RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0898-MR
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON
BEHALF OF HANNAH HURT APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-CI-01924
ANDERSON CAMPUS RENTAL
PROPERTIES, LLC; HALEY BOYD;
AND RON MORTON APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Commission (“the Commission”), on behalf of Hannah Hurt (“Hurt”), appeals
from the Fayette Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC (“Anderson”),1 Haley Boyd, and Ron
Morton (collectively “Appellees”). The Commission principally argues that the
circuit court erroneously interpreted KRS2 383.300 by concluding that Hurt, who
obtained an emergency protective order (“EPO”), was not entitled to terminate her
lease under that statute. The Commission further contends that Anderson
unlawfully retaliated against Hurt in violation of KRS 383.300 and KRS 344.280
by refusing to release her from the lease and by subsequently attempting to collect
unpaid rent after she vacated the premises. We conclude that the circuit court
correctly interpreted KRS 383.300 and properly entered summary judgment.
Although we reach the retaliation claims by somewhat different reasoning than the
circuit court, we likewise conclude that those claims fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2019, Hurt entered into a written lease agreement with
Anderson for Apartment 6, located at 650 Maxwelton Court in Lexington,
1
The Commission’s complaint named “Anderson Campus Rental, Inc.” as the defendant. In their answer, Appellees noted that the proper entity is “Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC.” The complaint was never amended to correct the misnomer. Because the identity of the intended defendant is not at issue on appeal, we refer to the entity throughout this Opinion as Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC, which is the corporate designation used by the Commission in its notice of appeal.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-Kentucky.3 The lease term commenced on August 18, 2019, and expired on July
31, 2020. It expressly provided that “[t]here are no termination privileges with this
lease.” Hurt also executed a Crime Free Lease Addendum, which provided that
certain criminal activity by a tenant or the tenant’s guests could constitute grounds
for termination of the tenancy.
On May 3, 2020, Lexington police responded to an incident at Hurt’s
apartment involving Ramon Mercado.4 Later that day, Hurt petitioned for and
obtained an EPO against Mercado pursuant to KRS 403.730(2)(a). Shortly
thereafter, Hurt vacated the apartment, returned her keys, and provided Anderson
with a copy of the EPO.5 On May 11, 2020, Anderson’s property manager, Haley
Boyd (“Property Manager Boyd”), advised Hurt by email that the lease did not
permit early termination and that Hurt remained financially responsible for rent
through the lease’s expiration on July 31, 2020. Property Manager Boyd further
3
Hurt originally entered into the lease with another tenant, Kaylee Hoelscher. After Hoelscher moved from the apartment in January 2020, Hurt testified that the two agreed Hoelscher would continue paying her share of the rent until Hurt found another roommate. Sometime thereafter, Hurt’s romantic partner at the time, Ramon Mercado, began residing with Hurt at the apartment. 4
According to the record, both Hurt and Mercado were arrested following the May 3, 2020, incident and were charged with drug-related offenses. The charges against Hurt were subsequently dismissed. Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as expressing a view regarding the applicability of the Crime Free Lease Addendum under the facts presented here. Although the provision appears in the record, Anderson did not seek to terminate Hurt’s tenancy on that basis, and that issue is not before us.
5
The parties dispute precisely when Anderson received Hurt’s keys and a copy of the EPO. Because that factual dispute is not material to the issues on appeal, we need not address it further.
-3-advised Hurt that she could execute a promissory note permitting her to satisfy the
remaining balance through a payment plan and explained that, absent such an
arrangement, any unpaid balance would be referred for collection.
Hurt responded that court personnel had informed her the EPO
entitled her to terminate the lease without penalty. She further explained that she
had previously raised concerns with fair housing authorities regarding Anderson’s
management practices (entering her apartment without notice), that she was a
survivor of sexual assault, and that she no longer felt safe residing in the apartment
because Mercado had not yet been located or served with the EPO.6 Hurt indicated
that if Anderson declined to release her from the lease, she intended to pursue
relief through the fair housing process but would pay rent in the interim, so there
was no need to refer her to collections. Property Manager Boyd reiterated
Anderson’s position that the lease remained legally binding and that the EPO did
not entitle Hurt to terminate the lease early.
The parties continued communicating regarding the lease throughout
the summer of 2020. During that time, a formal request was made that Anderson
accommodate Hurt by permitting an early termination of the lease based upon
Hurt’s status as a victim of domestic violence. Anderson declined the request.
6
Mercado was never served with the EPO. As a result, neither a domestic violence order (“DVO”) nor an interpersonal (“IPO”) was ever entered, and the EPO was ultimately dismissed on November 10, 2020.
-4-In July and August 2020, after Hurt had vacated the apartment,
Anderson’s in-house collections coordinator, Ron Morton (“Collections
Coordinator Morton”), sent Hurt correspondence seeking payment of the
remaining rent due under the lease and advising that ordinary collection remedies
such as institution of a civil action or referral to an outside collections agency
could follow if the balance remained unpaid.
On December 7, 2020, Hurt filed a housing discrimination complaint
against Anderson with the Commission. Following an investigation, the
Commission issued a probable cause determination in May 2022. Hurt thereafter
elected to pursue her claims in circuit court pursuant to KRS 344.635 and KRS
344.670. On July 5, 2022, the Commission, on Hurt’s behalf, filed the underlying
action in Fayette Circuit Court alleging that Anderson violated KRS 383.300 by
refusing to permit Hurt to terminate her lease after obtaining an EPO and retaliated
against Hurt in violation of both KRS 383.300 and KRS 344.280 by refusing to
release her from the lease and subsequently attempting to collect unpaid rent. The
complaint also alleged housing discrimination under KRS Chapter 344 arising
from the same conduct.
Anderson answered the complaint, denying liability, and subsequently
moved to dismiss the Commission’s claims. The circuit court denied that motion,
-5-and the parties proceeded through written discovery, depositions, and the exchange
of documentary evidence.
Following discovery, Anderson moved for summary judgment,
arguing principally that Hurt was not a “protected tenant” entitling her to terminate
her lease under KRS 383.300 because she obtained only an EPO rather than a
DVO or IPO. Anderson further argued that the undisputed facts failed to establish
actionable retaliation under either KRS 383.300 or KRS 344.280. The
Commission opposed the motion, and at the circuit court’s request the parties
submitted supplemental briefing addressing the statutory definition of a “protected
tenant” and whether the protections afforded recipients of EPOs extend to the
lease-termination provisions contained in KRS 383.300(5).
In a thorough written opinion, the circuit court concluded that the
statute unambiguously limits the right to terminate a lease under KRS 383.300(5)
to tenants who obtain a DVO or IPO and does not extend that remedy to recipients
of an EPO. The court further concluded that, because Hurt was not entitled to
terminate the lease under the statute, Anderson’s subsequent efforts to collect
unpaid rent did not constitute actionable retaliation under either KRS 383.300 or
KRS 344.280. Accordingly, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor
of Anderson, Boyd, and Morton. This appeal followed.
-6-II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment. “The
proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a motion for
summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” HMB Professional Engineers, Inc. v. Ives, 733
S.W.3d 246, 251 (Ky. 2026) (quoting Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins.
Corp., 706 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Ky. 2024)). Because summary judgment involves no
fact-finding, we afford no deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. State
Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian
Church, 706 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Ky. 2024).
This appeal also presents issues of statutory interpretation. “Statutory
interpretation is a question of law for the court to be reviewed de novo.” Bell v.
Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 222 (Ky. 2014).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Commission advances three principal arguments.
First, it contends the circuit court erroneously construed KRS 383.300 by
concluding that Hurt, who obtained an EPO, was not entitled to terminate her lease
without further liability under the statute. Second, it argues the circuit court erred
in dismissing Hurt’s retaliation claim under KRS 383.300. Finally, it contends the
-7-circuit court improperly dismissed Hurt’s retaliation claim under KRS 344.280.
We address each argument in turn.
A. Hurt’s Status as a Protected Tenant Under KRS 383.300.
The Commission first argues that the circuit court erroneously
concluded Hurt was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300
because she obtained an EPO rather than a DVO or an IPO. Specifically, the
Commission contends the circuit court interpreted the statute too narrowly by
failing to recognize that KRS 383.300 extends “protected tenant” status to
recipients of EPOs and that, once Hurt became a protected tenant, she was entitled
to all of the protections afforded by the statute, including early termination of her
lease without penalty. Anderson responds that the General Assembly deliberately
distinguished between recipients of EPOs and recipients of DVOs and IPOs,
extending certain protections to both groups while reserving the lease-termination
remedy exclusively for tenants who obtain a DVO or an IPO.
Resolution of this issue turns upon the language of KRS 383.300,
which provides, in relevant part:
(2) As used in this section:
(a) “Named individual” means a person identified in the
protective orders listed in paragraph (b) of this subsection
as restrained from contact with the protected tenant; and
(b)1. “Protected tenant” means a residential rental or
leased housing tenant, applicant for tenancy, or a tenant
-8-with a minor household member, who is protected by a
valid:
a. Domestic violence order issued pursuant to KRS
403.740, which restrains the adverse party from
any unauthorized contact; or
b. Interpersonal protective order issued pursuant to
KRS 456.060 which restrains the adverse party
from any unauthorized contact.
2. For purposes of subsections (3) and (4) of this
section, “protected tenant” also means a residential
rental or leased housing tenant, applicant for tenancy,
or a tenant with a minor household member who is
protected by a valid:
a. Emergency protective order issued pursuant to
KRS 403.730;
b. Temporary interpersonal protective order issued
pursuant to KRS 456.040; or
c. Pretrial release no contact order issued pursuant
to KRS 431.064.
(3)(a) A landlord shall not terminate, fail to renew, refuse
to enter into, or otherwise retaliate in the renting or
leasing of a residence because of the person’s status as a
protected tenant.
(b) It shall be a defense to an action for possession of a
rented or leased residential property if the court
determines that: The tenant is a protected tenant; and
The notice to vacate is substantially based on acts which
violated the tenant’s protective order or led to the
issuance of a protective order listed in subsection (2) of
this section, including an action for possession based on
complaints of noise, disturbances, or repeated presence of
peace officers.
-9-(4)(a) After informing the landlord of an intention to
install a new lock, a protected tenant, at his or her
expense, may install a new lock to his or her dwelling
(b) Regardless of any provision in the lease or rental
agreement, the landlord may refuse to provide a key to
the new lock to a named individual
(c) A named individual who has been excluded from
leased or rented property under this section remains
liable for rent.
(5)(a) For a protected tenant who obtains a valid
protective order listed in subsection (2)(b)1. of this
section after entering into a lease or rental agreement, the
lease or rental agreement may be terminated by providing
the landlord with:
1. Written notice of termination to be effective on
a date stated in the notice that is at least thirty (30)
days after the landlord’s receipt of the notice; and
2. A copy of the valid protective order.
(b) For a protected tenant who obtains a valid protective
order listed in subsection (2)(b)1. of this section before
entering into a lease or rental agreement, the lease or
rental agreement may be terminated by: Providing the
landlord with written notice of termination. . . .
Attaching a copy of the valid protective order; and
Demonstrating a safety concern to the landlord that arises
after execution of the lease.
(c) Upon termination of a lease or rental agreement under
this section, the released protected tenant shall: Be liable
only for rent prorated to the effective date of termination;
-10-Not receive a negative credit entry or be liable for
additional rent or fees solely because of the early
termination; and Not be subject to damages or penalties
under the circumstances specified by the statute.
(d) Regardless of whether the named individual is a party
to the lease, the named individual is deemed to have
interfered with the lease and is civilly liable for the
landlord’s resulting economic losses.
Id.
The Commission’s argument focuses upon subsection (2)(b)2. It
correctly observes that recipients of EPOs are included in the definition of
“protected tenant.” From that premise, the Commission reasons that Hurt became
entitled to every protection afforded by KRS 383.300, including the right to
terminate her lease pursuant to subsection (5).
The difficulty with the Commission’s position is that subsection
(2)(b)2. does not broadly redefine “protected tenant” throughout KRS 383.300.
Rather, it expressly provides that recipients of EPOs, temporary IPOs, and nocontact orders are protected tenants “[f]or purposes of subsections (3) and (4)[.]”
Id. (emphasis added). The lease-termination provisions, however, are found in
subsection (5), not subsection (3) or (4). Moreover, subsection (5) does not apply
generally to any “protected tenant.” Instead, it expressly limits the remedy to “a
protected tenant who obtains a valid protective order listed in subsection
(2)(b)1.” Id. (emphasis added). The only protective orders listed in subsection
-11-(2)(b)1. are DVOs issued pursuant to KRS 403.740 and IPOs issued pursuant to
KRS 456.060. An EPO issued pursuant to KRS 403.730 is not among them.
This language is plain and unambiguous.
“[C]ourts . . . have a duty to interpret and enforce a statute according
to its plain-text meaning.” Normandy Farm, LLC v. Kenneth McPeek Racing
Stable, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Ky. 2024). “Where the words used in a statute
are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for
construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.” Griffin v. City of
Bowling Green, 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1970). We are not at liberty “to add or
subtract from the legislative enactment or discover meanings not reasonably
ascertainable from the language used.” Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d
541, 546 (Ky. 2000).
The Commission advances several arguments for why recipients of
EPOs should enjoy the same lease-termination rights as recipients of DVOs and
IPOs. Those arguments, however, are more appropriately directed to the General
Assembly than this Court. Our role is to apply statutes as written. In doing so, we
must recognize that where the General Assembly creates a legislative cause of
action, it alone retains the authority, within constitutional bounds, to prescribe the
elements, limitations, and prerequisites for one who seeks to pursue such an action.
See Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994).
-12-We do not rewrite legislation to remedy perceived omissions or to
extend statutory protections beyond those the legislature has chosen to provide.
“While liberal construction is proper to effect a beneficent purpose, a statute
should not be construed so as to give it a meaning which the language of the statute
does not fairly and reasonably support as it is ‘neither the duty nor the prerogative
of the judiciary to breathe into the statute that which the Legislature has not put
there.’” Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Ky. App. 1999) (quoting
Wilson v. SKW Alloys, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Ky. App. 1995)).
While the Commission persuasively articulates various reasons why it
might be better to provide EPO recipients the same rights as recipients of DVOs
and IPOs, our task is not to make such policy determinations, but instead, to
determine what the legislature actually intended, gleaning this intent from the
unambiguous statutory language the legislature chose to employ. Chapman v.
Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky.1973) (“[I]t is for this court to interpret the
law, not to enact legislation.”). If KRS 383.300 should afford recipients of EPOs
the same lease-termination rights as recipients of DVOs and IPOs, the statute must
be amended through the legislative process.
Nor is the distinction drawn by the General Assembly inherently
irrational. Although the statute does not explain why recipients of EPOs receive
fewer protections than recipients of DVOs and IPOs—and no explanation is
-13-required—one plausible reason lies in the temporary nature of an EPO. Unlike
DVOs and IPOs, which generally remain in effect for extended periods, an EPO is
an ex parte order of limited duration that may never result in the entry of a DVO or
IPO. The General Assembly may well have concluded that recipients of EPOs
should receive the immediate protections afforded by subsections (3) and (4),
while reserving the extraordinary remedy of unilateral lease termination for those
who ultimately obtain a DVO or IPO. Whether that was, in fact, the legislature’s
reasoning is beside the point. The language of KRS 383.300 clearly and
unmistakably distinguishes between the two classes of protective orders. Because
Hurt obtained only an EPO, she was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to
subsection (5). The circuit court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on
this claim.
B. Retaliation Under KRS 383.300.
The Commission next argues that, even if Hurt was not entitled to
terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300(5), Anderson nevertheless retaliated
against her in violation of KRS 383.300(3). Specifically, the Commission
contends Anderson retaliated by refusing to release Hurt from her lease,
demanding payment of the remaining rent, threatening legal action, and advising
that the outstanding balance could negatively affect her credit.
-14-Subsection (3) prohibits a landlord from “terminat[ing], fail[ing] to
renew, refus[ing] to enter into, or otherwise retaliat[ing] in the renting or leasing of
a residence because of the person’s status as a protected tenant.” Thus, even
assuming Hurt qualified as a protected tenant for purposes of subsection (3), the
Commission was still required to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that Anderson engaged in retaliatory conduct prohibited by the
statute.
The Commission failed to do so. The principal conduct identified by
the Commission is Anderson’s refusal to release Hurt from the lease after she
presented an EPO. But as discussed above, KRS 383.300 did not entitle Hurt to
terminate her lease based on an EPO alone, and Hurt’s lease explicitly stated that it
did not include any early termination rights. Anderson’s insistence that Hurt
comply with the lease was based on its contractual rights under the lease and its
legal obligations under KRS 383.300. And Hurt did not produce any evidence that
Anderson responded to her early termination request any differently than it
responded to similar requests by its other tenants.
Likewise, the record establishes that the subsequent correspondence
from Property Manager Boyd and Collections Coordinator Morton demanding
payment of the remaining rent, offering a payment plan, advising Hurt of the
outstanding balance, and warning that ordinary collection remedies could follow
-15-was in conformity with Anderson’s standard operating practices for overdue or
unpaid rent.7
Ultimately, the Commission’s retaliation claim depends on the
premise that Anderson’s continued insistence on enforcement of the lease was
retaliatory simply because Hurt asserted statutory rights with which Anderson
disagreed. KRS 383.300(3) does not compel that conclusion. Because the
Commission failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Anderson retaliated against Hurt in the renting or leasing of the
residence because of her status as a protected tenant, the circuit court properly
entered summary judgment on this claim.
C. Retaliation Under KRS 344.280.
Finally, the Commission argues the circuit court erred in dismissing
its retaliation claim under KRS 344.280. KRS 344.280(1) provides, in relevant
part:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, or for two
(2) or more persons to conspire:
(a) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a
person because he has opposed a practice declared
unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a
charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
7
Although Anderson advised Hurt that failure to satisfy the debt could result in collection activity, the record does not indicate that Anderson immediately filed suit or imposed any penalties beyond those contemplated by the lease.
-16-participated in any manner in any investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter[.]
Id.
As the Commission correctly observes, a retaliation claim under KRS
344.280 is analytically distinct from the underlying discrimination claim. “[T]he
standard [for proving retaliation] is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the
underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint.” Asbury
University v. Powell, 486 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, a
plaintiff need not ultimately prevail on the underlying claim to maintain a
retaliation claim under KRS 344.280.
That principle, however, does not alter the outcome here. To establish
a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she engaged in a
protected activity, (2) she was disadvantaged by an act of [the defendant], and (3)
there was a causal connection between the [protected] activity and the
[defendant’s] act.” Kentucky Department of Corrections v. McCullough, 123
S.W.3d 130, 133-34 (Ky. 2003).
Even assuming Hurt engaged in protected activity by contacting the
Commission, filing a formal housing discrimination complaint against Anderson,
and participating in the Commission’s subsequent investigation, the Commission
failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
-17-Anderson thereafter subjected Hurt to a materially adverse action because of that
protected activity.
The Commission identifies no conduct by Anderson following Hurt’s
protected activity that differed in any meaningful respect from Anderson’s position
before that activity occurred. Immediately after Hurt vacated the apartment,
Property Manager Boyd advised Hurt that she remained liable under the lease
because Anderson did not believe KRS 383.300 authorized early termination based
upon an EPO. Property Manager Boyd simultaneously offered Hurt the
opportunity to satisfy the remaining balance through a payment plan. The
subsequent correspondence from Collections Coordinator Morton merely reiterated
that same position by requesting payment of the outstanding balance and advising
Hurt of the potential consequences of continued nonpayment. Those
communications were consistent with Anderson’s previously stated contractual
position; they did not reflect a new or different course of conduct undertaken in
response to Hurt’s protected activity.
Nor did the Commission present evidence that Anderson treated Hurt
differently from similarly situated tenants or otherwise departed from its ordinary
business practices in attempting to collect what it believed to be a lawful debt. The
record simply does not support a reasonable inference that Anderson’s collection
-18-efforts were motivated by Hurt’s protected activity rather than by its longstanding
position that Hurt remained contractually obligated under the lease.
The Commission emphasizes the temporal proximity between some of
Anderson’s collection correspondence and Hurt’s contacts with the Commission.
Temporal proximity, however, cannot alone create a genuine issue of material fact
where the challenged conduct merely continues a course of action that began
before the protected activity occurred. Montell v. Diversified Clinical Services,
Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 507 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that where the defendant merely
proceeds along lines previously contemplated before knowledge of the protected
activity, we cannot rely on temporal proximity as evidence of causality).
Here, Anderson consistently maintained—from its first
communication with Hurt after she vacated the apartment through the conclusion
of the parties’ correspondence—that Hurt remained liable under the lease. The
Commission has identified no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Anderson’s actions changed because Hurt sought relief from the
Commission.
Accordingly, although we reach the issue by somewhat different
reasoning than the circuit court, we likewise conclude that the Commission failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact on its retaliation claim under KRS
344.280. Summary judgment on this claim was therefore proper as well.
-19-IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit court correctly concluded that Hurt was not entitled to
terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300 and properly entered summary
judgment on the Commission’s remaining claims. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove Carroll M. Redford, III
Lexington, Kentucky Elizabeth C. Woodford
Lexington, Kentucky
-20-