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State v. Jackson

2026-08-14

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-3138.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :

: C.A. No. 2025-CA-57

Appellee :

: Trial Court Case No. 2025CR0089

v. :

: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas

DARRYEON M. JACKSON : Court)

:

Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &

: OPINION

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 14, 2026, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.

OPINION

GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-57

ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Darryeon Jackson appeals from his conviction for trespass in a habitation when

a person is present or likely to be present, a felony of the fourth degree, following a jury trial

in the Greene County Common Pleas Court. Jackson asserts that his conviction was based

on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically,

he argues that there was no evidence that the victim was likely to be present when he

entered her apartment and that he did not enter the victim’s apartment using force, stealth,

or deception. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 21, 2025, Jackson was indicted on one count of trespass in a

habitation when a person is present or likely to be present, a felony of the fourth degree.

A jury trial began on September 8, 2025.

{¶ 3} On February 17, 2025, Fairborn police officers were dispatched on two separate

occasions to an apartment complex at 319 West Dayton-Yellow Springs Road. The first call

was made at approximately 1:00 a.m. in response to a dispute between two neighbors, the

victim and Jackson. When Fairborn police officers arrived on the scene, they took a report,

but no arrests were made.

{¶ 4} The second call to police was made by the victim and occurred at approximately

2:45 a.m. This call was initially designated as another neighbor dispute but was later

reclassified as a burglary. The victim reported that someone had been in her apartment

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without her consent because items had been removed from her closet. Although some of

the items had been left at the front door of the apartment, the victim reported that her jewelry

box and several other items had been stolen. When officers arrived, they went to the victim’s

apartment and knocked on the door. While they were attempting to contact the victim,

Jackson came out of his apartment, which was on the same floor. The officers asked

Jackson if he had been in the victim’s apartment, and he stated that he had not. Jackson

was then asked by the police to stay in his apartment until they were ready to speak with

him. However, while officers were trying to speak with the victim, Jackson continued to come

out into the hallway, yelling, “prove it” to the officers. Jackson continued to argue with the

officers, ignoring their instructions to go back into his apartment.

{¶ 5} Although Jackson eventually complied, he was taken into custody for

obstructing official business. Jackson was placed in an officer’s cruiser; the victim continued

to speak to the officers, at which point the resident in the apartment directly across from the

victim’s came out to speak to the police, as well. The neighbor showed the police video

footage he had taken on his cell phone, showing someone who appeared to be Jackson

going in and out of the victim’s apartment.

{¶ 6} After seeing the video footage, officers spoke to Jackson again. Ultimately,

Jackson admitted that he had opened the door to the victim’s apartment and went inside to

“see if [she] was still there” and expressed that he was angry because she “keeps f*cking

with him.” Although Jackson had initially been detained for obstructing official business, he

was arrested for only the charge of trespass in a habitation. Jackson was then transferred

to the Greene County Jail.

{¶ 7} Jackson testified on his own behalf during the trial, asserting that the victim had

previously requested to have a conversation with him, but he declined. According to

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Jackson, he later decided to have the conversation with the victim, and when he went to her

apartment, the door was cracked open. He knocked on the door, which made it open more.

He called into the apartment, but the victim did not respond. Jackson stated that he then

stepped inside the victim’s apartment to see if she was there and left when he realized she

was not home.

{¶ 8} On September 9, 2025, the jury found Jackson guilty of trespass in a habitation

when a person is present or likely to be present. On October 22, 2025, the trial court

sentenced Jackson to a term of five years of community control sanctions, including a 180-day jail sentence with credit for 54 days of time served. Jackson now appeals the trial court’s

judgment, raising one assignment of error.

II. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 9} In his assignment of error, Jackson asserts that the evidence against him was

insufficient and that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 10} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant inquiry is

whether the evidence presented, if believed, was sufficient to support the conviction.” State

v. Anderson, 2024-Ohio-2003, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-3311, ¶ 16.

The question is whether any rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997). A guilty verdict will not

be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached

by the trier-of-fact.” Id.

{¶ 11} Conversely, “a weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of

the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more

believable or persuasive.” Anderson at ¶ 14, citing State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12

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(2d Dist.). “When evaluating whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id.,

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “The fact that the evidence is

subject to different interpretations does not render a conviction against the manifest weight

of the evidence.” Id., citing Wilson at ¶ 14. “A judgment of conviction should be reversed as

being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 175 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 12} Jackson was convicted of one count of trespass in a habitation when a person

is present or likely to be present in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), which states: “No person,

by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in a permanent or temporary habitation of any

person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be

present.”

{¶ 13} Jackson first argues that there was insufficient evidence that the victim was

present or likely to be present when he entered her apartment. We have held that the term

“likely” indicates something beyond mere possibility; it indicates “something less than a

probability or reasonable certainty.” State v. Frock, 2006-Ohio-1254, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

“A person is likely to be present when a consideration of all the circumstances would seem

to justify a logical expectation that a person could be present.” Id., quoting State v. Green,

18 Ohio App.3d 69, 72 (10th Dist. 1984). A defendant’s subjective belief as to whether

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someone is likely to be present is irrelevant. Id. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether it was

objectively likely that someone would be present in the home at the time of the trespass. Id.

{¶ 14} The evidence at trial established that the trespass into the victim’s apartment

occurred between 1:00 a.m. and 2:45 a.m., which are times when most people are at home

asleep. Further, Jackson admitted to police that he went to the victim’s apartment to have a

conversation with her, implying that he believed she was likely to be present in her

apartment. The victim also testified that she worked and attended school during the day;

there was no reason for Jackson to believe she would not be home in the middle of the night

when the trespass occurred. Moreover, less than two hours before the call that resulted in

Jackson’s arrest, the police responded to a dispute between the victim and Jackson, so at

the very least, Jackson knew that the victim had been home very recently. Accordingly, there

was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that, at the time of the trespass,

the victim was home or likely to be home.

{¶ 15} Additionally, Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence that he

entered the victim’s apartment by force, stealth, or deception.

{¶ 16} “Force” is defined as “any violence, compulsion, effort, or constraint exerted

by any means upon or against a person or thing to gain entrance.” See R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

Notably, we have held that the element of “force” is met when the defendant exerts any

physical effort. State v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-5498, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). Additionally, “stealth”

means “any secret or sly act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or to remain within

a structure of another without permission.” Finally, “deception” means “knowingly deceiving

another or causing another to be deceived by any false or misleading representation, by

withholding information, by preventing another from acquiring information, or by any other

conduct, act, or omission that creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in

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another, including a false impression as to law, value, state of mind, or other objective or

subjective fact.”

{¶ 17} During the trial, Jackson testified that he approached the door to the victim’s

apartment because he wanted to have a conversation with her. According to Jackson, the

door to her apartment was already slightly ajar and opened more when Jackson knocked.

At that point, Jackson admitted that he “walked around the home to see if anybody was in

the home.” Jackson’s own testimony demonstrates that he exerted physical effort to knock

on the door to the victim’s apartment, causing the door to open enough for him to enter her

residence without permission. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find

that Jackson used force to enter the victim’s apartment. Additionally, because there was

sufficient evidence of force, it was not necessary for the jury to also find that Jackson hhad

entered the apartment using stealth or deception.

{¶ 18} Similarly, Jackson’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Although Jackson may have interpreted the evidence and testimony differently,

the evidence presented does not weigh heavily against his conviction. Further, the record

does not demonstrate that the jury lost its way when it weighed the evidence in favor of the

victim and the police officers, rather than Jackson. Accordingly, Jackson’s assignment of

error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.

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