IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-CA-01326-COA
RAYMOND S. WINTON APPELLANT
v.
ANITA B. (WINTON) DEAN APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/05/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RODNEY PURVIS FAVER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW DANIEL WILSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ROY E. CARPENTER JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/11/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Anita Dean and Raymond Winton divorced in 2001. As part of the chancellor’s
determination of their property division, Anita was awarded 50% of Raymond’s Public
Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) benefits calculated as if Raymond retired on October
18, 2000, including the cost of living adjustment (COLA). Raymond was further required to
select an annuity option with Anita as the beneficiary instead of selecting his maximum
benefit option. Because selection of the annuity option prevented Raymond from receiving
his maximum benefit, the chancellor ordered Anita to compensate Raymond for the
difference between the maximum benefit and the mandatorily selected annuity. Raymond
began making payments to Anita in July 2017 following his retirement. In 2024, Anita filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Raymond’s payments failed to account for the COLA
as required under the original judgments. Raymond argued in response that the COLA did
not compound on Anita’s benefits during the seventeen years he continued to work following
the divorce, and he counterclaimed that Anita had not satisfied her obligation to compensate
Raymond for the difference between his maximum benefits and the mandatory annuity
option.
¶2. The current chancellor (hereafter “the chancellor”) determined that the COLA applied
to Anita’s benefits starting in 2001, which is when the COLA would have begun had
Raymond retired in 2000. The chancellor further determined that Raymond’s payments to
Anita should be proportionally adjusted to account for Anita’s compensation obligation.
Applying these methods to the financial statements provided by the parties, the chancellor
calculated Raymond to be in arrears in the amount of $13,352.56. Finding no error in the
chancellor’s methodology or calculations, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. Anita and Raymond married in 1973 and divorced in 2001. At the time of the divorce,
Anita worked as an accountant and Raymond worked as a professor at Mississippi State
University. Under the judgment of divorce and property division, as clarified by an order
entered in 2002, Anita was awarded 50% of Raymond’s PERS retirement benefits computed
as of October 18, 2000.1 The order specified that “[f]ifty percent (50%) of those benefits
1
The parties submitted the issue of property division to the court and did not enter into an agreed property settlement.
2
including COLA shall belong to the Plaintiff, and the Defendant shall pay Plaintiff those
benefits at the time the Defendant retires[.]”
¶4. Raymond was also required to select “the 50% Joint and Survivor Annuity Benefit
Payment Plan (Option 4-A) naming the Plaintiff, Anita B. Winton, as beneficiary.”2
Raymond could not change the selection unless Anita predeceased him. Additionally, since
selection of Option 4-A would “reduce the maximum retirement benefits [Raymond] could
receive were he permitted to select the Option for maximum benefits,” Anita was ordered to
compensate Raymond “for the decrease in his portion of said benefits,” including “for the
years of credible service earned by [Raymond] beyond October 18, 2000.”
¶5. In 2002, PERS provided Raymond a document calculating his approximate benefits
as if he had retired in October 2000. His maximum benefit was estimated to be approximately
$3,392.31 per month. His benefit for selecting the annuity Option 4A was estimated to be
approximately $3,014.41 per month. The original judgment of divorce noted that at the time
of the divorce in 2001, Raymond was 61 years old and intended to retire at the age of 62.
However, Raymond did not retire until 2017. His 2017 final estimate of benefits provided
by PERS calculated his maximum benefit to be $9,294.67 per month and his Option 4A
benefit to be $7,623.49 per month.
¶6. Raymond began making monthly payments of approximately $750 to Anita when he
retired in 2017. Each following year, he increased the payment to account for the annual
2
Anita’s 50% annuity interest was valued at Raymond’s years of service at the time of the divorce.
3
three-percent COLA.3 In 2024, Anita filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Raymond was
underpaying her and that he was in arrears in the amount of $26,003.52. Anita’s expert
submitted documentation to the court and testified at the hearing on the motion. By the
expert’s calculations, Raymond should have paid Anita approximately $1,050 each month
starting in 2017. To arrive at this number, the expert started by taking 50% of Raymond’s
maximum benefit as if he had retired in 2000 and then added a compounding COLA starting
in 2001. The expert then adjusted the amount to account for Anita’s compensation obligation
to Raymond for his selection of Option 4A, using the final 2017 PERS estimates. This
adjustment was calculated proportionally, consistent with the original order’s directive for
Anita to compensate Raymond “for the decrease in his said portion.”
¶7. The chancellor disagreed with Anita’s expert that the starting point for calculating the
payment to Anita should be 50% of Raymond’s maximum benefit. The chancellor found that
it would be inequitable to Raymond to use his estimated maximum benefit given the
mandatory selection of Option 4A. Therefore, the chancellor started by calculating 50% of
Raymond’s reduced benefits under Option 4A as calculated by PERS as if Raymond had
retired in 2000. But the chancellor agreed with the methodology of Anita’s expert in adding
the compounding COLA and then adjusting the payment to account for Anita’s proportional
compensation obligation. He found the compensation to apply the “fractional portion of the
3
Anita testified at the hearing that she had to annually remind Raymond to increase the payments.
4
benefits that [Anita] is receiving versus what [Raymond] is receiving.” Under these
calculation methods, Raymond received 70.716305% of his retirement benefit, and Anita
received 29.283695%. By the chancellor’s calculations, Raymond should have paid Anita
$820 starting in July 2017, plus the subsequent annual COLA.
¶8. The chancellor rejected Raymond’s counterclaim argument that the COLA arrears did
not apply and that Anita owed Raymond the entire difference between his maximum benefit
option and the benefit under Option 4A, instead of a proportional amount. Raymond argued
that because his final retirement benefit was reduced from $9,294.67 to $7,623.49 per month,
Anita owed him the full monthly difference of $1,671.18. By Raymond’s calculations, Anita
was in arrears to him in the amount of $85,289.11. The chancellor noted that “If the Court
were to accept [Raymond’s] interpretation of the Order, [Anita] would owe [Raymond]
money, which was clearly not [the original chancellor’s] intent.”
¶9. Although Raymond was found in arrears for the COLA, the chancellor declined to
hold Raymond in contempt, determining that “there was no willful and wanton disregard of
the [c]ourt’s prior Orders” given the “interpretive nature” of the proceedings. Raymond now
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. “A chancellor’s division and distribution will be upheld if it is supported by
substantial credible evidence. However, this Court will not hesitate to reverse if it finds the
chancellor’s decision is manifestly wrong, or that the court applied an erroneous legal
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standard.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 67 So. 3d 5, 8-9 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “Chancellors are
afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic relations matters, and
their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record.” Lewis v. Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 172 (¶16) (Miss. 2015)
(quoting Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d 703, 707 (¶9) (Miss. 2014)). “Contempt is
determined by the facts and left to the chancellor’s discretion.” Stallings v. Allen, 201 So. 3d
500, 504 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “The standard of review for civil contempt on appeal
is manifest error, meaning ‘the factual findings of the chancellor are affirmed unless manifest
error is present and apparent.’” Id. (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 797 (Miss.
1994)). A de novo review applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Greenville Pub.
Sch. Dist. v. Thomas, 352 So. 3d 190, 192 (¶6) (Miss. 2022).
DISCUSSION
¶11. Raymond’s primary argument on appeal is that the chancellor erred in holding that the
COLA applied to Anita’s awarded benefits starting in 2001. Raymond cites Mississippi Code
Annotated section 25-11-112 (Rev. 2024), which provides that a PERS member must receive
a monthly benefit for at least one full year before becoming eligible to collect the annual
COLA. Anita argues that the statute does not preclude a court-awarded COLA proxy from
accruing on her awarded benefit given that the benefit was to be calculated as if Raymond
had retired on October 18, 2000, “including COLA.”
¶12. The chancellor agreed with Anita and cited equitable considerations, stating that “the
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[c]ourt is not persuaded that [the original chancellor’s] intent was to deny Plaintiff the costof-living increase from the year 2000 until [Raymond’s] retirement in 2017 . . . . [I]f the
[c]ourt followed the logic of the Defendant, the Defendant’s benefit would increase almost
40% over the sixteen years between the time the Order was entered and the time of the
Defendant’s retirement in 2017 . . . if Plaintiff’s benefit were to stay the same, this would be
egregiously inequitable.”4 Anita points out that under the logic of Raymond’s additional
arguments, if he delayed retirement long enough, he would not owe Anita any money, and
she might owe him money.
¶13. We agree with the chancellor’s determinations. Anita was awarded 50% of
Raymond’s retirement benefits as if Raymond had retired on October 18, 2000, “including
COLA[.]” Had Raymond retired in October 2000, the COLA would apply starting in 2001.
The chancellor applied this parameter in his calculations, noting that “no COLA would be
paid in 2000, the first year [of retirement].” We find that the chancellor’s interpretation of
the original orders was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The chancellor
made equitable considerations in favor of each party, including starting the calculations from
Raymond’s reduced benefit option, the uncertainty of when Raymond would retire, and the
compounding inequity to Anita’s share of the benefits (which she could not access) if the
COLA did not accrue as contemplated by the original order.
4
Raymond earned an additional two or two-and-a-half-percent for each additional year he was employed.
7
¶14. After adjusting Anita’s benefit to account for the COLA arrears and her compensation
obligation, the chancellor determined that Anita’s monthly benefit due as of July 2017 was
$820.00, subject to subsequent annual COLAs. At the time of the contempt proceedings in
2024, Raymond owed Anita a total of $84,473.83 and had paid $71,121.27, leaving arrears
of $13,352.56. Finding no manifest error, we affirm.
CONCLUSION
¶15. The chancellor did not err in finding that the intent of the original judgment as
amended was for Anita’s COLA benefit to accrue as if Raymond had retired in October
2000. Under this application, the COLA accrued on Anita’s 50% award of Raymond’s
retirement benefits beginning in 2001. The chancellor further appropriately determined that
Raymond’s payments to Anita should be proportionally adjusted to account for her
compensation obligation given Raymond’s mandatory selection of annuity Option 4A.
¶16. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND
LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., AND
EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.
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