IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-KA-01296-COA
JARMARION THOMPSON A/K/A JAMARION APPELLANT THOMPSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/24/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ALAN D. LANCASTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIAM ADAM HOPPER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/11/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. An Attala County Circuit Court jury found Jarmarion Thompson guilty of first-degree
murder for the fatal shooting of Jamel Davis. The Attala County Circuit Court sentenced
Thompson to serve thirty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC). On appeal, Thompson argues that the circuit court erred by allowing
the lead investigator to testify about a statement the victim’s brother made regarding how the
shooting occurred and by refusing the defense’s proposed jury instruction about the
defendant’s right to stand his ground. Upon review, we find no reversible error. We therefore affirm Thompson’s conviction and sentence for first-degree murder.
FACTS
¶2. Around 1:30 a.m. on July 20, 2023, Deputy Jacob Edwards with the Attala County
Sheriff’s Office and Captain Matt Ward with the Kosciusko Police Department were both
on duty and parked at a local business when they heard multiple gunshots. As the law
enforcement officers drove to the suspected area of the gunshots, they received a call about
a shooting victim at a local residence. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers saw a man,
later identified as Davis, lying in the residence’s driveway. Davis had suffered a gunshot
wound to his chest. Davis told Captain Ward that he did not believe he had much longer to
live. In response to Captain Ward’s questions, Davis said that he had been standing by some
bushes in his front yard when he was shot. Davis further said that he believed the shot had
been fired from some nearby woods.
¶3. While Deputy Edwards and Captain Ward were canvassing the surrounding area, they
received a report about a vehicle, later identified as a 2018 gray Nissan Altima, abandoned
in a ditch on a nearby street. As the officers pulled up to the Altima, they saw one man, later
identified as Taveon Rimmer, leaning into the passenger side window of the vehicle. The
officers saw a second man, later identified as Billy Brown, walking down the street. After
detaining both Rimmer and Brown, the officers noticed a rifle (an AR-15) leaning against
a tree about five feet away from the vehicle. After Deputy Edwards collected the rifle,
Captain Ward ran a search on the serial number and stowed the weapon in his patrol car.
Captain Ward later turned over possession of the AR-15 to Greg Collins, the lead
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investigator with the Kosciusko Police Department.
¶4. When Investigator Collins arrived at the scene of Davis’s shooting, Davis had been
loaded into an ambulance. Davis’s brother, Ferrell Bailey, lived with Davis and had been
with him at the time of the shooting. Bailey remained at the crime scene and spoke with
investigators about the shooting. As Investigator Collins walked around the area of the
shooting, he observed numerous .40-caliber shell casings in the front yard of Davis and
Bailey’s residence. He also noticed some AR-15 rifle shell casings at the wood line near the
property.
¶5. As Investigator Collins canvassed the crime scene, he received a phone call from
Lieutenant Jerry Erving with the Kosciusko Police Department. Lieutenant Erving had
responded to a dispatch call about another shooting victim at the local hospital. At that point
in time, law enforcement had no knowledge as to whether the new victim was related to
Davis’s shooting or had been involved in a separate incident. Upon arriving at the hospital,
Lieutenant Erving learned that the victim, Thompson, was only seventeen years old. After
obtaining consent from Thompson’s mother, Lieutenant Erving interviewed Thompson about
his gunshot injuries. Thompson stated that he was driving in his car with a female friend
when he heard gunshots. Thompson said that he exited his car and walked toward the wood
line. Thompson stated that he then realized he had been shot. Thompson denied that he had
fired a weapon. Because Thompson’s account of his shooting placed him on a street near
Davis and Bailey’s residence, Lieutenant Erving passed along the information about the
incident to Investigator Collins.
3
¶6. Upon receiving Lieutenant Erving’s phone call about Thompson, Investigator Collins
turned the crime scene over to another member of the Kosciusko Police Department and
drove to the hospital. After Investigator Collins informed Thompson of his Miranda rights,1
Thompson gave Investigator Collins a videotaped statement about the events leading to his
injuries. Unlike what he told Lieutenant Erving, Thompson told Investigator Collins that he
had been driving in his car with his friend, Rimmer, when two guys began shooting at them.
Thompson stated that he exited his car and collapsed as he ran away. According to
Thompson, Rimmer retrieved an AR-15 from the vehicle, went to the nearby wood line, and
fired the weapon.
¶7. Following Thompson’s statement, Investigator Collins informed Thompson that he
was going to perform a gunshot residue test on Thompson to send to the Mississippi
Forensics Laboratory for analysis. Although Thompson had initially denied firing a weapon,
he subsequently changed his story. Thompson admitted to Investigator Collins that he, not
Rimmer, had fired the AR-15 after the other two men had shot their weapons at him.
¶8. After completing the gunshot residue test, Investigator Collins again asked Thompson
to recount the events that had led to Thompson’s injuries. This time, Thompson told
Investigator Collins that after the two men shot at him and ran away, he retrieved the AR-15
from his car, went to the wood line nearby, and fired the weapon at the two men. Thompson
stated that he was shot as he attempted to run away. Although Thompson made it back to his
vehicle, he stated that he backed the car into a ditch.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
¶9. After completing his interview with Thompson, Investigator Collins returned to the
crime scene. Law enforcement officers collected multiple .40-caliber shell casings where
Davis and Bailey fired from their front yard, as well as multiple shell casings from
Thompson’s AR-15 at the nearby wood line. At Thompson’s subsequent trial for Davis’s
shooting death, Investigator Collins testified about his investigation. On cross-examination,
Thompson’s attorney elicited testimony that “it was a hostile environment” when Investigator
Collins arrived at the crime scene. Thompson’s attorney further elicited testimony that
Bailey had made an excited and very emphatic utterance in Investigator Collins’s presence,
although the State objected to Investigator Collins testifying about the exact words Bailey
had uttered.
¶10. Thompson’s attorney asked if Investigator Collins had questioned Bailey about any
weapons present at the crime scene. Investigator Collins initially responded that Bailey said
someone had shot at him and the victim, which corresponded with the statement Davis made
to the first officers to arrive at the crime scene. Following Investigator Collins’s response,
Thompson’s attorney emphasized that he was only asking about what Bailey had said
regarding any weapons present at the crime scene. Investigator Collins then responded that
Bailey had admitted to putting the weapons he and Davis had fired under a bedroom mattress
inside the residence.
¶11. Based on Bailey’s disclosure, Investigator Collins obtained a warrant to search the
residence. Consistent with Bailey’s statement, Investigator Collins recovered two .40-caliber
handguns from underneath a bedroom mattress. At least one of the weapons still had live
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ammunition inside it. In response to additional questioning on cross-examination,
Investigator Collins explained that he did not have the weapons dusted for fingerprints
because Bailey admitted that he and Davis had fired the weapons from the residence’s front
yard, which was where law enforcement had recovered the .40-caliber shell casings.
¶12. On redirect examination, the State asked Investigator Collins what Bailey had
disclosed regarding how the shooting occurred. Thompson’s attorney immediately raised a
general objection to the testimony. Thompson’s attorney argued that he had limited his
questions on cross-examination to statements Bailey had given regarding weapons concealed
under the bedroom mattress. The circuit judge found, however, that the defense had opened
the door to the issue of how the shooting occurred by asking Investigator Collins about the
concealed weapons. The circuit judge concluded that in answering the defense’s questions
regarding the weapons, Investigator Collins had “also [been] talking about the shooting.”
As a result, the circuit judge overruled the defense’s objection and allowed Investigator
Collins to testify as to what Bailey had said about Davis’s shooting.
¶13. According to Investigator Collins, Bailey said that he and Davis were standing in their
front yard when a gray car drove by the residence multiple times. Bailey eventually saw the
car pull onto a nearby street. He then heard the sound of doors closing and saw someone in
the woods. Bailey told Investigator Collins that he and Davis ran to the back of their house.
As they returned to the front yard, someone shot at them from the woods. Bailey told
Investigator Collins that he and Davis then returned fire toward the wood line.
¶14. Investigator Collins obtained a search warrant for Thompson’s Altima, where he
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recovered a gunstock from the back seat of the vehicle. Investigator Collins then conducted
another interview with Thompson on August 31, 2023. Thompson again waived his Miranda
rights and agreed to a recorded interview with Investigator Collins. Investigator Collins
asked Thompson to share his account of the events leading to Davis’s shooting. Thompson’s
version of events differed from those he had previously provided to law enforcement.
Thompson stated that after dropping off a female friend, he drove by two men who began
shooting at him. Thompson said that he was injured by the gunfire and attempted to flee the
scene in his vehicle. Thompson stated that he reversed his Altima to leave the scene, but the
car became stuck in a ditch. Thompson said that by this point the two men had retreated to
the nearby woods. Thompson stated that he retrieved his AR-15 from his vehicle, proceeded
to the wood line, and began shooting at the two men.
¶15. In light of Thompson’s statement, Investigator Collins canvassed the area along the
street where Thompson claimed the shooting began. Despite searching multiple times,
Investigator Collins did not find any shell casings to corroborate Thompson’s story that the
two men had shot at him from the roadway. Instead, Investigator Collins reiterated that the
only two places where he recovered shell casings were in the front yard of Davis and Bailey’s
residence and the spot along the wood line where Thompson admitted he had fired his AR15.
¶16. Law enforcement officers arrested Thompson for Davis’s death. At trial, Thompson
testified in his own defense. Thompson stated that he and Davis became interested in the
same young woman. According to Thompson, Davis sent him threats over the Internet and
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social media and warned him to stay away from the young woman. Thompson stated that the
day before the shooting, Bailey also sent him a threatening message over social media.
Thompson testified that although he did not know Davis and Bailey personally, he was aware
that they had a reputation for violence. As a result, Thompson stated that after receiving
Davis’s and Bailey’s threats, he began to drive around with the AR-15 in the back seat of his
vehicle.
¶17. Thompson testified that on the night of the shooting, he had driven to a friend’s home.
Thompson explained that after he left his friend’s home, he turned onto another street and
encountered two people standing in the road. Although it was dark outside, Thompson’s
vehicle headlights illuminated the two people. Thompson testified that as a result, he could
see that the two people were holding weapons.
¶18. Thompson stated that he opened his car door and asked the people what they were
doing. Neither individual answered Thompson, but he testified that he was finally able to
identify the two men as Davis and Bailey. Thompson stated that Bailey held a handgun, and
Davis held an AK-47. Thompson further stated that he sustained a gunshot to his left arm
as he tried to get back into his car. Thompson said that he tried to flee the scene but backed
his Altima into a ditch. Thompson testified that Davis and Bailey were still standing in the
same spot, and he feared for his life.
¶19. Thompson stated that he retrieved his AR-15 from the back seat of his car. Davis and
Bailey had made it to the nearby wood line, so Thompson followed them to the woods.
Thompson stated that by the time he reached the wood line, Davis and Bailey had reached
8
their front yard. According to Thompson, as Davis raised his AK-47 to shoot him,
Thompson “opened fire” and emptied his fifteen-round magazine. Thompson stated that
Davis and Bailey began shooting at him as well. Thompson testified that as far as he knew,
neither Davis nor Bailey had been injured during the exchange of gunfire.
¶20. After running out of ammunition, Thompson stated that he walked back toward his
Altima. Another vehicle approached him, and after learning that Thompson had been shot,
the driver transported Thompson to the hospital. Hospital staff administered treatment to
Thompson and gave him medicine for his pain. Thompson stated that he was still receiving
treatment at the time that Investigator Collins first interviewed him at the hospital.
Thompson admitted that over the course of his various interviews with Investigator Collins,
he provided several different versions of the events leading to his injuries and Davis’s
shooting. Thompson stated, however, that in each version he maintained that Bailey and
Davis had shot at and injured him first.
¶21. On cross-examination, Thompson stated that he had “been aware of” Davis and Bailey
for about a year before the shooting occurred. He further stated that he could identify the two
men by sight and knew where they lived. About a month before the shooting, Thompson
began dating a young woman. Thompson stated that Davis was also dating the same woman
and learned about the relationship around four days before the shooting, when the woman
posted a picture on social media of herself and Thompson. Thompson stated that after the
woman posted the picture on social media, he began to receive threats from Davis.
¶22. When questioned by the State about another shooting that occurred at Davis and
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Bailey’s house just prior to Davis’s death, Thompson denied any involvement. In response
to Thompson’s testimony that his AR-15 could shoot fifteen rounds at a time, the State asked
how law enforcement had recovered twenty-one shell casings at the crime scene from
Thompson’s weapon. In replying to the State’s questions, Thompson denied any knowledge
of where the additional shell casings had come from, and he again denied any involvement
in the earlier shooting that had occurred at Davis and Bailey’s residence.
¶23. Thompson admitted on cross-examination that on the night of the shooting, he snuck
out of his house after his curfew and picked up his friend, Rimmer. Thompson also admitted
that instead of avoiding the streets around Davis and Bailey’s residence, he drove on the
roads near their home on the night of the shooting. On direct examination, Thompson had
alleged that when he encountered Davis and Bailey in the road and exited his Altima, he kept
his driver’s side door between himself and the two other men. Thompson had also alleged
that Davis and Bailey shot him as he attempted to get back into his vehicle. Despite his
description of events, Thompson admitted on cross-examination that “there were no bullet
holes in [his] car” from the shots he claimed that Davis and Bailey initially fired at him. In
addition, Thompson agreed with the State that if the men had shot him as he was getting back
into his car as he had claimed, he likely “would have been hit in the front of the body” rather
than sustaining a gunshot wound to the back of his arm. Thompson denied, however, that
he actually fired at Davis and Bailey first from the wood line and then was shot in the back
of the arm as he attempted to flee from their return gunfire.
¶24. Thompson conceded that he initially lied to law enforcement about how the shooting
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occurred and only admitted to firing the AR-15 after Investigator Collins got ready to
perform the gunshot residue test on him. Thompson also conceded that after Davis and
Bailey had allegedly fired at him from the road and then retreated to their residence, he
“walked somewhere between 150 to 225 feet to[ward] danger to defend [himself].” In
response to the State’s questions, Thompson stated that he had no explanation for why law
enforcement had been unable to recover any shell casings from the spot near the road where
he said Davis and Bailey had initially shot at him.
¶25. Following its deliberations, the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder for
Davis’s death. The circuit court sentenced Thompson to serve thirty-five years in MDOC’s
custody.2 Thompson unsuccessfully moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
alternatively, a new trial. Aggrieved, Thompson appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Right to Confront Witnesses
¶26. Thompson argues that the circuit court erred by allowing Investigator Collins to testify
2
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21(2)(b) (Supp. 2024), which applied at the time of Thompson’s sentencing in September 2024, provides the following:
A juvenile offender who is convicted of first-degree murder after July 1, 2024,
may be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of
Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury. If the jury fails to fix the
penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than
twenty (20) nor more than forty (40) years in the custody of the Department
of Corrections.
Thompson was seventeen years old at the time of Davis’s death, and the jury convicted him of first-degree murder after July 1, 2024. As a result, the circuit court sentenced him in accordance with section 97-3-21(2)(b).
11
on redirect examination about Bailey’s statement as to how the shooting occurred.
Thompson asserts that the testimony regarding Bailey’s statement constituted prejudicial
hearsay and violated his fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him. Thompson
acknowledges that his trial attorney’s general objection to Investigator Collins’s testimony
failed to explicitly reference either hearsay or a violation of the Confrontation Clause. He
therefore asks this Court to review the issue for plain error, asserting that “[a] violation of
the Confrontation Clause is a violation of a fundamental, substantive right, which seriously
affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Corbin v. State,
74 So. 3d 333, 337 (¶11) (Miss. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Patterson v. State, 422 So. 3d 1062, 1069 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (“For the
plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been an error that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” (quoting Conners v. State, 92 So. 3d 676, 682 (¶15) (Miss. 2012))).
¶27. “Under both the United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution, an
accused has a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless the witness is unavailable
or the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine the witness.” Quinn v. State, 398 So.
3d 256, 267 (¶35) (Miss. 2024) (citations and internal quotation mark omitted). Here,
nothing in the record reflects that Bailey was unavailable for trial. The record does clearly
reflect, however, that Thompson had no prior chance to cross-examine Bailey about the
statement he gave regarding how the shooting occurred.
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¶28. We next consider the nature of the statement that Bailey gave to Investigator Collins.
“Statements are non-testimonial when they are ‘made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’” Phillips v. State, 415 So. 3d
583, 592 (¶24) (Miss. 2025) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). By
contrast, “[t]estimonial statements occur when the ‘circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency’ and when ‘the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Id.
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
¶29. In Phillips, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s argument that
playing an eyewitness’s statements for the jury, which occurred following the admission of
a responding officer’s body-camera footage, violated his right to confrontation. Id. at 591
(¶17). Similarly to the present case, the eyewitness in Phillips did not testify at trial, and the
supreme court reviewed the matter for plain error. Id. at 591-92 (¶¶17, 22). Before
determining whether the disputed statements were testimonial or non-testimonial, the Phillips
court noted the following:
The relevant inquiry in determining whether the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency, making statements
non-testimonial, is the purpose that reasonable participants would have had,
as ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and the
circumstances in which the encounter occurred. Courts should further look at
whether an ongoing emergency existed at the time of their encounter, the
formality of the encounter between the victim and the police, and the
statements and actions of both the declarant and the interrogators.
Id. at 593 (¶27) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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¶30. In looking at other cases that discussed similar issues, the Phillips court focused on
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 348 (2011), where the United States Supreme Court
ultimately found that a victim’s statements to law enforcement at the crime scene were
non-testimonial. Phillips, 415 So. 3d at 592-93 (¶26). As the Phillips court explained,
[i]n Bryant, police officers responded to a 911 call that a man had been shot,
but they did not know why, where, or when the shooting occurred. Further, the
officers did not know the location of the shooter or anything else about the
circumstances in which the crime had occurred. The officers asked the victims
question like what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting
occurred to allow the police to assess the situation, the threat to their own
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim and to the public. In other
words, they solicited the information necessary to enable them to meet an
ongoing emergency.
Additionally, the Bryant Court considered the informality of the
situation and the interrogation. It reflected that the officers arrived to the
scene at varying times, and they did not conduct a formal or structured
interrogation. The Bryant Court ultimately found that the victim’s statements
to the officers on the scene were made during an ongoing emergency, they
were not testimonial, and they did not violate Bryant’s Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause rights.
Id. at 593 (¶¶28-29) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶31. Consistent with the circumstances presented in Bryant, the Phillips court concluded
that the statements contained in the body-camera footage “were made during an ongoing
emergency, and the primary purpose of [the witness’s] statements to the officers that night
were to ‘assess the situation, the threat to the officers’ safety, and possible danger to the
potential victim and to the public.’” Id. at 593-94 (¶30) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 376).
“Also consistent with Bryant, the interrogation by the officers on the scene that night was not
structured or formal[,]” and the “responding officers arrived at different times, similar to
14
Bryant.” Id. at 594 (¶32). The responding officers also both testified that although the
witness in Phillips was not physically injured, he was distraught by what had just occurred.
Id. “In conjunction with the fact that Phillips had fled the scene with a weapon,” the supreme
court found sufficient record evidence to demonstrate “that the primary purpose of [the
witness’s] statements made to officers was to assess the situation and to address the ongoing
emergency.” Id. Based on what was known at the time, Phillips, who was “armed and at
large, created a possible threat to the officers’ safety and a potential danger to the victim and
the public.” Id. at (¶33). For these reasons, the Phillips court deemed the witness statements
contained in the admitted body-camera footage non-testimonial and found no violation of
Phillips’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Id.
¶32. Unlike its decision in Phillips, our supreme court more recently found in Gibson v.
State, No. 2024-KA-00726-SCT, 2026 WL 1830389, at *10 (¶46) (Miss. June 25, 2026), that
the circuit court “abused its discretion by allowing large amounts of prejudicial hearsay
testimony” from investigators, who were permitted to testify over the defense’s continuing
objections “in great detail regarding what they learned during their investigation” from the
multiple witnesses they interviewed. The Gibson court reiterated the principle that an
officer’s testimony about statements he obtained is admissible when “used to explain why
[the officer] did what he did in the course of his investigation” rather than to “prove the truth
of the matter asserted[.]” Id. (quoting Dukes v. State, 369 So. 3d 553, 562-63 (¶35) (Miss.
2023)). But in stark contrast to both the present case and Phillips, the supreme court
concluded that the investigators’ testimony in Gibson far exceeded an explanation for the
15
course of their investigation or the reason for their next investigatory step. Id. at *11 (¶47).
¶33. The Gibson court noted that the two investigators “were allowed to testify in depth
as to what each person [whom] they had interviewed during their investigation had informed
them, essentially forming the foundation of the State’s entire case.” Id. at *14 (¶57). The
Gibson court further noted that in addition to the investigators’ improper testimony, “the
State was allowed to cross-examine [the defendant] about a portion” of a pre-trial “statement
that was not admitted into evidence and to which no witness had testified.” Id. at *15 (¶59).
Finding that the inadmissible testimony “was used to establish key points of the State’s case
during trial” as well as to “greatly prejudice[] Gibson,” the supreme court reversed Gibson’s
convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at *16 (¶61).
¶34. Upon review, we conclude that the present case more closely aligns with the facts set
forth in Phillips than with the extreme circumstances detailed by our supreme court in
Gibson. Like the witness in Phillips, Bailey was not himself physically injured, but he was
clearly upset about his brother’s injuries. As Thompson’s attorney elicited from Investigator
Collins on cross-examination, Bailey made an excited and emphatic utterance at the crime
scene. In addition, Investigator Collins described the scene as “a hostile environment” by
the time he arrived.
¶35. As law enforcement responded to Davis’s shooting and attempted to ascertain what
had occurred, both Davis and Bailey made separate statements that someone had shot at
them. As previously discussed, the circuit court admitted the testimony about Davis’s
statement into evidence, and on appeal, Thompson raises no challenge regarding that ruling
16
by the circuit court. At the crime scene, officers discovered numerous shell casings in both
the residence’s front yard and at the nearby wood line. These discoveries corroborated the
portion of Davis’s and Bailey’s statements in which they indicated that they had fired
weapons from their yard as another person returned fire from the wood line.
¶36. While at the crime scene, law enforcement received a report about an abandoned car
in a nearby ditch, and when the officers arrived at the car, they discovered a rifle leaning
against a tree and two men in the vicinity. Law enforcement then received another report
about an additional gunshot victim, who turned out to be Thompson, at the hospital. At the
time of receiving the report, the responding officers had no idea if Thompson’s shooting was
relevant to the crime they were already investigating. After learning about Thompson’s
shooting from another officer, Investigator Collins testified that he left the crime scene to
interview Thompson.
¶37. Thompson initially stated in both his first and second versions of events that someone
had shot at him and that he had not fired a weapon in return. In his second version of events,
he amended his statement to include that his friend, Rimmer, whom law enforcement had
already detained near Davis and Bailey’s home, had fired the rifle found at that crime scene.
It was only in Thompson’s third version of events that he admitted to actually being the one
who fired the rifle found near Davis and Bailey’s home.
¶38. Based on the tense and chaotic environment of the crime scene, coupled with the
incoming reports of an abandoned car nearby and another unknown gunshot victim at the
hospital, the record provides sufficient evidence to establish that the statements Bailey made
17
occurred “during an ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of [the] statements to
[Investigator Collins] that night were to ‘assess the situation, the threat to the officers’ safety,
and possible danger to the potential victim and to the public.’” Phillips, 415 So. 3d at 593-94
(¶30) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 376). Accordingly, we conclude that the statement Bailey
made to Investigator Collins regarding how the shooting occurred was non-testimonial in
nature and that Thompson’s right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of the
statement into evidence. We therefore find no reversible error with regard to this issue.
II. Stand-Your-Ground Jury Instruction
¶39. In his second issue on appeal, Thompson contends that the circuit court erred by
refusing his proposed jury instruction about his right to stand his ground.3 We review the
circuit court’s denial of the proposed jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Haynes v.
State, 412 So. 3d 1170, 1179 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). The jury instructions “given must
be read as a whole.” Id. (quoting Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010)). If
the jury instructions as a whole “fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice,
no reversible error will be found.” Id. Although a “defendant is entitled to have jury
instructions which present his theory of the case, . . . the court may refuse an instruction that
incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without
foundation in the evidence.” Id. (quoting Newell, 49 So. 3d at 74 (¶20)).
¶40. As set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-15(4) (Supp. 2023),
3
Thompson’s proposed jury instruction stated, “If the Defendant was in a place where he had a right to be and the Defendant was not the initial aggressor or provoker, then the Defendant has no duty to flee and does not lose his right to self-defense.”
18
Mississippi’s stand-your-ground law provides the following:
A person who is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in unlawful
activity shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force under
subsection (1)(e) or (f) of this section if the person is in a place where the
person has a right to be, and no finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the
person’s failure to retreat as evidence that the person’s use of force was
unnecessary, excessive or unreasonable.
¶41. Here, the jury was instructed on Thompson’s right to defend himself. The State
objected, however, to a stand-your-ground instruction on the basis that the trial testimony and
evidence did not support the instruction. In agreeing with the State, the circuit judge found
that Thompson’s own testimony failed to provide a foundation for the proposed instruction.
Thompson claimed that after Davis and Bailey shot at and wounded him from the road, they
did not pursue him (even after he reversed his vehicle and became stuck in the ditch).
Instead, Thompson stated that the brothers retreated to the nearby woods. Thompson further
stated that after he retrieved his rifle from the back seat of his car, he pursued Davis and
Bailey to the wood line. Thompson admitted that by the time he reached the wood line,
Davis and Bailey had retreated even farther to their residence. As Thompson conceded on
cross-examination, he “walked somewhere between 150 to 225 feet to[ward] danger to
defend [himself].” Based on these admissions, the circuit judge concluded that Thompson
lost the right to stand his ground when he did not return fire from the roadway, where he
claimed the altercation initially occurred. Instead, as Thompson himself admitted, after
Davis and Bailey retreated from the alleged altercation with him, he took the time to grab a
weapon, pursue the brothers, and then fire upon them from the relative protection of the
woods as they stood in their front yard.
19
¶42. In addition to the circuit judge’s stated reason for refusing the stand-your-ground
instruction, the physical evidence presented at trial failed to support Thompson’s version of
events regarding how the shooting initially occurred. In the account of the shooting that he
testified to at trial, Thompson stated that Davis and Bailey fired at him first from the roadway
where his vehicle was found stuck in the ditch. But although numerous shell casings were
found in front of Davis and Bailey’s residence and at the wood line, no shell casings were
recovered from the road where Thompson claimed the altercation began. Thompson also
claimed that he was standing behind the open driver’s side door of his car when the brothers
first began to shoot at him. As he admitted on cross-examination, though, not only were no
bullet holes found in his car, but if his injury had occurred as he claimed, he likely “would
have been hit in the front of the body” rather than experiencing a gunshot wound to the back
of his arm. Based on Thompson’s own testimony and a lack of foundation in the evidence,
we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s refusal to give the proposed stand-yourground jury instruction.
CONCLUSION
¶43. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm Thompson’s conviction and sentence
for first-degree murder.
¶44. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER
ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., AND McDONALD, J.,
CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J.
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WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
¶45. I concur with the majority that no reversible error occurred related to Thompson’s
Confrontation Clause argument. I write separately because I would find that Thompson was
entitled to the proposed stand-your-ground jury instruction. Stand-your-ground jury
instructions should be given consistent with Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-15(4)
(Rev. 2020), which states in relevant part:
A person who is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in unlawful
activity shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force under
subsection (1)(e) or (f) of this section if the person is in a place where the
person has a right to be, and no finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the
person’s failure to retreat as evidence that the person’s use of force was
unnecessary, excessive or unreasonable.
¶46. A defendant may receive both a self-defense and a stand-your-ground instruction.
Craig v. State, 660 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Miss. 1995). Failure to give a stand-your-ground
instruction is reversible error when the instruction is supported by the evidence and not
adequately covered by the other instructions given. Williams v. State, 343 So. 3d 1035, 1039
(¶24) (Miss. 2022); see also Sanders v. State, 77 So. 3d 497, 502 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2011).
¶47. For example, in Haynes v. State, 412 So. 3d 1170, 1180 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025),
the jury that convicted the defendant of imperfect self-defense manslaughter received several
instructions covering his theory of self-defense. Id. at 1179 (¶31). However, the trial court
refused the defendant’s requested stand-your-ground instruction, reasoning that the evidence
did not support that the defendant had an opportunity to retreat when he made a “splitsecond” decision to fire his gun during an argument in a parking lot. Id. at 1178 (¶26). This
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Court reversed, finding that the defendant’s testimony did support that he had an opportunity
to retreat, that the evidence contained a basis for a jury to determine that the defendant was
not the original aggressor, and that the stand-your-ground principle was not adequately
covered when looking at the given instructions as a whole. Id. at 1184 (¶45).
¶48. Here, I would find that the evidence supported giving Thompson’s proposed jury
instruction D-17, which stated, “If the Defendant was in a place where he had a right to be
and the Defendant was not the initial aggressor or provoker, then the Defendant has no duty
to flee and does not lose his right to self-defense.” Thompson’s testimony at trial provided
an evidentiary basis to support that Davis and Bailey were the initial aggressors. Officer
Collins testified that Thompson’s statement to him was that “he was shot, then he went to the
wood line and shot back at them.” When asked, “[D]o you have anything to disprove that,
that he was shot first?” Officer Collins replied, “I can’t – I can’t disclose if he was or if he
wasn’t.” While Bailey told Officer Collins that someone shot at him and Davis first from the
woods, in the face of conflicting evidence, it is the prerogative of the jury to determine who
was the initial aggressor. McNeer v. State, 307 So. 3d 508, 516 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
¶49. Additionally, this is not a circumstance in which the instruction should be properly
refused because the defendant testified that he “had no time or opportunity to retreat.” Lewis
v. State, 374 So. 3d 529, 545 (¶56) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023); see also Spires v. State, 10 So. 3d
477, 486 (¶36) (Miss. 2009); Shaheed v. State, 205 So. 3d 1105, 1112 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). Thompson’s testimony provided an evidentiary basis to support his account that after
Davis and Bailey shot at him from the intersection, Thompson went back toward the house
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and then walked 50 yards to the wood line.
¶50. Finally, the stand-your-ground principle was not adequately covered in the other jury
instructions when reading them together as a whole. Hayes, 412 So. 3d at 1180 (¶32). While
the jury was instructed on self-defense, none of the instructions communicated that a
defendant who was not the original aggressor does not have a duty to retreat or that the
failure to retreat cannot be used as evidence that the use of force was unnecessary. Id. at
(¶33). “In homicide cases, the trial court should instruct the jury about a defendant’s theories
of defense, justification, or excuse that are supported by the evidence, no matter how meager
or unlikely, and the trial court’s failure to do so is error requiring reversal of a judgment of
conviction.” Reynolds v. State, 776 So. 2d 698, 700 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Manuel v. State, 667 So. 2d 590, 593 (Miss. 1995)). Even when “based on meager evidence
and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be
submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the
court.” Hester v. State, 602 So. 2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1992).
¶51. Because I would find that the court’s failure to give Thompson’s proposed jury
instruction D-17 was reversible error, I respectfully dissent in part.
McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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