IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 177PA24
Filed 14 August 2026
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TERRY WAYNE NORRIS, JR.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, 294 N.C. App. 475 (2024), reversing a judgment entered on 3
August 2022 by Judge Jacqueline D. Grant in Superior Court, Rutherford County,
and remanding the case for dismissal. Heard in the Supreme Court on 5 November
2025.
Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Joshua D. Abram, Special Deputy Attorney
General, for the State-appellant.
Mikayla Mann and Kellie Mannette for defendant-appellee.
ALLEN, Justice.
In general, state law prohibits individuals with felony convictions from
purchasing, owning, or possessing firearms. N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) (2025). While the
actual possession of firearms by such individuals violates the statute, they can also
violate the statute by constructively possessing firearms. Constructive possession
occurs when a person has the intent and capability to maintain control over an item.
Defendant Terry Wayne Norris Jr. was indicted on a charge of possession of a
firearm by a felon. At trial, he moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the State
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failed to introduce substantial evidence that he constructively possessed the firearm
found in a dresser located three or four steps from the site of his arrest. The trial
court denied the motion, and the jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals
agreed with defendant and reversed the trial court’s judgment.
When considering a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for insufficient
evidence, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. The
Court of Appeals turned this principle on its head by viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case.
I.
On 11 July 2020, United States Marshals and officers of the Forest City Police
Department (FCPD) arrived at 124 Hamilton Street, a house in Forest City, to serve
an arrest warrant on defendant for a charge that was later dismissed. Defendant had
previously been convicted of multiple felonies.
Law enforcement officers went to 124 Hamilton Street because Detective
Dakotah Thomas of the FCPD knew that defendant lived there and had seen him
there “multiple times.” The same was true of Detective Thomas’s partner, Officer
Dylan Radford, who had dealt with defendant at that location at various times
throughout his roughly five-year career in law enforcement.
Defendant was standing on the front porch of the house as law enforcement
vehicles approached. When he saw the officers, defendant “hurriedly” went inside the
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house.
The marshals entered the house, apprehended defendant near the front door,
and brought him back outside. They advised Detective Thomas and Officer Radford
that they had seen marijuana in plain view in the living room.
Defendant’s girlfriend, Sherry Renee Ledford, resided at the house with her
two children. Detective Thomas was informed that Ms. Ledford “want[ed] to deal
with” him specifically. He asked Ms. Ledford for permission to search the residence,
and she consented.
A black mailbox with the name “Norris” on it was mounted beside the front
door. As officers stepped through the doorway and into the living room, they observed
a small bedroom immediately to the right. The bedroom door was open.
Detective Thomas searched the living room, where he noticed packages of
marijuana around the sofa. Moving into the kitchen, Detective Thomas recovered a
cellular phone with a lock screen that displayed a photograph of defendant and his
deceased daughter, Aaliyah Norris.
Officer Radford entered the bedroom, where he observed a plastic dresser
against the wall immediately to his right. The dresser contained five translucent gray
drawers. It was situated only three or four steps from the front door. Two sets of
scales sat on top of it.
In the far corner of the room lay a mattress flanked by two small black
nightstands. Elsewhere in the bedroom, a television stood atop a black nine-cube
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organizer. A mirror mounted on the wall above the television had a school nametag
with “Aaliyah” written on it. A portrait of a little girl hung on one of the bedroom
walls. The frame was heart-shaped and decorated with a bow and the letter “A.”
Piles of clothes covered the bedroom floor. Some of those clothes were men’s
clothes. Men’s shoes were also present. A laundry basket full of mixed clothing,
including men’s boxer shorts, sat behind the bedroom door.
Turning his attention to the dresser, Officer Radford discovered that it was not
locked or otherwise secured. Opening the second drawer, he found a loaded silver .38
Special revolver lying on a pile of toiletries. The toiletries consisted of hairspray and
other feminine products.
Officer Radford also discovered pills in the bedroom and a couple of envelopes
with defendant’s name on them. At trial, Detective Thomas, who assisted Officer
Radford with the bedroom search after Officer Radford found the handgun, recalled
finding a piece of paper in the bedroom with defendant’s name on it, though he could
not remember anything more specific about it. Footage from the officers’ body
cameras depicted a white envelope on which were handwritten defendant’s name and
“Bookmarks for Aaliyah Norris.” That same footage also depicted an envelope from
Rutherford County Schools addressed to “Mr. Terry Norris.”
After concluding their search, the officers went outside to speak with Ms.
Ledford. She explained that the pills belonged to defendant and that they “kept him
calm and helped him sleep.” The discussion turned to the handgun discovered in the
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bedroom. The officers explained that defendant could not be around the weapon
because of his status as a convicted felon. Ms. Ledford claimed that the weapon was
hers and denied that defendant lived in the house. She did admit that he occasionally
stayed there, however.
A grand jury subsequently indicted defendant for possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1. At trial, defendant twice moved to dismiss
the charge for insufficient evidence, once at the close of the State’s evidence and again
at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions, and the jury found
defendant guilty of the charged offense.1 The court sentenced defendant to
imprisonment for a term of 75 to 102 months.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motions
to dismiss. In particular, he maintained that “the State proffered insufficient
evidence to establish his constructive possession of the firearm.” State v. Norris, 294
N.C. App. 475, 477 (2024).
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that “[a] trial court properly
denies a motion to dismiss if there is substantial evidence (1) of each element of the
offence charged and (2) of the defendant being the perpetrator of such offense.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 477 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Gallion,
1 Defendant had also been indicted for obtaining habitual felon status in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1. After the jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, he pleaded guilty to the habitual felon offense.
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282 N.C. App. 305, 334–35 (2022)). The appellate court further observed that, “[w]hen
determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a trial] court examines all evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, allowing the State every reasonable inference
thereon.” Id.
The Court of Appeals remarked that “the State’s theory of [defendant’s]
possession [of the firearm] rests solely upon constructive possession.” Id. at 478. It
explained that a “determination of constructive possession rests on the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. “Constructive possession is established when an item is not under
the defendant’s physical custody, but he has knowledge of the item alongside the
power and intent to control the item.” Id. Additionally, “[w]hen the defendant does
not have exclusive possession of the location where the firearm is found, the State is
required to show other incriminating circumstances in order to establish constructive
possession.” Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 203 N.C. App. 448, 459 (2010)).
Relying on State v. Rich, 87 N.C. App. 380 (1987), and this Court’s decision in
State v. McLaurin, 320 N.C. 143 (1987), the Court of Appeals reasoned that, even if
one assumes that defendant shared nonexclusive control over the house, “the State
failed to present such other incriminating circumstances to substantially link
[d]efendant with the gun, to the bedroom, or to the dresser drawer where the gun was
found along with the other items therein.” Norris, 294 N.C. App. at 479–80. In
reaching this conclusion, the panel characterized the State’s case as dependent on
four circumstances:
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(1) [d]efendant was found at the home at the same time as
the gun; (2) the mailbox listed [d]efendant’s last name; (3) a
non-descript and unspecified piece of paper was found
inside a tote bag inside the bedroom with [d]efendant’s
name somewhere on it; and, (4) there were both male and
female clothes in the closet where the paper was found.
Id. at 480.
Insisting that the facts relied upon by the State “must be considered in totality
with all others and not in isolation,” the court highlighted evidence that, in its view,
undermined the State’s argument that defendant constructively possessed the
firearm. Id. It pointed out, for example, that “[t]he bedroom where the gun was found
was decorated and contained numerous items that heavily suggested a female
occupant, and the gun was found inside a closed drawer containing only feminine
products.” Id. Moreover, “Ms. Ledford claimed the handgun belonged to her . . . [and]
[s]he also testified that the home was rented to her.” Id. Although defendant’s last
name appeared on the mailbox, “Ms. Ledford testified [d]efendant’s last name was
listed on the mailbox because his deceased daughter . . . lived with Ms. Ledford for
many years.” Id. According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he totality of the evidence [did]
not support a conclusion of constructive possession of the gun by [d]efendant.” Id.
The court also criticized the State’s theory that “[d]efendant had ‘stashed’ the
gun in the closed dresser drawer with Ms. Ledford’s personal items during the short
period he was not being observed by the officers.” Id. at 481. “[T]he State offer[ed] no
evidence tending to show [d]efendant’s actions beyond his entering the home,” so
“[a]ny conclusions concerning [d]efendant’s purported actions cannot be inferred from
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his simple entry into and exit onto the porch of the home.” Id. Thus, the State’s
“stashed” theory “constitutes speculation rather than an inference and does not
support a conclusion of substantial evidence.” Id.
Having determined that the State failed to present substantial evidence of
constructive possession, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an
order of dismissal. Id. Although defendant also argued that the trial court committed
plain error in its instructions to the jury, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary
to reach that issue. Id.
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, the State petitioned this Court to review
whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] when it held that defendant’s motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence of constructive possession should have been granted.” We
allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review.
II.
“Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element
of the offense is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Tucker, 380 N.C. 234, 236 (2022) (quoting State v. Crockett,
368 N.C. 717, 720 (2016)). A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss if “ ‘there is
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser
offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such
offense.’ ” Id. at 236–37 (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98 (1980)). “Substantial
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evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491, 493 (2008). It “is the same as
more than a scintilla of evidence.” Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237.
“In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of
the case but are for the jury to resolve.” State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75 (1993)
(citation omitted). “[S]o long as the evidence supports a reasonable inference of the
defendant’s guilt, a motion to dismiss is properly denied even though the evidence
also permits a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence.” State v. Bradshaw,
366 N.C. 90, 93 (2012) (quoting State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99 (2009)). On the other
hand, “[w]hen the evidence raises no more than a suspicion of guilt, a motion to
dismiss should be granted.” Id. (quoting Miller, 363 N.C. at 99).
“If the evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must consider whether
a reasonable inference of [the] defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the
circumstances.” Barnes, 334 N.C. at 75. “In making this determination, a court ‘is to
consider all evidence actually admitted, competent or incompetent, which is favorable
to the State, disregarding [the] defendant’s evidence unless favorable to the State.’ ”
Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237 (quoting State v. Baker, 338 N.C. 526, 558–59 (1994)). “[If]
the court decides that a reasonable inference of [the] defendant’s guilt may be drawn
from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly
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or in combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually
guilty.” Barnes, 334 N.C. at 75–76 (cleaned up).
III.
“To convict [a] defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon the [S]tate must
prove that [the] defendant (1) was previously convicted of a felony and
(2) subsequently possessed a firearm.” Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at 93 (citing N.C.G.S.
§ 14-415.1(a) (2011)). “It is well established that possession may be actual or
constructive.” Id.
In his brief to this Court, defendant does not dispute that he was a convicted
felon at the time of his arrest. Likewise, he expressly concedes that, at a minimum,
he was “an occasional overnight guest [at the house] and therefore [was] considered
to have nonexclusive possession” of the same. Consequently, since the State
proceeded on a theory of constructive possession, the only issue for this Court is
whether the State presented substantial evidence that defendant constructively
possessed the firearm.
“Constructive possession of contraband material exists when there is no actual
personal dominion over the material, but there is an intent and capability to maintain
control and dominion over it.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 568 (1984). If the
defendant had sole control over the place where the contraband was found, then the
analysis can be relatively straightforward. If the defendant shared control of the
location with another person, however, “the State must show other incriminating
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circumstances sufficient for the jury to find [that the] defendant had constructive
possession.” Miller, 363 N.C. at 99.
“Whether incriminating circumstances exist to support a finding of
constructive possession is a fact-specific inquiry.” State v. Chekanow, 370 N.C. 488,
496 (2018). In Chekanow, this Court set out five factors for courts to consider when
evaluating whether sufficient evidence exists of incriminating circumstances in
constructive possession cases:
(1) the defendant’s ownership and occupation of the
property . . . ; (2) the defendant’s proximity to the
contraband; (3) indicia of the defendant’s control over the
place where the contraband is found; (4) the defendant’s
suspicious behavior at or near the time of the contraband’s
discovery; and (5) other evidence found in the defendant’s
possession that links the defendant to the contraband.
Id.
Because “[n]o one factor controls, . . . courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. We therefore consider the evidence in this case corresponding to
each of the Chekanow factors.
A. Ownership and Occupation
The State’s evidence of ownership and occupation included the mailbox with
the name “Norris” beside the front door of the house. Detective Thomas testified that
he knew the house to be defendant’s home and had seen him there “multiple times.”
Likewise, Officer Radford testified that he knew the house to be defendant’s residence
and had seen defendant there on multiple occasions. As officers approached the house
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to arrest defendant, he rushed into the house without first knocking on the door or
otherwise obtaining permission to enter the premises.
Other evidence tended to show that defendant shared not only the house but
also the bedroom with Ms. Ledford. In speaking with law enforcement immediately
following defendant’s arrest, Ms. Ledford initially denied that defendant lived at the
address but conceded that he stayed there sometimes. Detective Thomas observed
men’s clothes scattered throughout the bedroom. He also recalled seeing men’s shoes
there. Ms. Ledford admitted that pills found in the bedroom belonged to defendant,
who used them to help him sleep. The officers found an envelope with defendant’s
name on it and a separate piece of mail addressed to defendant. When viewed
together and in the light most favorable to the State, as it must be, the evidence
introduced by the State amounted to substantial evidence that defendant shared
nonexclusive possession of the house and bedroom with Ms. Ledford.
In determining otherwise, the Court of Appeals noted that Ms. Ledford claimed
that she rented the house and that “[t]he décor and items in the bedroom itself
alongside the [female] contents of the closed drawer all heavily refute the inference
[that] [d]efendant was more than an occasional occupant of the bedroom.” Norris, 294
N.C. App. at 480. The court also referenced Ms. Ledford’s testimony that defendant’s
last name appeared on the mailbox “because his deceased daughter, whose last name
was also ‘Norris,’ lived with Ms. Ledford for many years.” Id.
The Court of Appeals erred in its approach. To begin with, even if defendant
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stayed at the house only occasionally, that fact alone would not preclude a finding of
nonexclusive possession. Defendant admits as much in his brief to this Court,
conceding that “whether or not he lived there was not a determinative factor in the
analysis on constructive possession as he was minimally an occasional overnight
guest.”
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals contravened our precedent by basing its
decision on evidence unfavorable to the State. As explained above, when reviewing a
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, a court must “consider all evidence
actually admitted, competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State,
disregarding defendant’s evidence unless favorable to the State.” Tucker, 380 N.C. at
237 (emphasis added) (quoting Baker, 338 N.C. at 558–59).
The logic of this rule is obvious if one remembers that trial courts are not
allowed to weigh the evidence when deliberating on motions to dismiss for insufficient
evidence. See State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 178 (1983) (“In considering such motions,
the trial court is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to take the case
to the jury and not with its weight.”). There is no point in asking a court to consider
contradictory evidence if it lacks the power to resolve the contradiction.
It follows that evidence unfavorable to the State, such as Ms. Ledford’s claim
that the “Norris” on the mailbox referred to defendant’s daughter, did not provide the
trial court with grounds for dismissing the charge against defendant. “Contradictions
and discrepancies [in the evidence] do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for
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the jury to resolve.” Barnes, 334 N.C. at 75. The jury could have concluded that Ms.
Ledford’s testimony was not credible and that defendant’s name appeared on the
mailbox because, as Detective Thomas and Officer Radford testified, he lived at 124
Hamilton Street. The trial court properly left it to the jury to resolve conflicts in the
evidence. The Court of Appeals impermissibly resolved those conflicts in defendant’s
favor.
B. Proximity to the Contraband
“[I]n addressing a defendant’s proximity to the contraband, this Court
considers proximity in terms of space and time.” Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 497. The
bedroom that defendant shared with Ms. Ledford was situated immediately on the
right as officers entered the front door. The unlocked dresser in which Officer Radford
found the firearm was located only three or four steps from the front door. Thus, when
defendant rushed inside the house as officers approached, the dresser was within
easy reach. Inasmuch as federal marshals arrested defendant near the front door, it
appears that he remained close to the dresser after entering the house. Hence, “in
terms of space and time,” defendant was sufficiently close to the firearm to support a
finding of constructive possession.
This Court’s decision in Bradshaw confirms our application of the proximity
factor. There, the charges against the defendant included possession of a firearm by
a felon. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at 91–92. The charges resulted from a search of a
residence where at least two men other than the defendant had been known to live.
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Id. Officers discovered cocaine in one of the bedrooms and a rifle in the closet of that
same bedroom. Id. at 91. Various pieces of evidence linked the defendant to the
bedroom, such as “photographs, a Father’s Day card, a cable bill, a cable installation
receipt, and a pay stub.” Id. at 90. Some of the evidence appeared to place the
defendant in the bedroom two days before the search. Id. at 96. Although the
defendant was absent when the search occurred, this Court held that “evidence
placing the defendant in the . . . bedroom within two days of the search provides a
sufficient link between [the] defendant and the contraband to survive a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 97.
In this case, the State presented evidence showing that defendant was close to
the handgun’s location. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Bradshaw, defendant was
present when the search took place; indeed, he was apprehended just a few feet away
from the dresser containing the firearm. If the evidence in Bradshaw sufficiently
established the spatial and temporal proximity needed for constructive possession,
then so does the evidence introduced in this case. See also State v. Baxter, 285 N.C.
735 (1974) (holding that sufficient evidence existed of defendant’s proximity to
marijuana found in the bedroom that he shared with his wife, even though officers
had not seen the defendant at the apartment during the preceding week and the
defendant was absent at the time of the search).
C. Indicia of Control
“[A] defendant’s opportunity to place contraband in the place where it was
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found is additional indicia of control.” Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 497. The State
presented substantial evidence that defendant had the opportunity to put the firearm
in the bedroom dresser: upon seeing law enforcement approach, defendant hurried
into the house; he was arrested just a few steps away from the dresser; as Officer
Radford testified, the dresser was not “secured or locked in any way”; and the firearm
was not under anything but was “laying right on top” when Officer Radford opened
the drawer.
In Chekanow, we cited State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563 (1984), for the principle
that the opportunity to put contraband in the place where it was found can be
evidence of control. Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 499 (citing Brown, 310 N.C. at 569). In
Brown, police officers arrested the defendant after finding him standing a few inches
away from a table on which they observed cocaine and drug-related paraphernalia.
310 N.C. at 564–65. The arrest took place in an apartment allegedly leased by the
defendant’s brother. Id. at 565. The defendant was subsequently convicted of
manufacturing a controlled substance by packaging and repackaging cocaine. Id. at
564–65.
In the defendant’s appeal to this Court, we noted that the State had to rely on
the doctrine of constructive possession “because the evidence d[id] not reveal that
[the] defendant was in the actual physical possession of the drugs or the related
paraphernalia.” Id. at 568. Furthermore, because the defendant did not exclusively
possess the premises, “constructive possession of the contraband materials [could] not
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be inferred without other incriminating circumstances.” Id. at 569. We nonetheless
upheld the defendant’s conviction inasmuch as “there [were] circumstances other
than [the] defendant’s proximity to the contraband materials which tend[ed] to
buttress the inference that [the] defendant was the person engaged in the
manufacture of cocaine.” Id. Specifically, the State presented evidence showing that
the defendant (1) had a key to the apartment, (2) had $1,700 cash in his pockets at
the time of his arrest, and (3) “had been under surveillance by the police for some
time and on every occasion that police observed him, he was at [the apartment] rather
than his claimed residence.” Id. at 569–70.
Here, the evidence of control aside from defendant’s proximity to the firearm
is plainly sufficient under Brown. Though neither officer testified to finding a key to
the house on defendant’s person, both Detective Thomas and Officer Radford testified
that defendant lived at 124 Hamilton Street. The mailbox mounted beside the front
door had defendant’s—not Ms. Ledford’s—last name on it. The presence of
defendant’s sleeping pills, an envelope with defendant’s name on it, a piece of mail
addressed to defendant, and men’s clothing in the bedroom constitute further
evidence that defendant exercised control over the firearm’s location.
In his brief to this Court, defendant argues that the evidence of control in this
case must be deemed insufficient under State v. McLaurin, 320 N.C. 143 (1987).
There, a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia after
officers searched her residence and found a set of scales in the kitchen, a vial bearing
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traces of cocaine in the pocket of a man’s overcoat hanging in the living room closet,
a baggie bearing traces of cocaine on a bar between the living and dining rooms, and
“[a] box containing a spoon, eighteen small tinfoil squares, and a plastic bag . . . in a
drawer full of children’s clothing in a bedroom apparently occupied by children.”
McLaurin, 320 N.C. at 144.
This Court determined that the defendant’s control over the premises “was
patently nonexclusive” in that two men “had both been observed entering and leaving
the day of the search, there was no evidence that defendant was so observed, and the
presence of children’s and adult male clothes in closets and bureaus indicated that
[the] defendant did not reside there alone.” Id. at 146. Additionally, the defendant
and one of the men shared the same last name, and the house contained photographs
of that man and the defendant. Id. at 145.
Given the evidence of nonexclusive possession in McLaurin, we concluded that
the defendant’s constructive possession of the drug paraphernalia could not be
inferred “without other incriminating circumstances.” Id. at 146 (quoting Brown, 310
N.C. at 569). Since “there was no evidence of other incriminating circumstances
linking [the defendant] to [the contraband],” we held that “her control was
insufficiently substantial to support a conclusion of her possession of the seized
paraphernalia.” Id. at 147. We thus reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
upholding the defendant’s conviction. Id.
According to defendant, McLaurin governs the outcome in this case because
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there, “[e]ven though the investigation yielded . . . ample evidence [that] the
defendant resided in the home, this Court did not consider any of this to be
‘incriminating circumstances’ linking her to the items that were found in a drawer
that did not contain her belongings, in a room she did not occupy.” Defendant points
to Officer Radford’s testimony that the dresser drawer containing the handgun “was
full of ‘lady items, hairspray, different things, stuff like that.’ ”
Although McLaurin bears a superficial resemblance to this case, the evidence
there differs materially from the evidence introduced here. Most importantly, the
McLaurin defendant was absent during the search of her residence. Thus, unlike
defendant, she did not dart inside when officers arrived and was not apprehended
near contraband. Similarly, none of the contraband seized in McLaurin was
discovered in the defendant’s bedroom, whereas Officer Radford discovered the
handgun in the bedroom that defendant shared with Ms. Ledford. In short, the
evidence in McLaurin did not establish an “opportunity to place contraband in the
place where it was found” comparable to the one supported by the evidence in this
case. See Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 497.
In its opinion reversing the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the facts of this case are closer to McLaurin than to State v. Rich, 87
N.C. App. 380 (1987). Norris, 294 N.C. App. at 479–81. In Rich, the Court of Appeals
held that evidence of incriminating circumstances was sufficient to allow the jury to
find constructive possession of cocaine where “[t]he evidence showed that [the]
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defendant was present on the premises when the cocaine was found, that women’s
clothes and undergarments were in the room and in the dresser where the cocaine
was found, and that letters with [the] defendant’s name on them were also found in
the room.” 87 N.C. App. at 382.
The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish Rich from this case on two
grounds. First, “[u]nlike in Rich, the contraband was not found in a closed drawer
with items that coincide with [d]efendant’s sex.” Norris, 294 N.C. App. at 480 (citing
Rich, 87 N.C. App. at 382–83). Second, “[w]hile the agents in Rich found letters
addressed to the defendant, including an insurance policy listing defendant as the
resident, the only comparable evidence is a non-descript and unspecified piece of
paper that had [d]efendant’s name somewhere on it, and that paper is not in the
record.” Id.
While Officer Radford did find feminine products in the dresser drawer, that
fact alone is not determinative. It must be viewed alongside the many pieces of
evidence indicating that defendant occupied the bedroom and the evidence of his
proximity to the dresser shortly before Officer Radford discovered the handgun. The
Court of Appeals also seems not to have been aware of the body camera footage of the
envelope with defendant’s name on it and the piece of mail addressed to defendant.
Interestingly, Rich itself expressly distinguishes its own facts from those of
McLaurin. One of the differences emphasized is that the McLaurin defendant
“apparently was not present at the time the paraphernalia was found” and “[t]here
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was no evidence that she had entered or left the premises at all on the day of the
search.” Rich, 87 N.C. App. at 383. Of course, defendant was present when Officer
Radford found the handgun, and he had entered the house at 124 Hamilton Street
mere moments before that discovery. On balance, then, Rich cannot sustain the Court
of Appeals’ decision in this case.
D. Suspicious Behavior
The evidence before the trial court also provides reason to believe that
defendant behaved suspiciously “at or near the time of the contraband’s discovery.”
See Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 496. Defendant rushed inside when he saw law
enforcement officers approaching the house, and federal marshals arrested him just
a few feet away from the unlocked dresser in which Officer Radford found the
handgun.
The Court of Appeals discounted this evidence of suspicious conduct because
“the State offer[ed] no evidence tending to show [d]efendant’s actions beyond his
entering the home.” Norris, 294 N.C. App. at 481. According to the court, this evidence
was insufficient to support the State’s theory that defendant “ ‘stashed’ the gun in the
closed dresser drawer with Ms. Ledford’s personal items during the short period he
was not being observed by the officers.” Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that
“[d]efendant’s purported actions cannot be inferred from his simple entry into and
exit onto the porch of the home.” Id.
In a sense, we agree. The State would have no case if it could show nothing
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more than that defendant entered the house and shortly thereafter returned to the
front porch. The problem is that the Court of Appeals viewed this evidence in
isolation. As we have explained, “[a] finding of constructive possession requires a
totality of the circumstances analysis.” Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 493.
This Court’s treatment of the suspicious behavior factor in Chekanow
illustrates the point. The defendants in that case faced criminal charges over twentytwo marijuana plants “found growing on a remote part of the property [the]
defendants owned and occupied.” Id. at 491–92. One of the defendants “directed an
‘unfortunate gesture’ at the clearly marked State Highway Patrol helicopter as it flew
over her property.” Id. at 498. She then “appeared to flee the premises . . . as the
helicopter hovered to investigate the possible field of marijuana.” Id. at 498–99.
By themselves, these two actions did not provide substantial evidence that the
Chekanow defendants were guilty of drug-related offenses. Nonetheless, this Court
held that there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession. We reasoned that
“a jury could reasonably infer that [the] defendants knowingly possessed the
marijuana plants” based on
the State[’s] . . . evidence of [the] defendants’ ownership of
the property on which the plants were growing, [the]
defendants’ reasonable proximity to the growing
marijuana plants, [the] defendants’ ability to control access
to that portion of the property via a fence and sole entry
point, one [of the] defendant[s’] recent maintenance of the
area where the plants were found, the presence of [the]
defendants’ chickens and their chicken coop in the area
where the plants were found, one [of the] defendant[s’]
suspicious behavior—the gesture and flight—before the
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Opinion of the Court
discovery of the plants, and the discovery of equipment on
[the] defendants’ property that could have been used to
cultivate the plants.
Id. at 500.
The Court of Appeals should have viewed the evidence of defendant’s
suspicious behavior alongside the evidence of the other Chekanow factors. When
considered together with evidence demonstrating defendant’s occupation of the
house, proximity to the weapon, and control of the premises, the suspicious conduct
by defendant supports an inference—not mere speculation—that he rushed inside the
house to hide the firearm.
E. Other Evidence Found in Defendant’s Possession Linking Defendant to
Contraband
In addressing this factor in its principal brief to this Court, the State argues
that the placement of the firearm in an unlocked dresser easily accessible to Ms.
Ledford’s children “is further evidence that [d]efendant stashed the gun.” We do not
regard this circumstance as “additional evidence found in defendant’s possession
which links . . . defendant to the contraband.” See Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 499. In
Chekanow, we cited as an example of such evidence the $1,700 in cash discovered on
the defendant’s person in Brown. Id. (citing Brown, 310 N.C. at 569). Similarly, in
State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121 (1972), “the Court considered in its sufficiency analysis
the fact that officers found marijuana seeds in the defendant’s bedroom at the same
time marijuana plants were found in a dilapidated shed located twenty yards behind
defendant’s home.” Chekanow, 370 N.C. at 499 (citing Spencer, 281 N.C. at 129–30).
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Opinion of the Court
Unlike the additional evidence in Brown and Spencer, the State’s “further
evidence” does not consist of other items found on the accused or in his possession.
Hence, it does not qualify for consideration under the fifth Chekanow factor. The
absence of other evidence is hardly fatal in this case, however. See id. at 496 (“No one
factor controls, and courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.”). When
taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence
pertaining to the other Chekanow factors demonstrates the existence of
“incriminating circumstances sufficient for the jury to find [that] defendant had
constructive possession” of the handgun discovered by Officer Radford. See Miller,
363 N.C. at 99.
The trial court correctly determined that substantial evidence supported each
element of the charge against defendant. For this reason, the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence.
IV.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. We hereby remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration of any remaining issues on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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