In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00408-CV
FIRMUS CENTRO, LLC, APPELLANT
V.
ATX SELF-STORAGE, LLC, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 419th District Court
Travis County, Texas1
Trial Court No. D-1-GN-19-008477, Honorable Catherine A. Mauzy, Presiding
August 12, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
This appeal is the second in the underlying dispute. In the first, this Court
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant, Firmus
Centro, LLC’s, request for permanent injunction and attorney’s fees in accordance with
1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. We apply the Third Court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. our opinion.2 On remand, the trial court entered an order concerning those matters.
However, Firmus claims the trial court again abused its discretion. It therefore appeals
from the trial court’s Amended Final Judgment awarding an injunction and attorney’s fees.
We modify the trial court’s judgment in part, and, as modified, affirm the judgment as set
forth herein.
BACKGROUND
The conflict giving rise to this appeal involved an easement agreement between
two adjoining commercial property owners. In this Court’s opinion disposing of the first
appeal, we determined the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Firmus
a permanent injunction against ATX for obstructing vehicular ingress and egress. This
Court also found Firmus was the prevailing party under the easement agreement and
therefore, was entitled to attorney’s fees. We remanded the matter to the trial court for
“consideration of Firmus’s request for permanent injunction and a determination of
Firmus’s attorney’s fees in accordance with this opinion.”
On remand, the trial court entered a permanent injunction as follows:
It is HEREBY ORDERED that ATX and its representatives, agents,
servants, representatives, and all persons or entities acting in active concert
or participation with ATX are hereby ordered to refrain from and are hereby
immediately permanently enjoined from interfering with Firmus’s rights of
ingress and egress across the Driveway Easement Areas dedicated by the
Lot 2 Owner as illustrated in Exhibit “C” to the Easement Agreement for
Reciprocal Access and Parking and located on ATX’s property at 6901 IH35 North in Austin, Texas . . . .
2 Firmus Centro, LLC v. ATX Self-Storage, LLC, No. 07-23-00171-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8152
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 22, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
2
“Interfering” as used in this Amended Final Judgment means
blocking more than 10 feet of the subject easement Driveway Easement
Areas, such that less than 15 feet of contiguous space is left for vehicular
and pedestrian traffic to pass.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no finding of contempt shall issue
based on this Permanent Injunction unless Firmus has shown all of the
following beyond a reasonable doubt:
• The person parking the interfering vehicle or placing the
interfering obstacle was an ATX owner, an ATX employee, or
an invitee to ATX’s premises; and
• If the person parking the interfering vehicle or placing the
interfering obstacle was not an ATX owner or employee, then:
o ATX has been provided written notice of the interfering
vehicle or obstacle, generally describing the vehicle or
obstacle and its location on the property (via email
*********); and
o ATX has failed to instruct the person to move the
interfering vehicle or obstacle within:
▪ Ten (10) minutes if during ATX’s posted office
hours; or
▪ one (1) hour if not during ATX’s posted office
hours; and
o In the event the person fails to comply with ATX’s
instructions to move the interfering vehicle/obstacle,
ATX has failed to call a towing service to remove the
offending vehicle (or, if feasible, failed to move the
offending non-vehicular obstacle) within ten (10)
minutes after the instructions were given.
Additionally, by its order, the trial court adopted the findings of this Court
concerning attorney’s fees to be awarded to Firmus and awarded to it $79,000 plus
additional appellate fees. But, it further found ATX prevailed “as to another main
issue . . . of at least equal importance . . . and is therefore also entitled to an award of its
reasonable attorney’s fees associated with that summary judgment victory.” It awarded
to ATX attorney’s fees in the amount of $273,000 plus additional appellate fees. It found
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that when the Amended Final Judgment became final and non-appealable, “it will become
a judgment in ATX’s favor for the net sum of $194,000.00.”
ANALYSIS
Issue One—Permanent Injunction
By its first issue, Firmus argues the trial court abused its discretion by entering a
narrow injunction that did nothing to prevent ATX’s ongoing breach of the parties’
driveway easement and, instead, placed an improper heightened burden on Firmus to
remediate any breach. We agree and sustain the issue.
We review a trial court’s decision concerning a permanent injunction for an abuse
of discretion. Wiese v. Healthlake Cmty. Ass’n, 384 S.W.3d 395, 399 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision
is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.
(citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).
The purpose of injunctive relief is to “halt wrongful acts that are either threatened
or in the course of accomplishment.” Wiese, 384 S.W.3d at 399. “Every order granting
an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall
be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the
complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.” Gilbreath v. Horan,
682 S.W.3d 454, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R.
CIV. P. 683). Therefore, an injunction must be as “definite, clear, and precise as possible
and when practicable it should inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from
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doing . . . .” Gilbreath, 682 S.W.3d at 543 (citing Computek Computer & Office Supplies,
Inc. v. Walton, 156 S.W.3d 217, 220–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). An injunction
“must also be narrowly drawn and ‘must not be so broad that it would enjoin a defendant
from acting within its lawful rights”). Rule 683 does not impose a heightened standard of
review in the context of civil injunctions of the nature before us. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.
In determining whether contempt is civil or criminal, we “examine the purpose
behind the contempt order.” In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-25-00681-CV,
2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 3737, at *16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 21, 2026, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Civil contempt is “remedial and coercive in nature,” and “the contemnor
carries the keys to the jail cell in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned
on obedience with the court’s order.” Id. Conversely, “criminal contempt is punitive in
nature—the contemnor is being punished for some completed act which affronted the
dignity and authority of the court.” Id.
In our opinion disposing of the first appeal, we concluded, “Firmus’s requested
injunction is narrowly tailored and specific enough to address the particular conduct
complained of, namely, the blocking of the driveway . . . [r]egardless of whether the trial
court agreed with the specific language suggested by Firmus, it was required to grant an
injunction upon request to prohibit future offending behavior by ATX. The failure to do so
was an abuse of discretion.” Firmus Centro, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8152, at *10. On
remand, the trial court was presented with the same proposed injunction from Firmus. It
did not enter that injunction, however. Rather, it imposed the injunction as set forth above.
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Under the injunction put in place by the trial court, Firmus can only establish a
finding of contempt is warranted if it can show beyond a reasonable doubt that it has fully
complied with the requisites set forth in the imposed injunction. Such a standard places
a very high burden on Firmus and is, in fact, a standard not typically found in civil law.
See In re Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. 2020) (commitment proceeding under the
Sexually Violent Predators Act that noted the case was the “unusual civil case
incorporating the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ burden of proof typically reserved for
criminal cases”). Rule 683 and accompanying case law do not impose, or appear to
authorize, this heightened burden in the context like that before us.
We therefore modify the injunction entered by the trial court by deleting the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” language from the paragraph stating, “[n]otwithstanding the
foregoing, no finding of contempt shall issue based on this Permanent Injunction unless
Firmus has shown all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”
We note also Firmus argues that under the injunction put in place by the trial court,
Firmus, not ATX, bears the burden of monitoring and providing written notice of any
interfering vehicle or obstacle. The trial court was tasked with implementing an injunction
narrowly tailored and specific enough to address the particular conduct complained of,
namely, the blocking of the driveway. While the injunction tailored by the trial court does
place the burden of monitoring and notifying upon Firmus, we cannot say such placement
was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Therefore, with the exception of the
modification set forth above, we do not disturb the remainder of the trial court’s permanent
injunction.
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Issue Two—Attorney’s Fees
Via its second issue, Firmus contends that in light of this Court’s previous opinion
stating, “Firmus was the prevailing party, not ATX,” the trial court erred by both
“nominating ATX a prevailing party in the amended final judgment and awarding ATX
$273,000 in attorneys’ fees, plus additional contingent appellate attorneys’ fees.”3
In our opinion disposing of the first appeal, this Court concluded ATX was not a
prevailing party because it did not obtain actual relief on any claim. Firmus Centro, 2024
Tex. App. LEXIS 8152, at *15–16. Further, we found the “legal relationship between ATX
and Firmus was materially altered by the jury’s verdict, and ATX could not be the
‘prevailing party’ for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees.” Id. at *16. We determined
the trial court erred by awarding ATX attorney’s fees and reversed the trial court’s
judgment “as to the attorney’s fees awarded to ATX.” We remanded the matter for “a
determination of Firmus’s attorney’s fees in accordance with this opinion.”
On remand, the trial court awarded to Firmus attorney’s fees in the amount of
$79,000, plus $12,000 for representation in the court of appeals, plus a total of $21,000
for representation at the petition for review stage, merits briefing, and oral argument in
the Supreme Court. However, it also found ATX prevailed on another claim and awarded
it attorney’s fees in the amount of $273,000 plus additional appellate fees. It also found
3 In the alternative, Firmus claims that even if ATX is a prevailing party, the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding attorney’s fees that were unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence and that significantly exceeded the amount ATX tried to tie to the single issue on which the trial court adjudged it a prevailing party. Given our disposition of Firmus’s second issue, we need not consider its alternative argument.
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that when the Amended Final Judgment became final and non-appealable, “it will become
a judgment in ATX’s favor for the net sum of $194,000.00.”
That order directly contradicts this Court’s ruling concerning the prevailing party
and attorney’s fees. It also directly contradicts the provision in the easement agreement
providing that only the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney’s fees. “The trial
court, however, has no authority to take any action that is inconsistent with or beyond
what is necessary to give full effect to the appellate court’s judgment and mandate.” Scott
Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, 578 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.); see also
Spicer v. Maxus Healthcare Partners, LLC, No. 02-21-00423-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS
1009, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court
must observe and carry out the mandate of the court of appeals, and its orders carrying
out the mandate are ministerial. Scott Pelley P.C., 578 S.W.3d at 699. The scope of the
mandate is determined by looking at the mandate itself as well as the opinion of the court.
Spicer, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 1009, at *6. Additionally, the appellate court’s judgment is
final, “not only in reference to the matters actually litigated, but as to all other matters that
the parties might have litigated and had decided in the cause.” Scott Pelley, 578 S.W.3d
at 699. We determined Firmus to be the prevailing party and directed the trial court on
remand to determine Firmus’s attorney’s fees, not ATX’s. The trial court went beyond our
mandate and therefore, abused its discretion.4 We sustain Firmus’s issue.
4 We note also ATX sought review of the attorney’s fees issue in the Texas Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition.
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CONCLUSION
We modify the portion of the Amended Final Judgment concerning the permanent
injunction by deleting the language requiring proof of “beyond a reasonable doubt” as set
forth herein. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2. We further modify the Amended Final Judgment
by deleting the award of attorney’s fees to ATX, and, as modified, affirm the judgment.
Alex Yarbrough
Justice
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