[Cite as Kent v. Brooker, 2026-Ohio-3165.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY
CITY OF KENT, OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-P-0085
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Municipal Court, Kent Division
LEE JOHN BROOKER,
Trial Court No. 2025 CRB 00771 K
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 17, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Hope L. Jones, The City of Kent, Ohio, Law Director, and Eric R. Fink, Assistant Law Director, 320 South Depeyster Street, Kent, OH 44240 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Lee John Brooker, pro se, 317 Wilson Avenue, Kent, OH 44240 (Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Lee John Brooker, pro se, appeals his minor-misdemeanor
conviction for disorderly conduct following a bench trial in the Portage County Municipal
Court, Kent Division.
{¶2} We construe Appellant’s brief as challenging (1) the trial court’s failure to
appoint legal counsel, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and
(3) the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
assignments of error, so construed, are without merit. First, Appellant was not entitled to
court-appointed counsel because he was charged with a minor misdemeanor and faced no possible jail time as a sentence. Second, Appellant’s conviction was supported by
sufficient evidence. The trial testimony, if believed, supported a finding that Appellant
engaged in at least “turbulent behavior” that “recklessly caused inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm to another.” Third, the guilty verdict is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Despite Appellant’s apparent disagreement with the witnesses’
testimony, the trial court found one or both of them to be credible, and there is no basis
to disturb that determination.
{¶4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court,
Kent Division.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} On June 26, 2025, Appellant and David Smicklevich were at Kent Social
Services in Kent, Ohio, for a free lunch. While Smicklevich was standing in line, Appellant
approached him and asked, “Did you read the law?” According to Appellant, his question
related to a prior incident between the two men from September 2024. Appellant
contends that he was riding his bicycle on the road, when Smicklevich “lean[ed]” on his
vehicle’s horn. Appellant lost control of his bicycle, hit the curb, and injured his hand.
{¶6} Smicklevich responded to Appellant’s query with a threat, stating that he
would “squeeze [Appellant’s] nuts until they pop.” Smicklevich subsequently left the line
and walked toward the front door to leave. Appellant followed and asked Smicklevich the
same question. Smicklevich turned around, head-butted Appellant, and left. Appellant
called the police and reported that Smicklevich had assaulted him. Smicklevich later
testified that Appellant’s behavior was “argumentative,” “aggressi[ve],” and “potentially
violent” and caused him “inconvenience,” “annoyance,” and “alarm.”
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{¶7} Officer Bolgrin of the City of Kent Police Department was dispatched to the
premises for a reported assault. Officer Bolgrin encountered Appellant in the parking lot,
who informed her that an individual named “Dave” had “head-butted” him and left the
premises. Officer Bolgrin also spoke with the staff, none of whom wanted to be involved,
but who indicated they were “inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed by the
circumstances.”
{¶8} Officer Bolgrin reviewed surveillance video of the incident. She later
testified that the video showed Appellant walk “straight up” to Smicklevich and
“immediately confront[]” him, at which time a “verbal argument” ensued that “persisted for
a few minutes.” Smicklevich then started walking out of the building. While Smicklevich
was in the front entryway, Appellant “chased him down” and “cornered him.” The video
then “cut[] out.” Officer Bolgrin described the two men as being “very close in proximately”
and “acting . . . in a very kind of aggressive manner towards each other.” Officer Bolgrin
also spoke with Smicklevich.
{¶9} On July 10, 2025, a complaint was filed in the Portage County Municipal
Court, Kent Division, charging Appellant with Disorderly Conduct, a minor misdemeanor
in violation of Kent Cod.Ord. 509.03(a)(1). Smicklevich was charged with the same
offense.
{¶10} On July 30, 2025, Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
{¶11} On November 13, 2025, Appellant’s and Smicklevich’s cases were tried to
the bench, with both men proceeding pro se. The City first tried Smicklevich’s case and
presented testimony from Appellant and Officer Bolgrin. The City next tried Appellant’s
case and presented testimony from Smicklevich and Officer Bolgrin. Following
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Appellant’s case, the trial court found both men guilty, sentenced both to a $25 fine and
court costs, and gave them 180 days to pay.
{¶12} On November 14, 2025, the trial court filed Appellant’s judgment of
conviction. On November 20, 2025, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry
correcting a clerical error.
{¶13} On November 26, 2025, Appellant timely appealed.
{¶14} Appellant’s brief does not set forth any assignments of error, as required.
See App.R. 16(A)(3). Instead, Appellant identifies 33 alleged errors in the trial transcript.
Appellant’s appeal is subject to dismissal due to his brief’s noncompliance with the rules
of court. See App.R. 12(A)(2); Eleventh Dist.Loc.R. 16(D). In the interests of justice,
however, we exercise our discretion to decide the appeal on its merits.
Appointment of Counsel
{¶15} Appellant argues that the trial court should have provided him with legal
counsel because he is indigent and the proceedings were “inherent[ly] unfair[ ]” based on
his lack of “legal education or experience.” We construe Appellant’s argument as
challenging the trial court’s failure to appoint him legal counsel.
{¶16} In Ohio, an individual charged with a minor misdemeanor, who faces no
possible jail time as a sentence, is not entitled to appointed counsel. Mentor v. Meyers,
2014-Ohio-2011, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). Appellant was charged with disorderly conduct in
violation of Kent Cod.Ord. 509.03(a)(1), which is a minor misdemeanor that is not
punishable by any jail time. See Kent Cod.Ord. 509.02(e)(1) and (2); 501.99(b)(1).
Therefore, the trial court was not required to appoint Appellant legal counsel.
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{¶17} Appellant’s first assignment of error, as construed by this Court, is without
merit.
Sufficiency/Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶18} Appellant also requests that we reverse the trial court’s judgment and find
him not guilty. He contends that he did nothing wrong, much less anything illegal. We
construe Appellant’s argument as challenging the sufficiency and the manifest weight of
the evidence.
{¶19} “‘“Sufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied
to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test
of adequacy.” Id. “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
{¶20} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court
is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that the
judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Thompkins at ¶ 24. “Weight of the
evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in
a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. Weight is not a question of
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mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Id.,
quoting Black’s. In considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, “‘[t]he [appellate] court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such
a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
“‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting Martin at
175.
{¶21} Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Kent Cod.Ord.
509.03(a)(1), which provides: “[1] [n]o person [2] shall recklessly cause inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm to another [3] by . . . [e]ngaging in fighting, in threatening harm to
persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior.”
{¶22} “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person perversely disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.
A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to
the consequences, the person perversely disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such circumstances are likely to exist.” Kent Cod.Ord. 501.08(c).
{¶23} In the context of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), i.e., Ohio’s identical disorderly-conduct
statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined “turbulent” as “tumultuous behavior or unruly
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conduct characterized by violent disturbance or commotion.” State v. Reeder, 18 Ohio
St.3d 25, 27 (1985).
{¶24} Appellant contends that he “merely asked [Smicklevich] a serious question,”
which was “entirely protected by [his] First Amendment right of Free Speech.” Appellant’s
argument implicates the third component of Kent Cod.Ord. 509.03(a)(1), i.e., whether he
“[e]ngag[ed] in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or
turbulent behavior.”
{¶25} Appellant presumes that he was convicted for making verbal statements.
“The United States Supreme Court has stated that no matter how rude, abusive,
offensive, derisive, vulgar, insulting, crude, profane or opprobrious spoken words may
seem to be their utterance may not be made a crime unless they are ‘fighting words’ as
defined by that tribunal.” State v. Hoffman, 57 Ohio St.2d 129, 131 (1979). However,
Kent Cod.Ord. 509.03(a)(1) “prohibits certain behavior.” Reeder at 26 (involving R.C.
2917.11(A)(1)).
{¶26} The trial evidence supports a finding that Appellant did more than merely
speak to Smicklevich. Specifically, Smicklevich testified that Appellant engaged in
behavior that was “argumentative,” “aggressi[ve],” and “potentially violent.” Similarly,
Officer Bolgrin, based on her review of the surveillance video, described Appellant’s
behavior as (1) “chas[ing]” and corner[ing]” Smicklevich, (2) “confront[ational],” (3)
“aggressive,” and (4) part of a “verbal argument.” This testimony, if believed, was
sufficient to establish that Appellant engaged in at least “turbulent behavior.”
{¶27} While Appellant disagrees with the witnesses’ testimony, the trial court
apparently found one or both of them to be credible. The Supreme Court of Ohio has
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explained that the trier of fact “is best able to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 80 (1984). Thus, the Court has held that “[t]he choice between credible witnesses
and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact[,] and an appellate court
may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio
St.3d 120, 123 (1986). This Court has explained that “[a] fact finder is free to believe all,
some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Fetty, 2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.). Upon review, we see no compelling basis to disturb the trial
court’s credibility determination.
{¶28} Accordingly, Appellant’s second and third assignments of error, as
construed by this Court, are without merit.
{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Municipal
Court, Kent Division, is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s assignments of error,
as construed by this court, are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court
that the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Kent Division, is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against Appellant.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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