NUMBER 13-26-00014-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
HEATHER LYN SHUMAKE, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 2ND 25TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
Appellant Heather Lyn Shumake appeals her conviction of possession of
methamphetamine, a controlled substance in penalty group one, in the amount of one
gram or more but less than four grams, a third-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 481.115(a), (c). By one issue, Shumake challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting her conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 28, 2025, Shumake’s bench trial commenced, and Lavaca County
Sheriff’s Office (LCSO) Deputy Justin Simpkins testified that on September 15, 2024, he
was dispatched around 9:00 p.m. to a call for service involving a possible theft. After
gathering information from Krisenda Besetsny, the complaining witness, Deputy Simpkins
made contact with Shumake, a potential suspect, in a trailer located approximately “30
yards behind [Besetsny’s] residence.” Deputy Simpkins testified that Shumake invited him
inside her residence and that no one else was present in the trailer when he was speaking
to her. Deputy Simpkins questioned Shumake regarding the alleged stolen items, and
she gave him limited consent to search her trailer, directly expressing to Deputy Simpkins
that he “could not open anything.” During his search, Deputy Simpkins observed “a glass
pipe often used in the ingestion and inhalation of methamphetamine with residue, . . . [a]
Tupperware container which contained a white crystal-like substance, . . . [and] a small
bag that is normally associated with the storage of illegal substances” in an open cabinet
in plain view. The State admitted into evidence photographs of these items.
Once Deputy Simpkins noticed the illicit contraband, he requested consent to
search the entire trailer, and Shumake denied his request. He then seized the items he
initially observed and secured the scene to obtain a search warrant. Deputy Simpkins
field “tested the substance inside of the [Tupperware] container and then applied for a
search warrant.” The field test indicated the substance inside was positive for
methamphetamine. Photographs of the initial items and field test as well as a copy of the
search warrant were admitted into evidence.
After obtaining the search warrant, Deputy Simpkins returned to Shumake’s
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residence to conduct a search and found more illicit contraband “[i]n a closed cabinet
directly next to where . . . the other paraphernalia was located.” He described the
additional contraband as “[a] bag containing a white crystal-like substance,” which he
suspected was methamphetamine, “as well as several different types of drug
paraphernalia,” including a unicorn pipe and glass stems commonly used to inhale
methamphetamine and storage bags commonly associated with the storage of
methamphetamine. He additionally “found four bottles containing various types of
prescription pills that did not belong to [Shumake].” Photographs of these additional items
were admitted into evidence. Deputy Simpkins also testified that Shumake told him
“somebody had illegally entered her residence earlier in the day and had left those items,
[and] any further items discovered in there.” Thereafter, Deputy Simpkins arrested
Shumake for possession of a controlled substance. On cross-examination, Deputy
Simpkins noted that the lock on Shumake’s trailer did not function properly. Footage from
Deputy Simpkins’s body-worn camera was admitted into evidence and depicted the
events previously discussed.
Former LCSO Sergeant Investigator Ariana Vavrusa testified she did not
personally interact with Shumake but was tasked with mailing certain evidence seized by
Deputy Simpkins to the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) crime lab. She
explained that she only mailed evidence “Item No. 2,” which was a small baggie
containing a crystal-like substance found by Deputy Simpkins on September 15, 2024.
During Vavrusa’s testimony, DPS’s “Seized Drugs Analysis Laboratory Report” from
Shumake’s case was admitted into evidence. The report indicated that the substance
weighed 2.49 grams and was determined to be methamphetamine.
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Shumake testified that in September of 2024, she was initially residing in a home
with Besetsny and that her acquaintance Wendy Migl was renting her trailer for about
three days. Shumake further testified that she was assaulted by Besetsny and moved
back into her trailer after the assault occurred. On September 15, 2024, Shumake and
Migl ate breakfast and then left Shumake’s trailer to go to a laundromat in Yoakum around
11:00 a.m. Before leaving, Shumake took steps to secure her trailer door by placing “a
big steel bar in the ground” diagonally against the door “[b]ecause the door had not locked
for a . . . month or two.” Upon returning from the laundromat, Shumake recalled seeing
the steel pole located in a different position and a bottle of hand sanitizer that was not
there before. She testified that the hand sanitizer was significant because Besetsny “was
a huge hand sanitizer carrier . . . [and w]ould carry a baggy of it around all the time.”
Shumake also testified that she had seen Besetsny use drugs and, more specifically,
methamphetamine. The following exchange then occurred:
[Defense counsel]: [Shumake], you heard [Deputy] Simpkins testify
about what was found at your [residence]?
[Shumake]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: Did any of that drug paraphernalia belong to
you?
[Shumake]: No.
[Defense counsel]: As we sit here today, do you have any
idea . . . who owned that drug paraphernalia?
[Shumake]: No.
[Defense counsel]: Do you have any idea how it got into your
[residence]?
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[Shumake]: No.
[Shumake]: I wouldn’t have . . . invited somebody in my
house. If I would have had something like that in
my house, I wouldn’t have invited them in.
That’s ridiculous.
[Defense counsel]: Now, let’s specifically ask about the
methamphetamine that was found by [LCSO]?
Did that belong to you?
[Shumake]: No. I had just had three heart attacks like real
close together. I—no, I did not know about any
of that in my house. I wouldn’t have had any of
that in my house.
[Defense counsel]: Did you know that methamphetamine was in
your home?
[Shumake]: No.
[Defense counsel]: Did you have any knowledge as to how it got
there?
[Shumake]: No.
[Defense counsel]: [Deputy] Simpkins said that you told him that
somebody must have broken in and basically
planted that evidence there?
[Shumake]: I told him that . . . anything that would be in my
house was placed there by someone.
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Do you suspect it was placed there by
[Besetsny]?
[Shumake]: Absolutely.
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Do you believe [Besetsny] had a motive
to do that?
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[Shumake]: Absolutely.
[Defense counsel]: And what was that?
[Shumake]: She . . . was sleeping with my ex. The whole
reason . . . why I was even living in the [trailer]
and living like that anyway.
[Defense counsel]: So, again, [Shumake], just to be clear . . . for the
Court’s purposes, did you have any knowledge
that there was methamphetamines in your
[residence] on the 15th or 16th of September of
2024?
[Shumake]: Absolutely not.
[Defense counsel]: Did you knowingly possess methamphetamines
on September 15th or 16th of 2024?
[Shumake]: No, sir.
On cross-examination, Shumake testified that the open cabinet, where Deputy Simpkins
first saw the items in plain view, was located in the “dining room area.” She further testified
she was not sleeping in the bedroom of the trailer, but she slept on the “daybed in the
living room.” Shumake reiterated that her residence had not locked for several months
and that she did not know what was inside her home because she had not been living
there.
Following arguments by the parties, the trial court found Shumake guilty and
sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment. However, the trial court suspended the
sentence and placed her on community supervision for a term of ten years. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.053(a)(1). This appeal ensued.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on
the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational factfinder could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Edward v. State,
635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“If the record supports conflicting inferences, the
reviewing court must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the
prosecution and defer to the [factfinder’s] factual determinations.” (citation modified)). We
remain mindful that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”
Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, pet.
ref’d) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
“However, a fact[]finder is ‘not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere
speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.’” Erwin v. State, 578
S.W.3d 182, 186 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (quoting Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them,” while
“[s]peculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and
evidence presented.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16. “[T]he mere existence of an alternative
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reasonable hypothesis does not render the evidence . . . insufficient.” Villarreal Lopez v.
State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 98 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (quoting
Richardson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)). “[W]e will
not usurp the role of the fact[]finder by factoring into our sufficiency analysis an alternative
‘hypothesis inconsistent with the guilt of the accused.’” Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583,
601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)).
When a reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, it is required “to defer to the trier of fact’s credibility and weight determinations,
because the trier of fact is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be
given their testimony.” Dansby v. State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 226 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017,
pet. ref’d) (first citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); and
then citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “[A] factfinder may disbelieve some or all of a
witness’s testimony, even when that testimony is uncontradicted.” Hernandez v. State,
161 S.W.3d 491, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence produced
at trial against “the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically
correct jury charge.” Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)
(quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The hypothetically
correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
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defendant was tried.” Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing
Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). “‘As authorized
by the indictment’ means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the
charging instrument.” Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546 (quoting Curry v. State, 30
S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
The elements of possession of a controlled substance as charged are (1) the
defendant; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) possessed; (4) at least one gram but less
than four grams of a controlled substance. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 481.115(a), (c);
see Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680, 689 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.).
Methamphetamine is statutory defined as a penalty group one controlled substance. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 481.102(6). In this case, a hypothetically correct jury charge
would require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Shumake (1) knowingly
or intentionally, (2) possessed, (3) one gram or more, but less than four grams of
methamphetamine. See id. § 481.115(a), (c); see also Walker, 594 S.W.3d at 336;
Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546.
“‘Possession’ means actual care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL
CODE § 1.07(a)(39). Thus, “[t]o support a defendant’s conviction as a principal actor, the
State had to prove the defendant ‘knowingly possessed’ the contraband, which requires
proof that the defendant (1) exercised ‘actual care, custody, control, or management’ over
the substance and (2) knew the substance was contraband.” Espino-Cruz v. State, 586
S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (first citing TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.002(38); then citing Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588,
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594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); and then citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006)); see also Romero v. State, No. 13-20-00103-CR, 2021 WL 1045804,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (defining the term “knowingly possessed”).
The State must prove that the defendant’s connection with the contraband “was
more than fortuitous”; in other words, “[m]ere presence at the location where drugs are
found is . . . insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those
drugs.” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161–62. Further, the defendant’s knowledge of the
presence of the contraband is not sufficient to establish joint possession without other
links. Jenkins v. State, 76 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002,
pet. ref’d) (citing Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). “[E]vidence
which affirmatively links [the defendant] to [the contraband] suffices for proof that [she]
possessed it knowingly.” Barbosa v. State, 537 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2017, no pet.); see also Romero, 2021 WL 1045804, at *4.
The defendant does not need to be in exclusive possession of the contraband—a
factfinder may otherwise infer that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the
contraband if sufficient facts and circumstances support the inference of possession. Tate
v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has compiled a non-exhaustive list of factors that may indicate a link connecting
the defendant to the knowing possession of contraband:
(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the
influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed
other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant
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made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant
attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures;
(9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other
contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant
owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found;
(12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed;
(13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and
(14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of
guilt.
Id. at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). While “these factors can help guide
a court’s analysis, ultimately the inquiry remains that [is] set forth in Jackson.” Id. (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). Further, it is “not the number of links that is dispositive, but
rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.” Evans, 202
S.W.3d at 162.
IV. ANALYSIS
Shumake challenges her conviction by asserting that the affirmative links between
herself and the methamphetamine found in her residence were insufficient to support a
finding of guilt. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(a), (c). We disagree.
The cumulative force of the evidence presented at trial could have led the trial court
to reasonably believe that the 2.49 grams of methamphetamine found in Shumake’s
residence belonged to her. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Shumake was not merely present where the baggie of methamphetamine was found—
she was in close proximity to it as it was found in the home where she resided, and it was
located in a cabinet near the daybed where she was sleeping. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at
414 (assessing the appellant’s proximity to and accessibility of the contraband as a
factor). More specifically, Deputy Simpkins testified that the baggie of a crystal-like
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substance, later determined to be methamphetamine by the DPS crime lab, was located
in the cabinet directly next to where he first observed illicit paraphernalia in an open
cabinet in plain view. See id. (assessing whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia
were present as another factor). Although Shumake denied ownership of any contraband
and asserted that someone planted the items, the trial court could have disbelieved
Shumake’s denial of ownership and concluded that she was aware and in control of the
methamphetamine found inside her trailer. See Hernandez, 161 S.W.3d at 501. And “the
mere existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis,” that the methamphetamine and
paraphernalia belonged to another individual, “does not render the
evidence . . . insufficient.” See Villarreal Lopez, 267 S.W.3d at 98; Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d
at 601.
Furthermore, the evidence supports a finding of sufficient affirmative links between
Shumake and the methamphetamine. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414. Three of those links
include Shumake’s presence during the search, the fact that she resided in the trailer
where the search was conducted, and her close proximity to where the initial contraband
as well as the additional contraband was located. See id. For instance, the presence of
glass pipes and stems commonly used to smoke methamphetamine, some of which
contained residue, several baggies of methamphetamine, and additional empty baggies
where Shumake was present and resided supports a reasonable inference that she had
smoked or intended to smoke the methamphetamine. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16;
see also Briscoe v. State, No. 13-20-00445-CR, 2022 WL 710083, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding same reasonable inference based on similar evidence).
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Shumake argues on appeal that the methamphetamine was not hers; someone
planted it in her home; she could not have possessed it since she had heart issues and
“recently had two or three heart attacks;” she did not make any incriminating statements,
furtive gestures, or flee; and that Besetsny had a motive to incriminate her due to the
assault and Besetsny’s relationship with “[her] ex.” However, “the absence of certain
[affirmative] links do not weigh against those that are present.” Ferguson v. State, 313
S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (first citing Evans, 202
S.W.3d at 162; and then citing Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)); see also Davenport v. State, No. 13-17-00363-CR,
2019 WL 613275, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 14, 2019, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding sufficient affirmative links present
despite several missing links and drugs being found inside another passenger’s genitals);
Maldonado v. State, No. 13-12-00586-CR, 2015 WL 4381067, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[I]t
is well established that the absence of certain links do[es] not weigh against those that
are present.”); Larios v. State, No. 13-15-00022-CR, 2015 WL 9487107, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding the jury could have concluded the absence of some affirmative links
was attributed to the appellant being “careful and collected in the way she pursued her
task”).
We must determine whether under the evidence presented, viewed in a light most
favorable to the verdict, any reasonable factfinder could have concluded that Shumake
knowingly or intentionally exercised actual care, custody, or control, over the
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methamphetamine discovered in her residence. See Espino-Cruz, 586 S.W.3d at 543;
Blackman, 350 S.W.3d at 594; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(a), (c); TEX. PENAL
CODE § 1.07(a)(39). We conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient such that a
rational factfinder could have concluded that Shumake knowingly or intentionally
possessed more than one gram but less than four grams of methamphetamine. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(a), (c); TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(39); Edward, 635
S.W.3d at 655; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Shumake’s sole issue is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
13th day of August, 2026.
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