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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 25-12478
ERNEST N. FINLEY, JR.,
JENNIFER M. REAVES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STEVEN L. REED,
in both his official and individual capacities, et al.,
Defendants,
THOMAS ALBRITTON,
CYNTHIA RAULSTON,
BYRON BUTLER,
in their individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12478
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00464-KKD-PBM
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER,
Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether two police officers
provided enough evidence for a jury to infer that state ethics officials fabricated evidence against them. Byron Butler, a special agent
for the Alabama Ethics Commission, and Cynthia Raulston, the
Commission’s general counsel, investigated allegations of misconduct within the Montgomery Police Department. The Commission found probable cause that Ernest Finley, the Chief of Police,
and Jennifer Reaves, the Deputy Chief of Operations, used public
resources to advance private “financial interest[s]” in connection
with a firearms assessment. ALA. CODE § 36-25-5(c)–(d). Finley and
Reaves then sued Butler, Raulston, and the executive director for
fabricating evidence during the investigation. The district court
granted summary judgment for the ethics officials. Because Finley
and Reaves failed to present substantial evidence of fabrication, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We describe the background of this appeal in three parts.
We first recount the events that occurred during the Department’s
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October 2020 firearms assessment. We next explain the Commission’s investigation of Finley and Reaves. We then describe the proceedings in the district court.
A. The October 2020 Assessment.
Ernest Finley became the Chief of Police of the Montgomery Police Department in 2015. He named Jennifer Reaves the Deputy Chief of Operations in 2020. Finley, Reaves, and all other members of the Department must maintain proficiency with firearms by
completing regular “[q]ualifications.”
Department policy 2.311 took effect in September 2012 and
required “[a]ll sworn police officers . . . to qualify with their assigned handgun . . . at least twice a calendar year.” The policy gave
officers two attempts “to shoot a qualifying score of no less than
76.” Officers who failed to qualify received one “Official Failure”
and had to attend remedial training before they could attempt to
qualify again. Official failures followed officers “throughout their
career” and came with accumulating financial penalties. For
“[t]hird and [s]ubsequent Official Failures,” officers received “[l]oss
of off-duty employment for six months,” “[l]oss of take-home vehicle privileges for six months,” and “[t]wo days [of] suspension with
an additional day for each additional Official Failure.” Four consecutive or eight cumulative official failures triggered termination.
Policy 3.2.4 purported to “[r]escind[]” policy 2.311 in June
2018. The new policy retained the requirements to achieve a qualifying score of 76 within two attempts and to attend remedial training upon failing. But policy 3.2.4 eliminated many of the financial
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12478
penalties under policy 2.311 and provided that prior qualification
failures would “roll off every 12-month period.” Policy 2.311 nevertheless remained “active” in the Department’s internal computer
system. A search for “firearms” in the system yielded policy 2.311
instead of policy 3.2.4. Several supervisors believed that policy
2.311 still controlled. And some supervisors continued to discipline
officers under policy 2.311.
The Department held handgun qualifications in October
2020. Sergeant Matthew Hoffman announced the qualifications in
a memorandum that specified that “[o]fficers who fail to qualify after two attempts must go to the . . . remedial [course] on Friday,
October 23.” After seven officers failed on October 19, Chief of
Staff Zedrick Dean emailed the supervisors to “remind any of
[their] personnel who failed qualifications [that they] will not be
able to work off-duty jobs until they clear remedial.” Dean’s reminder invoked the disciplinary penalties imposed by policy 2.311.
Reaves attempted to qualify on October 20 but failed for the
fourth time in her career. Under policy 2.311, her failure would
trigger a three-day suspension and restrict her vehicle privileges
and off-duty employment opportunities. Under policy 3.2.4, she
would only have to participate in a counseling discussion and attend remedial training.
The parties dispute what happened next. Some evidence
suggests that Reaves asked Finley for a third attempt. Other evidence suggests that Finley previously decided that “everybody deUSCA11 Case: 25-12478 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 5 of 14
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serves a third round” and applied that rule to Reaves when he discovered her failure. Whatever the sequence, Finley gave Reaves
another chance, and this time Reaves qualified. Confusion ensued
when other failing officers were not immediately given the same
opportunity.
Late on October 21, Captain Kedrick Miliner emailed all the
failing officers that Finley had approved third attempts for the following day. Finley later directed that no officers be disciplined for
failures that week. He also changed the policy for future qualifications by giving officers three attempts to achieve a minimum score
of 70. The Department implemented this change by amending
both policy 2.311 and policy 3.2.4.
B. The Commission’s Investigation.
Lieutenant Marcus Webster believed that Finley abused his
authority by changing the rules to accommodate Reaves. After reporting Finley to the civil investigations unit, Webster filed a complaint with the Alabama Ethics Commission, see ALA. CODE § 36-25-4(a)(7), alleging that Finley gave Reaves “special treatment” during the qualifications and “change[d] the standard to fit one person.” Webster attached documents in support, including the full
text of policy 2.311, the memorandum from Sergeant Hoffman,
and a disciplinary form for Officer J. C. Richardson. The disciplinary form stated that Richardson failed the October 2020 qualifications “in violation of departmental policy 2.311.”
The Commission assigned Special Agent Byron Butler to investigate Webster’s complaint. In January 2021, Butler asked City
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Attorney Stacy Bellinger to send him a copy of the Department
policies in place during the most recent qualifications. Bellinger forwarded two copies of policy 2.311 with effective dates in September 2012 and November 2020, respectively. Bellinger then called
Butler in April to explain that Lieutenant Raymond Carson, the Department’s “policy guy,” had noticed policy 3.2.4. She told Butler
that policy 3.2.4 technically rescinded policy 2.311 but stated that
the Department was “still operating under” policy 2.311 because “a
memo . . . went out from [Sergeant Hoffman] right before qualification . . . attach[ing]” it.
Bellinger later learned that Hoffman did not attach policy
2.311 to his memorandum. She assumed “incorrectly” that the documents went together because “[w]hen city investigations scanned
the information” from Webster’s complaint, it “scanned [the]
memo and the copy of policy 2.311 as one document.” But
Bellinger never advised Butler of her mistake.
Other conversations suggested that policy 2.311 still applied.
On April 16, Bellinger told Butler that the policy “remained active
in the system” and reiterated that it “w[as] attached to a memorandum sent out by the range master prior to [the] October . . . qualifications.” The same day, Webster told Butler that policy 2.311 was
“operating.” Webster also sent contemporaneous screenshots
showing the November 2020 version of policy 2.311 in the system.
Two days later, Butler asked Bellinger for any documents establishing that officers were “disciplined for being in violation of . . . policy
2.311 . . . from 2018 to present.” Bellinger responded with some
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disciplinary forms citing policy 2.311 and others citing policy 3.2.4.
The Richardson form that Webster attached to his complaint was
not among these materials. Nor was that form in Richardson’s personnel file. But Bellinger included an active form for Officer C. M.
Williams that cited policy 2.311 and had a counseling date of October 20, 2020.
Butler interviewed witnesses on May 11 and May 13. Cynthia Raulston, as general counsel, assisted Butler with the questioning. Butler and Raulston asked the witnesses about Hoffman’s
memorandum and, in some cases, represented that policy 2.311
was attached. They also presented witnesses with a redacted version of the Richardson form and erroneously stated that it was still
in his file.
Butler notified Finley and Reaves the next week that the
Commission “received a complaint alleging that [they] may have
violated the Alabama Ethics [Act].” Finley’s notice cited a provision
prohibiting public officials from using public resources “for the private benefit” of “any other person” in a manner that “would materially affect his or her financial interest.” Id. § 36-25-5(c). Reaves’s
notice cited a parallel provision prohibiting any person from “solicit[ing]” a public official for such a benefit. Id. § 36-25-5(d).
The Commission held a hearing on August 4 “to determine
whether [there was] probable cause” that Finley and Reaves committed ethics violations. Id. § 36-25-4(i). Butler and Raulston argued
that Reaves solicited, and Finley approved, the use of Department
resources to shoot a third time. They contended that the handgun
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qualifications affected Reaves’s financial interest because she could
face a three-day suspension and lose her take-home vehicle if Finley
applied policy 2.311 as written. Although Finley’s and Reaves’s attorneys had copies of policy 3.2.4, they elected not to dispute that
policy 2.311 remained in effect during the October 2020 qualifications.
The Commission found probable cause that Finley and
Reaves each committed an ethics violation. It publicly announced
its decision and referred the matter to the Attorney General of Alabama for review. See id. But the Attorney General determined that
Finley and Reaves were innocent. He stated that Butler and
Raulston used “false evidence” and “material misrepresentations of
fact” to mislead the Commission into finding probable cause. The
Commission conducted an internal investigation in response and
concluded that Butler and Raulston did not falsify evidence or
make any misrepresentations.
C. The Litigation.
Finley and Reaves sued Butler, Raulston, and Thomas Albritton, the Commission’s executive director. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They alleged that the ethics officials violated due process by
“us[ing] false evidence, false testimony, and material misrepresentations” to secure a finding of probable cause. They also brought
an equal-protection claim, a conspiracy claim, and claims under Alabama law.
The ethics officials moved for summary judgment and invoked qualified immunity. The district court entered judgment for
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25-12478 Opinion of the Court 9
the ethics officials on the federal claims and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether the ethics officials are entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See Marbut v.
Phillips, 176 F.4th 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026).
III. DISCUSSION
Public officials “acting within their discretionary authority”
enjoy qualified immunity from suit unless their conduct “violate[s]
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Stryker v. City
of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
Finley and Reaves do not dispute that the ethics officials acted
within their discretionary authority. And the ethics officials do not
dispute that fabricating evidence during an investigation violates
due process. We assume without deciding that the parties’ understanding of due process is correct. To the extent that fabrications
before an investigatory body can deprive a person of “life, liberty,
or property” under the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, the ethics officials are still entitled to summary judgment
because no reasonable jury could find that they fabricated evidence.
We begin with Albritton. Finley and Reaves argue that “Defendants” engaged in fabrication. But their briefing as to Albritton
states only that he “was present” for misconduct committed by
Butler and Raulston. We have long held that officials “in an investigative role” do not “violate clearly established law . . . by failing USCA11 Case: 25-12478 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 10 of 14
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to act in the face of knowledge that another offic[ial] ha[s] fabricated” evidence. Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1281
(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th
Cir. 1999)). So Albritton is entitled to qualified immunity.
Butler and Raulston also enjoy qualified immunity. Finley
and Reaves say that Butler and Raulston fabricated evidence by obscuring the rescission of policy 2.311, telling witnesses that Hoffman attached the policy to his memorandum, and presenting a redacted version of the Richardson form not in his file. But a reasonable jury could not find evidence of fabrication under any of these
theories.
Fabrication requires bad faith. When criminal defendants
seek relief for false evidence presented at trial, they must prove that
“the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony” or “failed to
correct what he subsequently learned was false.” United States v.
Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
“[H]onest mistakes” are insufficient. United States v. Al Jaberi, 97
F.4th 1310, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d
1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103,
1110 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th
Cir. 1981). Consistent with these precedents, examples of fabrication involve “evidence that was falsely created” with an intent “to
link the accused to a crime.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 841
(11th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247,
1253 (11th Cir. 1997) (planting drugs); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289–90
(manufacturing a boot print).
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Butler and Raulston had good-faith reasons to believe that
policy 2.311 remained effective even if policy 3.2.4 purported to rescind it. Cf. Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268,
1285 (11th Cir. 2025) (explaining that some policies are “official”
and others stem from “custom or practice” (citation modified)).
Dean invoked policy 2.311’s off-duty consequences in his October
2020 email. Webster cited the policy when he filed his November
2020 complaint. Bellinger told Butler multiple times that the policy
was still operational after the attempted rescission. Carson stated
that policy 2.311 was the “only thing you were going to get” upon
searching for “firearms” in the Department’s system. Screenshots
confirmed that it remained active in the system. And Finley approved an updated version labeled “2.311” that “[a]mend[ed]
2.311” following the 2020 qualifications without suggesting that
policy 3.2.4 had already superseded it.
Concessions during discovery also support Butler and
Raulston. Finley agreed at his deposition that “Butler had the right
to rely on anything that . . . Bellinger told him” about the applicable
policies. Finley’s attorney acknowledged that he was “personally
aware” that policy 3.2.4 purported to rescind policy 2.311 and chose
not to make a rescission argument because “certain people in the
Department believed that 2.311 was still in effect” and “2.311 was
amended in November of 2020.” Reaves’s attorney likewise testified that she knew about policy 3.2.4 yet never “argue[d] to the
Ethics Commission that 2.311 was [ineffective or that] . . . it had
been rescinded.”
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Finley and Reaves fare no better when it comes to Hoffman’s memorandum. Although Butler and Raulston erroneously
told multiple witnesses that Hoffman attached policy 2.311, their
statements reflected their honest belief. The file prepared by the
investigations unit compiled the “memo and the copy of policy
2.311 as one document.” Bellinger then told Butler during an April
2021 phone call and in a follow-up email the next day that Hoffman’s memorandum “attach[ed] th[e] policy.” These communications preceded the witness interviews by less than a month. And
Bellinger testified at her deposition that she never informed Butler
of her mistake. At least one other witness had the same mistaken
recollection as Bellinger. Another witness told Butler that it was
customary for Hoffman to send a memorandum and the policy before qualifications.
Nor did Butler and Raulston fabricate a disciplinary form.
To be sure, they presented a form for Officer Richardson to witnesses and the Commission that was not in his disciplinary file. But
no reasonable jury could find that they “falsely created” evidence
with a bad faith intent “to link [Finley] to” an ethics violation because Officer Williams had a similar form in his file. Rehberg, 611
F.3d at 841. Finley and Reaves attempt to downplay the Williams
form because it “was filed in error and later removed.” But the fact
remains that at least one officer who failed the October 2020 qualifications faced discipline under policy 2.311, which was the very
thing Butler and Raulerson were trying to establish with the Richardson form. And nothing in the record suggests that anyone had
removed Williams’s disciplinary form when Butler and Raulston
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spoke with witnesses or presented their case to the Commission.
To the contrary, Finley’s attorney acknowledged before the Commission that it was possible the Department had not yet retracted
all disciplinary forms relating to the October 2020 qualifications.
Finley and Reaves insist the mix-up with Richardson’s form
was no accident because Butler and Raulston redacted his name “to
make [the form] difficult to contradict.” But there could not have
been a contradiction because Butler and Raulston used the form to
make the general assertion that an unidentified officer had an active
disciplinary form. In the light of the Williams form, that assertion
was correct.
Finley and Reaves also rely on the Attorney General’s conclusions that Butler and Raulston made “material misrepresentations” and “rel[ied] upon demonstrably false evidence.” But the Attorney General had no opportunity to consider much of the evidence that establishes Butler’s and Raulston’s good faith.
Bellinger’s testimony about Hoffman’s memorandum, Finley’s testimony about Butler’s ability to rely on Bellinger, and counsel’s testimony about policy 2.311 all postdated the Attorney General’s report. These additions to the record amplify other evidence predating the report, including Dean’s email to supervisors, Bellinger’s
phone call with Butler, Carson’s statements about the Department’s system, and Williams’s disciplinary form. Finley and Reaves
cannot reach a jury by ignoring dispositive “evidence that was
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available to the district court at the time” it granted summary judgment. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir.
2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the ethics
officials.