IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CP-00153-SCT
DEMETRIUS JOHNSON
v.
ERICH NICHOLS, RYAN COPLON, PATI
COPLON, AND HEALTHWALLET, LLC
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: MICHAEL F. CAVANAUGH
JAKLYN LEIGH WRIGLEY
GEORGE BRECK HARRISON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DEMETRIUS JOHNSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JAKLYN LEIGH WRIGLEY
GEORGE BRECK HARRISON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/13/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Harrison County Circuit Court granted HealthWallet, LLC, Erich Nichols, Ryan
Coplon, and Pati Coplon’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Demetrius
Johnson’s claim because it was filed outside the statute of limitations. Because Johnson
raises no issues in his brief that contest the summary judgment order, the Court affirms.
FACTS
¶2. HealthWallet is a healthcare technology limited liability company formed in 2016.
Nichols, Ryan Coplon, and Pati Coplon are current members. HealthWallet’s original operating agreement was adopted July 1, 2017, and Johnson was a founding member. The
members replaced the initial operating agreement with an amended operating agreement on
April 1, 2019, and replaced that with a second amended operating agreement on November
8, 2019.
¶3. In August 2020, Johnson assigned his membership interest in HealthWallet to Ryan
Coplon and McLendon Holdings, LLC. Johnson does not dispute that he signed and returned
the assignment documents to the other members. HealthWallet makes periodic distributions
to its members, but records show that Johnson’s final distribution was received on June 30,
2020.
¶4. On July 18, 2022, Johnson’s attorney contacted HealthWallet members and asserted
that the assignment was made under duress and based on fraudulent misrepresentations. He
also asserted improprieties with the amended operating agreements.
¶5. On September 27, 2022, Johnson began serving a federal prison sentence for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud regarding bogus Paycheck Protection Program loans
unrelated to the instant case. He was released on December 21, 2023.
¶6. On February 21, 2024, Johnson, along with James McLendon, who is no longer a
party, filed suit against Nichols, Ryan Coplon, Pati Coplon, and HealthWallet in the Harrison
County Circuit Court. In his complaint, Johnson alleged six counts: negligent
misrepresentation, Mississippi securities law violation, intentional interference with
contractual relations, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty.
¶7. HealthWallet filed a motion for summary judgment on May 14, 2024, contending,
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inter alia, that the complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations; on December 17,
2024, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. In the order, the court found
that all of the counts in the complaint were subject to Mississippi’s catch-all three-year
statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019) and that no
discovery rule applied to Johnson’s injury. Further, the order identified Johnson’s injury as
the transfer of ownership via the contested assignment on August 13, 2020, and noted that
the complaint was filed on “February 21, 2024, which is over six months after the expiration
of the applicable three-year limitations period.” During the proceedings, Johnson had argued
that the defendants had forged his signature on the November 2019 operating agreement.
The trial court’s judgment addressed the forgery argument as a red herring because the
operating agreement was not relevant to Johnson’s assignment of his membership.
¶8. After filing his notice of appeal with the Court, Johnson filed a motion to supplement
the appellate record. The Court remanded the question to the trial court. Order, Johnson v.
Nichols, No. 2025-TS-00153-SCT (Miss. June 11, 2025). The trial court determined that the
requested supplemental materials were either already in the record or were not before the trial
court when it ruled; therefore, they were not eligible for inclusion.
¶9. Johnson raises three issues in his pro se brief: (1) whether the circuit court abused its
discretion by denying supplementation of the record after the Supreme Court’s limited
remand, contrary to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e); (2) whether omission of
Exhibit K1 prevents the appellate court from conducting meaningful review; and (3) whether
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Exhibit K is an email sent after the trial court issued its summary judgment order that Johnson wanted included in the appellate record.
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cumulative omissions and acknowledged concealment require corrective action to prevent
manifest injustice. Notably, Johnson did not raise any errors in the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment. The brief does not mention the order granting summary judgment at all
and asks the Court to reverse the circuit court’s September 9, 2025 Order Denying
Supplementation.
¶10. In response, HealthWallet argues that Johnson waived any challenge to the final
summary judgment order because his brief does not address the trial court’s statute of
limitations ruling. It further argues that the record-supplementation ruling was not erroneous
because Rule 10(e) cannot be used to add evidence that was not presented to the trial court
before the appealed judgment. In the alternative, HealthWallet defends the statute of
limitations ruling and argues that the trial court was correct to find that Johnson’s claims
accrued in August 2020 when he assigned his membership interest, that he stopped receiving
distributions, and that the discovery rule does not apply because the alleged injury was
neither latent nor inherently undiscoverable.
¶11. In his reply brief, Johnson argues that no waiver occurred because his appeal is from
the summary judgment order, and the exhibit with which he wanted to supplement the record
relates to the statute of limitations and discovery rule questions. Johnson also argues that
genuine factual disputes remain concerning when he discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the injury. Johnson cites no case law or statute in his reply brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12. “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment de
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novo.” City of Jackson v. Lawson, 431 So. 3d 686, 690 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2026) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Jackson v. Maxie ex rel. M.Y., 412 So. 3d 1156,
1159 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2025)). “[S]ummary judgment shall be granted if no genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning the question of the running of the statute of limitations.”
Brown v. McKee, 242 So. 3d 121, 127 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2018) (citing Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.
2d 1051, 1053 (Miss. 1986)).
¶13. The Court reviews the grant or denial of a Rule 10(e) motion to supplement the
appellate record for abuse of discretion. See Miss. True v. Dzielak, 293 So. 3d 243, 248–49
(¶ 13) (Miss. 2020); Russell v. Humphreys Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (In re Validation of
Tax Anticipation Note, Series 2014), 187 So. 3d 1025, 1031 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2016); United
States v. Pagan-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 582 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We review the district court’s
denial of a [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] 10(e) motion for abuse of discretion.”
(citing United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 530 (6th Cir. 2005)).
DISCUSSION
I. Johnson waived review of the summary judgment order by failing to
identify in his appellant’s brief any error committed by the trial court
in granting summary judgment.
¶14. Johnson’s appellant’s brief argues only that the circuit court erred by refusing to
supplement the appellate record. “It is well established that an appellant must brief an issue
for it to be reviewed on appeal.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107, 1117 (¶
31) (Miss. 2003) (citing Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So. 2d 529, 532 (Miss. 1992)). “Mississippi
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3) requires that the brief of the appellant contain a
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Statement of Issues that ‘shall identify the issues presented for review. . . . Each issue
presented for review shall be separately numbered in the statement.’ And ‘[n]o issue not
distinctly identified shall be argued by counsel[.’]” Biegel v. Gilmer, 329 So. 3d 431, 434
(¶ 11) (Miss. 2020) (first and second alterations in original) (quoting M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3)).
“It is presumed that the trial court’s judgment is correct, and the . . . appellants, are required
to show otherwise. This Court is under no obligation to consider this issue beyond the
arguments presented, and we decline to do so.” Kansler v. Miss. Dep’t of Revenue, 263 So.
3d 641, 655 (¶ 40) (Miss. 2018) (citation omitted) (citing Birkhead v. State, 57 So. 3d 1223,
1231 (Miss. 2011)).
¶15. The Court has repeatedly held that it does not review issues not raised in the
appellant’s brief. Johnson raised none that relate to the trial court’s summary judgment
order. Specifically, Johnson’s appellant’s brief contains no argument that the circuit court
erred by holding that his claims accrued in August 2020; no explanation of how the court
failed to apply the discovery rule to the summary judgment record; no argument that the
injury was latent or inherently undiscoverable; and no challenge to the circuit court’s
conclusion that the alleged November 2019 forgery was immaterial to accrual because the
relevant transaction was the August 2020 assignment.
¶16. Johnson’s reply brief attempts to correct his error and reframe his brief as a direct
challenge to the summary judgment ruling, but his attempt comes too late. The Court does
not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. “[T]his Court does not consider
issues raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief.” Biegel, 329 So. 3d at 434 (¶ 11)
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(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ray v. State, 238 So. 3d 1118, 1122 n.3 (Miss.
2018)). The reply brief can answer HealthWallet’s waiver argument, but it cannot supply the
missing merits argument that Johnson omitted from his principal brief.
¶17. Johnson is appealing pro se. The Court has held that a “pro se complaint is held ‘to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Terrell v. State, 573 So.
2d 732, 733 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Further,
“when a prisoner proceeds pro se, we consider that fact ‘to the end that a prisoner’s
meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully drafted.’” Id. at 733 (quoting Moore
v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. 1990)). However, while “pro se litigants are afforded
some leniency, they ‘must be held to substantially the same standards of litigation conduct
as members of the bar.’” Sumrell v. State, 972 So. 2d 572, 574 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2008) (quoting
Perry v. Andy, 858 So. 2d 143, 146 (Miss. 2003)). In Sumrell, the Court held that Sumrell
was not exempt from a procedural bar based on failure to raise issues at the Court of Appeals
because he was proceeding pro se. Id. at 575 (¶ 14). Thus, the Court will not exempt
Johnson based on his pro se status.
¶18. Johnson waived any challenge to the actual order from which he appealed.
II. The record-supplementation argument would not warrant reversal.
¶19. Even if the Court were to consider Johnson’s record-supplementation argument, it
does not provide a basis to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Rule 10(e)
provides:
(e) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
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difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated in the record, the parties by
stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or either appellate court on proper
motion or of its own initiative, may order that the omission or misstatement be
corrected, and, if necessary, that a supplemental record be filed. Such order
shall state the date by which the correction or supplemental record must be
filed and shall designate the party or parties who shall pay the cost thereof.
Any document submitted to either appellate court for inclusion in the record
must be certified by the clerk of the trial court. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appropriate appellate
court.
M.R.A.P. 10(e). Rule 10(e) is designed to ensure that the appellate record accurately reflects
what occurred in the trial court. It is not a device for adding new evidence to the record after
the judgment under review. In Dzielak, the Court wrote:
But “[t]his Court has held that Rule 10(e) ‘is not a vehicle for admitting new
evidence into the record, a role generally reserved for the trial court; rather
Rule 10(e) is a method for correcting the appellate record to reflect what
occurred in the trial court.’” Russell v. Humphreys Cty. Bd. of Supervisors (In
re Validation of Tax Anticipation Note, Series 2014), 187 So. 3d 1025, 1031
(Miss. 2016) (quoting Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 315 (Miss. 2014)).
“Rule 10(e) . . . contemplates omission from the appellate record by error,
accident, or misstatement.” Id. at 1031-32. “Rule 10(e) does not contemplate
adding to the record material documenting what has occurred after the entry
of a final judgment in the trial court.” Id. at 1041.
Dzielak, 293 So. 3d at 248–49 (¶ 13) (alterations in original).
¶20. The trial court entered summary judgment in December 2024. All parties agree that
Exhibit K was not in evidence when the trial court entered its order, but it was part of the
June 2025 proceedings after the Court’s limited remand. Thus, on Johnson’s own
description, Exhibit K was not part of the summary judgment record before the circuit court
when it decided the motion.
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¶21. The Court is tasked with addressing the judgment from which Johnson appealed—the
summary judgment order. The circuit court cannot have erred based on materials not before
it when it granted summary judgment, and a post-judgment exhibit cannot create a genuine
dispute of material fact retroactively.
¶22. Johnson asks the Court to reverse the September 9, 2025 supplementation order, direct
the clerk to transmit Exhibit K, or consider Exhibit K, but the appealed final judgment is the
December 2024 summary judgment order. Adding Exhibit K to the appellate record would
not change what was before the trial judge on summary judgment. If the Court were to
consider Exhibit K for the truth of its contents, that would convert Rule 10(e) into a method
for introducing new evidence into the appellate record, not merely correcting it.
¶23. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to supplement the
record.
III. Additionally, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment
on the merits.
¶24. Even if the Court were to reach the merits, the circuit court’s statute of limitations
ruling is correct. The parties agree that Johnson’s claims are governed by a three-year
limitations period. The critical question, then, is when the claims accrued. The circuit court
held that no genuine issue of material fact existed that Johnson’s right to sue vested on
August 13, 2020, when he executed and delivered the assignment documents. The court’s
finding is supported by the record. Coplon’s affidavit attached the Membership Interest
Purchase Agreement, the Assignment of Limited Liability Company Interest, and the August
13, 2020 email from Johnson transmitting executed signature pages. The circuit court found
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that the parties did not dispute that Johnson signed and delivered the signature pages.
Johnson’s counsel argued at the hearing that Johnson signed blank signature pages, but
HealthWallet responded that Johnson did not deny sending the August 13, 2020 email
attaching the executed assignment and signature page.
¶25. Most importantly, Johnson did not allege in his complaint that he did not assign his
ownership through the documents, only that the documents “were obtained by
misrepresentation and fraudulent means[.]” The method through which assignment was
achieved does not change the timing of the assignment, and the timing is what matters to a
summary judgment order based on the statute of limitations.
¶26. Johnson argues that he did not discover the injury until 2022 and suggests that the
discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations until then. The argument does
not comport with Court precedent. The injury Johnson complains of is his loss of ownership
of membership interest in the LLC. He knew about the sale when he executed it. He knew
that he ceased receiving payouts from the LLC from June 30, 2020 forward. The Court
addressed a similar issue in Brown v. McKee, 242 So. 3d 121 (Miss. 2018).
¶27. In Brown, George McKee and Monty Brown owned equal shares in Brownsville
Station, LLC. Id. at 124 (¶ 3). Over a few years’ time, McKee bought Brown out of his
shares, completing the purchase in 2006. Id. In 2013 Brown sued McKee and alleged that
McKee fraudulently induced him to sell his shares below market value and violated his
fiduciary responsibility. Id. at 125 (¶ 7). The trial court held that the action was barred by
the statute of limitations and granted McKee’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 126 (¶
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13).
¶28. On appeal, Brown argued that the discovery rule applied because he could not have
know the real value of the apartment complex at the time. Id. at 126 (¶ 12). Arguably,
Brown presented a stronger case for application of the discovery rule than Johnson does here.
Brown argued that the material fact he could not discover was the true value of the ownership
interest he sold. Johnson, however, needed only to know that he had assigned his
membership interest, and he does not dispute that he executed and transmitted the assignment
documents in August 2020. The Court responded to Brown’s argument:
Brown seeks refuge in Section 15-1-49(2)’s tolling provision. But this
provision applies only to actions “involv[ing] latent injury or disease.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2012). Here, Brown’s alleged
injury—underselling his interest in the company—was not latent. The true
value of the apartment complex at the time of sale was reasonably
discoverable—especially to someone like Brown, who according to his own
pleading had experience building apartments in Starkville. That Brown chose
to trust McKee and not question the numbers, documents, or McKee’s motives
does not make this information “inherently undiscoverable.”
Id. at 127–28.
¶29. Like in Brown, there was no latent injury in the case sub judice. He knowingly
executed the assignment documents. Three and a half years later, he sought to contest the
assignment—six months too late.
¶30. Even if everything Johnson alleged were true:
“the fact that a barred claim is a just one or has the sanction of a moral
obligation does not exempt it from the limitation period.” Smith v. Sneed, 638
So. 2d 1252, 1263 (Miss. 1994). Mississippi’s limitations statutes “apply with
full force to all claims and courts cannot refuse to give the statute effect merely
because it seems to operate harshly in a given case.” Id. Instead, we must
abide by the “legislative prerogative” to establish time boundaries.
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Id. at 130–31 (¶ 35). Accordingly, on the merits, the trial court committed no error.
CONCLUSION
¶31. The Court affirms the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, BRANNING
AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.
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