[Cite as State v. Willey, 2026-Ohio-3177.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. CT2026-0017
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case
No. CR2025-0679
BRIAN WILLEY
Judgment: Affirmed/Reversed in Part and
Defendant - Appellant Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry: August 17, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Brian Willey, appeals his January 28, 2026 sentence
from the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court. Plaintiff-Appellee is State of Ohio. We
affirm/reverse the trial court in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On October 16, 2025, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted Willey on
two counts of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12 (Case No. CR2025-0661).
{¶ 3} On October 29, 2025, the Muskingum County Grand Jury reindicted Willey
on one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32, one
count of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13, two counts of burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.12, one count of grand theft (firearm) in violation of R.C. 2913.02, two counts of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, one count of having weapons while under
disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of
R.C. 2923.24, and one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12 (Case
No. CR2025-0679). Each of the burglary counts included one-year firearm specifications
under R.C. 2941.141.
{¶ 4} On November 26, 2025, Willey pled guilty to the two burglary counts including
the firearm specifications, the grand theft of a firearm count, one of the theft counts, and the
tampering count; the remaining counts and the indictment in Case No. CR2025-0661 were
dismissed. By entry filed December 2, 2025, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas. By entry
filed January 28, 2026, the trial court sentenced Willey to an aggregate term of ten years in
prison with eight of those years deemed mandatory time.
{¶ 5} Willey filed an appeal with the following assignments of error:
I
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE CONTRARY TO LAW
BY MATERIALLY MISCLASSIFYING MANDATORY PRISON TIME."
II
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES IN CONTRAVENTION OF R.C. §2929.14(C)(4)."
I
{¶ 8} In Willey's first assignment of error, he claims the trial court erred in
misclassifying mandatory prison time. We agree.
{¶ 9} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse or modify a sentence
"only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law."
State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. "Clear and convincing evidence" is that "which will
produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 10} In its January 28, 2026 entry, the trial court sentenced Willey to a mandatory
thirty-six-month sentence on each of the burglary counts (third degree) with a mandatory oneyear sentence on each of the firearm specifications, twenty-four months on the grand theft of
a firearm count (third degree), and thirty-six months on the tampering count (third degree).1
One of the burglary sentences and the tampering sentence were to be served concurrently, but
consecutively to all of the other sentences that were also ordered to be served consecutively,
for an aggregate term of ten years in prison. The trial court deemed eight of those years to be
mandatory time.
{¶ 11} Willey argues the only offenses that required mandatory prison time were the
two one-year firearm specifications and no other count carried a mandatory prison term under
R.C. 2929.13. Appellant's Brief at 6. Therefore, Willey argues under R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) and
State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, his sentence is contrary to law.
{¶ 12} R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires a mandatory sentence for "[a]ny offense, other than
a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, that is a felony, if the offender had a
firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing
the felony, with respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of
section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for having the firearm." The Supreme Court has held
The trial court elected not to sentence Willey to any prison time on the theft count, therefore 1
we will omit this count from our analysis.
that a trial court is required under the statute "to impose a prison sentence on an offender
convicted of a felony offense that has a corresponding firearm specification." Logan at ¶ 25.
Willey argues while the trial court was required to impose some prison time on the burglary
counts because a firearm specification was attached to each count, Logan does not transform
the prison term on the underlying offenses into mandatory time. Appellant's Brief at 6.
{¶ 13} In State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-2603, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.), this court conducted a
thorough analysis of the sentencing statutes and the Logan decision and held:
We therefore hold that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) does not require that a prison
term imposed on the underlying felony offense accompanying a firearm
specification carry mandatory status precluding reduction mechanisms under
Chapter 2967. Although Logan requires that a prison term to be imposed for
the underlying felony, it does not require that term be designated mandatory
within the meaning of R.C. 2929.01(X)(1). The limiting clause, "with respect
to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of section
2929.14 of the Revised Code for having the firearm," confines the nonreduction mandate of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) to the specification term. The
underlying felony sentence, while required to be a prison term by Logan, is not
thereby rendered mandatory.
{¶ 14} In its appellate brief at 3, the State basically concedes the issue by stating,
"[a]ppellee is unable to locate case law or statutory law to support the position of the trial
court with regard to 'mandatory' sentences" and we agree with this assessment.
{¶ 15} Upon review, we find the trial court erred in imposing eight years mandatory
when in actuality it is two years mandatory for the firearm specifications; we find Willey's
sentence is contrary to law. We remand the matter to the trial court for redetermination of
the mandatory status of the prison terms imposed on the underlying burglary offenses.
{¶ 16} Assignment of Error I is granted.
II
{¶ 17} In Willey's second assignment of error, he claims the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We disagree.
{¶ 18} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs consecutive sentences and states the following:
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the
court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was
under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple
offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for
any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by
the offender.
{¶ 19} As held by the Supreme Court: "In order to impose consecutive terms of
imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no
obligation to state reasons to support its findings." State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus.
Further, nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this court to independently weigh the
evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court "concerning
the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 [purposes and principles of felony
sentencing] and 2929.12 [seriousness and recidivism factors]." State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,
¶ 42.
{¶ 20} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the requisite findings for
consecutive sentencing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), stating (January 21, 2026 T. at 10-11):
And I do find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
public from future crime or to punish this Defendant and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the Defendant's
conduct and the danger the Defendant poses to the public.
At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more - - as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
or more of the multiple offenses committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct.
Also, the Defendant's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by
this offender.
{¶ 21} In the sentencing entry, the trial court noted, "consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the Defendant, and that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct,
and to the danger the Defendant poses to the public." Entry filed January 28, 2026. The trial
court stated, "[a]t least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses committed
was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part
of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the Defendant's
conduct." Id. The trial court further stated: "[t]he Defendant's history of criminal conduct
demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender." Id.
{¶ 22} As stated above, the trial court was not obligated to state its reasons in support
of its findings. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177.
{¶ 23} In sentencing Willey, the trial court acknowledged it received a presentence
investigation report and noted his prior criminal history. January 21, 2026 T. at 6-7. The
trial court stated it was imposing a "mandatory consecutive" sentence for the grand theft of a
firearm count, not mandatory time, but mandatory consecutive service, which we find to be
proper under R.C. 2929.14(C)(3). Id. at 8.
{¶ 24} Upon review, we find the trial court made the required findings at the
sentencing hearing for consecutive sentencing and incorporated its findings into its sentencing
entry, meeting the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶ 25} Assignment of Error II is denied.
{¶ 26} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part as to the consecutive service,
but reversed in part and remanded for redetermination of the mandatory status of the prison
terms imposed on the underlying burglary offenses.
{¶ 27} Costs to appellee.
By: King, P.J.
Montgomery, J. and
Popham, J. concur.