 1489174 (E.D. La. May 22, 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-30493, 2025 WL 4477516 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), and motion for relief from judgment denied, No. 25-CV-197, 2026 WL 925531 (E.D. La. Apr. 6, 2026).
2
was “(1) likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities
of the government, and (2) not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester,” as required
for a fee waiver. ECF No. 1-1, at 5. The FTC further explained that Mr. Rodriguez had not shown
a “compelling need” for the records to justify expedited treatment. Id. at 5-6 (“Compelling need
can be shown in two ways: by establishing that failure to obtain the records quickly ‘could
reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual’
or by showing that the requester is a ‘person primarily engaged in disseminating information’ and
that an ‘urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity’
exists.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v))). The FTC stated that it would place the request on
a ten-day hold to allow Mr. Rodriguez to provide a fee agreement. Id. at 6. And while the FTC
acknowledged that Mr. Rodriguez was entitled to two hours of free search and review, id.; see
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3), the agency advised that he was “seeking over 10 years of material related to
Meta, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp and [two hours] would be insufficient to process this
request,” ECF No. 1-1, at 6.
Mr. Rodriguez appealed the FTC’s determinations to the FTC’s Office of the General
Counsel. ECF No. 1-1, at 8-13; see ECF No. 13, at 2; ECF No. 16-3, at 2. He asserted that his
FOIA request “directly relates to alleged ongoing and systematic biometric, behavioral, and
unlawful surveillance by Meta and co-defendants [in his Eastern District of Louisiana lawsuit],
which implicates FTC enforcement records and regulatory findings going back to 2015.” ECF
No. 1-1, at 9. Mr. Rodriguez further argued that his federal lawsuit was “of urgent public interest
as it involves federal consumer protection violations, civil rights injury, and reputational
surveillance harm—core matters of FTC jurisdiction.” Id. at 10. Mr. Rodriguez accordingly
maintained that he was “not seeking records ‘primarily in a commercial interest’ but in pursuit of
3
constitutional rights and public protection,” thus satisfying the requirements for a fee waiver. Id.
Mr. Rodriguez also argued that expedited processing was “legally required” because he was a
“civil plaintiff asserting imminent reputational and privacy-based injury” and seeking records that
“directly inform the conduct of Meta under FTC oversight.” Id.
In May 2025, the FTC’s Office of the General Counsel denied Mr. Rodriguez’s appeal. Id.
at 17-20; see ECF No. 13, at 2; ECF No. 16-3, at 2; ECF No. 17-3, at 3; ECF No. 21, at 18-19.
The FTC stated in its denial letter that Mr. Rodriguez was not entitled to a fee waiver because he
had failed to show that the requested records were not primarily in his commercial interest or that
disclosure of the requested information was likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government. ECF No. 1-1, at 19. The FTC
further noted that indigence is not a basis for a fee waiver. Id. The FTC separately affirmed the
denial of Mr. Rodriguez’s request for expedited processing because Mr. Rodriguez had asserted
only “non-physical injuries” from his failure to obtain the requested records and because his
“primary purpose in seeking the requested records [was] for [his] personal use in [his] pending
civil litigation.” Id. at 20. Finally, the FTC explained that Mr. Rodriguez could file a lawsuit
under FOIA or seek mediation with the Office of Governmental Information Services (“OGIS”) if
he wished to continue the dispute. Id.
In June 2025, Mr. Rodriguez requested mediation assistance from OGIS, id. at 22-46, but
he received an automated reply stating that OGIS was experiencing an increase in inquiries and
apologizing for any delays, id. at 23. Later that month, the FTC sent Mr. Rodriguez a letter
advising him that the agency was closing its file on his FOIA request because, after his appeal was
4
denied, he had not responded to the FTC’s request that he enter into a fee agreement or narrow his
request. ECF No. 19-6, at 2.3
In July 2025, Mr. Rodriguez filed this action, alleging that the FTC’s “refusal to timely
produce responsive records” violates FOIA. ECF No. 1, at 3. After the FTC filed an answer to
Mr. Rodriguez’s complaint, ECF No. 11, the court directed the parties to meet and confer and file
a joint status report, ECF No. 12. Two days after the court issued its order, Mr. Rodriguez filed a
motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 13. The FTC thereafter filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, ECF No. 17, and the court issued a Fox/Neal order advising Mr. Rodriguez of his
obligations under Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam), and Neal v.
Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1992), see ECF No. 18. The parties’ cross-motions are
fully briefed. ECF Nos. 13, 16, 17, 19 to 24.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. FOIA
The purpose of FOIA is “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny.” Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 655 F.3d 1, 5
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). “[T]he vast
majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade
Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A court shall grant summary judgment “if
3
The FTC’s initial letter did not expressly ask Mr. Rodriguez to narrow his request, but, as noted, the FTC stated that the request was “seeking over 10 years of material . . . and [two hours] would be insufficient to process this request.” ECF No. 1-1, at 6. The FTC also provided a contact for Mr. Rodriguez if he “ha[d] any questions about the way [the FTC was] handling [his] request or about the FOIA regulations or procedures.” Id.
5
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
An agency’s duties under FOIA are triggered “only once [the] agency has received a proper
FOIA request.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 711 F.3d 180, 185
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A FOIA request must “reasonably describe[]” the records being requested.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). A request meets this requirement if it is “sufficient [to] enable[] a
professional employee of the agency who was familiar with the subject area of the request to locate
the record with a reasonable amount of effort.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 545 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-876 (1974)). “Broad, sweeping requests lacking
specificity are not sufficient.” Dale v. Internal Revenue Serv., 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104
(D.D.C. 2002). But even where a request has “sufficient precision to enable the agency to identify
[the records],” “[a]n agency need not honor a request that requires ‘an unreasonably burdensome
search.’” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (quoting Goland v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Because it is
“the requester’s responsibility to frame [his] request[] with sufficient particularity to ensure that
searches are not unreasonably burdensome[] and to enable the searching agency to determine
precisely what records are being requested,” an agency is not required to respond to a request that
falls short in either respect. SAI v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 315 F. Supp. 3d 218, 248 (D.D.C. 2018)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr., Inc. v. Cent. Intel.
Agency, 720 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D.D.C. 1989)).
A court reviews an agency’s decision to deny a fee waiver de novo, but judicial review is
limited to the record that was before the agency at the time of the waiver request. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(A)(vii); Larson v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per
6
curiam). The FOIA requester bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a fee waiver. Jud.
Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 365 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
B. Pro Se Litigants
The pleadings of pro se parties must be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). “But on a motion for summary judgment, a pro se plaintiff is
held to the same evidentiary burdens as those represented by counsel and must therefore ‘provide
evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor.’” Husain v. Power, 630 F. Supp.
3d 188, 195 (D.D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prunte v. Universal Music
Grp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2010)).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Rodriguez argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the FTC failed to
timely produce responsive records, improperly denied his request for a fee waiver, and improperly
denied his request for expedited processing. ECF No. 13, at 3-4. The FTC counters that each of
these claims fails, see ECF No. 17, at 7-16, and the agency asserts that it is entitled to summary
judgment because Mr. Rodriguez “has not paid the required fees,” id. at 7, and because his FOIA
request is not reasonably described, see id. at 16-23. The court concludes that the FTC properly
denied Mr. Rodriguez’s request for a fee waiver and that the FTC was not obligated to respond to
his FOIA request—even for the two free hours to which Mr. Rodriguez was entitled—because it
would require an unreasonably burdensome search. These conclusions render moot
Mr. Rodriguez’s argument that the FTC improperly denied his request for expedited processing.
7
A. Fee Waiver
FOIA requesters generally must pay reasonable fees associated with processing their
requests. Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III) (permitting agencies to exact reasonable charges for “document search and
duplication” when records are requested for noncommercial use that is not for scholarly, scientific
research, or news purposes). A requester is entitled to a fee waiver if “disclosure of the information
is in the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). In order to make that showing, a requester
must demonstrate that disclosure of the information sought would “(1) shed light on ‘the
operations or activities of the government’; (2) be ‘likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding’ of those operations or activities; and (3) not be ‘primarily in the commercial
interest of the requester.’” Cause of Action v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 799 F.3d 1108, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)). “While fee-waiver applications are to be ‘liberally
construed’ in favor of finding that requesters meet [this] test, requesters still must justify their
entitlement to a waiver of fees in ‘reasonably specific’ and ‘non-conclusory’ terms.” Nat’l Sec.
Couns. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 848 F.3d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Rossotti, 326 F.3d
at 1310).
The parties agree that Mr. Rodriguez’s requested records would shed light on the
operations or activities of the government. See ECF No. 16, at 8 & n.2; ECF No. 21, at 19. The
court accordingly proceeds to the second factor: whether disclosure is likely to contribute
significantly to public understanding of government operations or activities. Courts assess this
factor “along two dimensions: the degree to which ‘understanding’ of government activities will
be advanced by seeing the information; and the extent of the ‘public’ that the information is likely
to reach.” Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1116. A requester “need not demonstrate [his] ability to
8
reach a ‘wide audience,’” but he “must at least show that [he] can ‘disseminate the disclosed
records to a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject.’” Nat’l Sec. Couns.,
848 F.3d at 474 (quoting Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1116).
In support of his request for a fee waiver in his FOIA request, Mr. Rodriguez cited the
“public interest, [his] active civil rights litigation, and [his] indigency.” ECF No. 1-1, at 3. In his
appeal to the FTC’s Office of the General Counsel, Mr. Rodriguez further explained that his FOIA
request would shed light on “ongoing and systematic biometric, behavioral, and unlawful
surveillance by Meta and co-defendants” in his Eastern District of Louisiana lawsuit, which
“implicates FTC enforcement records and regulatory findings.” Id. at 9. He explained that this
“litigation is of urgent public interest as it involves federal consumer protection violations, civil
rights injury, and reputational surveillance.” Id. at 10.
Mr. Rodriguez fails to demonstrate that he intends to disseminate the requested records, so
disclosure is not likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the FTC’s operations
and activities. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Put another way, even assuming that disclosure of the
requested information could advance the public’s understanding of the FTC’s operations,
Mr. Rodriguez has provided no information about his “ability [or] intention to effectively convey
or disseminate the requested information to the public.” Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F.
Supp. 2d 17, 26 (D.D.C. 2006). Indeed, he alleged in his FOIA request and appeal that he would
use the requested records in his own civil suit, see ECF No. 1-1, at 3, 9-10, and he did not mention
any plans to disseminate the requested information to anyone, let alone a “reasonably broad
9
audience of persons interested in the subject,” Nat’l Sec. Couns., 848 F.3d at 474 (quoting Cause
of Action, 799 F.3d at 1116).4
Additionally, while the court’s review is “limited to the record before the agency,” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(vii), Mr. Rodriguez’s filings in this court also fail to identify or substantiate any intent
or ability to convey the requested records to the public. See generally ECF Nos. 13, 21.
Mr. Rodriguez’s briefing instead focuses on how the requested records would inform the public
about the FTC’s enforcement activities and oversight of Meta, see ECF No. 21, at 11-13, but he
does not “articulate[] how and to whom [he] will disseminate the requested information,” Pub.
Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 968 F. Supp. 2d 88, 100 (D.D.C. 2013).
Mr. Rodriguez has thus failed to “state his ‘ability and intention’ to disseminate the
requested information to the public, which ‘alone [provides] a sufficient basis for denying the fee
waiver request.’” Espinoza v. Dep’t of Just., 20 F. Supp. 3d 232, 243 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483); see Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 (affirming an agency’s
denial of a fee-waiver request where the requester had “failed to identify the newspaper company
to which he intended to release the requested information, his purpose for seeking the requested
material, or his professional or personal contacts with any major newspaper companies”);
Bernegger v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, No. 18-CV-908, 2022 WL 579291, at *6 (D.D.C. 2022)
(upholding the denial of a fee-waiver request where the requester had “fail[ed] to elaborate on his
4
In his appeal, Mr. Rodriguez cited Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 133 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2000), to support the proposition that “records used in litigation and public interest civil rights matters qualify for . . . fee waiver[s].” ECF No. 1-1, at 10-11. But the court in that case reached the opposite conclusion, upholding the agency’s denial of a public-interest fee waiver because, as here, the requester had made “‘ephemeral’” and “perfunctory assertions” about how disclosure would benefit the public. Jud. Watch, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 632 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 907 F.2d 203).
10
plans to disseminate the requested information”); cf. Rossotti, 326 F.3d at 1314 (holding that a
requester was entitled to a fee waiver where it had described in its FOIA request various ways the
organization communicates information to the public).5
B. Unreasonably Burdensome Search
An agency generally is not obligated to produce responsive records if the requester has not
paid assessed fees. See Marino v. Dep’t of Just., 993 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (“FOIA
requesters generally cannot obtain judicial review of their FOIA claims until they either pay any
fees associated with their records request or establish their entitlement to a fee waiver.”); 16 C.F.R.
§ 4.11(a)(1)(i)(F) (stating that a request to the FTC “will be deemed not to have been received” if
the requester does not agree to pay fees); see also Espinoza, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 244 (“Since under
[Department of Justice] regulations, the request is ‘not . . . considered received’ until the requester
agrees to pay assessed fees, [the agency] is under no statutory obligation to produce responsive
records; therefore, no improper withholding has yet occurred.”). Here, the parties agree that
Mr. Rodriguez did not pay any fees and that the FTC did not conduct a search or produce
responsive records. See ECF No. 16-3, at 2; ECF No. 17-3 ¶ 13; ECF No. 21, at 20.
Notwithstanding his failure to pay any fees, Mr. Rodriguez was entitled to two hours of
search time and up to 100 pages of duplication at no charge under the FTC’s FOIA regulations.
See 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3); ECF No. 1-1, at 6; cf. Donato v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, 308 F. Supp.
3d 294, 312 (D.D.C. 2018). The FTC acknowledged this entitlement in its letter denying his
5
Because Mr. Rodriguez did not qualify for a fee waiver on this ground, “the court need not analyze if the requested disclosure would be ‘primarily in his commercial interest.’” Hyatt v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., No. 18-CV-2800, 2022 WL 1718983, at *5 n.2 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022) (quoting Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1115). Mr. Rodriguez also concedes that “indigence alone is not a lawful basis for a fee waiver,” ECF No. 21, at 13, so the court need not address that argument, see Ely v. U.S. Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
11
request for a fee waiver, but it stated that his FOIA request was “seeking over 10 years of material
related to Meta, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp and [two hours] would be insufficient to
process this request.” ECF No. 1-1, at 6. The FTC accordingly closed Mr. Rodriguez’s request
after he failed to indicate whether he would enter into a fee agreement after his fee-waiver request
was denied or narrow his request such that it could be processed within two hours. See ECF
No. 19-1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 19-6, at 2; see also supra n.3 (explaining that Mr. Rodriguez was on notice
that his request would not be processed if he did not narrow its scope).6
The FTC contends that it was not required to conduct a search in response to
Mr. Rodriguez’s FOIA request because the request does not reasonably describe the records
sought, ECF No. 16, at 16-21; would require an unreasonably burdensome search, id. at 22-23;
and would require overly burdensome post-search efforts, id. at 23-24. The court agrees that
Mr. Rodriguez’s request would require an unreasonably burdensome search far exceeding his two
hours of free search time, so the FTC was under no obligation to conduct a search or produce
responsive records.
As noted, an agency’s duties under FOIA are triggered “only once [the] agency has
received a proper FOIA request.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 711 F.3d at 185 n.3. A
proper request “reasonably describes” the records being requested. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). “An
6
FTC regulations provide that the agency may close a FOIA request if the requester does not agree to pay fees and has been notified of the estimated costs. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 4.8(d)(2)-(3), 4.11(a)(1)(i)(F). Here, the FTC did not provide Mr. Rodriguez with an estimate of fees after it denied his request for a fee waiver, and it closed his request after he “provided no further response with respect to a fee agreement.” ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 9. Mr. Rodriguez does not challenge the FTC’s failure to provide him with an estimate of fees and has thereby forfeited the argument. In any event, for the reasons explained above, the FTC treated Mr. Rodriguez’s request properly because it was not obligated to respond to his request.
12
agency need not honor a request that requires ‘an unreasonably burdensome search.’” Am. Fed’n
of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 2782, 907 F.2d at 209 (quoting Goland, 607 F. 2d at 353). That is especially
so where the requester seeks “a vast quantity of material” that is not tailored to the requester’s
purpose for requesting the material. Id. Agency affidavits “enjoy a presumption of good faith,”
Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam),
and that presumption extends to declarations and affidavits laying out “good faith estimate[s] of
the excessive amount of time required to” respond to a FOIA request, Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
80 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (D.D.C. 2015).
The FTC has sufficiently established that Mr. Rodriguez’s FOIA request would require an
unreasonably burdensome search. The agency provides declarations from Margaret Horn, Acting
Assistant General Counsel for the FTC’s FOIA Unit, see ECF No. 19-1, and Jonathan Cohen,
Chief Litigation Counsel in the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, see ECF No. 16-2, which
detail the time and resources that a search for responsive records would require.
The first part of Mr. Rodriguez’s FOIA request seeks “all records . . . concerning . . .
[c]onsumer complaints or FTC investigations regarding Meta Platforms, Facebook, Instagram, or
WhatsApp involving biometric profiling, behavioral surveillance, or audio/video recording
without consent.” ECF No. 1-1, at 5. Ms. Horn explains that consumers are unlikely to use the
terms “biometric profiling,” “behavioral surveillance,” and “audio/video recording without
consent” in their complaints to the FTC, which makes it difficult for the agency to design search
terms to identify responsive records. See ECF No. 19-1 ¶¶ 12-13. Accordingly, FTC employees
would need to “manually review each of the 115,249 complaints” relating to the four companies
in the relevant period to determine responsiveness and then redact any personally identifying
13
information from responsive records. Id. ¶ 13. Ms. Horn estimates that this process would take
approximately 5,762 hours. Id.
As for records of investigations—which Mr. Rodriguez directly seeks in his first request
and which relate to his fourth request for records concerning “[e]nforcement actions, proposed or
closed, against Meta, Facebook, or Instagram, for background surveillance, predictive tracking, or
dark patterns that resulted in reputational harm to consumers,” ECF No. 1-1, at 2—Mr. Cohen
explains that the FTC conducts both formal and informal investigative work, and the agency “has
no centralized system to search for such informal investigative work by involved parties or subject
matter,” ECF No. 16-2 ¶ 6. Mr. Rodriguez’s first request for records concerning “FTC
investigations” and his fourth request for records concerning “[e]nforcement actions, proposed or
closed,” would thus require the FTC to search for records in virtually every part of the agency
where records related to enforcement activity exist. ECF No. 1-1, at 2; see ECF No. 16-2 ¶ 7
(estimating that at least nine different FTC offices, including the Bureau of Consumer Protection’s
Division of Enforcement, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, and Division of Advertising
Practices, as well as the FTC Commissioners’ Offices and the General Counsel’s Office, likely
possess records concerning FTC investigations). Similarly, Ms. Horn states that responding to the
third part of the request—for records concerning “FTC reports or internal documents referencing”
Mr. Rodriguez, ECF No. 1-1, at 3—“would require a search by nearly every office in the agency”
because the FTC “does not maintain a centralized repository for records,” ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 14.
These sweeping agency-wide searches would require far more than a “reasonable amount of
effort.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at 545 n.36 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nat’l Sec. Couns., 969
F.3d at 409-10 (finding a search unreasonably burdensome where the agency would be required to
14
search “every office” across “decentralized and compartmented” records systems (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Mr. Cohen also estimates that searching for records responsive to the second part of
Mr. Rodriguez’s request for “[i]nternal memoranda or staff guidance regarding persistent
telemetry, Custom Audience targeting, or data harvesting SDKs operating on Apple iOS devices,”
ECF No. 1-1, at 2, would require at least 3,520 hours, ECF No. 16-2 ¶¶ 15-21. He reached this
“extremely conservative” estimate, ECF No. 16-2 ¶ 15, by speaking with employees in two FTC
offices, and he confirmed that employees would need to search numerous different storage systems
and communication channels, including emails, Teams, filing cabinets, and off-site storage
facilities, id. ¶ 16. According to Mr. Cohen, at least fourteen divisions of the FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection perform work related to targeted advertising, and a search for responsive
records “would involve every attorney, or nearly every attorney” in those divisions—more than
200 attorneys in total, with each searching for at least sixteen hours. Id. ¶¶ 18-19; see Wolf v. Cent.
Intel. Agency, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that 3,675 hours of search time was
unreasonable).
Finally, the fifth part of Mr. Rodriguez’s request seeks records concerning “[a]ny
third-party data broker disclosures, FTC complaints, or redress efforts involving unauthorized
Custom Audience inclusion or inferred targeting of [Mr. Rodriguez].” ECF No. 1-1, at 3.
Mr. Cohen states that “a search for documents on any of these topics that could possibly show
targeting of [Mr. Rodriguez] would be looking for a needle in the haystack.” ECF No. 16-2 ¶ 14.
As with the other parts of his request, Mr. Rodriguez does not identify any locations where records
are likely to be found or other custodial limitations. In sum, Mr. Rodriguez’s “failure to identify
which record system to search or which office might maintain responsive records would require
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the agency to conduct searches agency-wide, a process which would exceed the two (2) hours
search afforded” to Mr. Rodriguez free of charge. Latham v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 658 F. Supp. 2d
155, 161 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Rodriguez provides no meaningful response to the FTC’s arguments, instead asserting
that the FTC “construe[d] [his] request in the broadest possible way” and that its declarations fail
to show “why more targeted approaches could not substantially reduce the burden.” ECF No. 21,
at 9. But the FTC was required to read his request “as drafted, not as either agency officials or
[the requester] might wish it was drafted.” Nat’l Sec. Couns., 969 F.3d at 410 (alteration in
original). Mr. Rodriguez cannot reduce the burden created by his request now by seeking “a
narrower date range” or searches of “more manageable segments.” ECF No. 21, at 9. Regardless,
“it is highly unlikely that even the type of search that [Mr. Rodriguez] suggests could be
accomplished within the two-hour limit.” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 12-CV-1872, 2015
WL 4910190, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2015). Accordingly, the FTC did not unlawfully withhold
records because it was under no obligation to respond to Mr. Rodriguez’s request.7
C. Expedited Processing
In light of the court’s conclusion that Mr. Rodriguez did not submit a proper FOIA request,
Mr. Rodriguez’s argument that the FTC erred in denying his request for expedited processing is
moot. FOIA provides that a district court “shall not have jurisdiction to review an agency denial
of expedited processing of a request for records after the agency has provided a complete response
to the request.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iv). Here, the FTC was not required to respond to
7
Because the court finds that Mr. Rodriguez’s request would require an unreasonably burdensome search, the court need not address the FTC’s other arguments regarding the request’s vagueness and burdensome post-search efforts.
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Mr. Rodriguez’s request, so “[t]here is nothing more to expedite.” Power the Future v. U.S. Dep’t
of State, No. 24-CV-346, 2025 WL 343175, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2025); see Legal Eagle, LLC v.
Dep’t of Just., No. 24-CV-3316, 2026 WL 35261, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2026) (dismissing an
expedited-processing claim as moot where the agency had denied the FOIA request as improper);
Jenkins v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 263 F. Supp. 3d 231, 234 & n.2 (D.D.C. 2017) (concluding that
because the plaintiff had not submitted a proper FOIA request that reasonably described the
records sought, the agency “was not obligated to process the request at all, let alone on an expedited
basis”); see also Al-Fayed v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 254 F.3d 300, 303 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(dismissing expedited-processing claims against agencies that had completed processing of FOIA
requests).
In any event, Mr. Rodriguez failed to show a compelling need for expedited processing.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i). A “compelling need” exists (1) when “failure to obtain requested
records on an expedited basis . . . could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the
life or physical safety of an individual,” or (2) when the requester is “primarily engaged in
disseminating information” and there is “urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged
Federal Government activity.” Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v). Mr. Rodriguez’s alleged risk of
“reputational and privacy-based injury,” ECF No. 1-1, at 10, and his desire to obtain records for
his civil lawsuit, see id. at 3, 10, do not satisfy either standard.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will deny Mr. Rodriguez’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 13, and it will grant the FTC’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 17. A contemporaneous order will issue.
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge
Date: August 13, 2026
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