Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

majority opinion

(Slip Opinion)

Section 930(d)(3) of title 18, U.S. Code, permits the lawful carrying of constitutionally

protected firearms in post offices that are generally open to the public.

August 12, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Congress has passed at least nine different statutes that bar or have

been interpreted to bar otherwise law-abiding citizens from carrying

weapons into designated locations. 1 It has also empowered the Department of Homeland Security, 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c), as well as individual

federal agencies, see, e.g., 39 U.S.C. §§ 401(2), 403(b)(3) (Postal Service),2 to regulate who may enter the buildings that they own and operate. Many of those agencies have opted to bar weapons from their facilities

and grounds either explicitly by regulation 3 or implicitly by closing their facilities to the public.4

1 See 15 U.S.C. § 1243 (switchblade knives in federal enclaves); id. § 1245(a) (ballistic

knives in federal enclaves); 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (school zones); id. § 930(a) (federal facilities); id. § 930(e) (federal court facilities); id. § 1791(a)(1), (d)(1)(A) (prisons); id. § 2277 (seized vessels); 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1)(A) (U.S. Capitol Buildings and Grounds); 49 U.S.C. § 46505 (commercial aircraft).

2 See also 10 U.S.C. § 2672 note (military installations); 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), (b)(1)

(buildings that house individuals protected by the Secret Service or designated events); 40 U.S.C. § 6102 (Supreme Court regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (Nuclear Regulatory Commission installations); 50 U.S.C. § 797 (defense property security regulations); 54 U.S.C. § 104906 (national parks).

3 See 4 C.F.R. § 25.14 (Government Accountability Office); 7 C.F.R. § 500.12(a) (U.S.

National Arboretum property); id. § 501.12 (U.S. Meat Animal Research Center); id. § 502.13 (Beltsville Agriculture Research Center); id. § 503.13 (Plum Island Animal Disease Center); 10 C.F.R. § 73.81(c) (nuclear facilities); 14 C.F.R. ֻ§ 135.119 (aircraft); id. § 1204.1003(a)(2) (National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 15 C.F.R. § 265.39 (National Institutes of Standards and Technology); 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Bureau of Prisons facilities); 31 C.F.R. § 91.13 (Bureau of the Mint buildings and grounds); id. § 407.13 (Treasury building and annex); id. § 700.11 (Federal Law Enforcement Training Center); 32 C.F.R. § 228.7 (National Security Agency); id. § 234.10 (Pentagon); id. § 552.120 (Fort Lewis); id. § 1903.10 (Central Intelligence Agency); 33 C.F.R. § 207.20(q)(10) (Cape Cod Canal); 36 C.F.R. § 13.1210 (Katmai National Park); id. § 327.13 (water resource development projects); id. § 331.3(b) (Ohio National Wildlife Conservation Area); id. § 504.14 (Smithsonian Institution premises); id. § 520.15 (Na1

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

You have asked whether one of those restrictions, codified at 18 U.S.C.

§ 930(a), is best read to impose criminal penalties on an otherwise lawabiding individual who carries weapons into a post office for the purpose of self-defense. We would have significant constitutional concerns if

Congress had created such a blanket ban on the lawful carrying of constitutionally protected arms into a building frequented by the public since

the Founding. But we ultimately need not reach that issue here, as Congressֻhasֻexemptedֻtheֻ“lawfulֻcarrying”ֻofֻfirearmsֻorֻotherֻdangerousֻ

weaponsֻ “incidentֻ toֻ huntingֻ orֻ otherֻ lawfulֻ purposes.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 930(d)(3). Because carrying arms for self-defense when entering a

buildingֻheldֻopenֻtoֻtheֻpublicֻisֻaֻparadigmaticֻ“lawfulֻpurpose[],”ֻthatֻ exception permits the lawful carrying of constitutionally protected firearms in post offices. Id.

As part its prosecution of the global War on Drugs, Congress made

possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons in federal facilities a felony in 1988. See Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.

No. 100-690, tit. VI, § 6215(a), 102 Stat. 4312, 4361–62. Congress providedֻthat,ֻsubjectֻtoֻthreeֻexceptions,ֻ“whoeverֻknowinglyֻpossessesֻorֻ causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal

facility (other than a Federal courtֻfacility),ֻorֻattemptsֻtoֻdoֻso,”ֻwouldֻ beֻ subjectֻ toֻ fines,ֻ imprisonmentֻ ofֻ “notֻ moreֻ thanֻ 1 year,ֻ orֻ both.” 18 U.S.C. § 930(a). Congressֻdefinedֻ“dangerousֻweapon”ֻtoֻincludeֻanyֻ

“weapon,ֻdevice,ֻinstrument,ֻmaterial,ֻorֻsubstance,ֻanimateֻorֻinanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a

tional Zoological Park); id. § 702.7 (Library of Congress); id. § 1002.4 (Presidio Trust); id. § 1280.14(a) (National Archives and Records Administration); 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(l) (U.S. Postal Service property); 44 C.F.R. § 15.15 (certain Federal Emergency Management Agency facilities); 45 C.F.R. § 3.42(g) (National Institutes of Health Federal Enclave); 46 C.F.R. § 386.23 (U.S. Merchant Marine Academy); 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111 (aircraft and secure areas in airports); 50 C.F.R. § 27.41 (National Wildlife Refuge System); Sup. Ct. Bldg. Regul. 3.

4 See, e.g.,ֻU.S.ֻEnv’tֻProt.ֻAgency,ֻ Visiting EPA: Building Access (July 8, 2026),

https://perma.cc/FM5T-DSML; Internal Revenue Serv., Contact Your Local IRS Office (July 14, 2026), https://perma.cc/8P94-HKAL; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Contact Us: FBI Headquarters, https://perma.cc/G6RQ-DLFA (last accessed Aug. 3, 2026).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

bladeֻofֻlessֻthanֻ[2.5]ֻinchesֻinֻlength,”ֻid. § 930(g)(2),ֻandֻaֻ“Federalֻ facility”ֻtoֻincludeֻanyֻ“buildingֻorֻpartֻthereofֻownedֻorֻleasedֻbyֻtheֻ Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for

theֻpurposeֻofֻperformingֻtheirֻofficialֻduties,”ֻid. § 930(g)(1).

A post office is unquestionably a facility within the meaning of section

930. See, e.g., Nastri v. Bondi, 828 F. Supp. 3d 316, 330–31 (D. Conn.

2026). The Postal Service is part of the Executive Branch, and its employees are federal employees. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1001. As of fiscal year

2025, the Postal Service owned or leased almost 31,000 retail offices

across the United States. See U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Facts: Size and

Scope (2024), https://perma.cc/K7Q5-F9YB. These federally owned or

leased offices, where Postal Service employees perform their duties, are

federal facilities under the definition of that term in section 930. See

18 U.S.C. § 930(g)(1).

Section 930(d) lists three exceptions to the general prohibition against

possessing firearms in federal facilities. The prohibition does not apply to:

(1) the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or

employee of the United States, a state, or a political subdivision

thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the

prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law;

(2) the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a federal official or a member of the Armed Forces if such possession is

authorized by law; or

(3) the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a

federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes.

Id. § 930(d)(1)–(3).

Because your question concerns members of the general public, the

third exception, which allows the carrying of a firearm or other dangerous weaponֻ“incidentֻtoֻhuntingֻorֻotherֻlawfulֻpurposes,”ֻisֻmostֻrelevantֻ

here. Id. § 930(d)(3). Thereֻhasֻbeenֻ“veryֻlittleֻcaseֻlawֻexploringֻtheֻ scopeֻofֻ[the]ֻ‘otherֻlawfulֻpurposes’”ֻexception. Yorzinski v. Imbert, 39 F. Supp. 3d 218, 227 (D. Conn. 2014). When the exception has arisen in

litigation,ֻtheֻDepartmentֻofֻJusticeֻhasֻarguedֻthatֻ“theֻscopeֻofֻ‘otherֻ lawfulֻpurpose’ֻisֻinformedֻbyֻtheֻspecificֻexampleֻthatֻtheֻstatuteֻprovides:ֻhunting.” Government’sֻSupplementalֻBriefֻtoֻDefendant’sֻMotionֻ

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

to Dismiss Indictment at 19, United States v. Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2024), Dkt. 32. And two district courts appear to have agreed

that,ֻatֻminimum,ֻtheֻfirearmֻmustֻbeֻlawfullyֻcarriedֻforֻaֻ“purposeֻthatֻ isֻrelatedֻtoֻtheֻfederalֻfacility”ֻintoֻwhichֻitֻwasֻcarried. United States v. De la Cruz-Bancroft, No. 09-cr-319, 2010 WL 8752034, at *2 (D.N.M.

Jan. 4, 2010); cf. Yorzinski, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 227 (citing favorably De la Cruz-Bancroft, 2010 WL 8752034, at *2–3).

II.

You have asked whether the Department should continue to take a narrowֻviewֻofֻtheֻ“lawfulֻpurposes”ֻexception,ֻallowingֻtheֻimpositionֻofֻ

criminal penalties on otherwise law-abiding individuals who carry weapons into a post office for the purpose of self-defense. It should not.

Toֻreiterate,ֻsectionֻ930(d)(3)ֻprovidesֻthatֻsectionֻ930(a)’sֻbarֻagainstֻ carryingֻfirearmsֻandֻdangerousֻweaponryֻdoesֻnotֻapplyֻtoֻ“theֻlawfulֻ

carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility

incidentֻtoֻhuntingֻorֻotherֻlawfulֻpurposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(3). To

fall within this exception with respect to firearms, an individual must

satisfy two criteria: (1) theֻcarryingֻofֻtheirֻfirearmֻmustֻbeֻ“lawful”;ֻandֻ (2) theֻcarryingֻmustֻbeֻ“incidentֻto”ֻaֻ“lawfulֻpurpose[],”ֻsuchֻasֻ“hunting.” Id.

The first requirement is relatively straightforward. It excludes, for example, a person who is not legally allowed to carry a gun anywhere. This

requirement considers both state and federal law. Cf. United States v.

Johnson,ֻ968ֻF.2dֻ208,ֻ212ֻ(2dֻCir.ֻ1992)ֻ(interpretingֻtheֻtermֻ“lawful”ֻ in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)ֻbyֻitsֻ“ordinaryֻmeaning”ֻandֻthenֻconsideringֻ

theֻinterplayֻbetweenֻstateֻlawֻandֻfederalֻlawֻofֻstandardsֻforֻ“lawfulֻ conduct”ֻ(citationֻomitted)). Under federal law, this exemption would not cover, for example, a person who has been convicted of a felony or a

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, a person who has been committed to a mental institution, or a person who is in the United States illegally. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (4), (5)(A), (9). It may also exclude an

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

individual who is forbidden from carrying a firearm in the relevant state because he is not licensed—so long as the licensing regime itself is not

constitutionally infirm. Cf. United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1323–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the defendant, who was licensed to carry a firearm under Alabama law, did not violate a federal law prohibiting

possession of firearms in a school zone).

The second requirement is less clear but is best read to cover an individual entering a post office that is open to the public while lawfully

carrying a firearm for self-defense. “Incident,”ֻ usedֻ asֻ anֻ adjective,ֻ meansֻ“occurringֻorֻlikelyֻtoֻoccurֻesp[ecially] as a minor consequence

orֻ accompaniment.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 609

(1985).5 Inֻtheֻlegalֻcontext,ֻ“incident”ֻmeansֻ“dependsֻupon,ֻappertainsֻ to,ֻorֻfollowsֻanother.” Black’s Law Dictionary 686 (5th ed. 1979).6 But

sectionֻ930(d)(3)ֻdoesֻnotֻspecifyֻwhetherֻtheֻ“lawfulֻpurpose”ֻtoֻwhichֻ the carrying of a firearm must accompany is the purpose for entering a

federal building or the purpose for carrying the firearm. Read in conjunction with background principles of law, we think the better view is that an individual needs both a lawful purpose to be in a federal facility and a

lawful purpose to carry a firearm in order for the individual to qualify for the exception in section 930(d)(3), but not necessarily that the two must be related. So understood, an otherwise law-abiding citizen who carries a constitutionally protected firearm into a post office that is generally open to the public would fall within the scope of that exception.

Underֻ theֻ “grammaticalֻ ‘ruleֻ ofֻ theֻ lastֻ antecedent,’ֻ . . . a limiting clauseֻorֻphrase”—here,ֻ“incidentֻtoֻhuntingֻorֻotherֻlawfulֻpurpose”—

“shouldֻordinarilyֻbeֻreadֻasֻmodifyingֻonlyֻtheֻnounֻorֻphraseֻthatֻitֻ

5 See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1142 (1986 ed.) (same); Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 618ֻ(1988ֻed.)ֻ(“[t]endingֻtoֻariseֻorֻoccurֻ asֻaֻconcomitant”);ֻThe American Heritage Dictionary 650 (2d coll. ed. 1982) (same); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 966ֻ(2dֻed.ֻ1987)ֻ(“likelyֻorֻaptֻ toֻhappen”).

6 See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary atֻ 609ֻ (“dependentֻ onֻ orֻ

relatingֻ toֻ anotherֻ thing”);ֻ Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary at 618 (“[c]ontingentֻuponֻorֻrelatedֻtoֻsomethingֻelse”);ֻThe American Heritage Dictionary at 650 (same); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary atֻ1142ֻ(“dependentֻonֻorֻ appertainingֻtoֻanotherֻthing”).

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

immediatelyֻfollows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); see

also, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 144–46ֻ(2012)ֻ(“Scaliaֻ&ֻGarner”). Whileֻ“quiteֻ

sensibleֻasֻaֻmatterֻofֻgrammar,”ֻhowever,ֻtheֻlast-antecedentֻ“ruleֻisֻnotֻ anֻabsolute,”ֻandֻinֻthisֻinstanceֻmustֻ“assuredlyֻbeֻovercomeֻbyֻotherֻ

indiciaֻofֻmeaning.” Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26 (quoting Nobelman v. Am.

Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993)).

In this instance, the rule of the last antecedent would suggest that sectionֻ930’sֻlawful-purposeֻrequirementֻmodifiesֻ“Federalֻfacility”—that

is, it would imply that an individual would need to enter the facility

lawfully because it is open to the public or that the individual is an invitee. Such an understanding accords with the background principle that

“[w]hereֻaֻcommon-law principle is well established, [we] may take it as

given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle willֻapply”ֻabsentֻaֻclearֻindicationֻtoֻtheֻcontrary. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 581 U.S. 360, 378 (2017) (cleaned up); see

also, e.g., Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S. Ct. 1857, 1876–77 (2023). “Atֻcommon law, opening up private property to the general public implies a

‘licenseֻtoֻallֻpersonsֻtoֻenter,’ֻmeaningֻthatֻ‘noֻpersonֻisֻaֻtrespasserֻbyֻ merelyֻenteringֻtherein’ֻunlessֻtheֻpropertyֻownerֻhasֻgivenֻ‘dueֻnotice’ֻ thatֻsuchֻaֻpersonֻisֻbanned.” Wolford v. Lopez, 146 S. Ct. 2032, 2045

(2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Power, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 596, 602

(1844)); see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *209. Applied

here, as a property owner, the federal government can prohibit weapons

on its property, including (within constitutional limits) by closing its

property to the public. Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2045. But the default rule isֻthatֻ“all [may] enter private property open to the public unless specificallyֻ prohibited.” Id. at 2045 (emphasis in original); see also infra

Part II.B.3.

But,ֻasֻinֻallֻstatutoryֻinterpretation,ֻ“contextֻmatters.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (cleaned up); see, e.g., Revocation of

Prior Monument Designations, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, at *22–23 (May 27,

2025). The context of section 930(d)(3) suggests that following the lastantecedent canon would lead to an incomplete picture. The complete

exceptionֻ allowsֻ “theֻ lawfulֻ carryingֻ ofֻ firearmsֻ orֻ otherֻ dangerousֻ weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(3). Aֻ“facility”ֻisֻaֻ“buildingֻorֻpartֻthereof.” Id. § 930(g)(1). Because hunting with firearms is an activity that must occur

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

outdoors, see, e.g., Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. Romero, 153 F.4th 192, 204 n.12 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted), 7 weֻ thinkֻ thatֻ “incidentֻ toֻ aֻ lawfulֻ purpose”ֻmustֻbeֻunderstoodֻdistributively. Cf. Scalia & Garner at 214.

That is, although the last-antecedent canon is a good rule of thumb (and

grammar),ֻ“sometimesֻwhereֻaֻsentenceֻcontainsֻseveralֻantecedentsֻandֻ

severalֻconsequents,”ֻtheֻreaderֻshouldֻ“applyֻtheֻwordsֻtoֻtheֻsubjectsֻ which,ֻbyֻcontext,ֻtheyֻseemֻmostֻproperlyֻtoֻrelate.” Encino Motorcars,

LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 87 (2018) (cleaned up); see also 2A N.

Singer & S. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction

§ 47:26, p. 448 (rev. 7th ed. 2014). Here, this principle supports interpreting the statute to require that both the entry into the federal facility and the carrying of the firearm must be for a lawful purpose.

This understanding tracks everyday experience with post offices. While

most post offices are open to the public, that is not universally the case: There are postal facilities on military bases and past the security cordons at airports. Each is subject to its own statutes and regulations, which limit access to something less than the general public. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2672

note (military installations); 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111 (airports and aircraft). And there are entirely lawful reasons to bring a firearm into a post office. Forֻexample,ֻweֻrecentlyֻconcludedֻthatֻ“theֻExecutiveֻBranchֻmayֻnot,ֻ

consistentֻwithֻtheֻConstitution,ֻenforceֻsectionֻ1715”ֻofֻtitle 18 to the U.S.ֻCodeֻtoֻcriminalizeֻtheֻmailingֻofֻ“constitutionallyֻprotectedֻfirearms”—a conclusion whose reasoning necessarily implies that section

930(a) cannot be enforced in a way that makes it a felony to carry the

boxed firearm into the facility from which it would be mailed. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1715, 50 Op. O.L.C. __, at *15 (Jan. 15, 2026).

Carrying arms for self-defense when entering a building held open to

the public is a paradigmatic lawful purpose. 8 The Supreme Court recog7 True, it is theoretically possible that one might enter a federal facility while hunting

on federal land—for example, to use the restroom or to pick up paperwork while hunting in a national park. But we do not think that is the most natural reading of the statute, as suchֻeventsֻcanֻhardlyֻbeֻdescribedֻasֻ“likelyֻtoֻoccur.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 609 (definingֻ“incident”).

8 For the avoidance of doubt, our conclusion does not extend to firearms and other

“dangerousֻweapon[s],”ֻasֻdefinedֻinֻtheֻstatute,ֻ18 U.S.C. § 930(g)(2), that are prohibited by law, such as undetectable firearms, see id. § 922(p)(1). As discussed below, infra Part II.B, our analysis is informed by the Second Amendment—a right that extends only toֻ“theֻpossessionֻandֻuseֻofֻweaponsֻthatֻareֻ‘inֻ commonֻuse.’” N.Y. State Rifle &

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

nized as much in District of Columbia v. Heller, when it unequivocally

statedֻthatֻ“theֻinherentֻrightֻofֻself-defense”ֻisֻ“centralֻtoֻtheֻSecondֻ Amendmentֻright.” 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). And it built on the point in

its recent Wolford decision, which recognized that people who carry

firearms for self-defenseֻregularlyֻvisitֻplacesֻopenֻtoֻtheֻpublicֻ“inֻtheֻ course of their daily routines, such as gas stations, convenience stores, restaurants,ֻcoffeeֻshops,ֻdrugֻstores,ֻgroceryֻstores,ֻ‘bigֻbox’ֻstores,ֻ home improvement stores, barber shops or hair salons, dry cleaners, and

laundromats.” 146 S. Ct. at 2040–41. Although run by the federal government, a post office open to the public is a retail establishment that is analogous to these locations, requiring (typically) brief visits by lawabiding citizens to acquire everyday goods and services. Unless the property owner has clearly closed the property to firearms being carried for

self-defense, such carrying is presumptively lawful. See id. at 2049

& n.10. Yet far from closing post offices to firearms, Congress expressly permitted the carrying of firearms incident to any lawful purpose.

Interpretingֻ“lawfulֻpurpose”ֻinֻsectionֻ930ֻtoֻincludeֻself-defense in a building held open to the public is also consistent with other rules of

statutory construction. For example, take the semantic canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528,

543, 545–46 (2015) (plurality opinion). In the Second Amendment context, hunting is often paired with self-defense as an archetypal lawful

purpose. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(2)ֻ(outliningֻCongress’sֻpurposeֻ ofֻ“preserv[ing]ֻaֻcitizen’sֻaccessֻtoֻaֻsupplyֻofֻfirearmsֻandֻammunitionֻ for all lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitiveֻorֻrecreationalֻshooting”). 9 So if an individual who is not

legally disabled from possessing a firearm enters a post office that is held

Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2128 (2022) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627). Theֻcarryingֻofֻprohibitedֻweaponsֻdoesֻnotֻsatisfyֻsectionֻ930(d)(3)’sֻrequirementֻ thatֻtheֻcarryingֻbeֻ“lawful.”

9 See also 18 U.S.C. § 922ֻnoteֻ(outliningֻCongress’sֻpurposeֻasֻbeingֻ“toֻavoidֻhindering industry from supplying firearms to law abiding citizens for all lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense,ֻcollecting,ֻandֻcompetitiveֻorֻrecreationalֻshooting”);ֻ Heller,ֻ554ֻU.S.ֻatֻ599ֻ(“[P]reservingֻtheֻmilitiaֻwasֻ[not]ֻtheֻonlyֻreasonֻAmericansֻ valued the ancient right [of bearing arms]; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defenseֻandֻhunting.”);ֻid. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “nonmilitaryֻ purposesֻ [forֻ bearingֻ arms]ֻ likeֻ huntingֻ andֻ personalֻ self-defense”);ֻ McDonald v. City of Chicago,ֻ561ֻU.S.ֻ742,ֻ891ֻ(2010)ֻ(Stevens,ֻJ.,ֻdissenting)ֻ(“Gunsֻ may be useful for self-defense, as well as for hunting and sport . . . .”).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

open to the public while properly carrying a firearm for self-defense,

sectionֻ930(d)(3)ֻappliesֻtoֻexemptֻthemֻfromֻsectionֻ930(a)’sֻcarryingֻ

ban,ֻasֻtheֻindividualֻisֻ“lawful[ly]ֻcarrying”ֻaֻfirearmֻ“incidentֻto”ֻaֻ “lawfulֻpurpose[].” 18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(3).

Ourֻunderstandingֻalsoֻhelpsֻtoֻ“interpretֻtheֻstatute,”ֻtogetherֻwithֻ

otherֻfederalֻfirearmsֻrestrictions,ֻ“asֻaֻsymmetricalֻandֻcoherentֻregulatoryֻscheme”—includingֻhowֻitֻ“mayֻbeֻaffectedֻbyֻotherֻActs,ֻparticularlyֻwhereֻCongressֻhasֻspokenֻsubsequently.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Gustafson v.

Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). It is unclear why Congress would

need to have more than a dozen different statutes regulating the possession of firearms on certain types of federal property, see, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2278a, if section 930(a) created a nearblanket ban on carrying in all federal facilities. This is particularly so givenֻthatֻitsֻ“wordsֻdescribeֻanֻelementֻofֻaֻcriminalֻoffense.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Pub.

Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Potter v. United States,

155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894)).

Toֻtakeֻaֻspecificֻexample,ֻshortlyֻafterֻtheֻCourt’sֻdecisionֻinֻHeller, Congressֻrecognizedֻtheֻrightֻtoֻbearֻarmsֻunderֻtheֻ“2dֻamendmentֻtoֻ

theֻConstitution,”ֻ54 U.S.C. § 104906(a)(1), and it prohibited the SecretaryֻofֻtheֻInteriorֻfromֻ“promulgat[ing]ֻorֻenforc[ing] any regulation

thatֻprohibitsֻan”ֻotherwiseֻlaw-abidingֻ“individualֻfromֻpossessingֻaֻ

firearm,ֻincludingֻanֻassembledֻorֻfunctionalֻfirearm,”ֻwithinֻtheֻNational Park System, id. § 104906(b). The National Park Service has interpreted the resulting statutory structure as entitling law-abiding citizens to carry firearms onto parklands (under section 104906) but not into park

buildings (under a narrow view of section 930(d)(3)). A person who is

carrying a firearm on parklands for self-defense but who has to disarm

beforeֻenteringֻaֻbuildingֻwouldֻnotֻonlyֻrenderֻhimselfֻ“vulnerableֻforֻ th[e]ֻperiodֻofֻtime”ֻduringֻwhichֻheֻwasֻdisarmed,ֻWolford, 146 S. Ct.

at 2048, he would potentially be arming an aggressor who could collect

the firearm.10 We, like the courts, will reject such an interpretation that

10 This does not even account for other risks of leaving a firearm outside of a building

in an area frequented by the public—for example, the risk that a child visitor may stumble upon the firearm while their parents are inside and accidentally harm themselves.

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

“make[s]ֻ aֻ hash”ֻ ofֻ theֻ overallֻ statutoryֻ scheme. Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354, 2364 (2022).

This interpretation is further supported by the canon of constitutional

avoidance,ֻwhichֻ“imposes”—at minimum—aֻ“‘clarityֻtax’ֻonֻCongress”ֻ

when it legislates in ways that raise constitutional doubts. Application of the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act to State Institutionalization of Patients with Severe Mental Illness or Disabilities,

50 Op. O.L.C. __, at *12 (June 18,ֻ2026)ֻ(“Integration Mandate”) (quoting Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2376–77 (2023) (Barrett, J.,

concurring)); see also John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the

Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399, 403 (2010)). 11 Here, although we

need not definitively resolve the issues implicated by them, we have such doubts regarding whether requiring an otherwise law-abiding citizen to

disarmֻbeforeֻenteringֻaֻpostֻofficeֻwouldֻsurviveֻtheֻSupremeֻCourt’sֻ

two-stepֻanalysisֻthatֻ“look[s]ֻtoֻhistory”ֻinֻorderֻtoֻdetermineֻwhetherֻaֻ restrictionֻfallsֻwithinֻtheֻtraditionalֻ“scopeֻofֻtheֻright”ֻtoֻbearֻarms. Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2042. The very existence of those doubts counsels

in favor of a broad interpretation of the exception in section 930(d)(3) as applied to post offices.12

11 As we have previously recognized, this is the weaker of two versions of the constitutional-avoidance canon. See Whether Eluding Inspection Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) Is a Continuing Offense, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, at *10–11 (June 21, 2025). In its stronger form, the canon can require that we read implicit exceptions into statutes that are otherwise unqualified in scope. See, e.g., Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 350–57ֻ(1995)ֻ(“Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458”). Theֻexistenceֻofֻtheֻ“lawfulֻpurpose”ֻexceptionֻinֻsectionֻ930(d)ֻobviatesֻtheֻ need to determine whether to imply such an exception under the strong form of constitutional avoidance—a form of reasoning that is, in many ways, indistinguishable from holding that section 930(a) is unconstitutional in certain applications.

12 For the avoidance of doubt, although our constitutional analysis under the first step

of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen’sֻtwo-prong approach applies to section 930(a) outside the context of post offices, we have not undertaken performing the historical analysis required under Bruen’s second step in any other context. Thus, nothing in Parts II.B.2 or II.B.3 of this opinion should be understood to reach any conclusions about other federal facilities.

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

The right to keep and bear arms pre-dates the Constitution. We

“codified”ֻ inֻ theֻ SecondֻAmendmentֻ aֻ “pre-existingֻ right,”ֻ rootedֻ inֻ natureֻandֻ“inheritedֻfromֻourֻEnglishֻancestors.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at

2127 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., William Baude & Robert Leider, The

General-Law Right to Bear Arms, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1465, 1468–69

(2024).

Thereֻ isֻ littleֻ roomֻ forֻ doubtֻ thatֻ sectionֻ 930(a)ֻ “clashesֻ withֻ theֻ ‘plainֻtext’ֻofֻtheֻ[Second]ֻAmendment’sֻlanguage”—regardless of the

government building to which it is applied. Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2043

(quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129–30). Theֻstatuteֻappliesֻtoֻ“theֻpeople”—thatֻis,ֻ“membersֻofֻtheֻpoliticalֻcommunity.” Id. (quoting Heller,

554 U.S. at 580); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.

259, 265 (1990). Itֻ concernsֻ “Arms,”ֻ U.S.ֻ Const.ֻ amend. II—that is,

“weapon[s]ֻcustomarilyֻusedֻforֻoffensiveֻorֻdefensiveֻpurposes,”ֻWolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2043. Specifically, section 930(a) prohibits individuals fromֻ “bear[ing]”—thatֻ is,ֻ “carrying”—those arms. Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134–35). Because it falls within theֻplainֻtextֻofֻtheֻSecondֻAmendment,ֻtheֻrestrictionֻisֻ“presumptivelyֻ unconstitutional.” Id. at 2044.

As applied to post offices that are generally open to the public, we have grave doubts that the government could carry its burden to overcome that

presumptionֻ byֻ demonstratingֻ theֻ restrictionֻ “isֻ consistentֻ withֻ theֻ Nation’sֻhistoricalֻtraditionֻofֻfirearmֻregulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130. That would be a high hurdle because, for nearly two centuries, there was no “historicalֻtraditionֻofֻfirearmֻregulation”ֻinֻpostֻoffices. Id.; see also id. at 2135. Moreover, it is unlikely that the government would be

ableֻtoֻovercomeֻthatֻhurdleֻbyֻreferenceֻtoֻtheֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻdoctrine because ordinary post offices appear to bear no legally significant resemblanceֻtoֻtheֻ“legislativeֻassemblies,ֻpollingֻplaces,ֻandֻcourthouses”ֻwhereֻtheֻCourtֻhasֻacceptedֻthatֻtheֻgovernmentֻmayֻpresumptivelyֻ

restrict firearms. Id. at 2133.

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

WhenֻevaluatingֻwhetherֻaֻlawֻisֻconsistentֻwithֻourֻNation’sֻhistorical tradition of firearms regulation, we begin by considering whether that lawֻ“addressesֻaֻgeneralֻsocietalֻproblemֻthatֻhasֻpersistedֻsinceֻ[theֻ

Founding].” Id. at 2131. If such a problem is apparent but we are unable

toֻfindֻ“aֻdistinctlyֻsimilarֻhistoricalֻregulationֻaddressingֻthatֻproblem,”ֻ theֻ“lack”ֻofֻsuchֻaֻhistoricalֻregulationֻisֻ“evidenceֻthatֻtheֻchallengedֻ regulationֻisֻinconsistentֻwithֻtheֻSecondֻAmendment.” Id. “Likewise,ֻifֻ earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through

materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern

regulationֻisֻunconstitutional.” Id. That appears to be the case here.

Violence at post offices and against postal workers is a general societal problem that even the Postal Service seems to acknowledge existed at—

and has existed since—the Founding. The postal system predates our

Nation. See U.S. Postal Serv., The United States Postal Service: An American History 1–4 (2025 ed.), https://perma.cc/ST55-ZVJKֻ(“Postal Service History”). The Constitution then granted Congress the enumerated

powerֻtoֻ“establishֻPostֻOfficesֻandֻpostֻRoads.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. And presumptively because of the ongoing threat to the mail, Congressֻsoonֻinferredֻfromֻthisֻenumeratedֻpowerֻanֻ“impliedֻpower”ֻtoֻ

“punishֻthose[]ֻwhoֻstealֻlettersֻfromֻtheֻpost-office[]ֻorֻrobֻtheֻmail.” 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 38 (1833); see also

M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 385 (1819) (explaining

inֻ dictaֻ thatֻ “theֻ powerֻ ofֻ establishingֻ postֻ officesֻ andֻ postֻ roads[]ֻ involvesֻthatֻofֻpunishingֻtheֻoffenceֻofֻrobbingֻtheֻmail”).

By all appearances, such violence directed toward the postal system

and postal workers continued to pose an intractable societal problem

throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Postal Service

History at 17 (describing the dangers to mail carriers of traveling by

stagecoach). In 1921, serving as a mail clerk was so dangerous that the

postmaster general armed mail clerks with pistols and authorized them to

“shootֻtoֻkill.” Id. at 23. And by the 1980s and 1990s, shootings at post officesֻhadֻbecomeֻsoֻcommonֻthatֻ“goingֻpostal”ֻenteredֻtheֻAmericanֻ

lexiconֻasֻaֻtermֻforֻ“becom[ing]ֻuncontrollablyֻangry.” 13

13 Austin Harvey, The Chilling Story of the Post Office Shootings that Inspired the

Phrase ‘Going Postal,’ AllֻThat’sֻInterestingֻ(Jan. 29, 2025), https://perma.cc/K4CW12

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

Yet Congress had never prohibited carrying firearms specifically in

post offices. TheֻFoundingֻgeneration’sֻsolutionֻtoֻtheֻproblemֻwasֻtoֻ

impose severe penalties for mail robbery. In 1792, Congress made it a

crime,ֻpunishableֻbyֻ“death,”ֻtoֻ“robֻtheֻmailֻ. . .ֻofֻanyֻletterֻorֻpacket,”ֻ toֻ“stealֻsuchֻmail,”ֻorֻtoֻ“stealֻandֻtakeֻ. . . from out of any post-office, anyֻletterֻorֻpacket.” Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 17, 1 Stat. 232, 237 (“1792ֻAct”). Two years later, Congress made it a crime, again punishableֻbyֻ“death,”ֻtoֻ“robֻanyֻcarrierֻofֻtheֻmailֻ. . .ֻofֻsuchֻmail.” Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 17, 1 Stat. 354, 361. Several years after that,

Congress amended the punishment to a maximum of 40 lashes and

10 years of imprisonment for a first offense, and death for a second offense. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 15, 1 Stat. 733, 736. But if a first offenderֻ“muchֻwound[ed]”ֻtheֻmailֻcarrierֻorֻputֻtheֻmailֻcarrier’sֻ“lifeֻ inֻjeopardy[]ֻbyֻtheֻuseֻofֻdangerousֻweapons,”ֻtheֻpunishmentֻremainedֻ

“death.” Id. Congress did not impose criminal penalties for carrying

weapons into a post office until its general bar on weaponry in federal

buildings in the 1980s. Supra Part I.

Instead, the Executive Branch was the first entity that restricted

firearms in post offices. But even it did not do so until the latter half of the twentieth century. In 1964, it promulgated regulations prohibiting

the possession of firearms in federal buildings. See 29 Fed. Reg. 15,972, 15,982 (Dec. 1, 1964); see also Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1342. And in

1972, it promulgated regulations prohibiting the possession of firearms

in post offices specifically. See 37 Fed. Reg. 24,346, 2,4347 (Nov. 13,

1972); see also Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1342.

That Congress historically addressed the problem of violence at post

officesֻandֻagainstֻpostalֻworkersֻthroughֻ“materiallyֻdifferentֻmeans”ֻ

suggests that there is no history or tradition of restricting firearms in post offices. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2131. Since history and tradition is the yardstick by which the right to keep and bear arms codified in the Second

Amendment is measured, this reasoning suggests that section 930(a) is

inconsistent with that right as applied to post offices open to the public— as at least two lower courts have found. See Firearms Pol’y Coal. Inc. v. Bondi, 805 F. Supp. 3d 721, 727 (N.D. Tex. 2025); Ayala, 711 F. Supp.

3d at 1341–42.

MPZR; see also Scott Williamson, The Surprising Origin of the Phrase ‘Going Postal,’ Grunge (Dec. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/44FH-E888.

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

One counterargument is that modern post offices are not analogous to

post offices from the Founding era because the latter were not located in government buildings. See Firearms Pol’y Coal., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 729.

“Untilֻ theֻ earlyֻ 1900s, . . . the Post Office was [often] located in the postmaster’sֻhomeֻorֻotherֻplaceֻofֻbusiness,ֻsuchֻasֻaֻgeneralֻstore.”

U.S. Postal Serv., Sources of Historical Information on Post Offices,

Postal Employees, Mail Routes, and Mail Contractors at 14 (2022),

https://perma.cc/5YNC-3RCQֻ (“Sources of Historical Information”).

Onlyֻ“[a]ֻsmallֻpercentageֻofֻPostֻOffices—fewer than 1 percent before

1910—were located in government-ownedֻbuildings.” Id.

It is unclear why this distinction should make a constitutional difference to the question before us. Congressֻwasֻprovidedֻtheֻpowerֻtoֻ“establishֻPostֻOffices,”ֻwithoutֻanyֻrequirementֻthatֻitֻdoֻsoֻonֻpropertyֻ that the federal government owned. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. And the 1792 law described above made robbing the mail a crime regardless of the

fact that many post offices were then located on privately owned land. See 1792 Act § 17, 1 Stat. at 237; Sources of Historical Information at 14.

Because many members of Congress were themselves among the Framers

of the Constitution, courts typically give considerable weight to such early understandings of the power provided to Congress. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983). So do we. See, e.g., The President’s

Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 202 (2001) (relyingֻonֻevidenceֻofֻPresidentֻGeorgeֻWashington’sֻunderstandingֻofֻhisֻ

constitutional authority to deploy the armed forces abroad).

Evenֻifֻweֻwereֻtoֻlimitֻourֻreviewֻtoֻtheֻ“smallֻpercentageֻofֻPostֻ

Offices . . . located in government-ownedֻbuildings”ֻatֻtheֻFounding,ֻweֻ would still need to look for some evidence that the government restricted the carrying of firearms in those federal buildings. Sources of Historical Information at 14. We are aware of no such evidence, and at least two

courts that have examined the issue have similarly found none. See Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1341–42; Firearms Pol’y Coal., 805 F. Supp. 3d at

729–30. Because the government bears the burden of proof at this stage of the Bruen analysis, this lack of evidence alone is enough to give us pause. But consistent with the instructions of Bruen,ֻweֻalsoֻlookֻforֻ“aֻwellestablishedֻ andֻ representativeֻ historicalֻ analogue”ֻ toֻ aֻ firearmsֻ restriction in post offices. 142 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis omitted).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

Even expanding our review to statutes that are relevantly similar to section 930(a)—rather than historical twins—our doubts are not assuaged.

The nearest such analogue that we have been able to locate is the

so-calledֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻdoctrine,ֻunderֻwhichֻtheֻgovernmentֻmayֻ

restrict the carrying of firearms in certain locations without violating the Second Amendment. See id. Theֻarchetypicalֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻwhereֻ

firearmsֻmayֻbeֻrestrictedֻareֻ“legislativeֻassemblies,ֻpollingֻplaces,ֻandֻ courthouses.” Id. Butֻ“theֻhistoricalֻrecordֻyieldsֻrelativelyֻfewֻ18th- and 19th-centuryֻ‘sensitiveֻplaces’ֻwhereֻweaponsֻwereֻaltogetherֻprohibited.” Id. Indeed, the scholarship cited by the Court in referencing this

doctrine suggests that the number of Founding-era restrictions at these

sensitive places was exceptionally small. See David B. Kopel & Joseph

G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the

Right to Bear Arms, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 205, 235–36ֻ(2018)ֻ(“Kopelֻ&ֻ

Greenlee”).14

Post offices that are generally open to the public do not appear to be

legallyֻanalogousֻtoֻtheֻarchetypicalֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻunderֻtheֻsecondֻ step of the Bruen analysis. 142 S. Ct. at 2133. If we were trying to conclusivelyֻ“[d]etermin[e]ֻwhetherֻthisֻconditionֻ[was]ֻmet,”ֻweֻwouldֻneedֻ

toֻconsiderֻbothֻtheֻ“how”ֻandֻtheֻ“why”ֻofֻtheֻrelevantֻregulation—

“thatֻis,ֻwhetherֻitֻimposedֻaֻrestrictionֻsimilarֻtoֻthatֻimposedֻbyֻtheֻ challengedֻlaw”ֻandֻ“whetherֻitsֻrationaleֻwasֻsimilarֻtoֻthatֻofֻtheֻnewֻ law.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2044. “Discerningֻwhatֻtheֻoriginalֻmeaningֻ of the Constitution requires in this or that case may sometimes be difficult,”ֻbecauseֻitֻrequiresֻmakingֻinferencesֻaboutֻtheֻunderstandingsֻofֻ people long dead and doing so based on incomplete sources. United States

v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1909 (2024). That inquiry is further compli14 The relevant scholarship cited by the Supreme Court in Bruen found only two laws

in Maryland that prohibited firearms in legislative buildings and one constitutional provision in Delaware that prohibited bringing firearms to polling places. See Kopel & Greenlee at 235–36; see also 1647ֻMd.ֻLawsֻ216ֻ(“[N]oeֻoneֻshallֻcomeֻintoֻtheֻhowseֻ of Assembly (whilst the howse is sett) with any weapon uppon perill of such fine or censureֻasֻtheֻhowseֻshallֻthinkeֻfit.”);ֻ1650ֻMd.ֻLawsֻ273ֻ(“Thatֻnoneֻshallֻcomeֻintoֻ eyther of the houses whillst they are sett, with any gun or weapon uppon perill of such fineֻorֻcensureֻasֻtheֻhowsesֻshallֻthinkeֻfitt.”);ֻDel.ֻConst.ֻart. 28ֻ(1776)ֻ(“Toֻpreventֻ any Violence or Force being used at the said Elections, no person shall come armed to any ofֻthem,ֻandֻnoֻMusterֻofֻtheֻMilitiaֻshallֻbeֻmadeֻonֻthatֻDay.”).

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

cated in this instance because the early English statutes recognized to be predecessorsֻofֻtheֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻdoctrine—“[t]he most prominent

[being]ֻtheֻ1328ֻStatuteֻofֻNorthampton,”ֻBruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2139—

were recognized, before the Framers were ever born, never to have been

enforced under their literal terms. Kopel & Greenlee at 222–26 (discussing Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (KB)).

Fortunately, because we are asking only whether applying section

930(a) to post offices raises any grave constitutional doubts, we need not engage in a deep historical dive into the hows and whys of these early

English statutes. Federal law contains direct modern descendants of two

of the three categories of sensitive places recognized by Bruen, which

have nothing to do with section 930(a): Congress, 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1); and federal courthouses, 18 U.S.C. § 930(e). The absence of a direct

analogue to polling places is easily explicable by the fact that the Framers entrusted regulating—and therefore protecting—federal elections to the

states. See Authority to Obtain and Share Statewide Voter Roll Data,

50 Op. O.L.C. __, at *2 (May 12,ֻ2026)ֻ(“[R]egulatingֻelectionsֻisֻprimarilyֻtheֻpurviewֻofֻstates.”).

To be sure, Congress could have intended section 930(a) and these

more specific statutes to punish overlapping conduct. As the Court has

recognized,ֻevenֻ“substantial”ֻoverlapֻbetweenֻtwoֻprovisionsֻisֻ“notֻ

uncommonֻinֻcriminalֻstatutes”—let alone legally problematic. Loughrin

v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 n.4 (2014) (citing Hubbard v. United

States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 n.14 (1995)). Butֻ“[w]henֻCongressֻadoptsֻaֻ

newֻlawֻagainst”ֻanֻestablishedֻlegalֻbackdrop,ֻweֻ“generallyֻpresume[]ֻ

the new provision should be understood to work in harmony with what

hasֻcomeֻbefore.” Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 1232, 1242

(2025) (collecting authorities). The existence of these modern-day descendants of sensitive-places regulations gives us considerable pause from adopting the view that section 930(a) was intended to cover the same

conduct for the same purpose and thus fit into the same constitutional

tradition.

A critic might suggest that it is inappropriate for us to rely on the canon of constitutional avoidance because the Court already stated in Heller that the Constitution permits the government to restrict firearms in govern16

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

ment buildings. In explaining its conclusion that the Second Amendment

protectsֻaֻpreexisting,ֻ“individualֻrightֻunconnectedֻwithֻmilitiaֻservice,”ֻ 554ֻU.S.ֻatֻ582,ֻtoֻ“hav[e]ֻandֻus[e]ֻarmsֻforֻself-preservation and defence,”ֻid. at 594 (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *140),

the Court caveated that nothing in its Heller opinionֻ“shouldֻbeֻtakenֻtoֻ cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by

felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposingֻconditionsֻandֻqualificationsֻonֻtheֻcommercialֻsaleֻofֻarms,”ֻid. at 626–27. Later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the

Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendmentֻ andֻ thenֻ itֻ “repeat[ed]”ֻ Heller’sֻ “assurances.” 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality opinion).

Becauseֻ theֻ discussionsֻ ofֻ “sensitiveֻ places”ֻ inֻ bothֻ Heller and

McDonald were dicta, neither case resolved whether post offices—or any

other government buildings, for that matter—are sensitive places where

firearms may be prohibited. Dictaֻareֻ“remarksֻmadeֻinֻtheֻcourseֻofֻaֻ

decisionֻbutֻnotֻessentialֻtoֻtheֻreasoningֻbehindֻthatֻdecision.” Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 44ֻ(2016)ֻ(“Garnerֻetֻal.”). AsֻtheֻSupremeֻCourtֻhasֻrepeatedlyֻexplained,ֻ“[i]tֻisֻtoֻtheֻholdingsֻofֻ [its]ֻcases,ֻratherֻthanֻtheirֻdicta,ֻthatֻ[readers]ֻmustֻattend.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994). 15 Relatedly, the SupremeֻCourtֻhasֻalsoֻcautionedֻthatֻ“theֻlanguageֻofֻanֻopinionֻisֻnotֻ always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979). To the contrary, itֻ hasֻ “emphasize[d]”ֻ thatֻ itsֻ “opinionsֻ disposeֻ ofֻ discreteֻ casesֻ andֻ controversiesֻandֻtheyֻmustֻbeֻreadֻwithֻaֻcarefulֻeyeֻtoֻcontext.” Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 1155 (2023). These

15 See also, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1404 (2020); S. Union Co. v.

United States, 567 U.S. 343, 352–53 n.5 (2012); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996); accord Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (explaining that mattersֻ “neitherֻ broughtֻ toֻ theֻ attentionֻ ofֻ theֻ courtֻ norֻ ruledֻ upon”ֻ areֻ “notֻ toֻ beֻ considered . . .ֻprecedent[]”);ֻ18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.03[2] (3d ed. 2023) (“Oneֻwayֻtoֻdistinguishֻbetweenֻdictumֻandֻtheֻreasoningֻnecessaryֻtoֻtheֻholdingֻisֻtoֻ ask whether the statement in question could be deleted without impairing the basis of the court’sֻdecision.”);ֻJohnֻChipmanֻGray,ֻThe Nature and Sources of the Law 261 (2d ed. 1972)ֻ (“Precedent”ֻ isֻ onlyֻ thatֻ “whichֻ isֻ necessaryֻ forֻ theֻ decisionֻ ofֻ aֻ particularֻ case.”).

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

principlesֻensureֻthatֻtheֻstatementsֻmadeֻinֻresponseֻtoֻ“[t]heֻquestionֻ . . .ֻbeforeֻtheֻCourtֻ[thatֻwas]ֻinvestigatedֻwithֻcare”ֻisֻnotֻincautiouslyֻ appliedֻtoֻsomeֻissueֻthatֻtheֻCourtֻhadֻnotֻ“completelyֻinvestigated.”

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (Marshall,

C.J.). Andֻtheyֻcounselֻcourtsֻandֻlitigantsֻnotֻtoֻ“combֻthe[]ֻpages”ֻofֻ theֻCourt’sֻopinionsֻlookingֻ“forֻstrayֻcommentsֻandֻstretch[ing]ֻthemֻ

beyond their context—all to justify an outcome inconsistent with [the]

Court’sֻreasoningֻandֻjudgments.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510,

1528 (2022).

Heller involved laws in the District of Columbia that banned the possession of handguns in the home and required that any lawful firearm in

the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock. See 554 U.S. at 628. McDonald involvedֻChicago’sֻsimilarֻordinances. See 561 U.S. at 749–50

(plurality opinion). Neither case involved firearm possession in a government building or other sensitive place. See Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d at

1348–49; Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 453–54 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett,

J., dissenting). But see Nastri, 828 F. Supp. 3d at 326 (suggesting the

“SupremeֻCourtֻhasֻrepeatedlyֻconfirmedֻthat”ֻgovernmentֻbuildingsֻareֻ

“‘sensitiveֻ places’”ֻ (quotingֻ Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133)). Instead, the Courtֻdiscussedֻfirearmsֻrestrictionsֻinֻ“governmentֻbuildings”ֻonlyֻasֻaֻ caveatֻtoֻmakeֻclearֻthatֻ“theֻrightֻsecuredֻbyֻtheֻSecondֻAmendmentֻisֻ

notֻunlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. BecauseֻtheֻCourt’sֻstatementsֻ

that government buildings are sensitive places were unnecessary to the

resolutionֻofֻeitherֻcaseֻorֻcontroversy,ֻneitherֻstatementֻ“constitutesֻtheֻ precedent”ֻofֻtheֻCourt. Garner et al. at 44.16

Toֻbeֻsure,ֻ“[w]eֻshouldֻnot”—and do not—“idlyֻignoreֻconsideredֻ

statementsֻ[of]ֻtheֻSupremeֻCourt”ֻwhetherֻtechnicallyֻinֻdictaֻorֻotherwise, Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)ֻ(citationֻomitted),ֻ“particularlyֻ where”ֻ suchֻ statementsֻ areֻ “consistentֻ withֻ longstandingֻ

16 It would be particularly problematic to treat the discussion of sensitive places in

McDonald as creating binding law because, in addition to being dicta, it is found in a part of the opinion belonging to only a plurality of four. See 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality opinion). When the Court splinters on the rationale for its judgment, we are to look for the “positionֻtakenֻbyֻthoseֻMembersֻwhoֻconcurredֻinֻtheֻjudgment[]ֻonֻtheֻnarrowestֻ grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted). Because there were not five votes for the discussion of sensitive places in McDonald, it is (at most) informative of the views of those justices. See Integration Mandate at *7–11.

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

SupremeֻCourtֻprecedent,”ֻIn re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases regarding the treatment of Supreme Court dicta by lower courts); see also Garner et al. at

69–70. Butֻultimately,ֻ“[d]ictumֻsettlesֻnothing,ֻevenֻinֻtheֻcourtֻthatֻ uttersֻit.” Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 351 n.12 (2005). It certainly does notֻ obviateֻ “ourֻ dutyֻ toֻ provideֻ anֻ independentֻ assessmentֻ ofֻ whatֻ faithfulֻ executionֻ [ofֻ theֻ law]ֻ means,”ֻ Integration Mandate at *12— particularly in an evolving area of law, cf. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct.

2141,ֻ2158ֻ(2021)ֻ(notingֻthatֻ“aside[s]”ֻandֻ“strayֻcomments”ֻareֻnotֻ

binding); id. atֻ2167ֻ(Kavanaugh,ֻJ.,ֻconcurring)ֻ(“TheֻCourtֻmakesֻclearֻ that the decades-oldֻ‘strayֻcomments’ֻ. . . were dicta and have no bearing onֻ[theֻcurrentֻcase].”).ֻ

In this instance, we must consider the language from Heller and

McDonald inֻviewֻofֻtheֻCourt’sֻmoreֻrecentֻopinionֻinֻ Bruen, which

“fleshedֻ outֻ theֻ processֻ ofֻ historicalֻ analysisֻ requiredֻ inֻ aֻ Secondֻ Amendmentֻ case.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2043. Bruen indicates that

firearms restrictions applicable to government buildings are not automatically exempt from its two-step analysis. Otherwise, the list of examples

the Court provided—which includes specific types of government buildings (legislative assemblies and courthouses)—would have been unnecessary. Instead, Bruen drawsֻitsֻlistֻofֻ“18th- and 19th- centuryֻ‘sensitiveֻ places,’”ֻ142ֻS. Ct. at 2133, from scholarship whose entire thesis is that “[n]otֻallֻgovernmentֻbuildingsֻareֻtheֻsame,”ֻKopelֻ&ֻGreenleeֻatֻ293ֻ

(emphasis omitted). In doing so, it implicitly leaves space for case-bycase determinations within that category. 17 As a result, we evaluate

whether a regulation on firearms in a government building is consistent

with the Second Amendment by examining whether the regulation is

sufficientlyֻanalogousֻtoֻhistoricalֻregulationsֻofֻfirearmsֻinֻ“sensitiveֻ places,”ֻsuchֻasֻ“legislativeֻassemblies,ֻpollingֻplaces,ֻandֻcourthouses.”

17 See, e.g., Hunter v. Cortland Hous. Auth., 714 F. Supp. 3d 46, 49–50, 57 (N.D.N.Y.

2024) (finding that applicants were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that a public-housingֻauthority’sֻcategoricalֻbanֻonֻfirearmsֻviolatedֻtheֻSecondֻAmendment);ֻ Columbia Hous. & Redev. Corp. v. Braden, 663 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (“[W]eֻcannotֻsayֻthatֻanֻindividual’sֻpublicֻhousingֻunitֻisֻanalogousֻtoֻthatֻofֻ[the]ֻ established sensitive government buildings [listed in Bruen]. . . . [W]e conclude that a total ban on the ability of law-abiding residents . . . to possess a handgun within their public housing unit for the purpose of self-defense is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.”).

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. 18 That a firearms regulation concerns a government building does not alone suffice to ensure constitutionality under the Second Amendment.

In our evaluation of whether to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance, we have considered the argument that the Second Amendment

mightֻapplyֻdifferentlyֻwhenֻCongressֻexercisesֻitsֻreservedֻ“Powerֻtoֻ

dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the

TerritoryֻorֻotherֻPropertyֻbelongingֻtoֻtheֻUnitedֻStates.” U.S. Const.

art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Afterֻall,ֻtheֻ“standardֻcommon-law rule on access to privateֻpropertyֻheldֻopenֻtoֻtheֻpublic”ֻisֻthatֻeveryֻpersonֻ“mayֻenterֻ unless expresslyֻprohibitedֻfromֻdoingֻso.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2040

(emphasis added). Section 930(a) could, the argument goes, be seen as

merelyֻ theֻ exerciseֻ ofֻ Congress’sֻ authorityֻ asֻ proprietorֻ toֻ excludeֻ firearms from federal properties.

Itֻisֻindisputablyֻtrueֻthatֻwhenֻitֻcomesֻtoֻfederalֻproperty,ֻ“Congressֻ exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the

publicֻdomain.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). And

theֻCourtֻhasֻrepeatedlyֻheldֻthatֻ“theֻgovernment,ֻ‘noֻlessֻthanֻaֻprivateֻ ownerֻofֻproperty,’ֻretainsֻtheֻ‘powerֻtoֻpreserveֻtheֻpropertyֻunderֻitsֻ controlֻforֻtheֻuseֻtoֻwhichֻitֻisֻlawfullyֻdedicated.’” Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 12 (2018) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,

47 (1966)). Itֻhasֻemphasizedֻthatֻ“[n]othing in the Constitution requires theֻGovernmentֻfreelyֻtoֻgrantֻaccessֻtoֻallֻwhoֻwishֻtoֻexerciseֻtheir”ֻ constitutionalֻ rightsֻ “onֻ everyֻ typeֻ ofֻ Governmentֻ propertyֻ withoutֻ regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be

causedֻbyֻtheֻ[person’s]ֻactivities.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &

Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985).

As noted above, the fact that Congress has opened most post offices to

the public creates the default rule that members of the public may enter

the premises carrying firearms. Supra Part II.A.2. But, at common law,

18 True, these statements are themselves arguably dicta, as Bruen centrally concerned

theֻ“properֻcause”ֻstandardֻforֻobtainingֻaֻlicenseֻtoֻcarryֻunderֻNewֻYorkֻlaw. 142 S. Ct. at 2122–23. We cite them, however, not for a binding conclusion on what constitutesֻaֻ“sensitiveֻplace”ֻwhereֻfirearmsֻmayֻpresumptivelyֻbeֻregulatedֻbutֻratherֻforֻtheֻ proposition that neither Heller nor McDonald were the final word on the subject.

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

“allֻsuchֻlicensesֻareֻinֻtheirֻnatureֻrevocable.” Power, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 602. Within outer limits set by common-carrier and publicaccommodation laws, an owner who has generally opened his property to

theֻpublicֻmayֻstillֻmakeֻpermissionֻtoֻenterֻ“conditional”ֻonֻcomplianceֻ withֻspecifiedֻrules,ֻsoֻlongֻasֻheֻprovidesֻ“dueֻnotice”ֻofֻtheֻconditions. Id. at 602–03. As Judge Thomas Cooley explained, notice of such restrictionsֻmayֻbeֻgivenֻ“byֻplacardֻorֻotherwise.” Thomas M. Cooley, A

Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of

Contract 303 (1879). A statute is certainly one method, other than a

placard, to give notice of a restriction. Cf. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.ֻ184,ֻ193ֻ(1998)ֻ(recitingֻtheֻ“backgroundֻpresumptionֻthatֻeveryֻ

citizenֻknowsֻtheֻlaw”). Suchֻaֻ“conditionalֻorֻrestrictedֻconsentֻtoֻenterֻ land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or restrictionֻisֻcompliedֻwith.” Restatement of Torts § 168 (1934).

At the same time, however, private-property rules likely cannot be imported wholesale onto government lands or buildings for one simple

reason: State and federal governments are bound by the Constitution,

including the Bill of Rights; private parties are not. “Statesֻmayֻnotֻadoptֻ property-lawֻrulesֻthatֻviolateֻconstitutionalֻrights.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2050 n.13. Andֻ“[t]heֻGovernment,ֻevenֻwhenֻactingֻinֻitsֻproprietaryֻ capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints,ֻasֻdoesֻaֻprivateֻbusiness.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (plurality opinion). Similarly, the Fourth Amendment

applies on public property in the workplaces of government employees—

albeit subject to a slightly different understanding of what reasonable

expectation of privacy an employee has at the workplace. See O’Connor

v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718–19 (1987) (plurality opinion).

The best course for demarcating the extent to which the federal government can bar firearms in its capacity as proprietor is to borrow a mode ofֻ analysisֻ fromֻ anotherֻ Billֻ ofֻ Rightsֻ guarantee:ֻ theֻ “‘forumֻ based’ֻ approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on theֻuseֻofֻitsֻproperty”ֻforֻexpressiveֻpurposesֻunderֻtheֻFirstֻAmendment. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800). There are generally three

regimesֻbyֻwhichֻtheֻGovernmentֻcanֻregulateֻanֻindividual’sֻexpressionֻ

on government property. Atֻoneֻendֻofֻtheֻspectrumֻisֻtheֻ“nonpublicֻ

forum,”ֻwhichֻisֻaֻ“spaceֻthatֻ‘isֻnotֻbyֻtraditionֻorֻdesignationֻaֻforumֻ

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

forֻpublicֻcommunication,’”ֻMansky, 585 U.S. at 11–12 (citation omitted), and over which the government largely retains the same control as

private owners, see, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 678–85. At the other end is the “traditionalֻpublicֻforum,”ֻwhichֻincludesֻ“parks,ֻstreets,ֻsidewalks,ֻandֻ theֻlike.” Mansky, 585 U.S. at 11. “[T]heֻgovernmentֻmayֻimposeֻreasonableֻtime,ֻplace,ֻandֻmannerֻrestrictionsֻonֻprivateֻspeech”ֻinֻaֻtraditionalֻpublicֻforum,ֻ“butֻrestrictionsֻbasedֻonֻcontentֻmustֻsatisfyֻstrictֻ scrutiny,ֻandֻthoseֻbasedֻonֻviewpointֻareֻprohibited.” Id. In between the two,ֻ “[t]heֻ Courtֻ hasֻ alsoֻ heldֻ thatֻ aֻ governmentֻ entityֻ mayֻ createֻ aֻ forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussionֻofֻcertainֻsubjects,”ֻsoֻlongֻasֻthoseֻlimitationsֻareֻenforcedֻinֻ an even-handed manner. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,

470 (2009); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,

106–07 (2001). 19

Although perhaps not a one-to-one match, the forum-based approach to

the First Amendment appears to align fairly well with how the government functionally has regulated firearms on government property. The

handfulֻofֻ“sensitiveֻplaces”ֻwhereֻgunsֻhaveֻbeenֻrestrictedֻsinceֻtheֻ

Founding are akin to non-public fora—at least during those periods of

time when the sensitive activities are occurring. See supra Part II.B.2.b; 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1)(A) (prohibiting firearms in the Capitol Buildings

and on Capitol Grounds); 18 U.S.C. § 930(e) (prohibiting firearms in

federal courthouses). The government can also create new non-public fora

by closing the property to the public in a way that would not have an easy historical analogue to a sensitive place. 20 On the other end of the spectrum, in areas that are generally open to all members of the public, the

government historically has not limited guns on such property. And under

19 Thereֻisֻtechnicallyֻaֻfourthֻcategoryֻofֻforaֻforֻ“spacesֻthatֻhaveֻ‘notֻtraditionallyֻ

beenֻregardedֻasֻaֻpublicֻforum’ֻbutֻwhichֻtheֻgovernmentֻhasֻ‘intentionallyֻopenedֻupֻ forֻthatֻpurpose.’” Mansky, 585 U.S. at 11 (citation omitted). Because these so-called designatedֻpublicֻforaֻ“shareֻessentialֻattributesֻofֻaֻtraditionalֻpublicֻforum,”ֻSummum, 555ֻU.S.ֻatֻ469,ֻandֻ“[t]heֻsameֻstandardsֻapply”ֻtoֻthem,ֻMansky, 585 U.S. at 11, we treat them as equivalent to traditional public fora for the purposes of this opinion.

20 True, those who work on the property may not be able to exercise the right to keep

and bear arms without the permission of their employer. But the law has long recognized thatֻtheֻgovernmentֻasֻanֻemployerֻcanֻlimitֻanֻindividual’sֻconstitutionalֻrightsֻinֻatֻ least certain ways that it cannot as a regulator. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417–20 (2006) (summarizing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

a history-based test, it could not adopt limitations on when, how, and what kinds of constitutionally protected weapons may be carried in such areas, because any such limitations would have no historical analogue and

would be inconsistent with our historical tradition of firearm regulation. In between, for buildings that are opened to the public for some but not all purposes, a more nuanced analysis would be required about whether a

restrictionֻisֻ“reasonableֻinֻlightֻofֻtheֻpurposeֻservedֻbyֻthe”ֻbuilding. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). 21

Assuming such a standard here, post offices that are open to the public

would likely fall within the intermediate zone of government property

where Congress could limit the circumstances under which, and the purposes for which, a citizen may exercise his Second Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has already concluded that post offices and the sidewalks outside them are not so open to the public that any restriction on

constitutional rights thereupon must satisfy strict scrutiny. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727–30 (plurality opinion). At the same time, neither Congress nor the Postal Service has purported to completely close post offices to all

firearms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)–(2) (allowing certain individuals to enter government facilities with firearms); id. § 1715 (exempting

certain individuals from the putative ban on mailing guns). As a result,

post offices would probably best be considered limited-purpose fora for

firearms.

“Weֻareֻmindful”ֻthatֻanyֻlineֻweֻdrawֻonֻthisֻsubjectֻwillֻbeֻfuzzyֻ

andֻ “thatֻ thisֻ areaֻ ofֻ lawֻ isֻ stillֻ beingֻ developed.” See Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and

Universities, 43 Op. O.L.C. 191, 197 (2019) (evaluating the constitutionality of funding for faith-based organizations at a time when there was

“notֻ yetֻ aֻ robustֻ post-Trinity Lutheran body of case law in the lower courts”ֻ(citationֻomitted)). We need not decide how extensively Congress

can limit firearms in federal facilities because, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Congress has already exempted the lawful carry21 Weֻrecognizeֻthatֻthisֻframeworkֻreliesֻonֻaֻ“means-endֻscrutiny”ֻthatֻisֻnotֻavailable under the Second Amendment following Bruen. 142 S. Ct. at 2125–26. In the absence of further guidance from the Court, however, the alternative seems to be to read the Heller dicta suggesting that all government buildings are sensitive places in a way inconsistent with Wolford’sֻstatementֻthatֻtheֻgovernmentֻ“mayֻnotֻadoptֻproperty-law rulesֻthatֻviolateֻconstitutionalֻrights.” 146 S. Ct. at 2050 n.13.

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

ing of constitutionally protected firearms in post offices. See supra

Part II.A.

In reaching this conclusion, we are aware of three district court decisionsֻthatֻhaveֻadoptedֻaֻnarrowerֻviewֻofֻtheֻ“otherֻlawfulֻpurposes”ֻ

exception in section 930(d)(3)—without addressing any constitutional

concerns. See, e.g., De la Cruz-Bancroft, 2010 WL 8752034. 22 Those

opinions predate Bruen, making the lack of any discussion in these cases

about the difficulties of section 930(d)(3) under the Bruen framework

entirely explicable. They concluded that section 930(d)(3) applies only if theֻ“lawfulֻpurpose”ֻforֻcarryingֻtheֻfirearmֻ“isֻrelatedֻtoֻtheֻfederalֻ facility”ֻ intoֻ whichֻ theֻ firearmֻ isֻ brought. Id. at *2. This conclusion followed from a concern that interpreting section 930(d)(3) more broadly

wouldֻ“notֻgiveֻfullֻeffectֻtoֻtheֻentireֻstatute”ֻbecauseֻ“[i]fֻmereֻlawfulֻ possession of the weapon outside the facility were enough, then there

wouldֻbeֻnoֻneedֻforֻtheֻphraseֻ‘huntingֻorֻotherֻlawfulֻpurposes.’” Id.

at *3. Aֻsecond,ֻrelatedֻconcernֻwasֻthatֻtheֻexceptionֻ“wouldֻlargelyֻ

swallowֻ theֻ prohibition”ֻ becauseֻ “[i]fֻ mereֻ lawfulֻ possessionֻ ofֻ theֻ firearm outside the Federal facility were enough to permit someone to

bring it inside, virtually anyone could bring such a weapon inside a Federalֻfacilityֻforֻanyֻreason.” Id. (emphasis in original).

We respectfully disagree. The President has an independent constitutionalֻ dutyֻ toֻ “takeֻ Careֻ thatֻ theֻ Lawsֻ beֻ faithfullyֻ executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. And our Office has a related duty to assess what faithful execution means, even if doing so requires disagreeing with a federal court. See Integration Mandate at *12. We part ways with the district

courts that have construed section 930(d)(3) narrowly, as their interpretation does not follow from the plain text of the statute. If the statute was meantֻtoֻrequireֻaֻnexusֻbetweenֻtheֻ“otherֻlawfulֻpurposes”ֻforֻwhichֻ

someone was carrying a firearm to the purposes for which the individual

was entering the facility, Congress could have framed section 930(d)(3) to

22 The other opinions addressing section 930(d)(3) have relied upon the interpretation

adopted in De la Cruz-Bancroft and provided no additional analysis of that statute. See Yorzinski, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 227; Tagore v. United States, No. 09-cv-27, 2011 WL 13124026, at *27 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2011), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

state:ֻ“Subsectionֻ(a)ֻshallֻnotֻapplyֻtoֻ. . . the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or

other lawful purposes for carrying a firearm or other dangerous weapon

in a Federal facility.” Furthermore, as we addressed in Part II.A.2,ֻ“hunting”ֻisֻanֻactivityֻthatֻordinarilyֻtakesֻplaceֻoutside,ֻatֻleastֻinֻtheֻcontext of firearms. Requiring a nexus between the purpose for which someone is carrying a firearm and the purpose for which that individual is

enteringֻaֻfederalֻfacilityֻwouldֻrenderֻtheֻ“hunting”ֻprovisionֻinֻsectionֻ 930(d)(3) nugatory.

Moreover, it does not follow that construing section 930(d)(3) according to the words that Congress chose would swallow the general prohibition on firearms in federal facilities. Section 930(a) still prohibits an individual from carrying a firearm or other dangerous weapon into a

federal facility incident to an unlawful purpose, even if that individual is otherwise not legally disabled from carrying a firearm. Consider the

hypothetical example of a citizen who has a state-issued concealed-carry

permit and enters a post office with a constitutionally protected firearm but for the purpose of committing a simple battery against an employee at the facility who is on vacation in another state. The individual would be “lawful[ly]ֻcarrying”ֻhisֻfirearm,ֻbutֻtheֻactֻofֻcarryingֻthatֻfirearmֻintoֻ theֻpostֻofficeֻwouldֻnotֻbeֻ“incidentֻto”ֻaֻ“lawfulֻpurpose[]”ֻbecause,ֻ in that scenario, the purpose would be criminal activity. 18 U.S.C.

§ 930(d)(3). The individual would not be covered by section 930(d)(3)

and therefore could be prosecuted under section 930(a).

Conversely, consider the hypothetical example of a person who is forbidden from possessing a firearm—for instance, a convicted felon, see id. § 922(g)(1); or an illegal alien, see id. § 922(g)(5). Even if such a person were carrying a firearm for the purpose of self-defense, the individual

wouldֻnotֻbeֻ“lawful[ly]ֻcarrying”ֻhisֻfirearm,ֻbecauseֻhisֻpossessionֻofֻ the firearm would be unlawful under section 922(g). Id. § 930(d)(3).

Thus,ֻtheֻ“lawfulֻcarrying”ֻandֻ“lawfulֻpurpose[]”ֻrequirementsֻinֻsection 930(d)(3) both do independent work. Id.

It also does not follow that construing section 930(d)(3) to allow for the exercise of constitutional rights would render section 930(d)(2) superfluous. Sectionֻ930(d)(2)ֻprovidesֻthatֻsectionֻ930(a)ֻdoesֻnotֻapplyֻtoֻ“theֻ possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or aֻmemberֻofֻtheֻArmedֻForcesֻifֻsuchֻpossessionֻisֻauthorizedֻbyֻlaw.”

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

Id. § 930(d)(2). Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) are not coextensive. Subsectionֻ(d)ֻsuppliesֻtheֻdefensesֻnotֻjustֻforֻsubsectionֻ(a)ֻ(“Federalֻfacilities”)ֻbutֻalso,ֻbyֻreference,ֻforֻsubsectionֻ(e)ֻ(“Federalֻcourtֻfacilities”). See id. § 930(e)(2). But only the defenses in subsection (d)(1) and (d)(2) apply to federal court facilities. See id. Soֻ “Federalֻ official[s]”ֻ andֻ “member[s]ֻofֻtheֻArmedֻForces”ֻwhoֻareֻ“authorizedֻbyֻlaw”ֻtoֻpossessֻ

firearms may carry firearms into federal court facilities, id. § 930(d)(2), butֻotherֻindividualsֻmayֻnotֻdoֻso,ֻevenֻifֻtheֻcarryingֻisֻ“incidentֻtoֻ huntingֻorֻotherֻlawfulֻpurposes,”ֻid. § 930(d)(3). Separating the defense for federal officials and members of the Armed Forces into subsection

(d)(2) is not surplusage but rather a structurally necessary part of the

statute.

Even if our view of the statute did render certain terms surplusage, that canon of construction would give way to another: the canon of constitutional avoidance. See supra Part II.B. Here, the Supreme Court has held

thatֻtheֻConstitutionֻprotectsֻ“anֻindividualֻrightֻtoֻkeepֻandֻbearֻarms,”ֻ Heller,ֻ 554ֻ U.S.ֻ atֻ 595,ֻ whichֻ extendsֻ toֻ “theֻ possessionֻ andֻ useֻ ofֻ weaponsֻthatֻareֻ‘inֻcommonֻuse,’”ֻBruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting

Heller, 554 U.S. at 627). And at least two federal courts have held that

thisֻ“blanketֻrestrictionֻonֻfirearmsֻpossessionֻinֻpostֻofficesֻisֻincongruentֻwithֻtheֻAmericanֻtraditionֻofֻfirearmsֻregulation.” Ayala, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1348; see also Firearms Pol’y Coal., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 731

(similar). But see Nastri, 828 F. Supp. 3d at 329–30. Although we need

notֻreachֻaֻfirmֻconclusionֻasֻtoֻsectionֻ930’sֻconstitutionality,ֻtheseֻ courts’ֻunderstandingֻisֻcertainlyֻconsistentֻwithֻourֻviewֻthatֻbanningֻ the mailing of firearms does not pass constitutional muster. See Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1715 at *11–12. ItֻalsoֻcomportsֻwithֻtheֻCourt’sֻ most recent articulation of the Second Amendment right: that it precludes barring law-abidingֻcitizensֻwhoֻareֻlawfullyֻcarryingֻarmsֻ“fromֻentering many places that people routinely visit in the course of their daily

routines,”ֻasֻsuchֻoutlawingֻofֻcommonlyֻusedֻweaponryֻleavesֻcitizensֻ

“vulnerableֻ forֻ th[e]ֻ periodֻ ofֻ time”ֻ duringֻ whichֻ theyֻ areֻ unarmed. Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2040–41, 2048.

In short, we will not interpret the statute in a way that raises serious

constitutionalֻdoubtsֻifֻ“anֻalternativeֻinterpretationֻofֻtheֻstatuteֻisֻfairlyֻ possible.” Constitutionality of Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 50 Op. O.L.C. __, at *14 (June 9, 2026) (citation omitted). For the reasons

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

discussed above, section 930(d)(3) can be fairly read to permit the carrying of firearms in pursuit of the individual right of self-defense.

III.

Finally, exercising its general authority to manage its property, the

Postal Service has also adopted a regulation providing that,

“[n]otwithstandingֻtheֻprovisionsֻofֻanyֻotherֻlaw,ֻruleֻorֻregulation,ֻnoֻ person while on postal property may carry firearms, other dangerous or

deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, or store the

sameֻ onֻ postalֻ property,ֻ exceptֻ forֻ officialֻ purposes.” 39 C.F.R.

§ 232.1(l); see also 37 Fed. Reg. 24,346, 24,347 (Nov. 13, 1972). Because that regulation does not include any exception analogous to section

930(d)(3), the saving construction discussed above is not available.

WeֻconcludeֻthatֻtheֻPostalֻService’sֻregulationֻisֻunlawfulֻasֻappliedֻ

to the otherwise law-abiding citizens carrying constitutionally protected firearms for self-defense in post offices open to the public. Accordingly, the Executive Branch may not enforce 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) or the Postal

Service’sֻ regulationsֻ againstֻ aֻ law-abiding individual who carries a

constitutionally protected firearm into a post office for the purpose of

self-defense.

In 1988, via section 930, Congress addressed the question of when individuals may carry firearms in federal facilities. This specific and laterin-time congressional determination narrowed the general authority of the Postal Service to manage its property. Cf. Harmonizing the Personal

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and

Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980,

50 Op. O.L.C. __, at *18 (Feb. 18, 2026). 23 At the time, the rule promulgated by the Postal Service did not includeֻtheֻcaveatֻ“[n]otwithstandingֻ theֻprovisionsֻofֻanyֻotherֻlaw,ֻrule,ֻorֻregulation.” 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(l).

23 Toֻbeֻsure,ֻthisֻprincipleֻisֻinֻsomeֻtensionֻwithֻ“[t]heֻpresumptionֻdisfavoringֻ

impliedֻrepeals”—but it is just that: a presumption. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 461–63 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting authorities). That presumption is weakened here by the fact that Congress passed a statute that is at odds with a regulation. But even if the regulation and the statute were on equal legal footing, the presumption againstֻ impliedֻ repealֻ canֻ beֻ overcomeֻ byֻ (amongֻ otherֻ things)ֻ anֻ “irreconcilableֻ conflict.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974).

50 Op. O.L.C. __ (Aug. 12, 2026)

TheֻPostalֻServiceֻaddedֻthatֻlanguageֻinֻ2007ֻtoֻ“eliminateֻpotentialֻ

conflicts with other laws, rules or regulation which may allow the possessionֻofֻ[firearms]ֻforֻotherֻthanֻofficialֻpurposes.” 72 Fed. Reg. 12,565, 12,565 (Mar. 16, 2007) (emphasis added).

Theֻ Postalֻ Serviceֻ mayֻ notֻ overrideֻ Congress’sֻ determination—at

least in the absence of any indication that post offices present distinct issues that Congress did not consider when legislating about federal

facilities. “Itֻisֻaֻcommonplaceֻofֻstatutoryֻconstructionֻthatֻtheֻspecificֻ governsֻ theֻ general.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated

Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (alteration accepted) (citation omitted).

And agencies may not use their regulatory authority in a manner that

“contradict[s]ֻcongressionalֻpolicy.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529

U.S. at 139. As noted above, congressional policy does not bar otherwise

law-abiding officials from carrying constitutionally protected firearms

into a post office that is open to the public for the purposes of selfdefense.24 We do not address post offices that are closed to the public or federal facilities other than post offices.

LANORA C. PETTIT

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

24 Even if we were to conclude that Congress had authorized the Postal Service to

promulgate firearms regulations stricter than section 930(a), we would still have grave doubtsֻthatֻtheֻPostalֻService’sֻregulationֻisֻconsistentֻwithֻtheֻSecondֻAmendmentֻforֻ the reasons discussed in Part II.B, supra. We would therefore still conclude, under the strong form of the constitutional-avoidance canon, see Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350–57, that the Postal Service must permit that lawful carrying of protected firearms for self-defense in post offices open to the public, see supra note 11 (discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance).

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) to Post Offices

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain