NUMBER 13-26-00008-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
SHEVIRSKI JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 156TH DISTRICT COURT
OF BEE COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca
Appellant Shevirski Johnson pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation (Count 1), a
second-degree felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm (Count 3), a third-degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 30.02(a), (c)(2); 46.04(a), (e). The trial court sentenced
Johnson to twenty years’ incarceration for Count 1 and ten years’ incarceration for Count
3, and it ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Johnson’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm because
we must defer to the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility.
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of January 31, 2024, after sundown, Beeville Police Department
(BPD) officers Matthew Puente and Domingo Luna were driving when they spotted
Johnson at an intersection. Johnson was riding a bicycle without the required front white
light, and the officers stopped him for violating Texas Transportation Code Section
551.104(b). See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 551.104(b). 1 After stopping Johnson, Puente
informed him that he lacked the required “white light” on the front of his bike. Puente
asked Johnson for his identification, which Johnson did not have.
Puente and Johnson argued regarding whether a “blinking” or “white” light was
required on his bike and Puente told him the light also had to be mounted. Puente asked
if Johnson had anything “on him” which Johnson denied. Johnson stated he did nothing
wrong. During this time, the officers checked and determined there were multiple
outstanding warrants for Johnson’s arrest. 2 At that point, Puente informed Johnson there
was a “local warrant” for him and attempted to arrest him. Johnson then fled and Puente
chased him. The officers eventually detained him. Following his detainment, the officers
searched his backpack and found him to be in possession of a firearm. Officers
determined that the firearm was linked to an earlier burglary incident, and they arrested
Johnson for that burglary. On July 17, 2025, the grand jury indicted Johnson for four
1 Texas Transportation Code Section 551.104(b) provides a person “may not operate a bicycle at
nighttime unless the bicycle is equipped with . . . a lamp on the front of the bicycle that emits a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 551.104(b)(1).
2 The record is unclear as to the nature of the crimes for these unknown warrants.
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offenses. 3
Before trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress, arguing the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to seize him or conduct a warrantless search of his bike and person.
He argued such stop and search violated his constitutional rights and that all evidence
obtained from this search and arrest should be suppressed. The trial court held a hearing
on this motion on December 1, 2025.
Puentes testified regarding the arrest of Johnson. He testified he was wearing a
bodycam during the stop, and the trial court admitted the camera recording for the
purposes of the hearing. The footage shows the stop and arrest as described above,
though the video is blurred from the time of Johnson fleeing onward.
Puentes testified they discovered Johnson had two active warrants during the stop
and thus initiated his arrest. On cross-examination, Puentes conceded that in one view
of the camera footage Johnson was not riding the bicycle and was only walking with it.
However, Puentes claimed he saw Johnson riding the bike and activated his vehicle lights
at that point, though his vehicle lacked a dash camera to capture footage of that moment.
Puentes also admitted Johnson told him that he was advised by another officer that a
blinking red light was sufficient for a bike, and that he was walking to Dollar General to
get a white light.
Johnson testified he was told by a different officer before Puentes’s stop that he
needed a white light on his bike and that he went home to get a flashlight to put on the
bike. He claimed his flashlight lacked batteries, and he was heading to Dollar General to
purchase batteries when Puentes stopped him. Johnson stated he was walking the bike
3 The trial court later severed Count 4 into a separate matter and dismissed Count 2.
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because he knew he could not ride it without the proper light. During cross-examination,
Johnson gave several arguably inconsistent statements about what type of light he
believed he was supposed to have on his bike at the time, and what he told Puentes.
Following the testimony, the State of Texas argued the evidence showed Johnson
was riding the bike during the stop and that the stop was thus legal. Conversely,
Johnson’s counsel argued there was no video evidence Johnson was riding the bike and
that Johnson was attempting to comply with the law when he was stopped and arrested.
The trial court stated it was a fact issue for the jury as to whether Johnson was riding the
bike and denied the motion.
On December 2, 2025, Johnson pleaded guilty as described above but preserved
his right to appeal any pre-trial motions ruled upon prior to the plea. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, Johnson argues the trial court erred when it denied the motion
to suppress evidence because the traffic stop was conducted without a warrant and
without reasonable suspicion since he was not “operating” the bicycle at the time he was
pulled over. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 provides that evidence obtained
in violation of the law or the United States or Texas Constitutions shall not “be admitted
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
Art. 38.23(a). Similarly, “[t]he federal exclusionary rule requires the suppression of
evidence obtained either directly or derivatively (‘fruit of the poisonous tree’) from police
conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Massey v. State, 667 S.W.3d 784, 788
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016)).
We review “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. McGuire, 689 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). This review is bifurcated
as we give complete deference to the trial court’s “determination of historical facts,”
“application of law to those questions of fact,” and decisions of “mixed questions of law
and fact that are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor.” Id. at 601–02;
Hawkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020, pet.
ref’d). Conversely, “[f]or mixed questions of law and fact that do not involve an evaluation
of credibility and demeanor . . . we conduct a de novo review.” McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at
602. “We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and reverse
judgment only if it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Hernandez v. State,
533 S.W.3d 472, 478 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d). “If the trial
court’s ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case and reasonably
supported by the evidence, the ruling will be upheld.” McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602.
The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures. Igboji v. State,
666 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We evaluate policer officer stops
“objectively, under the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether the officer
reacted reasonably.” State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “An
officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard is
satisfied.” Id. (quoting Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)).
“Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when
combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect
that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaged in criminal activity.”
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Id. (quoting Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247).
It is the State’s burden to prove the reasonableness of the stop. See id. If there are
disputes regarding the contents of videotape evidence, we defer to the trial court’s
findings. See Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Only if the
videotape “presents indisputable visual evidence” contradicting officer testimony may we
disregard trial court findings crediting such testimony. Id. (quoting Tucker v. State, 369
S.W.3d 179, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Alcalá, J., concurring)).
B. Analysis
Johnson contends the trial court abused its discretion when denying his motion
because it could not determine whether he was actually operating the bicycle at the time
police stopped him for non-confirming lights. Because it was undisputedly nighttime
during the stop, the Texas Transportation Code required him to have “a lamp on the front
of the bicycle that emits a white light” when operating the bike. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 551.104(b)(1). The Transportation Code does not define “operate” but the Court of
Criminal Appeals has defined operation of a motor vehicle as taking “action to affect the
functioning of [the] vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.” State v.
Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Denton v. State, 911
S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
Johnson argues the video evidence conclusively showed he was not riding, and
thus not operating the bicycle, and points to Puente’s testimony conceding that in at least
one view of the video evidence Johnson is only visible walking with the bicycle. Johnson
further argues Puente’s testimony that he saw Johnson riding the bicycle is contradicted
by all other evidence in the record. Conversely, the State responds Puente’s testimony
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alone supports the trial court’s ruling and the camera footage does not contradict his
testimony as it showed a later point in time and different angles.
Because the question of whether Johnson was riding and operating his bike is a
mixed question of law and fact based on assessment of Johnson and Puentes’s credibility
and demeanor, we must defer to the trial court’s determinations. See McGuire, 689
S.W.3d at 602–03; Hernandez, 533 S.W.3d at 478. Puentes testified he saw Johnson
riding the bike without the proper light when he first initiated the stop. See TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 551.104(b)(1). Directly witnessing a crime being committed meets the reasonable
suspicion standard, justifying Puentes’s warrantless stop. See Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 204.
As the trial court denied Johnson’s motion, it is apparent the trial court assessed
Puentes’s demeanor and found him a credible witness on this fact. See McGuire, 689
S.W.3d at 602–03; Hernandez, 533 S.W.3d at 478. Indeed, the trial court directly stated
this testimony created a fact issue for the jury to resolve.
Johnson argues Puentes’s testimony is contradicted by video and is not enough
to support such a finding, but because there is a dispute about whether the footage
forecloses the possibility Johnson was initially riding the bicycle, the footage is thus not
indisputable and we again must defer to the trial court’s determination that there was a
fact issue. See Miller, 393 S.W.3d at 263. Only “indisputable” video evidence allows us
to disregard the trial court’s findings. See id. While the video only definitively showing
Johnson walking with the bike certainly creates the possibility that Johnson was never
riding the bike, in light of Puentes’s testimony, the video does not display the entire
encounter from start to finish and therefore does not definitively or indisputably show that
Johnson was never riding the bicycle. See id.; McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602. The trial court
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credited Puentes’s testimony and we must defer to that credibility determination. See
McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602. That Johnson provided potentially contradictory testimony
on whether he was obtaining a white light or believed a blinking red light alone was
compliant with the statute factors into the trial court’s assessment of Johnson’s credibility
and demeanor as to whether he was riding the bicycle. See McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602–
03; Hernandez, 533 S.W.3d at 478.
The assessment of both witnesses’ credibility and demeanor lies within the zone
of reasonable disagreement and thus squarely within the trial court’s discretion. See
McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602–03; Hernandez, 533 S.W.3d at 478. Based on this record,
we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion. See McGuire, 689 S.W.3d at 602–03;
Hernandez, 533 S.W.3d at 478. “Suppression of evidence is a ‘last resort,’ not a ‘first
impulse.’” Massey, 667 S.W.3d at 788 (quoting State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 300
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). We overrule Johnson’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
13th day of August, 2026.
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