TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00474-CV
Justin Charles Sprung, Appellant
v.
Cindy Araceli Velazquez, Appellee
FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-24-006496, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Justin Charles Sprung, appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s final decree of
divorce from Cindy Araceli Velazquez rendered after a bench trial. In four issues, Sprung
asserts that the trial court (1) erroneously denied him a jury trial; (2) abused its discretion by not
imposing restrictions on Velazquez’s ability to travel internationally with their child;
(3) deprived Sprung of a fair and impartial trial due to bias and prejudice; and (4) abused its
discretion in dividing the marital estate. We will affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sprung and Velazquez were married in October 2012 and are the parents of one
child, who was born in June 2014. In August 2024, Velazquez filed a petition for divorce on the
grounds of insupportability. Sprung filed a counter-petition for divorce in which he requested
that the court appoint him and Velazquez joint managing conservators of their child and designate Velazquez as the conservator with the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary
residence within Travis County. Sprung also requested that the court order Velazquez to pay
spousal maintenance and maintain medical and dental insurance for their child and order him to
pay child support in an amount less than the Texas Family Code guidelines. Sprung’s petition
also included his objection to “an associate judge hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a
jury trial.”
The court held a bench trial on May 21, 2025, after which the court pronounced
the parties divorced. The court held a hearing on a motion to enter a final decree of divorce on
June 30, 2025, and the final decree was signed on July 8, 2025. Sprung then perfected
this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Jury trial
In his first issue, Sprung asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and
violated his right to due process by denying him a jury trial. We review the “‘denial of a jury
demand for an abuse of discretion.’” In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019) (quoting
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996)). A trial court abuses
its discretion when a “decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding
principles.” Id. To perfect one’s right to a jury trial in a civil case, the rules require that a jury
demand be filed in writing within “a reasonable time before the date set for trial of the cause on
the non-jury docket, but not less than thirty days in advance.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 216. The Texas
Supreme Court has observed that “[s]ome courts have interpreted rule 216 more leniently, using
the 30-day deadline as the time at which the requestor takes on the burden of proving the
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reasonableness of the request.” In re A.L.M.-F. 593 S.W.3d at 280 n.56. A timely request is
presumptively reasonable and ordinarily must be granted absent evidence that granting the
request would “(1) injure the adverse party, (2) disrupt the court’s docket, or (3) impede the
ordinary handling of the court’s business.” Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 371 (Tex.
1991) (enumeration added) (“A request in advance of the thirty-day deadline [in civil procedure
rule 216] is [rebuttably] presumed to have been made a reasonable time before trial.”); Tex. R.
Civ. P. 216 (defining a “reasonable time” for a jury demand as “not less than thirty days in
advance” of a non-jury setting).
In the present case, Sprung argues that he filed a written demand for a jury trial
when he filed his counter-petition for divorce, which included an objection to “an associate judge
hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a jury trial.” But his objection to an associate judge
hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a jury trial does not constitute a demand for a jury
trial. The record reflects that Sprung first requested a jury trial during the bench trial after
Velazquez had rested and that this request was oral, not written. Thus, Sprung failed to perfect
his right to a jury trial. See Vardilos v. Vardilos, 219 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007,
no pet.) (right to jury trial in civil case is not self-executing and to invoke and perfect right to
jury trial in civil case party must first comply with requirements of rule 216).
Moreover, even if we were to consider Sprung’s oral request for a jury trial, we
could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request. The request
was made during the bench trial and after the petitioner had rested her case. Thus, there is
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evidence that granting the request would disrupt the court’s docket and impede the ordinary
handling of the court’s business. Halsell, 810 S.W.2d at 371. 1
Although he does not identify this complaint in his statement of appellate issues,
in his brief Sprung asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance of
the bench trial. At the commencement of the bench trial, Sprung made an oral request for a
continuance, stating: “I’m representing myself. I’ve not had adequate information from the
petitioner to fully basically ingest a fair hearing today.” The court denied the request. On
appeal, Sprung states that denying the request for a continuance deprived him of a “fundamental
right” to “have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present [his] case” and constituted an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of
discretion. D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Savannah Props. Assocs., L.P., 416 S.W.3d 217, 222 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). A motion for continuance must be in writing and state the
specific facts supporting the motion. Serrano v. Ryan’s Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560,
564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied). A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion
by denying an oral motion for continuance. In re J.P.-L., 592 S.W.3d 559, 575 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2019, pet. denied). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251 further requires that a motion for
continuance be verified or supported by an affidavit. Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. If a motion for
1 Sprung also asserts that the trial court erred by stating in the decree that he had “waived” his right to a jury trial. See Vardilos v. Vardilos, 219 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2007, no pet.) (perfected right to jury trial may be waived by party’s failure to act, such as by not objecting when court proceeds to trial without jury). Sprung never perfected his right to a jury trial and, consequently, it was not incorrect to state that he waived that right. Even if use of the term “waived” in this context were technically incorrect, however, any error would be harmless and would not constitute reversible error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (reversal of judgment on appeal requires that error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment”).
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continuance is not verified or supported by an affidavit, we will presume that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.
1986); Hitselberger v. Bakos, No. 05-21-00146-CV, 2022 WL 16735374, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court did not err in denying wife’s motion for
continuance because she did not support her motion with affidavit demonstrating sufficient cause
for continuance); Scroggins v. Scroggins, No. 09-21-00094-CV, 2022 WL 17841134, at *3 (Tx.
App.—Beaumont Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (motion for continuance denied when
husband failed to provide affidavit and did not set forth intended testimony, anticipated evidence,
or importance of evidence that would have been offered at trial).
Sprung’s oral motion for continuance met none of the requirements of Rule 251
and Sprung failed to provide the court with an explanation for his stated lack of preparedness for
trial. The court noted that the case had been pending for over a year. Sprung did not elaborate
on what information he had not been provided by Velasquez, nor did he attempt to show that he
had exercised due diligence in trying to obtain such information. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251, 252;
Humphrey v. Ahlschlager, 778 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (court
considers whether party requesting continuance exercised due diligence to obtain information
from witnesses). Sprung alluded to the fact that he was not represented by counsel, but absence
of counsel alone does not provide a basis for continuance of a case when called to trial. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 253. Whether a continuance should be granted is to be judged in light of facts before
the trial judge at the time the motion is presented. Aguilar v. LVDVD, L.C., No. 08-01-00328-CV,
2002 WL 1732520, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 25, 2002, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because
Sprung failed to comply with Rules 251 and 252 and did not provide the court with sufficient
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cause to grant a continuance, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Sprung’s oral, unverified motion for a continuance. We overrule Sprung’s first issue.
Restriction on international travel
In his second issue, Sprung argues that the court’s granting Velazquez the
exclusive right to designate their child’s residence without geographic limitation combined with
the right to apply for and possess their child’s passport “essentially gives [Velazquez] the
unilateral power to remove the child from the state or country without [Sprung’s] consent or
knowledge,” rendering him “powerless to prevent the international relocation.” We understand
Sprung to assert that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to place restrictions on
Velazquez’s ability to travel internationally with their child. 2
The Texas Family Code provides trial courts a statutory basis for determining the
risk of international abduction in certain cases and ordering preventive measures based on that
risk. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 153.501-.503. If there is credible evidence of a potential risk of
international abduction, the trial court must determine whether to take one or more of the
preventive measures described in section 153.503. See id. §§ 153.501(a), .503(1)-(8). In
determining whether to take any measures, the court shall consider (1) public policies described
in section 153.001(a) 3 and the best interest of the child under section 153.002; 4 (2) the risk of
2At trial, Sprung testified that he “was scared that [Velasquez] might take the daughter and go down to Mexico with her.”
3 Section 153.001 states that it is the public policy of the state to assure that children have frequent contact with parents who act in the best interest of the child; to provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and to encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after separation or divorce. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a) (1)-(3).
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international abduction based on the court’s evaluation of risk factors set out in section 153.502;
(3) any obstacles to locating, recovering, and returning the child if international abduction
occurs; and (4) the potential physical harm or psychological harm to the child if international
abduction occurs. Id. § 153.501(b)(1)-(4).
In determining the risk of international abduction under section 153.502, the trial
court is to engage in a two-step process: (1) determine if there is credible evidence of a risk of
abduction; (2) if so, evaluate the risk. Id. § 153.502. Subsection (a) provides a list of evidentiary
factors the court shall consider in determining whether there is a potential risk of abduction—
whether the parent (1) has taken, enticed away, kept, withheld, or concealed the child; (2) has
threatened to do so; (3) lacks financial reason to stay in the United States; (4) has recently
engaged in planning activities that could facilitate the removal of the child from the United
States; (5) has a history of domestic violence; or (6) has a criminal history or history of violating
court orders. Id. § 153.502(a)(1)-(6). An affirmative finding of one of the factors is sufficient
evidence for the court to proceed to the second step of considering the additional statutory
factors listed in subsection (b). See In re Sigmar, 270 S.W.3d 289, 299-300 (Tex. App.—Waco
2008, orig. proceeding) (observing that statute does not specify the number of factors on which
court must make affirmative findings and lists factors in disjunctive).
Subsection (b) of section 153.502 prescribes two mandatory factors for the court
to consider in evaluating the risk found to exist under subsection (a): whether the parent (1) has
strong familial, emotional, or cultural ties to another country, particularly one that is not a
4 Section 153.002 provides that the best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration in determining issues of conservatorship, possession, and access. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002.
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signatory to or compliant with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction; or (2) lacks strong ties to the United States, regardless of whether the parent is a
citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.502(b)(1), (2).
Subsection (c) sets out additional, discretionary factors the court may consider in evaluating the
risk. See id. § 153.502(c)(1)-(4). Section 153.503 authorizes certain measures that the court may
take if it finds preventive measures necessary under section 153.501.
As evidence to support his assertion that the trial court should have put
restrictions on Velazquez’s international travel with the child, Sprung points only to his having
“voiced a specific fear that the child could be taken to Mexico, [Velasquez’s] ‘home country.’”
Sprung’s own concern is not evidence falling into any category of the statutory factors the trial
court is to consider in determining whether there is credible evidence of a risk of abduction. The
evidence at trial was that Velazquez is a United States citizen; she has resided lawfully in the
United States for over a decade; she has maintained employment in the United States; and she
has travelled with the child to Mexico to visit family in the past and has always returned to the
United States. Because there was no evidence of any of the statutory factors that would support
a finding that there was a risk of child abduction, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
not imposing restrictions on Velazquez’s international travel with the child.
Denial of motion to clarify parentage
Although he does not identify this complaint in his statement of appellate issues,
in his brief Sprung asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights by denying a motion
to clarify parentage and a request for genetic testing that he filed after the bench trial was
completed and before the hearing on a motion to enter a final divorce decree. Sprung and
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Velazquez’s child was born during their marriage and, consequently, he is presumed to be the
child’s father. See Tex. Fam. Code § 160.204(a)(1) (man is presumed to be father of child if he
is married to mother of child and child is born during marriage). This presumption of paternity
may be rebutted only by (1) an adjudication of paternity under Texas Family Code Subchapter G
or (2) the filing of a valid denial of paternity by a presumed father in conjunction with the filing
by another person of a valid acknowledgement of paternity. Id. § 160.204(b)(1), (2). Here,
Sprung has not filed a valid denial of paternity in conjunction with another person’s filing a valid
acknowledgment of paternity. Nor has Sprung requested an adjudication of paternity under
Texas Family Code Subchapter G. See id. § 160.601 (providing that civil proceeding may be
maintained to adjudicate parentage of child and such proceeding is governed by Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure). A civil proceeding to adjudicate parentage of a child has specific procedural
and substantive requirements, including that it is commenced not later than the fourth
anniversary of the date of the child’s birth unless the court makes certain findings, id. § 160.607,
and that it be initiated by a petition with specific pleading requirements, id. § 160.6035. For
example, the petition in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage must include a statement indicating
whether protective orders are in effect. Id. § 160.6035(a)(1). Sprung’s motion to clarify
parentage does not meet the requirements of a petition that could initiate a civil proceeding to
adjudicate parentage of the child, and the court was not required to conduct any proceedings to
rebut the presumption of Sprung’s paternity. We overrule Sprung’s second appellate issue.
Impartial tribunal
In his third issue, Sprung asserts that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial
because the trial court exhibited personal bias against him and made “a series of prejudicial
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statements on the record.” Sprung argues that the court’s impartiality toward him was
demonstrated by the judge’s comments that he should “look in a mirror” when assigning blame
for his current circumstances; that his “drug use has a part in” his claim to have “lost
everything”; and that the court had “bent over backwards” for him yet he was still complaining
after getting “far more that [he] deserve[d].” Sprung also points to the court’s denial of his
motion for continuance and mid-trial request for a jury trial as evidence of bias and impartiality.
Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion, and opinions the judge forms during a trial do not necessitate recusal unless they display
a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. In re M.H.,
No. 05-22-00017-CV, 2022 WL 3135919, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 5, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving,
or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “Not establishing bias or partiality
. . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or even anger . . . . A judge’s
ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary
efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.” Id. at 555-56. In short, a trial court has
the inherent power to control the disposition of cases “with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Texas courts
have held that “the discretion vested in the trial court over the conduct of a trial is great.”
Schroeder v. Brandon, 172 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. 1943). A trial court has the authority to
express itself in exercising this broad discretion. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237,
240-41 (Tex. 2001). Further, “a trial court may properly intervene to maintain control in the
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courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it considers to be a waste of time.” Id.
at 241.
The court’s rulings on Sprung’s motion for a continuance and request for jury trial
do not constitute evidence of bias or impartiality, particularly in light of the fact that we have
reviewed those rulings and overruled Sprung’s challenges to them. After examining the judge’s
allegedly improper comments in the context of the entire record, we conclude there is no
evidence of judicial bias or hostility. The record indicates that the judge exercised her broad
discretion to maintain control and promote the expediency of the court proceedings. We
overrule Sprung’s third issue.
Division of marital estate
In his fourth issue, Sprung asserts that the trial court’s division of the marital
estate was not “just and right” as required by the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 7.001 (requiring court to order division of marital estate in manner court deems just and right,
having due regard for rights of each party and any children of marriage). Sprung argues that
“[t]he division was heavily skewed in favor of [Velazquez], as evidenced by her own Marital
Estate Spreadsheet.” At trial, Velazquez had requested that the marital estate be divided
70%/30% in her favor. Velazquez admitted into evidence a document titled “Marital Estate
Spreadsheet” including her proposed disposition of the marital assets, which allocates 74.91% of
the marital estate to Velazquez and 25.09% to Sprung. This document is the basis for Sprung’s
claim that the trial court’s division of the marital estate was not just and right. The trial court did
not, however, divide the estate in the manner Velazquez requested. Instead, at trial the court
informed Velazquez that it did not intend to make a 70/30 division. The court ultimately divided
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the marital estate 55%/45% in Velazquez’s favor. The court awarded Velazquez the marital
home and its associated debt; a vehicle and its associated debt; her brokerage accounts; and her
health savings account. The court awarded Sprung all cash and accounts in his possession;
$20,368.90 from Velazquez’s 401k retirement account; and all life insurance policies insuring
his life. Velazquez was ordered to pay a joint Internal Revenue Service tax bill in the amount of
$28,591.81 and was ordered to pay Sprung an equalization payment of $21,791.18 resulting from
the award of the marital home to Velazquez. Sprung does not state how this 55/45 split of the
marital estate does not constitute a just and right division, taking into account the rights of the
parties and of their child.
Sprung also argues that the division of the estate is not just and right because
there is no evidence in the record of the value of some of his own accounts; specifically, a
“Chime Banking” account and a “CashApp” account. At trial Velazquez explained that she was
aware that Sprung had these accounts but that he had not provided her with any information
about their balances and, therefore, did not assign a value to them in the Marital Estate
Spreadsheet. But these accounts were awarded to Sprung, so any value they have would serve
only to increase the percentage of the marital estate awarded to him. Sprung has not
demonstrated that the trial court’s division of the marital estate was an abuse of its discretion.
See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981) (trial court’s division of marital estate
will be reversed only on clear showing of abuse of discretion).
Finally, Sprung asserts that the final decree of divorce erroneously fails to dispose
of issues addressed in temporary orders, including temporary spousal maintenance Velazquez
was ordered to pay Sprung during the divorce proceedings; the division of employment bonuses
she might receive while the divorce was pending; and child support arrearages caused by
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Sprung’s failure to pay court-ordered child support during the divorce proceedings. But, in a
section titled “Resolution of Temporary Orders,” the decree expressly states that Velazquez and
Sprung are “discharged from all further liabilities and obligations imposed by the temporary
orders of this Court.” Thus, the decree does dispose of the issues included in the temporary
orders by discharging the parties of any liabilities and obligations those orders imposed. We
overrule Sprung’s fourth issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Sprung’s appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s
final decree of divorce.
Karin Crump, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump
Affirmed
Filed: August 4, 2026
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