[Cite as Gottschalk v. Kelley, 2026-Ohio-3159.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
NATALIE GOTTSCHALK,
CASE NO. 2-25-14
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES BRADFORD KELLEY,
ET AL., OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2025 CV 0087
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: August 17, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Natalie J. Gottschalk, Appellant
Lindsay M. Johnson and Meredith C. Turner-Woolley for Appellees
Case No. 2-25-14
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Natalie J. Gottschalk (“Natalie”) appeals the
judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial
court erred by granting the Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings filed
by defendants-appellees Charles Bradford Kelley (“Kelley”) and Huffman, Kelley,
& Brock, LLC. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is
reversed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} In 2017, Natalie’s ex-husband filed a motion to modify their parental
rights and responsibilities. This motion alleged that Natalie had gone on a vacation
with her fiancé, Craig Gottschalk (“Craig”), in Colorado and had purchased
marijuana for Craig’s son during this trip. These allegations were based on
representations from Craig’s ex-wife and Craig’s son.
{¶3} In January of 2018, Kelley began to represent Natalie in this matter
while he was working in the same law firm as Craig. In this process, Kelley had a
meeting with Craig’s ex-wife and Craig’s son. In February of 2018, Kelley gave
Craig a copy of a lengthy email that he had received from Craig’s ex-wife and that
contained criticisms of Natalie. Kelley continued to represent Natalie until this legal
matter was resolved on January 9, 2019.
-2-Case No. 2-25-14
{¶4} In 2021, the 134th General Assembly passed a statute of repose for legal
malpractice claims that read, in its relevant part, as follows:
(1) No action upon a legal malpractice claim . . . shall be commenced
more than four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
constituting the alleged basis of the legal malpractice claim.
(2) If an action upon a legal malpractice claim . . . is not commenced
within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
constituting the alleged basis of the claim, then, any action upon that
claim is barred.
R.C. 2305.117(B). After the Governor signed Senate Bill 13 into law, this provision
went into effect on June 16, 2021.
{¶5} In July of 2021, Craig took Natalie’s client file into his possession when
he left the law firm where had worked with Kelley. By this time, Craig and Natalie
were married. In August of 2024, Natalie went through her client file. After
reviewing its contents, Natalie sent an email to Kelley that alleged he had
improperly shared information with Craig’s ex-wife.
{¶6} On May 30, 2025, Natalie filed a complaint that named Kelley and his
former law firm as defendants. She raised claims of legal malpractice; invasion of
privacy; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On August 27, 2025, the
defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that
the one-year statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose for legal
malpractice claims barred the action filed by Natalie.
-3-Case No. 2-25-14
{¶7} On October 14, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry that found
the allegations in the pleadings left questions of fact as to when the statute of
limitations began to run in this case. However, the trial court found that the statute
of repose in R.C. 2305.117(B) operated to bar Natalie’s claims and granted the
defendants’ Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis.
Assignment of Error
{¶8} Natalie filed her notice of appeal on November 12, 2025 and raises the
following assignment of error:
The Court erred in granting Defendant-Appellee’s Motion to
Dismiss.
Natalie asserts that the application of the statute of repose to the claims in her case
violated Ohio’s constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws since Senate Bill 13
went into effect after the alleged acts of legal malpractice occurred in 2018.
Standard of Review
{¶9} A Civ.R. 12(C) motion “imposes a structural test: whether on their face
the pleadings foreclose the relief requested.” Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School
Dist., 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). As a result, courts may only consider the
contents of the pleadings in deciding a Civ.R. 12(C) motion. Smith v. Wal-Mart
Stores East, LP, 2019-Ohio-5037, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶10} “When presented with such a motion, a court must construe all the
material allegations of the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences
-4-Case No. 2-25-14
in favor of the non-moving party.” Provens v. Woodridge Place Apts., 2023-Ohio1388, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted
where the court “finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Reznickcheck v. N. Cent. Corr.
Inst., 2007-Ohio-6425, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.).
{¶11} In other words, the decision to grant a Civ.R. 12(C) motion “requires
a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious,
75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570 (1996). Thus, “the review of a decision to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) presents only questions of law. . . .” Rayess v.
Educ. Comm’n for Foreign Med. Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18.
{¶12} For this reason, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review
when examining a decision to grant a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Guilford v. Zaner, 2023-Ohio-2098, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). Under the de novo
standard of review, an appellate court does not give deference to the trial court’s
determination but conducts an independent evaluation of the relevant materials.
McCreary v. Taylor Cadillac, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2562, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.).
Legal Standard
{¶13} “A statute of limitations establishes ‘a time limit for suing in a civil
case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was
discovered).’” Wilson v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6827, ¶ 9, quoting Black’s Law
-5-Case No. 2-25-14
Dictionary 1707 (11th Ed. 2019). In contrast, “[a] statute of repose . . . bars ‘any
suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted . . . even if this
period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.’” Id., quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary at 1707. Thus, in applying a statute of repose, the focus of
the analysis will typically be the date of the defendant’s conduct. Id.
{¶14} However, this analysis has a different focus if the defendant’s conduct
occurred before the effective date of the relevant statute of repose because Article
II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution states that “[t]he general assembly shall have
no power to pass retroactive laws. . . .” This constitutional provision prohibits the
state legislature “from passing new laws that reach back in time and create new
burdens, deprivations, or impairments of vested rights.” Miller v. Hixson, 64 Ohio
St. 39, 51 (1901). A “vested right” is “one that is ‘fixed, settled, absolute, and not
contingent upon anything.’” Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2016-Ohio-7432,
¶ 28, quoting Rehor v. Case W. Res. Univ., 43 Ohio St.2d 224, 229 (1975).
{¶15} The constitutional limitations imposed by Article II, Section 28 do not
only address laws that were intended to apply retroactively but also
include a prohibition against laws which commenced on the date of
enactment and which operated in futuro, but which, in doing so,
divested rights, particularly property rights, which had been vested
anterior to the time of enactment of the laws.
Bd. of Trustees of the Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. v. Boyce, 2010-Ohio-6207, ¶ 14, quoting Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A
-6-Case No. 2-25-14
Basic Principle of Jurisprudence (1936), 20 Minn. L.Rev. 775, 781-782. As a result,
“a statute that applies prospectively may, through its operation, violate the
Retroactivity Clause if it destroys vested rights[.]” Taylor v. First Resolution Inv.
Corp., 2016-Ohio-3444, ¶ 55.
{¶16} Further, “accrued causes of action are vested, substantive rights.”
Ruther v. Kaiser, 2012-Ohio-5686, ¶ 29. Thus,
[p]ursuant to Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution, . . .
plaintiffs have a substantive right to bring their accrued actions and
that the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws prevents the
Ohio General Assembly from unreasonably taking that right away by
outlawing their claims.
Oaktree Condo. Ass’n v. Hallmark Bldg. Co., 2014-Ohio-1937, ¶ 10. However, “a
party need not be granted an unlimited amount of time to bring a vested cause of
action. . . .” Antoon at ¶ 28. While a vested right to sue
cannot be taken away altogether, it does not conclusively follow that
the time within which the right may be asserted and maintained may
not be limited to a shorter period than that which prevailed at the time
the right arose, provided such limitation still leaves the claimant a
reasonable time within which to enforce the right.
Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 54 (1972), quoting Smith v. New York
Central Rd. Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 48 (1930). See Antoon at ¶ 28; Taylor at ¶ 56.
{¶17} In determining whether a statute of repose can be applied retroactively
under the Ohio Constitution, a court must “determine when th[e] action accrued”
before determining whether the action was filed “within a reasonable time of its
accrual.” Oaktree Condo. Ass’n. at ¶ 10, 12. Under the general rule, “a claim
-7-Case No. 2-25-14
accrues when the wrongful act occurs.” Brust v. Kravitz, 2016-Ohio-7871, ¶ 21
(10th Dist.); Harris v. Reedus, 2015-Ohio-4962, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (“[A] cause of
action exists from the time the wrongful act is committed.”). See also Collins v.
Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 507 (1988).
{¶18} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that applying the statute
of limitations based upon this general rule could lead to unjust results if the injury
caused by the malpractice is not apparent at the time of the relevant act or omission.
Harris v. Liston, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 205-206 (1999); Oliver v. Kaiser Community
Health Found., 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 113 (1983). To address this issue, the Supreme
Court of Ohio enunciated the discovery rule:
an action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations
begins to run when there is a cognizable event whereby the client
discovers or should have discovered that his injury was related to his
attorney’s act or non-act and the client is put on notice of a need to
pursue his possible remedies against the attorney or when the
attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction or
undertaking terminates, whichever occurs later.
Smith v. Conley, 2006-Ohio-2035, ¶ 4, quoting Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter &
Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54 (1989), at syllabus. In the context of applying a statute
of repose retroactively under the Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that the date on which the discovery rule is triggered provides the reference
point for determining whether the cause of action was filed within a reasonable time.
Adams v. Sherk, 4 Ohio St.3d 37, 40 (1983).
-8-Case No. 2-25-14
Legal Analysis
{¶19} Natalie argues that the trial court unconstitutionally applied the statute
of repose for legal malpractice claims retroactively. In this case, the alleged act of
malpractice occurred in 2018; the statute of repose took effect in June of 2021;
possession of Natalie’s client file was transferred in July of 2021; Natalie reviewed
her client file in August of 2024; and the complaint was filed in May of 2025.
{¶20} In examining the applicability of the statute of limitations in its
judgment entry, the trial court found that the discovery rule could have potentially
been triggered (1) when possession of Natalie’s client file was transferred in July of
2021; (2) when another child support case arose in July of 2022; or (3) when Natalie
reviewed her client file in August of 2024. After concluding that factual issues
existed as to when the discovery rule was triggered, the trial court found that the
statute of limitations could not serve as a basis for granting the Civ.R. 12(C) motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
{¶21} The trial court then found that the statute of repose barred this action
because Natalie filed her complaint more than four years after the defendant’s
conduct. But in reaching this conclusion, the trial court failed to apply the analysis
that was required to determine whether the application of the statute of repose for
legal malpractice claims was unconstitutionally retroactive in this case.
{¶22} As noted previously, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
application of a statute of repose is not unconstitutionally retroactive if the claimant
-9-Case No. 2-25-14
had a reasonable time in which to file his or her claim. See Adams, 4 Ohio St.3d at
40; Oaktree, 2014-Ohio-1937, at ¶ 1, 12. In turn, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied
upon the discovery rule to provide the reference point for determining whether a
claim was filed within a reasonable time. Adams at 40.
{¶23} In the case presently before us, the trial court’s statute-of-limitations
analysis correctly concluded that the date on which the discovery rule was triggered
could not be discerned in the absence of further discovery. But the date on which
the discovery rule was triggered also provides the reference point for determining
whether the relevant statute of repose is unconstitutionally retroactive.
{¶24} Because the discovery rule cannot be applied without further
discovery, no determination can be made at this juncture as to whether Natalie had
a reasonable time in which to file this action. As a result, no determination can be
made at this juncture as to whether the application of the statute of repose for legal
malpractice claims in this case would be unconstitutionally retroactive.
{¶25} Since the trial court correctly found that the discovery rule could not
be applied at this stage of the proceedings, neither the statute of limitations nor the
statute of repose could serve as a basis for granting the Civ.R. 12(C) motion for
judgment on the pleadings under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the sole
assignment of error is sustained.
-10-Case No. 2-25-14
Conclusion
{¶26} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas is
reversed. This cause of action is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed
And Cause Remanded
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
-11-Case No. 2-25-14
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
sustained and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is reversed with costs assessed to Appellees for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
and for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
John R. Willamowski, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
DATED:
/hls
-12-