NUMBER 13-24-00491-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JEREMY FABIAN FUENTES
A/K/A JEREMY FUENTES, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 404TH DISTRICT COURT
OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant Jeremy Fabian Fuentes a/k/a Jeremy Fuentes appeals his conviction of
two counts of aggravated assault on a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2),
(b)(2)(B). Following a bench trial, the trial judge found Fuentes guilty of the indicted
offenses and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. By a single issue, Fuentes argues the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2023, Harlingen Police Department (HPD) Officers Marian
Hernandez and Jacob Chavez were dispatched to a residence on North 9th Street in
Harlingen in response to a domestic disturbance call. The State introduced video footage
from both officers’ body worn cameras. The footage from Hernandez’s camera showed
her approaching a vehicle in the yard, and the vehicle’s occupant indicating he was
Fuentes’s cousin and that police were called “because my cousin is in there tripping.”
Hernandez then approached the residence where she was met by Fuentes’s mother who
pointed in the direction of screaming in the house and gave her permission to enter the
residence. Hernandez entered the house and found a bedroom with an open door and a
bedridden occupant inside who later identified herself as Fuentes’s grandmother.
Fuentes’s grandmother stated “[she] need[ed] him in jail” when she motioned towards the
kitchen where Hernandez heard screaming and loud talking.
Hernandez proceeded through the house, passed the kitchen, and entered a back
room where she encountered Fuentes. Fuentes immediately asserted “you can’t come to
my house” as he blocked further entry into the room. He then slowly advanced towards
Hernandez, closing the distance between them. Hernandez backed into the kitchen while
attempting to question Fuentes regarding the reason for the call. Chavez then arrived to
assist.
Both officers attempted to de-escalate the situation and continued to question
Fuentes as to what caused the domestic disturbance call. Fuentes insisted nothing
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happened and claimed that the officers knew him from a prior incident where he was
allegedly beaten by law enforcement. After the officers denied any prior involvement with
Fuentes, he left the kitchen to retrieve a cell phone with video footage purportedly of a
prior incident involving Fuentes and law enforcement officers. When Fuentes left the room
Chavez noticed a knife in the kitchen and he attempted to hide the knife by “putting it
underneath the microwave just to get it out of sight.”
As Hernandez and Chavez insisted they never encountered Fuentes before, he
re-entered the room and his behavior became more erratic. He gesticulated towards the
officers, postured, pointed his finger toward them and closed the distance between
himself and Chavez multiple times standing face to face. Additionally, Fuentes demanded
the officers leave his house and began to make statements such as: “[y]ou wanna play
with me?” and “[y]ou wanna play with God?”
Hernandez testified at trial that she saw that [Fuentes] had dilated pupils” and in
her experience, it was a sign “[he] might be under the influence of a narcotic.” She
explained Fuentes’s attention seemed divided between the officers and other household
members. Fuentes yelled at others present in the house to “shut the fuck up!” and
accused the officers of “breaking and entering.” He then said “I could do what I want to
here” and told the officers “[g]et out of my house.” The officers detailed that Fuentes
continued to escalate the situation and observed that his statements and actions became
more aggressive when he said “[i]f I say you dead, you dead. I do what I want to.” Finally,
Fuentes asked the officers “[y]ou think I’m playing? I can do what I want to here” and
proceeded to grab the knife which Chavez had attempted to hide from sight in the space
underneath the microwave. In response to Fuentes grabbing the knife, Chavez drew his
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gun, and Hernandez drew her taser.
Hernandez testified she felt threatened after Fuentes picked up the knife.
Hernandez stated because of Fuentes’s statements and his erratic gestures she “wasn’t
sure of what his next move [would be]. He had already picked up the knife and he was
making comments.” Similarly, Chavez testified Fuentes got uncomfortably close to him
and indicated that he felt threatened even before he had to draw his gun; Chavez drew
his weapon because he “didn’t know what [Fuentes’s] intentions were.” In his testimony,
Chavez interpreted Fuentes’s actions as a “threat.” He indicated that he was afraid that
Fuentes was going to attack him with the knife.
After considering the evidence submitted, the trial court found Fuentes guilty on
both counts of aggravated assault on a public servant. See id. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B).
The court sentenced him as described above. See id. § 12.32. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be
supported by sufficient evidence. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). This is no less true when a judge, rather than a jury, sits as the factfinder.
See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “Evidence is
sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a rational [factfinder] could find each essential
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573,
577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
In a legal sufficiency review, “we consider all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable
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inferences therefrom, a rational [factfinder] could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021). This “includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted.”
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial
evidence can be equally probative, and guilt can be established beyond a reasonable
doubt solely by circumstantial evidence. Id.
When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, as occurred here, we defer to the
judge’s role as the factfinder, which includes “resolving conflicts in the testimony,
weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts.” Murray v.
State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “[A]n inference is a conclusion
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.”
Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We consider “whether the necessary
inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Murray, 457 S.W.3d at
448 (quoting Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). On the other hand, a finding cannot be based
on speculation. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Unlike a
reasonable inference, “speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible
meaning of facts and evidence presented.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against “the elements of the offense
as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This standard applies equally to both jury and
bench trials. Id. A hypothetically correct charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is
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authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict its theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular
offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.
As relevant here, a person commits the offense of assault if the person
“intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL
CODE § 22.01(a)(2). A person commits the offense of aggravated assault “if the person
commits assault as defined in [section] 22.01 and the person . . . uses or exhibits a deadly
weapon during the commission of the assault.” TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02(a)(2). An
aggravated assault is a first-degree felony if it is committed “against a person the actor
knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty.”
Id. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). A “public servant” is defined as “a person . . . employed, or otherwise
designated as . . . an officer, employee, or agent of government.” Id. § 1.07(41)(A).
The Texas Court of Criminal appeals held “there must be some evidence of a threat
being made to sustain a conviction of assault by threat.” Olivas v. State, 203 S.W. 3d 341,
349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis original). Further, “[a] person commits assault by
threat when he acts with the intent to cause in another person a reasonable apprehension
of imminent bodily injury, though not necessarily with the intent to cause such harm.”
Jefferson v. State, 346 S.W. 3d 254, 256-57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011 pet.
ref’d). “It is well established that a threat may be communicated by action or conduct as
well as by words.” Id.; see also Jones v. State, 500 S.W. 3d 106, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016, no pet).
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B. Analysis
Fuentes argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he
“did not point a knife at any officer,” and he “merely picked . . . up” the knife “almost
casually.” The State of Texas responds that the trial evidence illustrates that “[Fuentes],
in a highly aggressive and agitated state, made a multitude of threats . . . prior to grabbing
the knife” including (1) “I can do what I want to here,” (2) “If I say you dead, you dead, I
do what I want here,” (3) “I’ll do what the fuck I want, yea[h],” and (4) “You think I’m
playing? I’ll do what I want.” The State contends the combination of these words, with
Fuentes’s action of picking up the knife, and the officers’ testimony that “they felt
threatened when [Fuentes] picked up the knife because they did not know his next move
or his intentions,” amounts to sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to have found the
essential elements of the crime of aggravated assault on a public servant beyond a
reasonable doubt. We agree.
The evidence demonstrates a steadily escalating confrontation. Officers
responded to the residence after receiving a report of domestic disturbance. Hernandez
attempted to investigate, but Fuentes immediately challenged her presence, repeatedly
moved toward her, and continued advancing as she backed into the kitchen. Both officers
testified Fuentes appeared to be under the influence of narcotics because of his erratic
behavior and because his pupils were dilated. As the encounter progressed, Fuentes
became increasingly agitated, repeatedly accusing the officers of misconduct during a
prior encounter, and not relenting after the officers tried to deescalate the situation.
Fuentes instead insisted that the officers leave his house and declared “[i]f I say you dead,
you dead.”
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The evidence further reflects Chavez independently recognized the kitchen knife
as a potential threat. Chavez testified he attempted to hide the knife by “putting it
underneath the microwave just to get it out of sight” when Fuentes briefly stepped out of
the kitchen. Nevertheless, Fuentes immediately retrieved that knife and declared to the
officers “[y]ou think I’m playing? I can do what I want to here.” Both officers responded by
drawing their weapons and testified that they believed Fuentes intended to attack them
based on the escalating situation.
Fuentes argues he never pointed the knife directly at either officer. Even assuming
he did not do so, the statute does not require proof that a deadly weapon was pointed at
the complainants. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(2); Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 348–51;
Jefferson, 346 S.W.3d at 256–57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113. The trial court, as the sole
judge of the witness’s credibility and the weight to be given the evidence, viewed the body
camera recordings and heard the officer’s testimony regarding Fuentes’ conduct
throughout the encounter. Jefferson, 346 S.W. 3d at, 256-57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113.
Considering Fuentes’ repeated advancement toward the officers, his escalating hostility,
his explicit verbal threats, his retrieval of the knife immediately after making those threats,
and the officer’s testimony that they feared imminent attack with the knife, a rational
factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuentes intentionally or
knowingly threatened the officers and committed assault by threat while using or
exhibiting a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), Jefferson,
346 S.W. 3d at, 256-57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113. Additionally, the officers wore their
law enforcement uniform and were responding to a domestic disturbance call. Thus, a
rational factfinder could conclude Fuentes knew or should have known that his actions
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were committed against actors he knew were public servants while they were “lawfully
discharging an official duty.” See id. § 22.02(B)(2)(B). Accordingly, the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the convictions.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
13th day of August, 2026.
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