RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1365-ME
JEFFREY CASE MEEKS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT
v. HONORABLE G. SID BRODERSON, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-D-00428-001
LESLEE ELIZABETH BANDY;
O.F.M., A MINOR CHILD; AND
W.J.M., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Jeffrey Case Meeks (“Meeks”), brings this
expedited appeal from the Warren Family Court’s issuance of a domestic violence
order (“DVO”). After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellee, Leslee Elizabeth Bandy (“Bandy”), Meeks’s former wife,
filed a petition for a DVO on July 25, 2025, seeking protection for herself and the
two children she shares with Meeks, Appellees, O.F.M., A Minor Child (“Younger
Son”), and W.J.M., A Minor Child (“Older Son”). Bandy alleged that Meeks had
repeatedly telephoned and harassed her, following her and their two children. The
petition also alleged that Meeks had continued to touch her in a sexual manner
even after she told him to stop.
The Warren Family Court issued an emergency protective order on
behalf of Bandy and both children. After some continuances, the Family Court
held a hearing on Bandy’s DVO petition in October 2025, with a Special Judge
presiding due to the retirement of the former Warren Family Court Judge.
Both Bandy and Meeks were represented by counsel at the hearing,
which lasted roughly two hours. Three witnesses testified: Bandy, Meeks, and
Meeks’s current wife, Stephanie Meeks (“Meeks’s Wife”).
Bandy testified first, stating that she and Meeks were divorced in
2022. Originally, both Meeks and Bandy possessed joint custody and equal timesharing by agreement. However, in January of 2025, Bandy became sole
custodian. Agreeing that the contents of her petition were true and correct, Bandy
then described her memory of a July 25, 2025, incident at a bowling alley.
-2-According to Bandy, she knew that Older Son needed to see a doctor about his ear,
and she had arranged for her mother to take him to an appointment later that day.
Bandy averred that while she was dropping off Younger Son at a bowling camp,
Meeks appeared in the parking lot, opened the passenger door, and angrily
demanded to know about Older Son’s medical condition and appointment. Bandy
did not want to provide those details to Meeks because he had been following her
and making her feel unsafe, and she was Younger Son’s sole legal custodian.
After the confrontation, Bandy proceeded to her workplace, whereupon her mother
telephoned to inform her that Sheriff’s office personnel were present at Bandy’s
home to perform a welfare check on Older Son. Bandy then decided to seek a
DVO.
When asked by the Family Court whether Meeks had ever harmed her
physically, Bandy stated that he had restrained her during their marriage. She also
said that, beginning in March or April of 2025, Meeks had forced himself sexually
upon her without her consent and had touched her in a sexual manner several times
even though she had asked him to stop. She also recounted that Meeks had
repeatedly telephoned or contacted her, including calling her roughly 120 times
between July 4 and July 24 (the day before she filed the petition for a DVO).
Bandy opined that the unwanted sexual acts, Meeks’s prior threats to kill her
-3-during the divorce proceedings if she kept their children away from him, and his
habit of carrying a loaded weapon in his vehicle caused Bandy to feel unsafe.
Bandy further testified that the Family Court had restricted Meeks to
one hour of supervised visitation per week since giving her full custody in January
of 2025. Nonetheless, Bandy conceded that after Meeks pressured her, she agreed
to let him have overnight visitation with the children on the night of June 14, 2025.
According to Bandy, on that date, Meeks left the children at his home
with his wife and went to find Bandy. Eventually, Meeks saw Bandy’s vehicle at
her boyfriend’s apartment and began to pound angrily on her boyfriend’s front
door at approximately midnight. Bandy eventually came outside and drove away
from her boyfriend’s apartment, claiming that Meeks chased her at high speeds.
Bandy said that Meeks drove in the incorrect direction at a roundabout to block her
car, exited his car, and yelled at her through her car window. Bandy did not exit
her car because she did not feel safe. She stated her fear of Meeks, both for herself
and their children’s safety.
On cross-examination, Bandy admitted that Meeks had not physically
touched her during either the July 25 incident at the bowling alley or the June 14
incident at her boyfriend’s home and the roundabout. She stated that she had
engaged in sexual relations with Meeks, at his insistence, around ten times in the
months preceding her seeking of the DVO, including after the June 14 incident.
-4-Bandy acknowledged that she was pregnant, but she was not sure if Meeks or her
boyfriend was the father. She also conceded that, despite fearing Meeks herself
and concern for her children, and in violation of the Family Court’s order
restricting Meeks’s supervised visitation, she had continued to allow him to have
unsupervised visitation with their children after the June 14 incident. Bandy
further admitted that Meeks had asked her to look for houses that they could buy
together, as evidenced in the record by her correspondence with a realtor.
Bandy denied that her attitude towards Meeks had only changed after
he told her on July 20, 2025, that he was going to stay with his (soon-to-be) wife
instead of reuniting with Bandy. According to Bandy, Meeks only made that
statement in response to Bandy’s earlier informing him that she did not want to
reunite with him. When questioned by the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed
for the children, Bandy admitted that she had allowed Meeks to have unsupervised
visitation with the children even though the January 2025 order which gave her
sole custody contained a finding that Meeks had subjected the children to abuse.
Meeks testified next, explaining that he drives a truck at night, and his
children usually contact him during work hours. Older Son had called Meeks in
the wee hours of July 25 and had mentioned needing to see a doctor about his ear.
That conversation alarmed Meeks, and he contacted Bandy three times, but she did
not respond. Thus, he went to the bowling alley because he knew that she would
-5-be dropping off Younger Son there for a camp. Meeks denied having behaved
aggressively towards Bandy at the bowling alley, and he presented video footage
of his interaction with her that morning.
According to Meeks, he had not forced Bandy to have sex with him.
Instead, Meeks and Bandy had consensual sex several times prior to July 25,
including at her workplace and on June 14 (before she went to her boyfriend’s
apartment later that same day).
As to the June 14 incident, Meeks said that the children wanted to talk
to Bandy, so he tried to contact her and eventually found her at her boyfriend’s
apartment (the address of which he intimated that he found via an internet search).
When Bandy came to the door, Meeks told her it was not right for her to be with
her boyfriend since she was pregnant with his (Meeks’s) child, and they (Meeks
and Bandy) had planned to reunite. Bandy left, and Meeks followed her until she
stopped near a roundabout. There were no other vehicles on the road. He stopped
in front of her vehicle and told her to stop driving “crazy” because she was
pregnant. He did not touch Bandy, and they were only stopped at the roundabout
for 15-20 seconds. Bandy continued to allow him to have unsupervised visitation
with children after the June 14 incident. He also helped coach the children’s
football team(s).
-6-Meeks testified that on July 20 he had informed Bandy that he was
going to remain with his soon-to-be wife instead of reuniting with Bandy. He
claimed that conversation changed Bandy’s attitude towards him. Meeks denied
ever having improperly touched or threatened Bandy.
During cross-examination by Bandy’s counsel and questioning by the
GAL, Meeks denied that Bandy had told him numerous times between March and
July 25 that she did not want to be with him. He did not deny the accuracy of
telephone records submitted by Bandy showing that he had called her numerous
times. Meeks maintained that he and Bandy had talked frequently, and he would
call her back if she did not answer the first time.
Meeks’s Wife served as the final witness at the hearing. She testified
that she had received a telephone call from Bandy on June 14, and during the
ensuing dialogue, Bandy told her that she (Bandy) and Meeks had been engaged in
a sexual relationship, and she (Bandy) was pregnant with Meeks’s child. Meeks’s
Wife averred that during that conversation, and a subsequent one, Bandy did not
mention being fearful of Meeks or having been pressured into having sex with him.
Meeks’s Wife acknowledged at the hearing that she was also pregnant with
Meeks’s child.
At the conclusion of proof and arguments by counsel, the Family
Court made a few brief oral findings. First, it explicitly declined to find that an act
-7-of domestic violence occurred on July 25 at the bowling alley. However, it found
that Bandy had testified “credibly” that there had been domestic violence in the
past, and that Meeks had made threats to harm Bandy if she took their children
away. The Family Court stated that it appeared as if Meeks and Bandy were
attempting to reunite prior to July 20, when Bandy told Meeks there would be no
reconciliation. Nonetheless, Meeks continued to try to contact Bandy until she
sought a DVO. The Family Court found that Meeks’s conduct constituted stalking,
and it issued a DVO to protect Bandy alone. It did not extend the DVO to the
children. The Family Court also did not state with specificity the acts that
amounted to stalking.
The Family Court soon thereafter issued its written decision, which
consists entirely of a completed Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”)
Form 275.3. It did not craft a Judgment of its own. Instead, the Family Court
merely checked a box indicating that it had jurisdiction and another box stating that
“it was established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an act(s) of” stalking
had occurred. Trial Court Record (“R.”) at 31. The Family Court neither
incorporated its oral findings nor made any additional, written findings. The DVO
prevents Meeks from coming within 500 feet of Bandy for three years. Meeks then
filed this appeal.
-8-II. ANALYSIS
Although not explicitly enumerated as such in Meeks’s briefs, we
perceive him to raise two, overarching issues: first, that the DVO is fatally flawed
because the Family Court failed to make sufficient findings of fact; second, that
there was insufficient evidence to conclude he stalked Bandy. Bandy asserts that
both issues are unpreserved. Before we may address the merits, we must resolve
competing motions filed by the parties.
A. Motions to Supplement and to Strike Parts of the Record
Bandy has asked to supplement the certified record with two decisions
issued by the Warren Family Court during the pendency of this appeal. Those
rulings make some minor modifications to the January 2025 custody order but
substantively deny Meeks’s request to vacate or amend that decision. Bandy
included those orders as the first two exhibits in the appendix to her Appellee
Brief. Relatedly, Meeks has asked us to strike those two exhibits to Bandy’s brief
because they are not in the certified record. A motion panel of this Court passed
both motions to this merits panel.
The January 2025 order granting Bandy sole custody of the children
was discussed at the DVO hearing, as was Meeks’s then-pending motion to alter,
amend, or vacate. However, the propriety of the DVO is the sole issue properly
before us. Consequently, this appeal does not directly involve any issues
-9-pertaining to child custody or visitation, and the children are not protected parties
under the DVO. As a result, the orders that Bandy attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to
her brief are not germane to the limited issues before us.
Because the orders at issue do not provide meaningful assistance with
our analysis of the DVO, Bandy has not shown good cause to supplement the
record with them. We decline to engage in an analysis of whether we may
properly take judicial notice of Family Court decisions that are not directly
relevant. Accordingly, we will deny Bandy’s motion to supplement the record and
grant Meeks’s motion to strike exhibits 1 and 2 to Bandy’s brief. However, we
will deny Meeks’s request to strike the entirety of Bandy’s brief; instead, we will
disregard the stray references therein to exhibits 1 and 2, resulting in no prejudice
to Meeks.
Standards of Review
Our standards for reviewing appeals are specific and oft-stated:
We review the entry of a DVO for whether the trial
court’s finding of domestic violence was an abuse of
discretion. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133
(Ky. App. 2008). Our review of the trial court’s factual
findings is limited to whether they were clearly
erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
52.01; Hall v. Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App.
2020). A trial court’s factual determination is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence,
which is evidence of sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Moore v.
Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
-10-“A trial court is authorized to issue a DVO if it
‘finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic
violence and abuse has occurred and may again
occur[.]’” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky.
App. 2019) (quoting Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
403.740(1)). “The preponderance of the evidence
standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes
the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been
a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318
S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird,
234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)).
Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021).
B. Sufficiency of Findings of Fact
Before we may address the merits of the DVO, we must first resolve
Meeks’s argument that the DVO is inherently flawed because the Family Court
failed to meet its duty to make sufficient findings of fact. We review de novo
whether a Court has met its duty to make sufficient factual findings under CR
52.01. Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Ky. 2021). Smith is the seminal
decision as to the findings that a Family Court must make when issuing a DVO.
In Smith, as here, the Family Court orally found at the conclusion of
the hearing that an act of domestic violence had occurred. Id. at 813. Also in
Smith, as here, the Family Court checked boxes on Form 275.3 to indicate that it
had jurisdiction and that domestic violence had occurred and may occur again. Id.
at 813-14. Further, in Smith, as here, the Family Court did not make additional
written findings of fact. Id. at 814.
-11-But, unlike here, the Family Court in Smith also issued a separate
form order incorporating its oral findings by reference. Id. Because the Warren
Family Court here failed to incorporate its oral findings into its written decision, its
oral findings are “beyond our consideration” since “[a] trial court speaks only
through written orders entered upon the official record.” Castle v. Castle, 567
S.W.3d 908, 916 (Ky. App. 2019). Consequently, the issue becomes whether the
Family Court here satisfied its fact-finding obligations by merely checking boxes
on Form 275.3, or whether it must also make additional findings. The ambiguous
language in Smith on that recurring issue has divided prior panels of this Court.
To determine the precise holding in Smith, we must quote from that
opinion in more detail than we usually deem necessary:
As previously described, the trial court made findings of
fact and conclusions of law orally at the end of the
hearing. It also fully and accurately completed AOC
Form 275.3, finding, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that acts of sexual abuse had occurred and may occur
again. Finally, it entered a written order “expressly and
specifically incorporating” its oral findings and
conclusions into the written order. We hold this was
sufficient to meet the trial court’s duty to engage in at
least a good faith effort at fact-finding and that the found
facts be included in a written order.
First, we note that in issuing a protective order, the
only essential facts, the trial court is required to find are
(1) whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating
violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has
occurred, and (2) whether it may occur again. The trial
court made both of these findings in writing on AOC
-12-Form 275.3. Any additional factual findings the trial
court makes in issuing a protective order are merely
supporting those ultimate factual findings and are not
“essential.”
This stands in contrast to the complex and multifaceted factual findings a trial court must make in the
child custody context. In custody disputes, the trial court
must specifically consider multiple factors to determine
what is in the child’s best interest. See KRS 403.270(2).
In the child custody context, the mere written finding that
something is or is not in a child’s best interest cannot be
sufficient because it does not show how the trial court
weighed each factor to determine what was in the child’s
best interest. Written factual findings regarding each
factor are an “essential” part of the trial court’s written
order in child custody cases. Such is not the case in the
protective order context. . . .
AOC Form 275.3 sufficiently apprises any third parties
of the facts they must know to act on the order. Law
enforcement, school officials, and medical providers are
the third parties most likely to require this information. It
is sufficient that they know an act of domestic violence
and abuse, dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual
assault has occurred and that it may occur again and what
the object of the protective order is restrained from
doing. All of this information is contained in a
completely and accurately filled out AOC Form 275.3.
No additional information is required for third parties to
fulfill any obligations they have in assisting in the
enforcement of these orders.
Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817-18 (some internal quotation marks, citations, and
paragraph breaks omitted).
The language that has divided prior panels of this Court stems from
seemingly inconsistent language in two consecutive paragraphs in Smith. In the
-13-first paragraph, our Supreme Court said that the Family Court’s completion of
Form 275.3 and its incorporation of its oral findings “was sufficient to meet the
trial court’s duty to engage in at least a good faith effort at fact-finding and that the
found facts be included in a written order.” Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). At least two prior panels of this Court have relied on that
paragraph to conclude that a Family Court satisfies its fact-finding duty by
completing Form 275.3 and making additional findings. See Hild v. Hild, No.
2024-CA-0363-ME, 2024 WL 4996639, at *3 (Ky. App. Dec. 6, 2024)
(unpublished) (citing Smith and holding that “a completely and accurately
completed AOC Form 275.3 order, along with some kind of additional findings, is
sufficient to satisfy the circuit court’s good faith duty to record its findings.”); and
Clan v. Streble, No. 2024-CA-0455-ME, 2025 WL 876392, at *2 (Ky. App. Mar.
21, 2025) (citing Smith and holding that “[i]n cases involving an order of
protection, it is well established that the language set out in AOC Form 275.3
order, along with some level of additional findings, is sufficient to satisfy the
family court’s duty to reduce its findings to writing.”).1
And in the very next paragraph of Smith, our Supreme Court held that
the only “essential facts” that a Family Court must make to support a DVO may be
1
We cite to these unpublished opinions pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41(A) as demonstrative, non-binding authority.
-14-made “in writing on AOC Form 275.3,” and “[a]ny additional factual findings the
trial court makes in issuing a protective order are merely supporting those ultimate
factual findings and are not ‘essential.’” Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817. At least four
prior panels of this Court have relied on that essential/nonessential dichotomy in
Smith to conclude that a Family Court satisfies its fact-finding duties by merely
completing Form 275.3. See, e.g., Jones v. Heavner, No. 2022-CA-0483-ME,
2022 WL 17543040, at *6 (Ky. App. Dec. 9, 2022) (unpublished) (holding that a
Family Court made sufficient findings by checking boxes on Form 275.3); Njere v.
Jerry, No. 2022-CA-1005-ME, 2023 WL 5312193, at *2 (Ky. App. Aug. 18, 2023)
(unpublished) (holding that “[u]nder our current precedent, an AOC Form 275.3
completely and accurately completed is sufficient” to satisfy the Family Court’s
factfinding duty); Mills v. E.M., No. 2023-CA-1230-ME, 2024 WL 1589668, at *3
(Ky. App. Apr. 12, 2024) (unpublished) (“A properly completed AOC Form 275.3
constitutes sufficient findings to support the issuance of a DVO.”); McClusky v.
Yount, No. 2022-CA-1300-ME, 2023 WL 4139876, at *3 (Ky. App. Jun. 23, 2023)
(unpublished) (holding that “under our current precedent, an AOC Form 275.3
completely and accurately completed is sufficient.”).2
2
Again, we cite to these unpublished opinions pursuant to RAP 41(A). Some of our post-Smith decisions have also relied on our pre-Smith opinion in Williford v. Williford, 583 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. App. 2019), wherein we held that “logically, completely and accurately filling out AOC Form 275.3 and checking the appropriate box under ‘Additional Findings’ on the form, in and of itself, must satisf[y] the court’s good faith duty to record fact-finding.” (Brackets in Williford; some internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) However, in Thurman v. Thurman,
-15-We conclude that Smith held that checking the boxes on AOC Form
275.3 alone is sufficient to satisfy a Family Court’s fact-finding duty. Indeed,
there would be no reason for AOC to have taken the time and expense to create
this form, approved by the Kentucky Supreme Court, if additional findings need to
be made separately every time that it is used.
Our Supreme Court in Smith stressed that the Family Court made the
“essential” factual findings “in writing on AOC Form 275.3.” Smith, 635 S.W.3d
at 817. That Court held that any additional findings made by the Family Court
beyond what is contained in Form 275.3 “are merely supporting those ultimate
factual findings and are not ‘essential.’” Id. We decline to make it mandatory for
Family Courts to issue nonessential findings of fact. After all, our Supreme Court
explicitly noted that any and all findings of fact not contained in Form 275.3 are
merely “supporting” the “ultimate factual findings” made in the form and thus not
‘“essential.’” Id.
Therefore, the fact that the Family Court in Smith also incorporated its
oral findings into its written decision does not mean that Family Courts must do so
560 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky. App. 2018), we noted, in dicta, that checking boxes on Form 275.3 does not satisfy a Court’s duty to make sufficient findings of fact. Any inconsistencies between Williford and Thurman are irrelevant going forward because each opinion predates our Supreme Court’s seminal decision on the subject in Smith (which does not cite to either Williford or Thurman). Because Smith is both more recent and a decision of our Commonwealth’s highest Court, we conclude that Smith governs our review of this issue. We thus decline to examine further the potential impact on this case of Williford or Thurman.
-16-in every case – even though it is always advisable. Incorporating oral findings is
common, as well as prudent and helpful to the parties and reviewing Courts. But
we decline to require invariably that busy Family Courts in essence issue two
orders on the same subject and in the same matter because any findings beyond
those found in Form 275.3 have been deemed inessential by our Supreme Court.
Thus, we reject Meeks’s argument that the DVO here is fatally flawed due to
insufficient findings of fact. However, we stress that “[a] party always has the
authority under CR 52.02 to request additional findings if [he or] she believes the
court’s fact-finding on AOC 275.3 alone is insufficient.” Williford, 583 S.W.3d at
430.
We also reject the argument that a Circuit/Family Court must
supplement the already-executed AOC form by making additional findings of fact
when issuing a DVO based upon stalking. The parties have not cited, and we did
not independently locate, published, post-Smith precedent determining whether
Courts must make additional findings of fact when issuing a DVO based upon
stalking. As we shall soon discuss, stalking is somewhat different than other forms
of domestic violence in that it requires at least two instances of misconduct by the
perpetrator.
However, stalking is a type of domestic violence under KRS
403.720(2)(a), which defines domestic violence and abuse as “[p]hysical injury,
-17-serious physical injury, stalking . . . between family members . . . .” Former
spouses are included within the definition of “family member” in KRS 403.720(3).
We see no indication in Smith that a Court has additional duties when issuing a
DVO based upon stalking. Certainly our Supreme Court in Smith explicitly
mentioned stalking, even though Smith did not involve stalking:
we note that in issuing a protective order, the only
essential facts, the trial court is required to find are (1)
whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating
violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has
occurred, and (2) whether it may occur again. The trial
court made both of these findings in writing on AOC
Form 275.3.
Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Therefore, appropriately completing Form 275.3 sufficiently satisfies a
Family Court’s fact-finding duties when issuing a DVO based on all forms of
domestic violence and abuse, including stalking.3
That conclusion is not impacted by our decision in the distinguishable
case of Taylor v. Fitzpatrick, 659 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. App. 2023). In Taylor, we
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support an order extending an
3
Though not cited by the parties, our research revealed that in one post-Smith opinion, we referenced additional factfinding for DVOs based on stalking. See Bowie v. Bowie, No. 2023-CA-1391-ME, 2024 WL 3380987, at *4 (Ky. App. Jul. 12, 2024) (unpublished). However, we did not directly analyze in Bowie that any requirement for additional factfinding for DVOs based upon stalking may not be harmonized with our Supreme Court’s holding in Smith. Additionally, Bowie is unpublished and thus not binding. See, e.g., Meier v. Jeff Wyler Alexandria, Inc., 685 S.W.3d 9, 14-15 (Ky. App. 2024).
-18-analogous interpersonal protective order (“IPO”). Id. at 749. We also criticized
the Family Court’s failure to make findings of fact beyond checking a box on Form
275.3. Id. at 751. Here, however, there was evidence which, if believed,
supported the issuance of a DVO. And, crucially, in Taylor we did not cite our
Supreme Court’s holding in Smith regarding which findings of fact are essential
and which are unessential. In sum, the DVO at hand contained sufficient findings
of fact via the Family Court’s completion of Form 275.3.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the DVO
Meeks and Bandy gave conflicting accounts of many events, such as
whether Meeks forced Bandy to engage in sexual acts and whether he kept
contacting her after she had asked him to stop doing so. Of course, we must stress
that the Family Court alone had the ability to weigh the evidence and assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354. Thus, Meeks’s reliance
upon the testimony he gave, in which he denied most of Bandy’s allegations, does
not mean that there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of a DVO.
To determine whether there was substantial evidence that Meeks
stalked Bandy, we must first analyze the term “stalking” and specify the conduct
that constitutes it by defining its meaning. Bandy asks us to refer to the dictionary;
-19-Meeks seeks reference to statutes governing IPOs. Surprisingly, the parties have
not cited a published opinion defining “stalking” as it is used in the DVO context.4
The defining issue presents itself because, for reasons to which we are
not privy, the General Assembly has allowed for the issuance of a DVO based on
stalking but has not defined that term. See KRS 403.720(2)(a) (including stalking
within the definition of “domestic violence and abuse”). Yet the General
Assembly did define “stalking” in the context of IPOs, describing it as “conduct
prohibited as stalking under [KRS 508.140 or 508.150], or a criminal attempt,
conspiracy, facilitation, or solicitation to commit the crime of stalking[.]” KRS
456.010(8). The cited statutes, KRS 508.140 and 508.150, “refer, respectively, to
the criminal offenses of first- and second-degree stalking.” Taylor, 659 S.W.3d at
749.
Of course, terms in statutes are generally defined according to their
everyday, common meaning under KRS 446.080(4). However, “technical words
and phrases” which “have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,
shall be construed according to such meaning.” Id. “Stalking” is a technical word
4
We have repeatedly used the definition of stalking found in the IPO statutes when reviewing a DVO based on stalking, albeit in unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Kiser v. Kiser, No. 2018-CA000812-ME, 2019 WL 169204, at *4 (Ky. App. Jan. 11, 2019) (unpublished); Kummer v. Valla, No. 2018-CA-001333-ME, 2019 WL 1578801, at *2 (Ky. App. Apr. 12, 2019) (unpublished); Parker v. Butler, No. 2025-CA-1368-ME, 2026 WL 1622937, at *4 n.2 (Ky. App. Jun. 5, 2026) (unpublished); Flintroy v. Gallegos-Esparza, No. 2021-CA-0928-ME, 2023 WL 324617, at *3 n.2 (Ky. App. Jan. 20, 2023) (unpublished).
-20-that has acquired a technical meaning in the law, as shown by the fact that it is
specifically defined in both IPO and penal statutes.
IPOs and DVOs are closely related. As our Supreme Court has
explained, “the heart of the difference” between them is “to whom the respective
protective orders offer relief.” Smith v. Doe, 627 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Ky. 2021).
However, “[a]part from who may file a petition for an IPO or DVO, the statutes
governing the respective protective orders read and operate in much the same
way.” Id. at 910. The Kentucky Supreme Court, and we, have remarked many
times in other published opinions on the close parallels between DVOs and IPOs.
For example, we have noted that “[a]lthough the statutes governing the issuance of
DVOs are found under KRS Chapter 403, the legislative intent for enacting the
IPO statutes is identical to that of the DVO statutes.” Jones v. Jones, 617 S.W.3d
418, 424 n.4 (Ky. App. 2021). Our Supreme Court has also noted that “though
they are housed under different portions of KRS, the statutes governing IPOs and
DVOs are nearly identical.” Doe, 627 S.W.3d at 908. We have held that “[i]t
appears the purpose and intent behind, and the interpretation of, the DVO statutes
are almost identical to that of the IPO statutes.” Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d
357, 360 (Ky. App. 2017). The close relationship between a DVO and an IPO is
perhaps best highlighted by the fact that “the same form [275.3] is utilized by the
Courts for both IPOs and DVOs.” Taylor, 659 S.W.3d at 748.
-21-We perceive no logical, compelling reason to interpret the meaning of
“stalking” differently in the DVO context than in the IPO context. Consequently,
we will define “stalking” in the context of a DVO by using the definition of the
term found in the context of an IPO. And we have summarized the IPO statutes to
mean that:
for an individual to be granted an IPO for stalking, he or
she must at a minimum prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that, an individual intentionally engaged in two
or more acts directed at the victim that seriously alarmed,
annoyed, intimidated, or harassed the victim, that served
no legitimate purpose, and would have caused a
reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress,
and that these acts may occur again. Additionally, the
individual must prove that there was an implicit or
explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in
reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or
death.
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Ky. App. 2017) (citations omitted).
Bandy alleged that Meeks forced her to engage in sexual acts against
her will, followed her, and continued to contact her frequently after she had asked
him not to do so. Indeed, it is undisputed that Meeks went to Bandy’s boyfriend’s
apartment without an invitation on June 14, and followed Bandy from that
apartment at a high rate of speed. It is also beyond question that Meeks called
Bandy numerous times, as discussed in Bandy’s testimony and shown on call logs
from her telephone that were entered into evidence. Bandy testified that Meeks
called her roughly 120 times between July 4 and July 24, 2025. Meeks also visited
-22-Bandy’s place of employment and photographed her car in the parking lot. Bandy
testified that she told Meeks on July 20 that she did not wish to reunite with him,
but telephone logs show calls made to her from his phone between July 20 and July
25 (when she sought the DVO). Bandy testified that she feared Meeks, both for
herself and for their children.
Meeks had a markedly different version of events, as he generally
testified that Bandy had consented to the sexual acts and to his frequent
communications. However, the Family Court alone had the ability to judge
credibility, and it obviously found Bandy to be more credible than Meeks.
Accepting Bandy’s testimony as credible, there was sufficient
evidence to show that Meeks had stalked her via frequently initiating unwanted
contact (or the attempt at contact) with her, following her, and forcing her to
engage in sexual acts without her consent. Bandy testified that Meeks was angry
and unpredictable. She also testified that she feared Meeks; he had threatened to
harm her in the past; and he had pushed her against a wall during their marriage.
Bandy also testified that Meeks kept a loaded gun in his vehicle. The evidence is
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Meeks made explicit or implicit
threats that placed Bandy in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or
death. In sum, the Family Court’s decision to issue a DVO against Meeks based
on his having stalked Bandy is supported by substantial evidence.
-23-We have concluded that any further arguments in the parties’ briefs
are without merit, irrelevant, or redundant. Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 n.1
(Ky. App. 2021). For the foregoing reasons, the Warren Family Court is affirmed.
III. ORDER
For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, the Court ORDERS that
Appellee’s motion to supplement the record with the documents found in Exhibits
1 and 2 to Appellee’s brief be, and it is hereby, DENIED. The Court ORDERS
Appellant’s motion to strike Appellee’s brief in its entirety be, and it is hereby,
DENIED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: ____08/14/2026____
HON. AUDRA J. ECKERLE
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth A. Meredith II William D. Tingley
Bowling Green, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky
-24-