[Cite as State v. Hitchcock, 2026-Ohio-3168.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-L-0011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
CORY A. HITCHCOCK,
Trial Court No. 2025 CR 000508
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 17, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor; Teri R. Daniel and Laurence D. Giegerich, Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Eric M. Levy, The Law Office of Schlachet and Levy, Terminal Tower, Suite 2200, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Cory A. Hitchcock, appeals his convictions for aggravated
possession of drugs, an accompanying major drug offender specification, and possession
of criminal tools following a jury trial in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} Appellant raises three assignments of error, arguing that (1) the trial court
erred by denying his motion for new appointed counsel; (2) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress; and (3) there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs
and the accompanying specification.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
assignments of error are without merit. First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Appellant’s request for new counsel. The record does not support the Appellant’s
assertion that there was a complete breakdown in communication between Appellant and
his appointed counsel. Second, Appellant has not established a reasonable probability
that a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle would have been
successful. There was no testimony indicting that Appellant was “lawfully” parked in the
driveway in which he left the vehicle before fleeing from police. Third, Appellant’s
conviction for aggravated possession of drugs was supported by sufficient evidence. This
Court reviews all evidence, including inadmissible evidence, in conducting a sufficiency
analysis. In addition, the definition of “bulk amount” utilized at trial is apparent from the
record.
{¶4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common
Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} On April 8, 2025, Deputy Gaylog of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office was
conducting traffic patrol in Painesville Township, Ohio. While traveling on Richmond
Road, Deputy Gaylog observed Appellant driving a white sedan and heard the vehicle
make an unusually loud noise from its exhaust. Deputy Gaylog initiated a traffic stop, at
which time Appellant turned into the driveway of a private residence, exited the vehicle,
and fled through the residence’s backyard. Deputy Gaylog ran after Appellant and caught
up to him. After engaging in a struggle, Deputy Gaylog took control of Appellant and held
him down on the ground until additional deputies arrived.
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{¶6} Deputy Vandervort assisted Deputy Gaylog in handcuffing Appellant and
escorting him to the backseat of a patrol vehicle, at which time the deputies were able to
identify Appellant. According to Deputy Gaylog, the vehicle Appellant had been driving
was registered to a female.
{¶7} Deputy Gaylog ordered a tow truck for the vehicle and searched it, which
he described as being “incident to an arrest.” Within the vehicle, Deputy Gaylog found a
zippered case containing a white crystal substance, yellow circular pills, and red and blue
circular pills; a fleece sack containing bags of a white crystal substance; a backpack
containing a crystal substance, a container, a gold scale with white powdery residue, a
black scale, and two iPhones. Based on his experience, Deputy Gaylog suspected that
the drugs were methamphetamine.
{¶8} Deputy Gaylog transported Appellant to the sheriff’s office, read him his
Miranda rights, and questioned him. Appellant stated that he had been living in the white
sedan for the past two months and that it was his primary mode of transportation.
Appellant confirmed that he fled the traffic stop due to the large amount of controlled
substances located in the vehicle. Appellant also stated that he bought the
methamphetamine two days prior in Cleveland for $2,100 and that he dealt the drug
throughout the Painesville area.
{¶9} Tyler Meader, a forensic analyst at the Lake County Crime Lab, tested the
suspected drugs. He determined that the substances contained methamphetamine and
that the scale contained methamphetamine and THC residue. According to Meader, the
“bulk amount” for methamphetamine set forth by the Ohio Board of Pharmacy is three
grams, and the total weight of the methamphetamine he tested was 397.79 grams.
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{¶10} On September 5, 2025, the Lake County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for
aggravated possession of drugs, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)
(count 1), and possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.24
(count 2). Count 1 alleged that Appellant knowingly possessed methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance, and that the amount exceeded 100 times the bulk
amount, to wit: 397.79 grams. Count 1 included a major drug offender specification
pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410.
{¶11} On October 7, 2025, Appellant, through appointed counsel, waived his right
to be present at his arraignment and entered not-guilty pleas.
{¶12} On December 11, 2025, Appellant sent correspondence to the trial court
indicating that appointed counsel was providing ineffective assistance. Appellant wrote
that he and counsel had had “multiple arguments” and that counsel would not file a
suppression motion. Appellant alleged that Deputy Gaylog violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by calling him by someone else’s name during his arrest. He further
wrote that it would be unfair for current counsel to continue to represent him.
{¶13} The trial court caused Appellant’s correspondence to be filed and scheduled
a hearing.
{¶14} On December 18, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s
correspondence. Appellant reiterated his written allegations. The trial court explained
that Appellant’s scenario did not present a Fourth Amendment violation and that counsel
is not permitted to file frivolous motions.
{¶15} One of Appellant’s attorneys next addressed the court. She stated that she
and co-counsel had a productive jail visit with Appellant on October 21 regarding
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discovery and that they told Appellant at that time it would be frivolous to file a motion to
suppress. Counsel attempted to visit Appellant on November 12, but Appellant denied
the visit. Since then, counsel had been “in constant contact” with Appellant through
“numerous letters.”
{¶16} The trial court informed Appellant that he had presented no grounds
indicating that appointed counsel were not doing their jobs and denied Appellant’s request
to appoint new counsel. Appellant then stated that he would “purchase a lawyer.” After
clarifying Appellant’s statement, the trial court instructed Appellant to tell “whoever it is
that you purchase” that the case was going to trial on January 6, i.e., in two-and-a-half
weeks, and would not be continued and that the plea deadline was December 23.
{¶17} Following the hearing, the trial court filed a judgment entry denying
Appellant’s request to appoint new counsel.
{¶18} On January 6, 2026, the matter was tried to a jury. The State presented
testimony from Deputy Vandervort, Deputy Gaylog, and Mr. Meader. As exhibits, the
State submitted numerous photographs, the suspected drugs, and the scales.
{¶19} Following the State’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for acquittal
pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court overruled. The defense rested without
presenting evidence and renewed its Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, which the trial court
overruled.
{¶20} On January 7, 2026, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The
jury also found that the weight of the methamphetamine was equal to or more than 100
times the bulk amount.
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{¶21} On January 8, 2026, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced
Appellant to a mandatory, indefinite prison term of 11 to 16.5 years on count 1 and 11
months in prison on count 2, to be served concurrently, for an aggregate prison term of
11 to 16.5 years.
{¶22} On January 12, 2026, the trial court filed the sentencing entry.
{¶23} On February 5, 2026, Appellant timely appealed and raises three
assignments of error.
Appointment of New Counsel
{¶24} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR NEW COUNSEL.”
{¶25} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
denying his request to appoint new counsel.
{¶26} A trial court’s decision denying a request for new counsel is reviewed under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Cowans, 1999-Ohio-250, ¶ 27.
{¶27} The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.” “The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that an indigent
criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to choose his court-appointed
attorney; rather, he is only entitled to competent legal representation.” State v. Sanders,
2008-Ohio-1126, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.); see State v. Murphy, 2001-Ohio-112, ¶ 50; Cowans at
¶ 27. “To discharge a court-appointed attorney, the defendant must show a breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right
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to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286 (1988),
paragraph four of the syllabus. The Court has “imposed an affirmative duty upon the trial
court to inquire, on the record, into a defendant’s complaints regarding the adequacy of
his appointed counsel.” State v. Keith, 1997-Ohio-367, ¶ 45. In particular, “[w]here,
during the course of his trial for a serious crime, an indigent accused questions the
effectiveness and adequacy of assigned counsel . . . , it is the duty of the trial judge to
inquire into the complaint and make such inquiry a part of the record.” State v. Deal, 17
Ohio St.2d 17 (1969), syllabus. “The trial judge may then require the trial to proceed with
assigned counsel participating if the complaint is not substantiated or is unreasonable.”
Id.
{¶28} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
request to appoint new counsel. On appeal, Appellant asserts that there was a “complete
and total” breakdown in communication between himself and counsel. However, the
record does not support that assertion. Counsel acknowledged having disagreements
with Appellant and that Appellant refused to permit counsel to visit him at the jail on one
occasion. Despite those challenges, counsel stated that they were in “constant contact”
with Appellant via “numerous letters.”
{¶29} Appellant also asserts that the trial court effectively prevented him from
retaining new counsel of his choice by stating that it would not continue the January 6 trial
date. The hearing transcript indicates that Appellant’s potential hiring of private counsel
was purely speculative. Appellant mentioned the possibility of “purchas[ing] a lawyer,”
explaining that he had “family members.” At the time of the hearing, however, Appellant
had not filed a motion for a continuance.
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{¶30} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶31} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: “APPELLANT RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL
FAILED TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ON APPELLANT’S BEHALF.”
{¶32} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress
the evidence discovered in the vehicle.
{¶33} “A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two components.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. Specifically, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness . . . considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688.
{¶34} “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. In other
words, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
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Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id.
{¶35} “‘[F]ailure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective
assistance of counsel.’” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 50 quoting Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). This Court has held that “[w]hen claiming ineffective
assistance due to failure to file or pursue a motion to suppress, an appellant must point
to evidence in the record showing there was a reasonable probability the result of trial
would have differed if the motion had been filed or pursued.” State v. Gaines, 2007-Ohio1375, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). “If case law indicates the motion would not have been granted,
then counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to prosecute it.” Id.
{¶36} Appellant acknowledges that allegedly being called the wrong name was a
“legally flawed” basis to support a motion to suppress evidence. However, he contends
that “the underlying facts of the search present a highly viable Fourth Amendment issue.”
In particular, he argues that the search of the vehicle was not legally valid as a search
subsequent to a lawful arrest or as an inventory search.
{¶37} “Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, subject to only a few
specific exceptions.” State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 15, citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 338 (2009). “Two such exceptions are a search incident to a lawful arrest and an
inventory search conducted pursuant to law enforcement's community-caretaking
function.” Id.
{¶38} Regarding the first exception, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained “[i]t
is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a law-enforcement officer to search
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a vehicle without a warrant when a recent occupant of the vehicle has been arrested and
(1) the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle or (2) it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense that led to the arrest.”
Id. at ¶ 16. Deputy Gaylog described his search of the vehicle as being incident to
Appellant’s arrest. Despite the deputy’s characterization, however, Appellant is correct
that there was no evidence establishing the above requirements other than the fact that
Appellant was arrested.
{¶39} Regarding the second exception, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained
that “[i]n the interest of public safety, as part of the community-caretaking function of
police, vehicles are frequently taken into police custody.” Leak at ¶ 20. “Examples of
vehicles taken into custody as part of law enforcement’s community-caretaking role
include those that have been in accidents, those that violate parking ordinances, those
that are stolen or abandoned, and those that cannot be lawfully driven.” (Emphasis
added.) Id.
{¶40} Appellant contends that an inventory search was impermissible because
the vehicle was “lawfully parked in a private driveway.” However, there was no evidence
at trial regarding who owned the driveway, much less that Appellant had the owner’s
permission to park there. Rather, Appellant’s statements to Deputy Gaylog after his arrest
indicate that he abandoned the vehicle in order to flee from police because of the large
amount of drugs contained therein. Therefore, Appellant has not established a
reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would have been successful.
{¶41} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶42} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: “THE STATE OF OHIO FAILED
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT FOR A CONVICTION IN COUNT ONE OF
THE INDICTMENT FOR AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF DRUGS
(METHAMPHETAMINE) IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2925.11(A), WITH A MAJOR DRUG
OFFENDER SPECIFICATION UNDER R.C. 2941.1410, IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶43} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues that the State presented
insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs and the
jury’s finding that he is a major drug offender.
{¶44} “‘“Sufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied
to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test
of adequacy.” Id. “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
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{¶45} Appellant was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs, a first-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). R.C. 2925.11(A) provides that “[n]o person shall
knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog.” R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(e) provides in relevant part:
(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the
following:
(1) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, mixture,
preparation, or substance included in schedule I or II, . . . whoever
violates division (A) of this section is guilty of aggravated possession
of drugs. The penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows:
(e) If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds one
hundred times the bulk amount, aggravated possession of
drugs is a felony of the first degree, the offender is a major
drug offender, and the court shall impose as a mandatory
prison term a maximum first degree felony mandatory prison
term.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶46} Appellant’s sufficiency argument is somewhat complicated. In essence,
Appellant argues that although Mr. Meader from the Lake County Crime Lab testified
regarding “[t]he precise quantity and aggregate weight” of the drugs seized from the
vehicle, the State failed to take the “requisite procedural step of qualifying Mr. Meader as
an expert witness pursuant to” Evid.R. 702. Therefore, he contends that Mr. Meader’s
testimony was inadmissible.
{¶47} Appellant did not object to the admissibility of Mr. Meader’s testimony at trial
nor does he assert plain error on appeal. In addition, “when conducting a sufficiency of
the evidence analysis, this court is to look at the actual evidence admitted at trial, both
admissible and inadmissible.” State v. Mansfield, 2008-Ohio-3989, ¶ 65 (11th Dist.).
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Therefore, even if Mr. Meader’s testimony was inadmissible, it would not require reversal
of his conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence.
{¶48} Alternatively, Appellant argues that Mr. Meader’s testimony was “factually
incomplete.” According to Appellant, Mr. Meader’s testimony failed to establish whether
the definition of “bulk amount” in R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(f) or in (D)(1)(g) applied. Those
provisions provide, in relevant part:
(D) “Bulk amount” of a controlled substance means any of the following:
(1) For any compound, mixture, preparation, or substance included
in schedule I, schedule II, or schedule III, . . . whichever of the
following is applicable:
(f) An amount equal to or exceeding one hundred twenty
grams or thirty times the maximum daily dose in the usual
dose range specified in a standard pharmaceutical reference
manual of a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance
that is or contains any amount of a schedule II stimulant that
is in a final dosage form manufactured by a person
authorized by the “Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,”
52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C.A. 301, as amended, and the
federal drug abuse control laws, as defined in section
3719.01 of the Revised Code, that is or contains any amount
of a schedule II depressant substance or a schedule II
hallucinogenic substance;
(g) An amount equal to or exceeding three grams of a
compound, mixture, preparation, or substance that is or
contains any amount of a schedule II stimulant, or any of its
salts or isomers, that is not in a final dosage form
manufactured by a person authorized by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the federal drug abuse control
laws.
{¶49} Thus, if the methamphetamine is in a final dosage form manufactured by a
person authorized to do so by federal law, its “bulk amount” is an amount equal to or in
excess of 120 grams “or thirty times the maximum daily dose in the usual dose range
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Case No. 2026-L-0011
specified in a standard pharmaceutical reference manual[.]” R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(f). If not,
its “bulk amount” is equal to or in excess of three grams. R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(g).
{¶50} This Court has explained that “the definition of ‘bulk amount’ under [R.C.]
2925.01 is a matter of law,” while “‘the questions of whether a substance seized from an
accused is a drug of abuse and whether it exceeds the bulk amount are questions of fact’
to which a competent expert is qualified to testify.” State v. Foster, 2005-Ohio-5281, ¶ 42
(11th Dist.), quoting State v. Montgomery, 17 Ohio App.3d 258, 260 (1st Dist. 1984).
{¶51} Here, the record demonstrates that the definition of “bulk amount” in R.C.
2925.01(D)(1)(g) was applicable. In particular, the indictment alleged that the amount of
methamphetamine that Appellant possessed exceeded “100 times the bulk amount, towit: 397.79 grams.” The trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he bulk amount of
methamphetamine is three grams.” Mr. Meader testified that the total weight of the
methamphetamine he tested was 397.79 grams, which exceeded 100 times the bulk
amount of three grams. See R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(e). Therefore, the State presented
sufficient evidence, if believed, to sustain Appellant’s conviction for aggravated
possession of drugs as a first-degree felony.
{¶52} The authority that Appellant cites is distinguishable. In State v. Williamson,
2010-Ohio-5060 (3d Dist.), the defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea to, among other charges, aggravated trafficking in drugs. See
id. at ¶ 1, 18. The defendant argued that the amount and form of the methamphetamine
that he sold constituted a lower degree felony rather than a second-degree felony. Id. at
¶ 20. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial, finding that “[t]he only evidence
before the trial court that described the methamphetamine was the lab report,” which did
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not indicate that the drugs were in “a final dosage form” under R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(f). Id.
at ¶ 23. Therefore, the defendant “failed to establish that his level of offense would have
been less than the level of offense for which he was charged.” Id. Given Williamson’s
procedural and factual differences to the present case, it does not support Appellant’s
sufficiency argument.
{¶53} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶54} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against Appellant.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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