Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-26-00078-CV
In the Interest of K.K., a Child
On appeal from the
474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Nikki Mundkowsky, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-3508-6
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the parental rights of D.K. (Father) and F.K.
(Mother) to the child, K.K., were terminated. The trial court found by clear
and convincing evidence that Father had violated Family Code subsection
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), Mother had violated Family Code subsection
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and termination was in the child’s best interest. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Father and Mother appealed. We will
affirm.
A. Mother’s Appeal
Mother raises three issues in her brief. Specifically, she contends that
the evidence is insufficient to support (1) the trial court’s best-interest finding
under Section 161.001(b)(2) where the Department refused to honor an
approved kinship placement, (2) the trial court’s reasonable-efforts finding
under Section 161.001(f) where the Department treats relative-placement
attempts as evidence of reasonable efforts and the Department failed to follow
through on approved relative placement, and (3) termination under Section
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).
1. Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
In her third issue, which we will address first, Mother argues that the
evidence is insufficient to support termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D)
and (E) “under the heightened standard of In re A.B.” The termination
judgment reflects that Mother’s parental rights were terminated based on two
predicate grounds: endangering environment (subsection (D)); endangering
conduct (subsection (E)). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1).
The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and
will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)
(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 2 In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two
elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or
omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,
and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)
(mem. op.), aff ’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d
at 381.
Termination of parental rights under subsection (D) or (E) requires proof
of endangerment, which means to expose the child to loss or injury, or to
jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t. of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.
1987).
The endangerment analysis under subsection D focuses on evidence
relating to the child’s environment to determine if the environment was a
source of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re
M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). A child
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 3 is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the
parent is aware of but disregards. Id. A parent’s conduct in the home can
create an environment that endangers the well-being of a child. In re J.T.G.,
121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
Termination under subsection (E) requires clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(b)(1)(E). The relevant
inquiry under subsection (E) is whether sufficient evidence exists that the
endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s
conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d
209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). However, it is not necessary
that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually
suffer injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. To determine whether termination is
necessary, courts look to parental conduct both before and after the child’s
birth. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet.
denied).
Scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts to constitute
endangerment under subsection (E). See In re L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022
WL 3655395, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 4 also not necessary to show that the parent’s conduct was directed at the child
or that the child suffered actual injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The specific
danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct
alone. Id. Furthermore, we may consider conduct both before and after the
child’s removal in an analysis under subsection (E). In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d
351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). If the
endangering person is someone other than the appealing parent, then the
parent generally must have known of the other person’s endangering conduct.
T. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d 901, 913 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2024, no pet.).
The evidence here shows many circumstances relevant under Paragraph
(D) and (E). Because the evidence is interrelated concerning these two
statutory grounds for termination, we consolidate our examination of the
evidence as to both grounds. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
Mother argues that the endangering conditions were not created by her,
specifically in relation to the incidents of domestic violence in Kansas between
her and Father and to the incidents of noise complaints, fighting, and police
calls at her brother’s apartment in Waco. With regard to the domestic violence,
Mother argues that Father was the aggressor, and Mother left Kansas with
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 5 K.K. to remove her from the situation. With regard to the incidents at her
brother’s apartment, Mother contends that the conditions were created by her
brother and his roommates and that Mother “extricated herself from that
environment as soon as she had alternatives.”
Mother also argues that her own conduct was not properly weighed.
Specifically, she focuses her argument on the steps she took to address her
substance-abuse issues.
Mother and K.K. arrived in Waco in December 2024. Mother provided
multiple reasons for the move, including escaping Father’s violence, because of
Mother and Father’s drinking, and that Mother did not like the people Father
was associating with. Mother and K.K. stayed at her brother’s apartment
when they first arrived. On the same day they arrived, an incident occurred
at the apartment involving residents being drunk, aggressive, and arguing,
which led to multiple residents calling police. The responding officer testified
that one of the callers said Mother was “belligerently screaming and acting
aggressively” towards other people in the apartment, and that Mother called
stating that her sister’s boyfriend was acting violent towards her sister. When
the responding officer arrived, she made contact with Mother in the apartment
parking lot and tried to work with Mother to develop a plan for a shelter or
some other location to take K.K. while she sobered up, but Mother wanted to
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 6 walk to a hotel with K.K. despite it being a cold night and Mother and K.K. not
being dressed for cold weather. Mother was showing signs of significant
intoxication. The responding officer noted that when she entered the
apartment, K.K. was initially on a bed with an intoxicated adult male and
seemed disconnected from the scene despite it being chaotic, but that K.K. ran
to Mother’s sister in the apartment for comfort instead of to Mother when she
heard Mother yelling. Because of Mother’s behavior, the responding officer
decided to arrest Mother for public intoxication. The responding officer stated
that Mother’s sister admitted to drinking but was not showing signs of
intoxication, so K.K. was left in her care. The responding officer called the
Department and turned the case over to them at this point.
Christopher Monteith, a Department investigator, testified about his
involvement with the case. He stated that he went to the apartment the day
after Mother was arrested for public intoxication. Mother stated they arrived
in Texas the day prior because of domestic violence and drug concerns with
Father. Mother admitted to a history of drug use, including
methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin. She also admitted that she had
drank an entire bottle of vodka the night before, when she was arrested for
public intoxication. She admitted to having a problem with alcohol and stated
she wanted to seek help but did not have a plan for treatment. She stated she
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 7 had progressed from drinking a beer or two at a time to one or two bottles of
vodka a night. She also did not have a plan for other living arrangements,
despite the allegations of violence in the apartment they were staying in with
her sister and other family friends. Monteith observed that one of the adult
male residents in the home was intoxicated and exhibiting aggressive and
argumentative behavior while Monteith was in the home. Monteith asked
whether physical violence had occurred within the residence, and Mother said
everyone had gotten aggressive the night before but denied domestic violence
had occurred. Mother also disclosed a history of mental health issues,
including anxiety, depression, and self-harm. After trying to make a safety
plan and discuss alternative arrangements, the decision was made to remove
K.K. from Mother’s care. Monteith was not able to make contact with Father,
which he later learned was because Father was in jail in Kansas.
Rebecca Mitschke, the Department caseworker assigned to this case,
testified about Mother’s actions during the pendency of the case. Mitschke
stated the Department’s initial concerns were alcohol abuse, stability, the
ability to supply basic needs to the child, and a history of domestic violence and
possible mental health issues. In collaboration with Mother, the Department
developed a family service plan, which was adopted as a court order, to help
address these issues. The Department added inpatient drug and alcohol
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 8 treatment services to the service plan after Mother tested positive for alcohol
and admitted to alcohol consumption. Mitschke discussed several different
rehabilitation facilities with Mother and advised Mother that she was going to
have to make contact with the facilities to admit herself. Mother was admitted
into an inpatient alcohol treatment facility, but the facility sent her to a
different facility to address some mental health concerns.
After Mother completed the mental health treatment, the alcohol
treatment facility was unable to take her back immediately. Mitschke testified
that she continued to work with Mother to get her into an inpatient program,
and at the end of February 2025, Mother told Mitschke that she was able to
get a new start date in early March for inpatient alcohol treatment. Mitschke
contacted Mother on March 3, 2025 to see if she had made it safely to the
rehabilitation facility, but Mother did not respond for over a month. When
Mitschke next heard from Mother, Mother informed Mitschke that she had not
gone to inpatient treatment and instead had moved to Colorado. Mother did
not provide any plan for seeking inpatient treatment in Colorado. A couple
weeks later, Mother informed Mitschke that she had been arrested in Colorado
for assault and damage to property after an argument with a boyfriend.
Mother stated that “the relationship had become violent and that she felt it
had to do with alcohol.” Mitschke discussed the possible limitations on
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 9 Department assistance caused by Mother’s move out-of-state. Mother said she
planned to stay in Colorado because she had family and friends to stay with
there and that she was going to look for alcohol treatment resources there,
which Mitschke assisted her with as she was able.
From March 2025 to May 2025, Mitschke testified that Mother had not
had any visitation with K.K. The Department recommended that her visits be
suspended until her alcohol issues could be addressed, and the court ordered
that she needed to complete a 30-day inpatient program before she could
resume virtual visits with K.K. Mother completed a 28-day inpatient program
and was able to resume virtual visits with K.K. in June 2025. Mother lived in
a sober living house for a month after completing inpatient and maintained a
job at a clothing store, but when she was able to graduate to a sober living
apartment, she did not do so. Instead, she decided to move in with a new
boyfriend and quit the job at the clothing store because it was too far away
from her new living arrangement. Mother did not report any sort of continuing
services to help her maintain her sobriety. In early August 2025, Mother
admitted she had drank again, but that she was going to Alcoholics Anonymous
and trying to get medication to help her with her cravings. At the end of
August, Mother told Mitschke that she could not live with her boyfriend
anymore because of domestic violence and that “they brought out the worst in
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 10
each other.” Mother stated she was going to go to a sober living for mothers
with children, but Mitschke testified that Mother never went to the sober
living.
Mitschke testified that in early September 2025, Mother again admitted
to drinking and that her next test would show that she drank. She also
reported that she had moved in with her grandfather and cousin, who were
renting the upstairs portion of another man’s house. The Department had
concerns about this living arrangement because the cousin had some mental
health issues and the man who owned the house had an alcohol problem. In
November 2025, Mother texted Mitschke and admitted to smoking marijuana.
The Department also received multiple diluted and positive tests that showed
Mother had been drinking again. When Mitschke asked her about the tests,
Mother stated she stopped taking the medication that helped with her cravings
in December because of the holidays. In January 2026, Mitschke and Mother
discussed Mother’s plans going forward. Mother stated she was considering
changing her job again and had talked with a friend about moving to Wyoming
because the cost of living was lower. As of two days before the final hearing,
Mother had again moved and was living with her sister in Denver. Mother had
quit her job and was trying to get another job.
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 11
In Mother’s own testimony, she admitted that she had had monthly
relapses after leaving the sober living house and that the only period of time
that she maintained sobriety during the pendency of the case was while she
was in the rehabilitation facility and the sober living house. She also testified
that she had moved nine or ten times in the year that the case had been
pending.
As stated above, the Department’s initial concerns included alcohol
abuse, stability, and the ability to supply basic needs to the child. Based on
the testimony from multiple witnesses, as well as Mother’s own admissions,
these concerns remained throughout the pendency of the case and were still
concerns at the final hearing. Considering all the evidence presented in this
case in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding and considering the
evidence as a whole, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually
sufficient to support termination of Father’s parental rights under Paragraphs
(D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1).
Therefore, we overrule Mother’s third issue.
2. Subsection 161.001(b)(2): Best Interest
In her first issue, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the best interest of K.K. under Section 161.001(b)(2). Specifically, she
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 12 argues that “the Department refused to honor an approved kinship placement
that would have provided K.K. permanency without termination.” The kinship
placement Mother argues for would have K.K. living with Father’s aunt, Holly
Stanton, in Tennessee, with Stanton’s husband and teenage or adult children.
In determining the best interest of a child, several factors have been
consistently considered, which were set out in the Supreme Court of Texas’s
opinion of Holley v. Adams. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley
factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs
of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the
child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the plans for
the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of
the parent. Id. This list is not exhaustive but simply identifies factors that
have been or could be pertinent in the best-interest determination. Id. at 372.
There is no requirement that all these factors be proven as a condition
precedent to parental termination. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).
The absence of evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from
reasonably forming a strong conviction that termination is in the child’s best
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 13 interest. Id. In fact, while no one factor is controlling, the analysis of a single
factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
The Holley factors focus on the best interest of the child, not the best
interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907
S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). And evidence relating to the
predicate grounds under subsection 161.001(b)(1) may be relevant to
determining the best interest of the child. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
Regarding the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future, the need for permanence is the paramount consideration. In re A.R.C.,
551 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at
87. As previously discussed, Mother had moved nine or ten times in the year
this case was pending. Her plan going forward was that K.K. could live with
Stanton in Tennessee while Mother continued to live in Colorado or elsewhere.
Because she had moved to Colorado, Mother also had not been able to visit
with K.K. in person for a significant portion of the pendency of the case, and
her virtual visits had been brief. Mother did not express any plans to move
closer to Stanton if K.K. were to be placed there.
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 14
Regarding the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future, evidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a
parent’s future conduct. See Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”). Mother argues that the
Department offered no evidence that Stanton’s household would expose K.K.
to any future danger. However, whether the Department had considered
potential placement with a paternal relative does not bear on whether
termination is in the child's best interest. In re K.P.C., No. 14-17-00993-CV,
2018 WL 2106669, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). K.K. was removed from Mother’s care due to concerns of
alcohol abuse, lack of stability, and inability to provide for K.K.’s basic needs.
In our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination
pursuant to subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we have detailed Mother’s
misconduct both leading up to the Department’s involvement and during the
pendency of this case. The record shows that the Department’s concerns at the
outset of the case remained throughout the case and were still present at the
time of the final hearing. While Mother did go to inpatient rehabilitation for
her alcohol use and stay in sober living for a period of time, Mother continued
to drink and testified that she relapsed at least monthly between her time in
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 15 sober living and the final hearing. Mother testified that she chose to stop
medication that was helping with her cravings so that she could drink around
the holidays. She also continued to change her living arrangements constantly,
choosing to live in residences with alcohol, violence, and other issues that she
admitted would not be safe or healthy for K.K.
Regarding the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking
custody and the stability of the home or proposed placement, the factfinder
may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and
consider “whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or
weak and ill-defined.” In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 119–20 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). A parent’s failure to show that he or she is stable
enough to parent a child for any prolonged period entitles the factfinder “to
determine that [the] pattern would likely continue and that permanency could
only be achieved through termination and adoption.” In re B.S.W., No. 14-04-00496-CV, 2004 WL 2964015, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23,
2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). A factfinder may also consider the consequences of
its failure to terminate parental rights and that the best interest of the child
may be served by termination so that adoption may occur rather than the
temporary foster-care arrangement that would result if termination did not
occur. In re B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 16 The goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling
state interest. Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 87. On appeal, Mother argues that
termination is not in K.K.’s best interest based on placement in a non-relative
foster home when placement with Holly Stanton, Father’s aunt, may be
possible. While a child’s anticipated placement is a factor in determining the
child's best interest, the fact that placement will be with non-relatives is not a
bar to termination. See In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). At trial, Mother did not provide any plan going
forward for K.K. other than testifying she would be able to care for K.K. if she
was returned to Mother. The Department, on the other hand, provided clear
plans for K.K.’s future care and stability. The record shows that K.K. was
doing well in the foster placement; her needs were being met and she had
bonded with the foster family. The foster parents were also interested in
adopting K.K. if Mother and Father’s parental rights were terminated.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could have reasonably
formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights
to K.K. was in the child’s best interest.
Accordingly, Mother’s first issue is overruled.
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 17 3. Subsection 161.001(f): Reasonable Efforts to Return
In her second issue, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court’s reasonable-efforts finding under Section 161.001(f)
“where the Department treats relative-placement attempts as evidence of
reasonable efforts and the Department here failed to follow through on an
approved relative placement.”
Texas Family Code requires the trial court to make a finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent:
(f) In a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship filed by
the Department of Family and Protective Services, the court may
not order termination of the parent-child relationship under
Subsection (b)(1) unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence and describes in writing with specificity in a separate
section of the order that:
(1) the department made reasonable efforts to return the
child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the
merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing
danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the
child to the parent
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(f)
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 18
The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding pursuant to subsection 161.001(f) are the
same as the standards for the predicate grounds. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.
2002) (factual sufficiency).
Mother argues that “if attempting relative placement is evidence of
reasonable efforts, then unjustified failure to follow through on an approved
relative placement is evidence that those efforts fell short of the statutory
standard.” However, subsection 161.001(f) requires only that the Department
has made reasonable efforts to return K.K. to Mother before the trial court can
order termination of Mother’s parental rights; it does not require that the
Department have made reasonable efforts to place K.K. with other family
members. See Rogers v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 175 S.W.3d 370,
379 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (no duty to place
child with relative before termination of parental rights). As previously stated,
the trial court’s determination of where a child should be placed is a factor in
determining the child’s best interest, but the fact that placement will be with
non-relatives, rather than with family members, is not a bar to termination.
See In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d at 902. While some cases have considered evaluating
other family members’ homes for potential placement as part of the
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 19 Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, this is not
the only evidence the trial court can consider.
The Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally
considered a reasonable effort to return the child to the parent. See, e.g., A.D.
v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2023, no pet.); In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019,
pet. denied). Here, the trial court found that the Department’s reasonable
efforts in this case included: attempting to implement a safety plan and parentchild safety placement prior to K.K.’s removal; holding a family group
conference to develop family plans of service for the parent; providing family
plans of service to the parents that included services to help alleviate the issues
and concerns that gave rise to the Department’s involvement; attempting to
assist Mother to find a shelter that she and K.K. could remain together prior
to K.K.’s removal; holding statutorily-required and informal conferences to
assist and encourage Mother in making changes so K.K. could be reunified with
her; attempting numerous times to get Mother treatment for alcohol and
encouraging her to go into sober living placements to help her with her
sobriety; providing transportation to Mother to a rehabilitation facility and to
visits with K.K. when Mother was residing in Texas; maintaining contact with
Mother and encouraging her engagement in services; offering supervised visits
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 20 for Mother to foster a healthy parent-child relationship and making
arrangements for Mother to continue visits virtually after Mother relocated
out of state; and working with Mother to help her have more meaningful
virtual visits by informing her of ideas for conversations and activities for the
virtual visits. The evidence previously discussed shows that the Department
took many steps during the pendency of the case with the stated goal of
returning K.K. to Mother’s care, which supports the trial court’s findings
pursuant to subsection 161.001(f).
Therefore, we overrule Mother’s second issue.
B. Father’s Appeal
Father filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order terminating
his parental rights to K.K. 1 Counsel for Father has now filed an Anders brief,
asserting that they diligently reviewed the record and that, in their opinion,
the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,
18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002,
order) (per curiam) (applying Anders to termination appeal).
Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders; it presents a
professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to
1 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had violated Family Code
subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N) and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1).
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 21 advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’
points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to
the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”);
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has
carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible
error in the trial court’s order of termination. Counsel has further informed us
that he has served appellant with a copy of his Anders brief, informed Father
of his right to review the appellate record and to file a pro se response, and
provided Father with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record.
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313,
319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; High v. State,
573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 408–09. By letter, we also informed Father of his right to review
the record and to file a pro se response. He did not file a pro se response.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of
all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349–50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).
An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in
law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10, 108 S.Ct. 1895,
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 22 1902 n.10, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and
counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an
appeal. 2 See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it
considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible
error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
C. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.
2 Counsel reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings as to Father
under Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N) and determined that it would be frivolous to attack the findings. We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Father violated subsection (D) and (E). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232–33, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding due process and due course of law requirements mandate appellate court detail its analysis if appellate court affirms termination on either subsection (D) or (E)). As stated above, many factors can support an endangerment finding, including a parent’s failure to complete a court-ordered service plan, missed visits with the child, and conduct that generally subjects a child to a life of instability and uncertainty. In re A.R.M., 593 S.W.3d 358, 371-372 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied). The record here shows that Father engaged in domestic violence, consumed a heavy amount of alcohol that resulted in intoxication, and possibly used drugs all in the presence of K.K. Further, at the time of the final hearing, Father admitted to recent usage of methamphetamine, marijuana, and fentanyl. He was also pending felony charges for distribution of methamphetamine in a school zone. The evidence also indicated that Father failed to attend a number of visits with K.K. and had no visitation for nearly a year before the final hearing. Father also failed to participate in the hair follicle drug testing and failed to have stable housing due to incarceration.
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 23
MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 13, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
CV06
In the Interest of K.K., a Child Page 24