[Cite as State v. King, 2026-Ohio-3176.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 26CA000005
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Cambridge Municipal
Court, Case No. CRB2500541
ADEN S. KING,
Judgment: Reversed and Remanded
Defendant - Appellant
Date of Judgment: August 17, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Craig R. Baldwin, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: William H. Ferguson (Cambridge Law Director), Cambridge, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; James S. Sweeney, Powell, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Aden King pled no-contest in the trial court to a misdemeanor
charge of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. That crime can be a “sexually oriented
offense” as that term is defined in R.C. 2950.01(A), but King’s offense would qualify for that
designation only if, in the words of R.C. 2950.01(A)(2), the minor with whom he had sexual
conduct “did not consent” to it.
{¶2} A minor who is less than 16 years old can never consent to sexual conduct, the
trial judge found, and so King’s offense — which took place with a minor who was several
months shy of age 16 — was necessarily, in the judge’s view, a sexually oriented offense.
King was therefore directed by the trial judge to comply with the sex-offender registration and
verification requirements that apply to Ohio sex offenders under R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶3} King argues here the trial court was mistaken in its view about the inability of
minors to consent to sexual conduct. We agree with King that the General Assembly’s “did not consent” language in R.C. 2950.01(A)(2) indicates that Ohio lawmakers believe that a
minor — even one under age 16 — can in fact consent to sexual conduct with another. For
that reason, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case with a directive that the
trial judge determine whether the minor in King’s case did or did not consent.
The Key Facts
{¶4} The R.C. 2907.04(A) criminal charge to which King pled no contest alleged
that King, when he was 19 years old, engaged in sexual conduct with a minor who was about
three years younger than he was. (The charge was a first-degree misdemeanor because King,
at the time of the alleged conduct, was, in the words of R.C. 2907.04(B)(2), “less than four
years older than the other person.”)
{¶5} After the trial judge accepted King’s plea and made a guilty finding, the judge
held a hearing to determine whether King should be required to register as a sex offender
under Ohio law. The judge heard testimony both from King and from the minor with whom
King had engaged in sexual conduct, but the judge then found that anyone under the age of
16 is “legally incapable of consenting” to that conduct. For that reason, the judge found that
R.C. 2950.01(A)(2)’s “did not consent” exception that might exempt an offender like King
from having to register as a sex offender could never apply to a case like his involving sexual
conduct with a minor under age 16, and the judge therefore ordered King to register as a tierI sex offender. King now appeals.
The Trial Court Should Have Determined Whether the Minor Did or Did Not Consent
{¶6} King argues here that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex
offender. Rather than concluding that no person under age 16 can consent to sexual conduct, the trial judge should, in King’s view, have weighed whether this particular minor did or did
not consent to the conduct. We agree.
{¶7} According to R.C. 2950.01(A)(2), the crime of unlawful sexual conduct is a
sexually oriented offense — and therefore one to which Ohio’s sex-offender registration and
verification requirements apply — if the offender was “less than four years older than the
other person” who engaged in the sexual conduct and if that other person “did not consent”
to that conduct. (That “other person” will always be at least 13 but less than 16 years old,
according to the elements of the offense that are spelled out in R.C. 2907.04(A), so any minor
who may or may not have consented to an alleged act of unlawful sexual conduct under the
statute will always be a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old.)
{¶8} The parties in this case agree that King was less than four years older than the
other person with whom he engaged in sexual conduct (and certainly the prior-conviction
language in R.C. 2907.04(B)(4) and R.C. 2950.01(A)(2) is not relevant in this case), so the
sole question for the trial court was whether that other person consented to the sexual conduct
alleged. The trial judge never resolved that question because the judge found that no person
under age 16 can consent to sexual conduct.
{¶9} That view was recently considered and rejected by the Second District in State
v. Halderman, 2026-Ohio-853, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.) (“R.C. 2950.01(A)(2) necessarily focuses on
whether the victim consented as a matter of fact”). We agree. As the Second District
explained in that case, “Every victim of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor is under age
16. If that fact made consent impossible, the consent inquiry in R.C. 2950.02(A)(2) would be
meaningless.” Id.
{¶10} R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(b) also supports our view that consent to sexual conduct by
what R.C. 2907.04(A) calls “the other person” is a factual inquiry and cannot be ruled out
just because that other person was under age 16. We say that because excluded from the
definition of the term “sex offender” under R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(b) is anyone convicted of a
sexually oriented offense if “the offense involves consensual sexual conduct,” if the victim of
the offense was at least 13 years old, and if the offender was not more than four years older
than that victim.
{¶11} In short, the R.C. 2907.04(A) crime at issue always involves an “other person”
who is at least 13 and less than 16 years old, and the General Assembly has called for trial
courts to treat offenders differently depending on whether that other person did or did not
consent to the sexual conduct at issue. Multiple courts agree that trial courts in cases like this
one must determine whether the 13-, 14-, or 15-year-old “other person” did or did not consent
to the sexual conduct in which that person and the offender engaged. See, e.g., State v. Metzger,
2011-Ohio-3749, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.) (“Without resolving whether [the victim] consented to the
sexual conduct . . . the trial court is unable to fulfill its obligation under the statute . . . if there
was no consent, the statute requires the classification of Tier 1 to be made. If there was
consent, appellee would be exempt from registering under R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(b)”); State v.
Meade, 2010-Ohio-2435, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.) (“Were we willing to accept the state’s argument,
the wording employed by the legislature in R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(b) would be rendered
nonsensical. . . . Had the legislature intended to limit victim consent to age 16, R.C.
2950.01(B)(2)(b) presumably would have been crafted to reflect such a limitation”).
{¶12} For these reasons, the trial court should have determined whether the minor
consented to the sexual conduct in which she engaged with King, and that determination in turn would then dictate whether King should be required to register as a sex offender. We
therefore reverse the trial court’s decision designating King as a tier-I sex offender, and we
remand the case to the trial court so the judge there can determine whether the minor in this
case did or did not consent to the conduct. Any court costs are waived.
By: Gormley, J.;
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.