[Cite as Schreiber v. Robsinson, 2026-Ohio-3169.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
VICTORIA SCHREIBER, CASE NO. 2026-L-0012
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division
ANDRE ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellee. Trial Court No. 2018 SE 01058
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 17, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded
Bradley Hull, IV, Cavitch, Familo & Durkin Co., L.P.A., 1300 East Ninth Street, 20th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Andre Robinson, pro se, 103 Columbia Street, Unit 4312, Augusta, GA, 30906
(Defendant-Appellee).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Victoria Schreiber (n.k.a. Victoria Hilditch), appeals the judgment
of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting in part and
overruling in part her objections to the magistrate’s decision regarding the child support
obligations of Appellee, Andre Robinsion (“Robinson”).
{¶2} Appellant raises four assignments of error, arguing that (1) Lake County Job
and Family Services (“LCJFS”) had no jurisdiction to modify the health insurance obligor
in the trial court’s prior child support order; (2) the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motions for a directed verdict; (3) the trial court erred by taxing costs to Appellant; and (4)
the trial court erred by making technical errors in its judgment entry.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
first and second assignments of error lack merit. Since the trial court did not modify the
health insurance obligor, any error involving LCJFS’s alleged lack of jurisdiction is moot
or harmless. Further, R.C. 3119.63 and 3119.73 expressly required LCJFS to consider
who should be the child’s health insurance obligor.
{¶4} Appellant’s third assignment of error has merit in part. The trial court
abused its discretion in assessing all costs of the action against Appellant. The court had
discretion to order Appellant to pay her own costs but not Robinson’s.
{¶5} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error also has merit in part. The trial court
abused its discretion by failing to correct two clerical mistakes in the record. The third
challenged item, however, involved a legal decision and could not be corrected as a
clerical mistake.
{¶6} Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and remand for further proceedings.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶7} The underlying matter began on August 28, 2018, when Appellant filed a
complaint against Robinson in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division. Appellant requested that Robinson be ordered to pay child support and
arrearage with respect to the parties’ minor child born in 2015.
{¶8} On April 22, 2019, the matter was tried to the magistrate. On June 20, 2019,
the trial court filed a child support order. Among other things, the trial court ordered
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Robinson to pay certain sums in child support and arrears, and Appellant was ordered to
continue providing health insurance for the child.
{¶9} Robinson filed motions in the trial court to modify his support obligations in
September 2019, April 2020, and October 2020. Robinson withdrew the first two motions.
The third motion was tried to the magistrate in October 2021. On December 13, 2021,
the trial court filed a judgment entry that modified the amounts of Robinson’s support
obligations. The judgment entry did not modify Appellant’s status as the health insurance
obligor.
{¶10} The proceedings underlying the instant appeal began in late 2024 or early
2025, when Robinson requested that LCJFS conduct an administrative review of the child
support order.
{¶11} On January 28, 2025, LCJFS issued an Administrative Adjustment
Recommendation pursuant to R.C. 3119.60 through 3119.71. Among other things,
LCJFS recommended that Robinson, instead of Appellant, be named as the health
insurance obligor.
{¶12} On February 11, 2025, Appellant filed a request for a hearing in the trial
court.
{¶13} The matter was tried to the magistrate on July 25, 2025, and October 10,
2025. At both the start and end of trial, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that CSEA did not have jurisdiction to modify the health insurance obligor in the
child support order. The magistrate denied Appellant’s motions.
{¶14} On October 16, 2025, the magistrate filed a decision. Among other things,
the magistrate found that it was not in the child’s best interest to change the health
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insurance obligor. On the same day, the trial court filed a judgment entry adopting the
magistrate’s decision. Both the magistrate’s decision and the judgment entry assessed
“[t]he cost of th[e] action” to Appellant to be paid within 30 days. On October 17, 2025,
the trial court issued a cost bill to Appellant in the amount $16.43.
{¶15} On October 31, 2025, Appellant filed preliminary objections to the
magistrate’s decision. Appellant objected to the following: (1) the magistrate’s denial of
her motions for a directed verdict; (2) the magistrate’s finding that LCJFS had jurisdiction
to recommend an administrative modification of the child support order; (3) the
magistrate’s finding that LCJFS could recommend an administrative modification of a
court child support order regarding which party is the health insurance obligor; (4) the
magistrate’s reduction of Robinson’s arrearage obligation from a 30% to a 20% rate of
collection; (5) the magistrate’s finding that Appellant pay all court costs; (6) the
magistrate’s finding that the matter was brought “pursuant to a Complaint and or Motion
regarding Objections to an Administrative Support Order”; and (7) the magistrate’s finding
that “Defendant made Motions for Direct Verdict.” (Emphasis added.).
{¶16} On December 30, 2025, Appellant filed supplemental objections and cited
portions of the trial transcript.
{¶17} On January 16, 2026, the trial court filed a judgment entry sustaining in part
and overruling in part Appellant’s objections. The trial court determined that “[a]s there
was no modification filed, the arrears shall continue to be collected at the 30% rate.” The
court overruled Appellant’s remaining objections.
{¶18} On January 27, 2026, the trial court scheduled a hearing on Appellant’s
failure to pay court costs.
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{¶19} On February 13 and 17, 2026, Appellant filed identical motions for sanctions
and attorney fees against Robinson for frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, which
the trial court denied on February 23, 2026.
{¶20} On February 13, 2026, Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s January
16, 2026 judgment entry.1
{¶21} On February 20, 2026, Appellant filed a motion to stay the hearing on her
failure to pay court costs, which the magistrate granted by order filed on February 23,
2026.
{¶22} On February 26, 2026, Appellant filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc judgment
entry, which the trial court denied the same day.
{¶23} Appellant raises four assignments of error. Appellee did not file an answer
brief.
Standard of Review
{¶24} Appellant’s assignments of error involve the trial court’s actions with respect
to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court’s judgment regarding whether to adopt, reject,
or modify a magistrate’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coliadis v. Holko
Enercon, Inc., 2016-Ohio-8522, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s
“‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler,
2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
LCJFS’s Jurisdiction
{¶25} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are related; therefore, we
review them together.
1. On July 29, 2026, this Court granted Appellant’s Amended Motion to Correct the Record to indicate that Appellant filed her notice of appeal and related documents on February 13, 2026.
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{¶26} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: “[LCJFS] Had No Jurisdiction to
Modify the Health Insurance Obligor.”
{¶27} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: “The Trial Court committed
reversible error in denying [Appellant’s] Motion for Directed Verdict.”
{¶28} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
finding that LCJFS, through its child support enforcement agency (“CSEA”), had
jurisdiction to modify the health insurance obligor in the trial court’s prior child support
order. In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
overruling her motion for a directed verdict based on LCJFS’s alleged lack of jurisdiction.
{¶29} Civ.R. 61 provides, in relevant part, that
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by
the court . . . is ground . . . for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
{¶30} Here, the trial court agreed with Appellant’s substantive position at trial and
did not modify the health insurance obligor in the child support order; therefore, any error
with respect to the denial of Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict is moot or harmless.
See Paul Davis Restoration of Cleveland Metro West v. Karaman, 2005-Ohio-4017, ¶ 37
(8th Dist.); Kluss v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 106 Ohio App.3d 528, 536 (8th Dist. 1995).
{¶31} Even if we reviewed the issue, however, Appellant’s argument would lack
merit. R.C. 3119.60 provides that a parent may request that CSEA review a “child support
order in accordance with the rules adopted pursuant to” R.C. 3119.76. The term “child
support order” in R.C. Ch. 3119 means “either a court child support order or an
administrative child support order.” R.C. 3119.01(B)(2).
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{¶32} R.C. 3119.63 sets forth the requirements for CSEA’s review of a “court child
support order.” Among other requirements, the statute requires CSEA to “[c]alculate a
revised child support computation worksheet and issue a child support recommendation
under the court child support order . . . .” R.C. 3119.63(A). R.C. 3119.73 provides that
“[i]n calculating a revised amount of child support to be paid” under R.C. 3119.63, CSEA
“shall consider,” among other factors, “[t]he appropriate person, whether it is the obligor,
obligee, or both, to be required to provide health insurance coverage for the” child. R.C.
3119.73(A)(1).
{¶33} Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, CSEA’s express statutory authority does
not conflict with the trial court’s authority under R.C. 3119.30. R.C. 3119.30(A) provides,
in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding in which a child support order is issued or
modified, the court, with respect to court child support orders, . . . shall
determine the person or persons responsible for the health care coverage
of the children subject to the child support order and shall include provisions
for the health care coverage of the children in the child support order.
{¶34} R.C. 3119.30(A) indicates that the trial court ultimately determines the
health insurance obligor. By contrast, CSEA is statutorily-required to “consider” who
should be the health insurance obligor and to issue a “child support recommendation.”
Therefore, we see no conflict.
{¶35} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are without merit.
Costs
{¶36} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Committed
Reversible Error in Taxing Court Costs to [Appellant].”
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{¶37} Appellant argues that she was the prevailing party; therefore, the trial court
should not have assessed her any costs. We agree with Appellant in part.
{¶38} Civ.R. 54(D) provides, “Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise directs.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Ohio has
explained that Civ.R. 54(D) “is not a grant of absolute right for court costs to be allowed
to the prevailing party . . . .” State ex rel. Gravill v. Fuerst, 24 Ohio St.3d 12, 13 (1986).
The Court has held that the phrase “‘unless the court otherwise directs’ grants the court
discretion to order that the prevailing party bear all or part of his or her own costs.” Vance
v. Roedersheimer, 1992-Ohio-24, ¶ 11. However, the phrase does not “empower[ ] the
court to award costs to a non-prevailing party.” Id.
{¶39} “‘Costs are generally defined as the statutory fees to which officers,
witnesses, jurors and others are entitled for their services in an action and which the
statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment.’” (Emphasis in original.)
Williamson v. Ameritech Corp., 1998-Ohio-347, ¶ 6, quoting Benda v. Fana, 10 Ohio St.2d
259 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶40} “A prevailing party is the party ‘who successfully prosecutes the action or
successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not necessarily
to the extent of his original contention. The one in whose favor the decision or verdict is
rendered and judgment entered.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Wigglesworth v. St. Joseph
Riverside Hosp., 143 Ohio App.3d 143, 150 (11th Dist. 2001), quoting Woyma v. Johnson,
1994 WL 638493 (11th Dist. Nov. 16, 1994).
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{¶41} As stated, the trial court assessed “the cost of th[e] action” to Appellant.
Although Appellant was the prevailing party, the trial court had discretion to order her to
pay her own costs. The trial court did not have discretion to award costs to Robinson.
However, it appears the trial court effectively did so by assessing costs solely against
Appellant. Accordingly, the trial court erred.
{¶42} Appellant’s third assignment of error has merit in part.
Technical Errors
{¶43} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Committed
Reversible Error in Making Technical Errors in its Judgment Entry.”
{¶44} Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to correct three
“technical” errors. Although Appellant’s assignment of error references the court’s
judgment entry, her argument focuses on the magistrate’s decision. First, Appellant
challenges the magistrate’s finding that the matter came before it “pursuant to a
complaint/motion regarding: . . . Objection to Administrative Support Order.” According
to Appellant, “[t]he matter was brought pursuant to an Administrative Appeal, Request for
an Administrative Adjustment Hearing, filed by Victoria Hilditch on February 11, 2025.”
Second, Appellant challenges the magistrate’s finding that “Defendant” (i.e., Robinson),
instead of Appellant, moved for a directed verdict at trial. As a third “technical” error,
Appellant challenges the following:
The finding of the Magistrate, upheld by the Trial Court, that the Court could
not or should not consider the increase in Father’s income, and that for this
to be modified, the parties must file a Motion to Modify or reach an
agreement. This juxtaposes with the Magistrate’s implicit finding that the
Court could and should consider (and even grant) a modification to Andre
Robinson’s JFS arrearage collection without the parties filing a Motion to
Modify or reach an agreement.
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{¶45} Civ.R. 60(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has
explained that “Civ.R. 60(A) permits a trial court, in its discretion, to correct clerical
mistakes which are apparent on the record, but does not authorize a trial court to make
substantive changes in judgments.” State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 1996-Ohio-340,
¶ 13. According to the Court, “[t]he term ‘clerical mistake’ refers to a mistake or omission,
mechanical in nature and apparent on the record which does not involve a legal decision
or judgment.” Id.
{¶46} We find that the first and second challenged items are clerical mistakes in
the record arising from oversight or omission. The trial court did not state any reasons for
overruling Appellant’s objection on this issue, and we see no valid reason why the record
should not be accurate. The third challenged item, however, does not qualify as a clerical
mistake; rather, it involved a legal decision.
{¶47} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error has merit in part.
Conclusion
{¶48} In sum, the trial court abused its discretion by assessing the costs of the
action solely to Appellant and by failing to correct two clerical errors in the record. On
remand, the trial court shall reassess the costs of the action in accordance with Ohio law
set forth above. The trial court shall also issue an order of correction indicating that (1)
the case came before the magistrate pursuant to Appellant’s request for a court hearing
filed on February 11, 2025, regarding the revised amount of child support calculated by
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CSEA, and (2) Appellant (i.e., Plaintiff or Victoria Hilditch) moved for a directed verdict at
trial.
{¶49} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, it is the judgment and order of
this Court that the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and that this matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Costs to be taxed equally against Appellant and Appellee.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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